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Seaports play a significant role in global logistics networks, contributing to the 
efficiency of both national and international economic growth. Dramatic changes in the 
supply chain encourage ports to maintain effective integration when delivering services. 
Ports are thus parts of complex systems operating in uncertain operational environments. 
Accident investigation shows that there has been a significant increase in marine accidents 
contributed to by human error during marine pilotage operations. The human element has 
been identified as a major critical factor for most operational failures. Therefore, an 
adequate understanding of the key factors influencing pilot reliability plays a vital role in 
all high-risk industries, among which maritime operations are included. 
This study aims to develop a new quantitative marine pilot reliability assessment 
methodology, known as the Marine Pilot’s Reliability Index (MPRI). The MPRI seeks to 
help decision makers in identifying the effects of certain factors on pilot reliability. 
Although human reliability has been investigated in different disciplines, there is no 
consensus on the selected criteria. Therefore, in this study, the researcher employed a 
hybrid research approach, comprised of qualitative and quantitative approaches in a 
sequential exploratory approach to elicit the key factors that are considered dominant in 
maintaining the reliability of a marine port pilot. This was conducted through a series of 
investigation tools such as field observation, semi-structured focus-group interviews, and 
port pilotage accident data analysis. This step culminated in a composite of four main 
criteria with thirteen sub-factors, which pilots considered dominant to their reliability. 
These factors are arranged in a hierarchal order forming the new developed MPRI. 
To ensure the applicability of the identified MPRI factors, the researcher applied a 
Delphi technique in examining the degree of agreement among experts towards the 
identified MPRIs. Two rounds of questionnaires were conducted. The results obtained 
ii 
 
show a high degree of agreement among experts towards the identified factors. This is 
followed by the application of the analytical hierarchal process (AHP) approach to 
determine the relative weights of all identified criteria.  
The second approach, a new conceptual MPRI interdependency model is 
constructed using a hybrid approach of a fuzzy decision-making trial and evaluation 
laboratory (FDEMATEL) and an analytical network process (ANP). This hybrid approach 
helps to deal with inherent uncertainties and highlights the degree of interdependences in 
the developed MPRIs.  
To examine the feasibility of the proposed model and determine the outputs from 
this research, the researcher employed a fuzzy evidential reasoning (FER) for solving 
multiple criteria decision-making (MCDM) problems in conjunction with the 
aforementioned approaches to empirically assess the reliability of a marine pilot. The 
application of FER helps manage uncertainties resulting from the nature of operations. 
Three senior marine pilots have been assessed using the developed reliability assessment 
tool. The results reveal the novelty of this assessment tool in offering an effective and 
flexible reliability assessment and a diagnostic instrument for decision makers to predict a 
reduction in a pilot’s reliability. The developed model is partially validated using a 
sensitivity analysis. The novelty of this work offers a foundation towards assessing the 
reliability of marine pilotage operations using risk-based methodologies with variance 
techniques to facilitate the acquisition of qualitative and quantitative data and to ensure safe 
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1. Chapter one: Introduction 
 
 
1.1 Chapter summary 
This chapter presents the background of the research and an explanation of the principal 
research objectives and sub-objectives, which have been developed through a broad and 
comprehensive literature review. The justification of the research study is also addressed in order 
to identify the importance of the study based on industrial needs. A number of techniques and 
methods are highlighted in brief for consideration. Finally, the structure and scope of this research 
are outlined. 
 
1.2 Research background 
Seaports are vital to global logistics networks and economic growth. Dramatic changes 
in the supply chain in terms of ship size and economical competition encourage ports to 
maintain optimal integration in the services they host (Robinson, 2002; Mangan et al., 2008; 
Song and Panayides, 2008). Ports are thus parts of complex systems operating in an 
uncertain operational environment. Accordingly, the interests of different port stakeholders 
are in conflict due to the presence of uncertainty in operations (Notteboom and 
Winkelmans, 2003). To ensure an efficient relationship with key port stakeholders and 
secure their allegiance, port managers have increasingly relied on maintaining proper 
management practices (Dooms and Verbeke, 2007). 
In the literature, port performance measurement has been a point of interest for many 
scholars in the field over the past three decades (Ha et al., 2017). However, there is still a 
significant need for further investigation and industrial assessment to fill the gap in 
academic research on optimising port operational performance. Existing literature has 
focused on limited operational dimensions or specific areas of the port to measure 
performance. Furthermore, most of the identified factors affecting marine port operations 
– including pilotage services – are considered independently. It has been suggested that 
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port systems be highlighted collectively rather than independently (Board, 1994). The 
justification for this is that when a broad range of options is considered, the implementation 
process is usually fragmented and uncoordinated due to the absence of proper 
correspondence between economic objectives and safety aspects within the port. Therefore, 
developing an effective quantitative reliability assessment tool for a marine port pilotage 
operation is complicated by a lack of cohesion and wide variation within marine navigation 
and piloting systems. These variations occur in terms of port, waterway and working 
environments, vessel types, equipment used, operating characteristics, and professional 
qualifications. The interactions among these factors result in safety problems that defy a 
simple solution. 
Enhancing the safety of marine port pilotage operations requires a careful consideration 
of risks associated with such operations. One of the factors most commonly identified by 
scholars in measuring port performance is the human element, i.e., the human influence on 
operations (Zhang et al., 2013; John et al., 2014). 
The human element has been identified as a major critical factor in most operational 
failures (Barnett et al., 2006; Yee et al., 2005; Riahi, et al., 2013). The marine port pilotage 
operation is known as a complex and interdependent process in a large sociotechnical 
system that encompasses massive complex interactions between humans and equipment. 
Moreover, the pilotage operation is extremely reliant on human performance and is 
therefore subject to considerable diversity with great variability in operational conditions. 
Human error has been the cause of between 80 and 96 per cent of incidents with serious 
consequences reported by high-risk industries such as aviation, nuclear, maritime, and 
health care (O’Connor et al., 2002; Embrey, 1993; Reason, 1990; Kariuki and Lowe, 2007) 
(see chapter 2). It is essential to understand the influence of key factors on human reliability 
in high-risk industries, and the marine and maritime industry is no exception. 
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Operational safety has improved over the last several decades, yet other safety issues have 
been raised which suggest a need for further safety resolutions. Despite efforts to enhance 
marine safety, major shipping accidents continue to occur, and these accidents have 
occurred mainly during the ship/port interface (Hsu, 2012) under the guidance of a 
common human element: the marine pilot. Seaports have become the subject of worldwide 
attention, as handling different types and sizes of ships requires a high level of safety 
during a pilotage operation. Given the complexity of maritime operations during ship/port 
handling, marine pilots have a significant role in safe handling procedures (Douglas et al., 
1997). 
This research investigates the difficulties associated with human reliability assessment, 
especially in marine port pilotage operations (MPPOs). The research attempts to develop 
a novel quantitative marine pilotage reliability index (MPRIs) to enable port safety officers 
to monitor, control, and mitigate the risks resulting from the degradation of pilotage 
operators’ reliability. The questions this study raises to discover the significance of the 
topic include the following:  
- What are the main contributory factors that constitute human reliability within 
MPPOs? Are they independent or interdependent?  
- To what extent do these factors critically degrade MPPO?  
- Will the implemented research framework help to proactively assess reliability? 
 
1.3 Research aim and objectives 
This research aims to develop a novel marine pilot reliability index (MPRIs) to assess 
the reliability of marine port pilotage operations. This research seeks to allow decision-
makers to predict, mitigate, and implement operational procedures to enhance the 
reliability of MPPOs’ to ensure higher operational safety. In order to accomplish this 
research aim, this study addresses the following main research objectives: 
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1- To comprehensively review previous efforts to monitor human reliability across 
different disciplines – including maritime operations – to highlight the risks 
associated with reliability degradation and identify the research gap that needs to 
be filled. 
2- To identify and analyse the key factors that shape marine pilot reliability based on 
the current operational practices to build a rational index that is capable of being 
used by decision makers, especially within MPPOs. 
3- To examine the degree of consensus among experts on the selected factors and 
highlight the degree of importance of each criterion towards shaping the reliability 
of marine pilots.  
4- To develop an effective method to analyse the degree of interactions among the 
identified factors to enable decision makers to predict the possibility of reliability 
fluctuations. 
5- To develop an effective systematic quantitative human reliability measurement tool 
to allow decision makers to improve the overall reliability of MPPOs. 
6- To conduct a real case study in one of selected marine port to assess the reliability 
of a marine port pilot and test the validity of the proposed model.  
The achievement of the highlighted objectives are outlined across chapters 2, 3, 4, 5, 





Figure 1.1. Reliability assessment framework 
 
The first objective is addressed within chapter two. The development of the MPRIs is 
achieved through a field investigation to understand the current operational working 
practices and qualitative elucidation of more in-depth information from experts about their 
concerns. This is illustrated in chapter 3. The degree of consensus among experts was 
examined holistically. Newly developed reliability shaping factors were examined by two 
rounds of Delphi surveys. This was followed by ranking the degree of importance using 
the AHP method, and this is featured in chapter 4. Moreover, the identified factors were 
believed to be interdependent. Therefore, they were examined using the fuzzy decision-
making trial and evaluation laboratory (FDEMATEL) to identify the cause and effect 
factors.  This was followed by identifying the global weight using analytical network 
process (ANP), and this is illustrated in chapter 5. Finally, featured in chapter 6, a marine 
pilot reliability assessment was conducted using a fuzzy evidential reasoning (FER) in 
conjunction with the aforementioned approaches through assessing three senior marine 





1.4 Structure of Thesis 
This research is outlined through seven chapters, as shown in Figure 1.2. 
 
 
Figure 1.2. Thesis outlines 
 
These chapters are briefly described as follows: 
Chapter 1 This chapter begins with the initiatives of this research. The research aim 
and objectives were highlighted followed by an explanation of the importance and 
justification of conducting this research. Finally, the chapter provides brief descriptions for 
each process conducted in the study to outline the research process. 
 
Chapter 2 This chapter presents the current literature related to the maritime industry, 
aiming to highlight the current research conducted in port and operational performance. It 
also seeks to identify the current research gap that needs to be filled. In addition, this 
chapter gives an overview of other research, which assessed human performance in order 
to build an overview on the current investigated factors. Several relevant books, journals, 
conference papers, tutorials, and reports are reviewed to build an effective approach 
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towards developing the research model. This chapter provides an essential picture of 
different perspectives towards the human element and the way it can be assessed. Finally, 
this chapter contributes significantly towards developing the survey and identifying the 
analysis tools required to achieve the aim of this research. 
 
Chapter 3 A field investigation was conducted for the purpose of this chapter in a major 
marine port to highlight the current organisational working practices in the maritime 
industry. This chapter aims to develop and examine the effectiveness and the suitability of 
the identified factors highlighted across different industries within marine port pilotage 
operations. Qualitative sequential exploratory research paradigms were used via employing 
field observation, semi-structured focus-grouped interviews, and port accidents data 
analysis in order to justify the factors which shape reliability. The proposed research MPRIs 
were developed as a result of this chapter.  
 
Chapter 4 The developed MPRIs from the previous chapter are tested in this chapter in 
terms of expert agreement on the selected criteria. Two rounds of questionnaires follow the 
main features of the Delphi technique to obtain the most desired factors. Following the 
confirmation process from the second round, a pairwise comparison based on the AHP 
approach was conducted to highlight the degree of importance given to each local criterion 
on the developed model. The significance of this step is to highlight the degree of influence 
that factors play in shaping operator reliability. 
 
Chapter 5 In this chapter, and following the discussion within the conducted interviews, 
it is considered crucial to highlight the degree of interdependencies among the identified 
factors. The links between factors are observed, which necessitate the use of a more suitable 
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approach that is capable of discovering the degree of influence between factors. Therefore, 
a proposed FDEMATEL approach aims to highlight the cause and effect factors that 
significantly provoke fluctuations in overall reliability. The identified factors were then 
tested by a non-linear pairwise comparison employing the ANP approach to identify the 
degree of influence among criteria within the MPRIs. As a result of the work explained in 
this chapter, the global weight of each identified MPRI was found. 
 
Chapter 6 This chapter examines the feasibility of the proposed MPRIs by assessing 
the reliability of three senior marine port pilots with considerable pilotage working 
experience within the port industry. The empirical investigation took place in a major port, 
employing the results obtained from chapters 3, 4, and 5 in conjunction with the application 
of the fuzzy evidential reasoning (FER) approach. The developed model was then tested 
using a sensitivity analysis. The chapter concludes with the suitability of the proposed 
model in assessing the reliability of a marine port pilot, which therefore achieves the aim 
of this research. 
 
Chapter 7 This chapter describes the overall observations and the results obtained from 
all chapters. This chapter also highlights the drawbacks and challenges faced during this 
investigation. The research contributions are explained in detail, and recommendations are 
provided on considerations for further future investigations. 
The references and appendices, which include some essential data that cannot be included 




2. Chapter Two: Literature review 
 
2.1 Chapter summary 
This chapter reviews the current literature related to the objective of this research. An overview 
of the significant marine pilotage operations is followed by an identification of the main cause of 
marine accidents. Historical data for marine failures is highlighted to show the significant need to 
enhance the reliability of marine operators. This is followed by overviewing other industrial efforts 
to develop the reliability of operators in order to develop a marine pilot reliability index. 
 
2.2 Introduction 
During the century preceding this research, the world’s economy grew significantly, 
and 80 per cent of the world’s goods by volume are transported by sea through ports. This 
increase has seen a subsequent increase in marine accidents within the last century, and 
accident investigations show that these accidents mainly occur within the confines of the 
seaport (Oltedal and McArthur, 2011; Bukhari et al., 2013). A total of 1,383 merchant 
shipping accidents occurred within UK port areas between 2001 and 2011, where human 
error constitutes 51 per cent of the total number of accidents that occurred during that time 
(MAIB, 2016). Thus, seaports have become the subject of increasing attention in the UK 
and worldwide, as handling different types and sizes of ships requires a high level of safety 
during pilotage operations. However, with the complexity of the maritime operations 
during ship/port handling, marine pilots make a significant contribution to safe handling 
procedures (Douglas et al., 1997). The main role of marine pilots is to ensure a vessel’s 
safety while navigating within a port’s limits in compliance with local regulations and to 
protect the port’s facilities, trade, and environment (Darbra et al., 2007). Therefore, the 
maritime industry, as any high-risk industry, is driven by the human element (Rothblum, 
2000). Thus, accidents are mostly caused by human errors (Riahi et al., 2012). 
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According to DNV (2002), humans are the main cause of most maritime accidents. 
Human error constitutes 80-96 per cent of reported accidents in most critical industries 
(Barnett et al., 2006; Yee et al., 2005; Riahi, et al., 2013; O’Connor et al., 2002; Embrey, 
1993; Reason, 1990; Kariuki and Lowe, 2007; Ren et al., 2008; Helmreich et al., 1999). 
According to Hollnagel and Amalberti (2001), the term ‘human error’ has different 
meanings, including human error as a cause, as an event, and as a consequence. Reason 
(1990) attempted to stipulate a generic term for human error as the failure of a planned 
sequence of mental or physical activities to accomplish its planned outcome when this 
failure cannot be attributed to the involvement of organisational assistance. He added that 
the problem of human error can be divided into two different approaches: personal and 
organisational. The personal approach is linked to individual errors, whereas the 
organisational approach is linked to the surrounding environment in which the operator 
works (Reason, 2000). Errors caused by humans can be the result of operational failure, 
poor management, and deficiency in scheduled maintenance or system design (Chauvin et 
al., 2013). Human error could be the result of an accumulated latent management failure 
over time left without proper action. For this reason, researchers interested in human 
reliability analysis (HRA) use the term ‘human failure event’ rather than generalising it 
into human error. This is done to avoid implications that result from blame during incident 
or accident investigations. 
Human reliability (HR) varies both in its definition and in the way it can be assessed. 
According to Swain and Guttmann (1983), HR is known as the probability of an operator 
to perform actions in accordance with a system’s demand and plan without conducting any 
unnecessary actions that can impact overall operational performance. Studies show that 
personal issues can influence human performance and behaviour, which leads to marine 
accidents or incidents (Ramin, 2010). Moreover, as mentioned above, any tool that helps 
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to assess HR is called human reliability analysis (HRA) (Swain, 1990). HRA is helpful in 
risk assessment, as it uses methods derived from engineering systems and human 
psychology to highlight the degree of human contribution to a risk. Therefore, HRA 
includes a number of methods aiming to trace the causation of a human failure and to 
evaluate the likelihood of its occurrence (Pyy, 2000). 
Accordingly, this study aims to develop an assessment tool with the capacity to assess 
the reliability of marine pilots during pilotage operations, which is achieved by 
investigating empirical data on existing pilotage practices. The following section presents 
an overview of port pilotage operations, which is followed by a section that presents 
historical failure data and a statistical analysis. The section also highlights the causes of 
marine accidents and pilotage hazards. The paper then presents an overview of the current 
efforts and progression of the HRA. Finally, a highlight of the factors that shape human 
performance across different industries is presented. 
 
2.3 Port pilotage operations 
Ships have been guided by marine pilots with local knowledge for centuries when 
entering or leaving ports. The significant role that pilots play has been recognised by the 
International Maritime Organisation (IMO) since 1968, when it adopted the assembly 
resolution A.159 (ES.IV) ‘recommendation on pilotage’. The resolution stated that it is 
important to employ a qualified pilot in a port’s approaches and other port areas where local 
knowledge of the port, language, and regulations is required (IMO, 2016). This resolution 
recommends that the port authority controlling pilotage operations must provide a high 
standard of pilotage service by defining the most appropriate safety measures, ships, and 
classes of ships that are mandatory to be piloted by an official designated pilot (IMO, 2016). 
A pilot with local knowledge is an expert in the area, able to recognise hazards to 
navigation and establish an effective method of communication with shore authorities and 
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tugs using local language, especially when a shipmaster is unfamiliar with the area. 
Therefore, in 2003, the recommendations on training, certification, and operational 
procedures for maritime pilots other than deep-sea pilots were adopted by the IMO under 
the resolution A.960 (23). Through this resolution, the IMO highlighted the significant role 
that pilots play in promoting maritime safety and protecting the environment. However, the 
degree of influence of other players involved in pilotage operations – such as shipmasters, 
tug masters, harbour masters, and VTS operators – is out of the scope of this study, and 
requires further investigation. Moreover, the IMO is not willing to become involved in 
setting pilots’ certification standards or licencing, because each pilotage area requires 
highly specialised experience and local knowledge on the part of the pilot (Board, 1994; 
IMPA, 2004). Therefore, port authorities have both statutory and non-statutory powers, 
which allow a port authority to state the minimum requirements and qualifications needed 
to assign a designated person to safely berth and un-berth ships calling at that port (IMPA, 
2004). 
In the United Kingdom, the Port Marine Safety Code (PMSC) is the code that, 
according to the Department for Transport (DfT) (2015, p. 6), refers to ‘some of existing 
legal duties and powers that affect harbour authorities in relation to marine safety, but it 
does not – in itself – create any new legal duties for harbour authorities’. This code was 
proposed mainly for a designated person who is responsible for the safety of marine 
operations in her/his waters and approaches, who is called the ‘duty holder’ or ‘harbour 
board’. The role of harbour board members is to regard themselves, either individually or 
collectively, responsible for maintaining the code’s standards through the following 
procedures (PMSC, 2015, p. 8): 
1- Review and be aware of their existing powers based on local and national legislation; 
2- Comply with the duties and powers under existing legislation, as appropriate;  
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3- Ensure all risks are formally assessed and as low as reasonably practicable in 
accordance with good practice;  
4- Operate an effective marine safety management system (SMS) which has been 
developed after consultation and uses formal risk assessment;  
5- Use competent people (i.e. trained, qualified, and experienced) in positions of 
responsibility for navigation safety;   
6- Monitor, review and audit the marine SMS on a regular basis – an independent 
designated person has a key role in providing assurance for the duty holder;  
7- Publish a safety plan showing how the standard in the Code will be met and a report 
assessing the performance against the plan; and  
8- Comply with directions from the General Lighthouse Authorities and supply 
information & returns as required.  
In addition, harbour authorities should seek additional powers if the existing powers 
are insufficient to meet their obligations to provide safe navigation and mitigate hazards 
that cause maritime accidents within pilotage and port operations. 
 
2.4 Historical failure data and statistical analysis 
A historical analysis of the accidents that have occurred helps to identify the main 
causes that lead to the most frequent accidents within a port’s jurisdiction, their origins, 
and their consequences. The analysis helps to identify risks that affect the reliability of the 
organisation by underlining useful information for a decision maker to implement safer 
operating procedures along with required contingency plans. Therefore, two sets of data 
have been obtained through direct contact with a UK Maritime Accident Investigation 
Branch (MAIB) to obtain in-depth accident details. Contact was also made through their 
website for general information and statistics. The reason for this is because the data set 
obtained from them directly covered the period between 2001 and 2011, and it was last 
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updated at the end of 2011. Meanwhile, the online sets gave the total number of accidents 
that occurred between 1998 and 2015 without further details.  
The fluctuation over time of annual ship accidents and the number of accidents related 
to a person reported to the MAIB during a period of 18 years are represented in Figure 2.1. 
There were a total of 2,527 ship-related accidents, and 4,276 person-related accidents. Thus, 
person-related accidents represent the majority over the period. In 1998, this number was 
significantly high, reaching 330 accidents, which represents almost 8 per cent of the total 
number of reported accidents. By the end of the covered period, this number had declined 
by more than half – to 141 accidents – which represents 3.3 per cent of the total number of 
reported accidents. On the other hand, the number of accidents in relation to ships had 
declined in 2015 by half compared with the total number of reported accidents counted in 
1998. The percentage of ship accidents in 1998 was 8.7%, while in 2015, it was only 4.7%. 
In general, this is still high, as the danger of accidents occurring has a significant impact 
on a country’s overall economy, port infrastructure, and human lives. Although it is 
apparent that the total number of accidents has progressively decreased, it has remained 






   
Figure 2.1. The number of ship accidents and person accidents for UK merchant vessels of ≥100 
GRT (1998-2015) [MAIB, 2016] 
 
This reduction may be due, but not limited to, the introduction of an organisational and 
industry-wide safety culture (Hsu, 2012), the evolution of container ships (Wang and 
Foinikis, 2001), and technological enhancement (John et al., 2014). These factors help to 
improve operational awareness and organisational safety aspects. 
A restricted search obtained from the data given by the MAIB for the period between 
2001 and 2011 resulted in a detailed accident record rather than a quantified number of 
accidents. This means that one accident can be found in several records, which requires 
considerable adjustment to avoid statistical errors. However, the total number of accidents 
that occurred within UK waters over a decade starting from 2001 was found to be 1,383, 
957, and 362 accidents within the port area, on passage and other type of accidents 
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Figure 2.2. Merchant vessel accidents (≥500 GRT) within UK waters [source: original] 
 
The percentage shown in Figure 2.2 confirms that ships approaching a confined body 
of water are subject to an increased level of risks (Darbra et al., 2007; Liu et al., 2005; Hsu, 
2012). The probability of accidents occurring becomes higher due to increased traffic, 
shallow waters and the effect of hydrodynamic interactions, tidal effects, and technical 
difficulties during ship handling operations. Fifty-one per cent of accidents that occur 
within the port area are due to technical, human, or a combination of the two factors, which 
represents the majority of reported accidents within UK waters only. These accidents often 
occur due to a combination of accidental events of one, or a combination of more than one, 
operational component that it is essential for successful completion of the operation. A 
classification of the places where these accidents occurred is shown in Figure 2.3, covering 
a 10-year period within UK waters between 2001 and 2011 according to the MAIB (2016) 
reports. The following failures occurred: while at anchor (67), drifting (8), cargo loading 
and discharging (44), alongside or moored (343), during mooring operation (122), during 
entering or leaving the port (788), and during anchoring operation (11). The percentages 












Figure 2.3. Merchant vessel accidents within UK port areas [source: original] 
 
As shown in Figure 2.3, the majority of accidents take place while transiting in or out 
of the port (57 per cent/ 788 accidents of 1383). The second highest number of accidents 
occurs when the ship is placed alongside or moored to the jetty (25 per cent/ 343 of the 
total number of accidents). This finding resulted in the search being narrowed to identify 
the root cause of these accidents. Accordingly, Figure 2.4 shows the main causes of 
accidents. Four main factors were brought to light: the human factor (444 cases), technical 
factor (216 cases), a combination of these two (118 cases), and unknown factors (10 cases). 
It is therefore not surprising that the majority of accidents that occur during transiting in a 
port are due to human actions. This necessitates the development of a methodology that 























Figure 2.4. Cause of accidents during leaving or entering port (2001-2011)    [source: original] 
 
Furthermore, Figure 2.5 indicates where the accidents occurred when entering or 
leaving the port, namely within port/harbour area, river/canal, coastal waters, and non-tidal 
waters, with percentages of 61.8%, 16.9%, 20.9%, and 0.4 per cent respectively. The nature 
of the accidents is represented in Figure 2.6, which displays the total for each individual 
accident type.  
 





































 Figure 2.6. The nature of accidents when leaving or entering port [source: original] 
 
 
2.5 Causes of marine accidents 
The shipping industry is a profession characterised by a high rate of fatal injuries 
resulting from organisational accidents and maritime disasters (Hansenet al., 2002). It is 
similar to any other critical industry at risk, in that it is driven by the human element 
(Rothblum, 2000) where humans contribute in some way to about 80-96 per cent of 
reported maritime accidents. This study has used several maritime accident events for the 
purpose of risk model development. Analysing maritime accidents, as an effective tool for 
developing a risk model, can support risk development in a way which can provide 
operational alternatives and accident prevention.  
The UK Marine Accident Investigation Branch (MAIB) declared that the human 
element still dominates the majority of maritime accidents (MAIB, 2016). Similar to other 
critical industries, according to Goulielmos et al., (2012), operational errors caused by a 
human element were identified as the second largest cause of losses in the chemical 
industry. The tendency of human beings to build in error results from operational errors 
















identified as the main causes of human failure across different disciplines (Board, 1994). 
On the other hand, the standard of management has been criticised by Turner (1994), as it 
does not prevent accidents. Thus, it is necessary to improve management characteristics by 
avoiding rigid beliefs, improving communication, and acknowledging potential 
consequences, as this will help, to some extent, to avoid unfavourable consequences. 
In addition, data provided by New Zealand shows that 49 per cent of shipping accidents 
resulted from the human element, while 35 per cent were due to technical failure, and 16 
per cent were caused by environmental factors (Hetherington et al., 2006). Since the 
accident details declared by the MAIB (2016) (see section 2.6) show that the main reasons 
behind the majority of marine accidents within ports were due to human error (57%), 
technical failure (27.76%), or a combination of these (15.17%), it therefore is essential to 
highlight the roots of causation that critically influence human performance. 
It is worth mentioning that maritime operations are highly regulated, instructed, and 
internationally directed in stressing the importance of the human factor and an 
organisational safety culture (Berg, 2013). However, the establishment of an organisational 
safety culture does not overcome the serious barriers that obscure enhancements made to 
safety management. Therefore, it is essential to highlight how the organisational safety 
culture within the industry can critically influence human error. 
 
2.5.1 Human error 
Human error characterises the majority of accident cases (Barnett et al., 2006) and is 
adversely involved in about 80-96 per cent of reported accidents in most critical industries 
(Yee et al., 2005; Riahi et al., 2013; O’Connor et al., 2002; Embrey, 1990; Johnston et al., 
2011). The most common human error causes have been linked to operator’s misjudgement, 
improper watch keeping, and not following the standard regulations. 
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Although Classification Societies came into existence in the 1760s, the IMO was 
established in 1948, and both are involved in enhancing maritime safety, there is still a high 
number of maritime accidents. However, the main focus of the IMO in the 1990s was the 
technical safety aspects of shipping. Since then, its emphasis has shifted towards factors 
aiming to improve the human element. This was followed by the IMO’s introduction of 
International Safety Management (ISM) in 1998 (Goulielmos et al., 2012). According to 
O’Neil (2004), accident occurrences cannot be avoided through regulation implementation 
alone, as the enhancement of safety requires proper organisational maintenance and reliable 
operational practices.  
Barnett et al. (2006) reviewed maritime accident databases from the United Kingdom, 
United States, Norway, and Canada, and they confirmed that human error was the main 
contributory factor within the maritime industry. This review illustrates that major maritime 
accidents are not caused by technical problems, but by failures of the crew to appropriately 
respond to the situation. They concluded that, although the number of accidents is declining, 
human error continues to be the dominant factor in 80 per cent to 85 per cent of all accidents. 
In a study of 100 Dutch marine accidents, Rothblum (2000) identified that human error 
was involved in 96 of these accidents. In 93 per cent of these accidents, there were multiple 
human contributions by two or more operators. These operators were both dependent on 
and influenced by the action of the other. Nonetheless, they had limitations as human beings 
and differed in their ability to perform their work and duties accordingly (Rothblum, 2000). 
Consequently, operators at a port and their work features such as their technical skills and 
working environments may impact the safety of navigation within the port (Hsu, 2012). 
Hetherington et al. (2006) stated that human factors have been identified as the reason 
for most accidents at sea. Worker fatigue, stresses, and health problems are the main 
observable factors that play vital roles in workers’ performance degradation. Rasmussen et 
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al. (2015) have highlighted that insufficient technical skills, insufficient mental abilities, 
and incompetence in mastering the language of communication as an additional set of 
operator performance-shaping factors. . In addition, they pointed to safety training, team 
management, and safety culture implementation as organisational factors which shape 
workers’ performance. 
Many critical areas have been addressed by the United States Coast Guard to enhance 
and improve human performance and safety (Rothblum, 2000). The most dominant factors 
are human fatigue, improper communication, arrangements between pilot and bridge, and 
improper technical knowledge – especially in using new intentioned navigational 
equipment. 
 
2.5.2 Organisational safety culture and safety management system 
Darbra et al. (2007) carried out a study which aimed to assess the safety culture and 
hazard risk perception of Australian and New Zealand maritime pilots. They undertook this 
assessment as previous studies had not considered the operational culture and reliability of 
the controlled environment of ports and harbours. Furthermore, they defined safety culture 
as sets of beliefs and standards used to enhance the safety reliability by controlling 
operators working individually or as a team who are interacting together and with people 
outside the organisation. Accordingly, based on the pilots’ shared values, the operational 
risks and economic and environmental issues could be mitigated, since human faults have 
been recognised as the main contributory factors involved in most accidents. Therefore, 
evaluations of the safety culture by identifying the weak links, which require further 
improvement, will enhance operational reliability by reducing incidents and their 
consequences. By contrast, the pilotage reliability analysis gives an indication to decision 




2.6 Pilotage hazard identification 
Pilotage operations, as aforementioned, take place in a dynamic working environment. 
The associated hazards are varied and subject to certain circumstances. The main hazards 
within port pilotage operations can be identified through literature review and accident 
investigations. 
According to Darbra et al. (2007), the term ‘hazards’ can be described as any event, 
activity, or phenomenon that can constitute harm to the operator, ship, port, the 
environment, or a combination of these. They defined ‘hazardousness’ in their study as ‘the 
potential to affect safety of ships' crew, cargo and environment’ (Darbra et al., 2007, p. 
741). They identified the top 10 hazardous events (Table 2.1) and the top 10 likely events 
(Table 2.2). 
 
Table 2.1. Top 10 hazardous events in pilotage (Darbra et al., 2007, p.742) 
Rating Top 10 hazardous events in pilotage 
1 Starting/steering/anchoring equipment failures when manoeuvring or navigating 
2 Poor boarding arrangements (e.g. incorrectly rigged pilot ladder, poor location, poor 
on-board access) 
3 Failure of tug lines 
4 Failure of ship’s master and/or personnel to correctly follow pilot’s directions (e.g. 
refusal, rejection, intervention by master) 
5 Navigating and ship handling in marginal operating conditions when subject to 
commercial pressure 
6 Readiness and efficiency of navigation/propulsion equipment misrepresented to pilot 
by master 
7 Pilots navigate vessels outside published guidelines or limits (draft, higher swell, 
lower tide, etc.) 
8 Incorrect operation of ship’s equipment (missed orders, incorrect interpretations, etc.) 
9 Failure of regulator to enforce efficient regulations for safe navigation (e.g. for small 
craft, adequate UKC, passing rules) 










Table 2.2. Top 10 likely events in pilotage (Darbra et al., 2007, p.742) 
Rating Top 10 likely events in pilotage 
1 Failure of ships to provide working environment conducive to pilotage (BRM, 
attentiveness, etc.). 
2 Failure of ships to prepare and present informative mandatory passage plans. 
3 Poor workplace design (e.g. wheelhouse instrumentation, location, accessibility, 
visibility, clarity, ergonomic layout, etc.). 
4 Incorrect operation of ship’s equipment (missed orders, incorrect interpretations, etc.). 
5 Failure of regulator to enforce efficient regulations for safe navigation (e.g., for small 
craft, adequate UKC, passing rules). 
6 Poor boarding arrangements (e.g. incorrectly rigged pilot ladder, poor location, poor 
on-board access). 
7 Inadequate charts, navigation equipment and/or operating language in use on ships. 
8 Engine starting/steering/anchoring equipment failures when manoeuvring or 
navigating. 
9 Incorrect ship details provided to pilot/port (draft, efficiency of machinery, etc.) prior 
to pilotage. 
10 Inadequate supervision and/or training of onshore service providers (VTS/Signal 




2.7 Human Reliability Analysis (HRA) 
The potential for major losses in terms of economics and even human life due to system 
complexity mark the need to improve human reliability analysis (HRA) (Swain, 1990). 
HRA is a systematic framework for assessing the contribution of humans to system risk, 
including the process of human performance evaluation and humans’ associated impact on 
structures, systems, and complex systems (Su et al., 2015). In light of historic disasters such 
as Three Mile Island and Chernobyl, a realistic assessment of human error probabilities is 
a major goal of HRA. HRA could thus help to identify the weaknesses of a system at any 
operational stage, and those weaknesses could in turn be corrected before the occurrence 
of serious outcomes. The reliability of complex systems cannot be guaranteed. Complex 
systems could fail catastrophically at any operational stage, and failures due to operational 
complexity are inevitable (Perrow, 1994). Although noticeable improvement in operational 
technologies has been made, failures still exist due to human involvement (French et al., 
2011). Accordingly, in complex systems, a deep operational understanding of human 
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behaviour is essential. This understanding entails awareness of the operators’ reliability in 
arranging and maintaining the safety barriers that influence the safety of the overall system. 
Across HRA literature, many approaches have been proposed to analyse the human 
reliability and error quantification. According to Konstandinidou et al. (2006), HRA has 
always been a serious concern among safety and risk assessment analysts. The subjectivity 
and uncertainty of the methods traditionally used for evaluating the reliability of a human 
were the main reasons behind this concern. HRA development began in the nuclear industry 
in the 1960s (Bedford and Cooke, 2001; Kirwan, 1994). Since then, HRA has been applied 
across many well-known, high-risk industries, including the maritime (Yang et al., 2013; 
Martins and Maturana, 2013), healthcare (Lyons et al., 2004), aviation (Calhoun et al., 2014) 
and offshore and oil and gas (Akyuz and Celik, 2015) industries. 
Different HRA techniques include hazards and operability analysis (HAZOP) 
(Chudleigh, 1994), a technique for human error analysis (ATHENA) (Dougherty, 1998), 
cognitive reliability and error analysis method (CREAM) (Hollnagel, 1998; Marseguerra 
et al., 2006), and human error assessment and reduction technique (HEART) (Williams, 
2015). The different HRA techniques fall into three generations of HRA methods. The first 
generation used the probabilities of task failure, the adjustment factors based on 
performance conditions, and the error factors (French et al., 2011). The second generation 
of the HRA methods attempted to incorporate contextual effects such as tiredness, stress, 
and organisational culture (Barriere et al., 2000). The third generation has sought to allow 
for potential variation in response and recovery actions once an error chain has begun 
(Mosleh and Chang, 2004). 
According to French et al. (2011), summative HRA and related approaches emphasise 
the use of quantitative and prediction approaches. The absence of well-developed and valid 
models of behaviour and organisations that can provide precision is noticeable. Successful 
41 
 
development of an effective quantification model for a complex working environment is 
highly dependent on the availability of data, which are needed to validate the HRA model. 
In this research, different methodologies were proposed with the aim of developing an 
effective quantitative marine pilot reliability assessment framework that could handle high 
levels of uncertainty and lack of data. These steps and approaches are explained in detail 
in the upcoming consecutive chapters. 
 
 
2.8 Highlighted factors on shaping human performance 
Team reliability is vital in every dynamic working environment, and it requires 
operators to continually monitor situations and adjust their decisions accordingly (Rouse et 
al., 1992). Decision-making is a central process in all organisations, and a successful 
operation requires an exceptionally reliable team. Variation in the decision making process 
can be expected for a team conducting a pilotage operation, due to the dissimilarity of 
operators’ responsibilities (Rouse et al., 1992). Therefore, developing a marine pilot 
reliability index will help decision makers to predict changes in a pilot’s performance and 
maintain operational efficiency. 
According to the guidance of the American Bureau of Shipping (ABS), the factors that 
are essential for overall organisational safety when selecting an operator for a task are as 
follows (ABS, 2003; Ramin et al., 2012): 
1. Knowledge, skills and abilities shaped through an individual's basic knowledge, 
general training and experience. 
2. Maritime-specific training and abilities such as certificates, licences, and other 
maritime-related skills, such as those relating to vessel or offshore installation. 
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3. Physical strength and personal capabilities and limitations (such as resistance to and 
freedom from fatigue), visual ability, physical fitness and strength, acute or chronic 
illness, and substance dependency. 
4. Psychological and mental characteristics (such as individual risk perception), risk 
tolerance, and resistance to psychological stress. 
5. Physical characteristics of an operator such as stature, shoulder breadth, height, 
functional reach, overhead reach and weight. 
Based on a literature review of notable highly critical industries and the ABS Guidance 
stated above, this section discusses existing findings on human performance, which aids in 
forming an overview of what may be beneficial in developing proposed MPRIs for this 
study. Accordingly, the following sections are organised based on the ABS guidance, with 
the selection of factors for each sub-section based on related information contained in 
existing studies. Moreover, the factors included in each sub-section are widely used in 
various industries to assess operator performance. Accordingly, factors shaping human 
performance are presented as follows: 
 
2.8.1 The contribution of knowledge on shaping performance 
According to the IMO resolution A. 960 (2004), operators conducting a pilotage 
operation are required to have specialised work-related knowledge and experience in the 
pilotage operation area. The competent pilotage authority is obligated to encourage the 
establishment of a competent pilotage system within a port through assessing and 
maintaining the pilot’s qualifications with the support of additional maritime training. As 
a result his/her work-related experience is enhanced. 
A qualified operator has a set of competencies, licences, and certifications that exhibit 
his/her achievement in complying with the minimum work-related knowledge required to 
carry out certain duties. These competencies cannot be achieved if they are not 
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accompanied by training, enough knowledge about the nature of the operation, and a certain 
level of working experience. 
In a port pilotage operation, a competent pilotage authority must ensure that the pilot 
holds an approved pilotage certificate, achieves a licence recognised by authority, and 
fulfils the minimum operational standard (IMO, 2004). The certificate must highlight any 
restrictions and limitations specified by the authority, such as maximum size, tonnage, and 
draft that the pilot is allowed to handle. Therefore, Section 7 of resolution A.960 (IMO, 
2004) states that the pilot must have the necessary pilotage knowledge for certification 
purposes. This is outlined in 28 syllabi focusing on recommendations for training, 
certification, and operational procedures for maritime pilots other than deep-sea pilots. 
These syllabi are designed for a pilot who is designated to operate in a specific pilotage 
area. This is because knowledge of some of them (such as traffic separation scheme, bridges 
as an obstruction, and port channels) is not necessary in ports where they do not occur. 
Training has been identified as one of the most dominant factors shaping organisational 
performance (Alvarenga et al., 2014). Lack of training within the maritime sector has been 
found to be a distinct cause of accidents (House, 2007), where specific training may include 
a set of compulsory or additional requirements (Riahi et al., 2013). As the human element 
accounts for 80 per cent of maritime accidents, the ISM code was implemented by the IMO 
in 2008 (Berg, 2013). This code addresses the issue of human element contribution by 
addressing the significant role that operator training and education can play towards safety 
performance. Therefore, the aim of the ISM code was to implement effective training and 
promote suitable qualifications and experience to reduce the probability of human error 
during maritime activities (Berg, 2013). As a result, tremendous efforts have been made 
aiming to trace the root cause of deficiencies in performance within maritime industries, 
particularly in relation to operators’ non-technical skills (NTS) (Hetherington et al., 2006). 
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For instance, the crew resource management (CRM) training course was initiated based on 
the core NTS developed in many industries, such as aviation (Flin et al., 2003).  
According to Rothblum (2000), the United States Coast Guard highlighted many 
critical areas affecting pilot performance. One of these factors was the particular training 
for a pilot, such as using radar, which was found to be crucial to a pilot's performance. It is 
the responsibility of the port authority, according to resolution A.960, to ensure that the 
assigned persons who are conducting pilotage operations are capable, technically qualified, 
and well experienced. This is generally confirmed by assuring they hold a certain required 
set of certificates and have taken special improvement courses based on what they need to 
use within the operations. 
It is known that risk within the maritime industry is an inherent factor that can be 
reduced or acknowledged, but it cannot be totally removed (Berg, 2013). Marine operators 
experience risks on a daily basis, and this can be addressed if the operators have gained 
enough experience, training, and work-related qualifications to make proper decisions. 
Thus, decision making constitutes the central operational process in every critical industry, 
and it is manifested through a dynamic working environment which achieves operational 
goals and through employing knowledgeable, well-trained operators. Expert knowledge 
can be built most importantly through experience. Accordingly, the operator’s work-related 
experience has been identified as fundamental to every working environment in handling 
critical operational situations. It has been proven that a well-experienced operator has the 
capability to choose the most suitable option when undergoing high stress or time pressure 
(Yule and Brown, 2012). According to Klein’s investigation (1993), experts can often 
identify the most feasible operational option for a problem based on their experience rather 
following systematic options such as an operational checklist. 
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Experience is developed by the accumulation of knowledge or skills that are gained over 
time. In summary, work-related experience has been found to be fundamental in shaping 
an operator’s capability to handle critical situations. 
 
2.8.2 The contribution of fatigue on operator performance 
Fatigue has been defined by Yule and Brown (2012, p. 47) as ‘a state of sleepiness 
characterized by feeling drowsy or tired that results in a reduced ability to maintain 
concentration, make decisions, and carry out skilled tasks’. The word ‘fatigue’ describes 
the workers’ feelings of mental or physical tiredness and depression in their daily working 
experience (Kim et al., 2009). A fatigued operator is usually unable to maintain work at the 
required level due to a lack of energy and motivation. As a result, forgetfulness, loss of 
memory, and diminished ability to think clearly will emerge in the subject (Kim et al., 
2009). Thus, a review of the current status of safety within the maritime industry and the 
human element involved in operations indicated that fatigue was one of the most dominant 
factors which adversely influenced overall operational safety performance (Hetherington 
et al., 2006).  
Studies have shown that there are potentially tragic outcomes from fatigue in terms of 
poor health and operators’ diminished performance (Josten et al., 2003). The existence of 
fatigue can be expected at all operational stages and cannot be avoided due to working 
hours, sleep problems, shift length, work stresses, and working environment (Hetherington 
et al., 2006). Most of the factors that predict fatigue have been identified through different 
studies, such as working hours (Raby and McCallum, 1997), work stresses (Yule et al., 
2012) and working environment (Undre et al., 2006). 
Working hours can be defined by the number of working hours per day or the time of 
the day when the operator is carrying out his/her duty, as highlighted in healthcare (Yule et 
al., 2012), the maritime industry (Hsu, 2012), and aviation (Flin et al., 2003). 
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Seafarers have been identified as having the second-highest level of fatigue after rail 
operators, as they have the highest number of working hours over a 30-day period (Board, 
1994). As Hetherington et al. (2006) reported the Cole-Davies study, which highlighted 
that the National Union of Marine Aviation and Shipping Transport (NUMAST) carried 
out a survey on 563 seafarers. Half of the surveyed seafarers were exceeding 85 working 
hours per week. Moreover, 66 per cent of these seafarers suggested that extra staffing was 
necessary to help reduce fatigue levels.  
For instance, in the 24 hours preceding the Exxon Valdez grounding in 1989, the officer 
of the watch had had only 5-6 hours of sleep (National Transportation Safety Board, 1990), 
which highlights the contribution of fatigue to this catastrophe. Extended hours on duty and 
the accumulation of hours worked in the preceding three days lead to marine accidents 
associated with fatigue (Raby and McCallum, 1997). As a result, it has been proven that 
lack of sleep caused by extended working hours reduces an operator’s clarity of thinking 
and causes him/her to become rigid in thinking (Yule and Brown, 2012).  
The contribution of shift arrangements to fatigue has been pinpointed in different 
industries. Rigorous shift arrangements can lead to serious degradation in operational safety 
performance and poorer operator health (Embriaco et al., 2007; Iskera-Golec et al., 1996). 
Shift work interrupts the circadian rhythm of the body by disrupting sleep patterns, 
resulting in disrupted sleep cycles (Yule and Brown, 2012). Therefore, a quick recovery 
from fatigue can be expected when working just a single day or a few days’ night shifts 
(Folkard et al., 2007; Spencer et al., 2006). This is preferable to having a continuous week 
of night shifts, which is considered the worst pattern of work, as it causes fatigue 
accumulation towards the end of the week with disrupted sleep (Yule and Brown, 2012). 
In addition, longer recovery from fatigue is associated with an increase in age, which 
explains why senior surgeons are taken off the on-call rota (Yule and Brown, 2012). 
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Thus, it could be inferred that this would also be found within the maritime domain 
with additional issues such as rolling, pitching, vibration, and noise, which could magnify 
any present effects of shift work-based fatigue (Harrison and Horne, 2000; McNamara et 
al., 2000). 
Work stresses have a direct influence on an operator’s technical and non-technical 
performance within the maritime industry. Typical conditions for seafarers feature high 
operational demands (Hetherington et al., 2006) due to factors such as shorter sea passages, 
higher levels of traffic, reduced staffing, and rapid turnarounds. As reported by Cole-
Davies (2001), the NUMAST carried out a survey on 1,000 officers and found that 84 per 
cent felt that stresses have become a dominant fatigue factor. Therefore, working stresses 
have been identified as an influential factor on operational productivity and operator health 
(McLeod, 2011; Cooper et al., 2001). Experiencing a high level of working stresses for an 
extended period of time will lead to the degradation of an operator’s mental capacity and 
physical health outcomes (Quick et al., 1997). 
The influence of stress has been proved to be the main cause of diminished working 
memory during a stressful time (Yule and Brown, 2012). Change in an operator’s cognitive 
function in association with acute working stresses has been linked to a significant 
reduction in memory. This has a serious impact on overall safety perceptions, decision 
making, and task management (Yule and Brown, 2012). Therefore, an operator who is 
inexperienced in handling critical situations and managing tasks may be unable to make 
the proper decision in an acutely stressful situation.  
Working environment has been found to significantly influence operator fatigue, which 
as a result affect operator performance in most critical industries. Aviation (Flin et al., 
2003), health (Undre et al., 2006), and maritime (Riahi et al., 2012) have all suffered losses 
due to improper enhancement of the working environment.  
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Different studies have highlighted factors that affect operators’ surroundings, which 
help to either maintain or degrade their operational standards (Chauvin et al., 2013; Berg, 
2013; Celik and Cebi, 2009; Darbra et al., 2007). These factors include, but are not limited 
to, physical working environment (Celik and Cebi, 2009), ergonomic design (Riahi et al., 
2013), and the status of the operative environment (Vincent et al., 2004).  
In a safe working environment, safety and professional practices are expected to be 
strengthened through maintaining an operator’s behaviour and providing management 
support (Saeed et al., 2016). In this working environment, accidents tend to decline as a 
result of safe operational practices. Therefore, the operators’ relations with managers and 
participation in workplace health and safety management have been proven to be 
significant in overall workplace safety (James and Walters, 2002; Bhattacharya and Tang, 
2013). 
The nature of pilotage operations requires the pilot to work in shift patterns based on 
the number of ships calling at that particular port and the time of calling. Prolonged working 
hours are expected, which vary from one port to another and are subject to different factors 
(channel distance, tide variation, number of tugs available, etc.). The operational demands 
require pilots to transfer between ships through a pilot boat. When travelling, the boat will 
be exposed to waves, vibration, humidity, and noises, which may make the pilot become 
drowsy or even worse. The pilot is required to climb a pilot ladder and, in some cases, this 
pilot ladder lies along the ship’s freeboard, which may reach a height of more than 10 
metres. Sometimes, the ladder is not properly maintained and, in addition to the high level 
of waves due to weather turbulence, this may result in the pilot falling from height into the 
pilot boat or into the sea. This could cause serious injury or even death. Therefore, the way 
in which the pilot is transferred to and gets on-board the ship increases pilot stress. In 
addition, climbing this ladder and the pilot’s ability to transfer quickly both require a high 
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level of physical strength. A pilot’s working environment tends to lead to a high level of 
stress, and this by its nature leads to a high level of fatigue. The high level of fatigue will 
lead to health problems and degrade an operator’s cognitive capacity. 
Darbra et al. (2007) investigated the link between working environment and safety 
culture, which causes fatigue within an organisation. Commercial pressure and the 
depression of wages resulting from bad safety culture management leads the pilot service 
provider to not maintain effective fatigue management, carry out proper pilot launch checks, 
or provide pilots with training (Darbra et al., 2007). 
 
2.8.3 The contribution of operator mental and personal characteristics 
The knowledge base and technical proficiency of employees within most well-
recognised high-risk industries are essential, and a vast amount of a company’s resources 
are spent on enhancing their technical proficiency. Around the mid-1980s, the aviation 
industry’s focus was on aircraft technological and technical aspects and pilot training 
(Moorthy et al., 2005). This followed research carried out by the National Aeronautics and 
Space Administration, which revealed that human errors constituted around 70 per cent of 
reported accidents due to failures in interpersonal communication, decision making, and 
leadership (Helmreich et al., 1999). Moreover, operators’ NTS and their component 
failures (situational awareness, decision making, etc.) which were revealed in most accident 
analysis lead to adverse events in increasingly complex organisations, even if the operator 
had a high level of technical competencies (Sharma et al., 2011). Since the 1980s, 
researchers have tried to tackle the problem caused by the deficiency of NTS through 
developing a behavioural marker tool (Sevdalis et al., 2009; Flin et al., 2003; Yule et al., 
2006; Yule et al., 2008; Sevdalis et al., 2008; Healey et al., 2004; Salas and Prince, 1997). 
This tool is widely used in different high-critical industries which aim to structure the 
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required training needs and evaluate these skills. It surfaces in aviation (Flin et al., 2003), 
marine (Saeed et al., 2016), and health (Fletcher et al., 2004; Yule et al., 2012). 
For this reason, an intensive literature review has been carried out to discover the main 
components of the operator’s NTS from different disciplines. The review displays that 
operators’ NTS are composed from a set of social and cognitive competencies that exhibit 
the operator’s ability to perform his/her work. Variability was observed in researchers’ 
points of view on the factors that adversely influence NTS due to the nature of the industry. 
In summary, proper enhancement of operators’ NTS in high-risk industries is highly crucial 
in order to eliminate the consequences of human error (Helmreich et al., 1999). 
One of the identified factors constituting operator NTS is personal skill for making 
proper decisions. The decision-making (DM) process has been defined by Flin et al. 
(2008:41) as ‘a process of reaching a judgement or choosing an option, sometimes called a 
course of action, to meet the needs of a given situation’. DM is an essential skill for reliable 
operations in any high-risk industry, and it is identified widely in all investigations 
concerning the operator’s NTS (Ramin et al., 2013; Yule et al., 2012, Moortyh et al., 2005; 
Flin et al., 2003).  
Intensive efforts have been made by researchers to develop decision-making techniques 
that can be used by key decision makers (Flin et al., 2008). These techniques are subject to 
situations and circumstances that are sensitive to safety-critical decisions (Saeed et al., 
2016). This leads to variability in identifying the main components of NTS. A psychologist 
researcher at NASA studied different styles of DM made by a pilot in different situations. 
The final statement of this research was: ‘Crews make different kinds of decisions, but all 
involve situation assessment, choice among alternatives and assessment of risk’ (Orasanu 
and Connolly, 1993, p. 138). Thus, it is apparent that the degree of DM process varies and 
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is subject to multiple cognitive processes depending on task conditions and decision 
requirements (Flin et al., 2003). 
It is worth mentioning that the process of DM encompasses a set of structural sequences 
as per Flin et al. (2003). 
 
Table 2.3. Structural sequences of the decision-making process (Flin et al., 2003, p. 109) 
 
 
DM, as a cognitive process, is a hidden process that cannot simply be predicted and 
evaluated. However, it can be inferred by an operator’s behaviour. When a decision maker 
communicates a decision to other team members, it is essential for a decision maker to bear 
various factors in mind that may influence member duties in order to comply with that 
decision, such as available options and support, crew qualifications and demands, company 
standard procedures and policies, etc. (Saeed et al., 2016). Therefore, when making a 
decision, operation-related information must be collected that helps to determine and 
evaluate the current situation at that particular time. 
During a pilotage operation, the pilot may face an engine failure problem while 
transiting through the port channel that endangers the port by blocking the channel for other 
users. The pilot is first required to identify the problem and generate different options to 




Gathering information and determining the nature of the 




Formulating alternative approaches for dealing with the 
situation. The opportunity for this will depend on available 
time and information. 
Risk assessment and 
option selection 
 
Making a judgement or evaluation of the level of risk/hazard in 
alternative approaches and choosing a preferred approach. 
Outcome review 
 
Considering the effectiveness/suitability of the selected option 




critical process when making decisions. Therefore, in this critical situation, the pilot will 
formulate different approaches to deal with the failure. This approach is highly dependent 
on time constraints and information availability (Flin et al., 2003). In a situation where a 
ship’s engines fail while manoeuvring the ship inside the port, the pilot can decide either 
to drop the anchor using the bow thruster or obtain external support from the tugs. 
After the decision makers have generated options, risk assessment must be carried out 
in order to select from these generated options. The word ‘risk’ means a small hazard that 
may turn into a critical situation (Saeed et al., 2016). Accordingly, the decision maker is 
required to evaluate the risks associated with the generated options to weigh the risks’ 
probability. In the above-mentioned example of engine failure while manoeuvring the ship 
inside the port, dropping anchor may not be the best option at that time, as failure to choose 
the proper anchor will increase the risk of collision or even grounding.  
Accordingly, when the pilot chooses an option, its consequences must be reviewed in 
order to implement a course of action. This requires the decision maker, when choosing an 
option, to consider the effectiveness of the selected option according to the current 
operational demand.  
The DM process is categorised as one of the most important NTS required by an 
operator in enhancing operational reliability in most high-risk industries. In the maritime 
context, for instance, a poor decision by the master of a ship may lead to the loss of lives, 
loss of the ship, or pollution of water (Riahi et al., 2012). In 1967, the grounding of the 
tanker Torrey Canyon resulted from a poor decision made by the captain. This captain 
decided to save six hours in reaching Milford Haven by taking a direct route to arrive at 
high tide. In this case, commercial pressure had an influence. Although the short course he 
chose was deep enough to cross safely, the ship went aground crossing the area around the 
Scilly Isles while trying to avoid collision with a fishing boat (Hetherington et al., 2006). 
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Consequently, there is a distinct link between commercial pressures, situation awareness 
(SA), DM, making decisions under stress, and these factors’ have an effect on operator 
reliability and operational safety. 
To make proper decisions, the operator is required to comprehend operational processes 
by collecting the required data and enhancing operator awareness. SA skill has been 
identified as a major key factor in accident causation which impacts the safety of most 
critical industries (Salmon et al., 2009; Flin et al., 2008). Poor performance may occur as 
the result of scarcity of operational information, improper planning, heavy workload, poor 
DM, improper team building, and fatigue. SA skills mean developing and maintaining 
awareness of surrounding changes during an operation (Johnston et al., 2011). This type of 
skill is the personal ability to model mental processes in accordance with what is going on 
at the time to make adequate decisions that satisfy the demands of the current situation 
(Salmon et al., 2009).  
Researchers have made significant efforts in tracing the way that SA develops over time 
during an operation. The significance of developing a behavioural marker assessment tool 
to assess the performance of operators in different disciplines was due to the fact that SA, 
as one factor that constitutes operators’ NTS, has a distinct importance in shaping human 
performance (Flin et al., 2003; Livingstone, 1994; Healey et al., 2004). In addition, the 
crew resource management (CRM) course has been developed to give operators 
proficiency in NTSs, and it is widely applied in different safety-critical industries. 
Endsley (1995, p. 36) defined SA as ‘the perception of the elements in the environment 
within a volume of time and space, the comprehension of their meaning, and the projection 




1- Correct perception of main elements must be shaped by the operator in order to 
project an accurate operational picture; 
2- Combining, interpreting and storing all collected information that helps to form a 
situational image which helps to understand the significance of particular objects 
and events; and  
3- For projection purposes, acquired information from steps one and two must be 
combined. 
Endsley (1995) introduced a generic model that constituted the above three levels. The 
model mainly focused on the influence of SA on an operator’s DM process in crisis 
conditions. The model shows the factors that critically influence an operator’s SA. As per 
Salmon et al. (2009) and Flin et al. (2008), a chain of information can be obtained from 
Endsley’s three-level model. The perception of the elements in the environment is in the 
first level. The second level involves comprehending the information gained in the first 
level, and future status projection forms the third level.  
The operator can predict what is going to happen in the future as the SA is defined 
through a set of operational processes. He/she is required to gather important information 
which will help him/her to be aware of the next step at that stage of the process. In fact, the 
‘perception of elements in the current situation’ was predicted and information was 
gathered through the first level of Endsley’s SA model (Ensley, 1995). For instance, the 
ship’s course and speed, traffic density, and weather conditions are examples of the main 
elements required for the bridge team to develop the current situation at this stage (Saeed 
et al., 2016).  
The operator is required to process and assess the significance of the information 
gathered from different resources throughout the operation. This level is the second level 
of Endsley’s model and means that decision makers are able to form a clear picture of the 
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current situation through highlighting the significant factors in implementing procedures 
according to the current event. For instance, a ship’s officer must evaluate the situation 
when two methods for position fixing result in different outcomes, showing that the ship is 
not in the same place (Saeed et al., 2016). As the expected result has changed, an 
investigation must be carried out to control the situation and implement orders in the right 
way. This process can only be tackled by an experienced operator. Thus, a novice operator 
may not be able to go beyond level one of Endsley’s model, ‘perception of elements in the 
current situation’, and interpret the information gathered. Therefore, experienced decision 
makers will be capable of assessing the situation in achieving the desired operational goals 
(Endsley, 1995; Flin et al., 2008). 
Based on the information gathered and its interpretation, the third level allows the 
decision makers to predict and project future events (Mishra et al., 2008). An experienced 
decision maker’s future prediction allows him/her to take the necessary action to avoid 
unfavourable events that may occur.  
Therefore, the three levels of SA can be summarised as follows: 
SA is based on far more than simply perceiving information about the environment. It 
includes comprehending the meaning of that information in an integrated form, 
comparing it with operator goals, and providing projected future states of the 
environment that are valuable for DM. In this respect SA is a broad construct that is 
applicable across a wide variety of application areas, with many underlying cognitive 
processes in common (Endsley, 1995; p. 37). 
In summary, evaluating a situation properly requires the careful identification of key 
factors that influence SA. It is apparent from different models (i.e. Endsley’s model) that 
the correlation between factors (e.g. experience, training, state of the environment) was 
found to be inherent, meaning that the factors influenced each other. The objective of this 
56 
 
research is to identify the degree of influence of other identifiable factors on performance. 
For instance, a pilot who is suffering from fatigue tends to be sensitive and irritable towards 
other team members. This means that other team members will not communicate what is 
going on during their duty. As a result, the information flow will substantially decrease. 
This information may be important for projection purposes and, as a result, decisions made 
will not satisfy operational standards. 
Communication skills (CS) are another key factor in effective and safe task 
achievement in any safety-critical industry (Flin et al., 2003). These skills are categorised 
as central within other NTS in that its effectiveness will contribute to overall production 
safety and performance (Lamb et al., 2011). The criticality of inadequate CS reflects lack 
of SA, poor teamwork, and poor operational decisions. As per Yule et al. (2006), the role 
of CS is to regulate, control, motivate, express feelings, and convey information to other 
team members involved in an operation. Lack of transparency in communication between 
members is the root of most conflicts that occur during an operation (Blundel and Ippolito, 
2008), as evidenced by Gawande et al. (2003) that 43 per cent of errors made by surgeons 
were due to communication failure. Thus, the way in which the information will be 
expressed or transmitted must be decided in advance between team members. 
Flin et al. (2008) defined communication based on the way the information has been 
transmitted. CS is an important skill to all parties engaged in the pilotage operation, such 
as the shipmaster, pilot, tug master, VTS operator, and harbour master. Different 
researchers have identified the significance of communication and its influence on 
teamwork effectiveness as a key skill to ensure an acceptable level of understanding of a 
shared operational situation and to complete tasks efficiently (Yule and Brown, 2012). 
Accordingly, enhancing an operator’s CS will improve the mental model shared between 
team members (Flin et al., 2008). 
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Eliminating doubt and confliction can be achieved through clear and concise 
communication in regards to identifiable issues that influence the safety of the operation 
(Kleij, 2009). Operator language capability is one of the main identifiable problems found 
in every domain that needs CS, such as health (Yule and Brown, 2012), nuclear (Saeed et 
al, 2016), and shipping industries (Ramin et al., 2012). With regards to shipping, 
Hethrington et al. (2006) observed that the level of language fluency required to operate 
ships safely has not yet been achieved, and this is still the case today. 
Different studies have categorised communication as an independent operator’s NTS 
(Ramin et al., 2012; Moorthy et al., 2005), while others have included it within teamwork 
building skills (Yule et al., 2008; Undre et al., 2006; Fletcher et al., 2004). This variability 
in category is due to different views on structuring the particular study’s model. However, 
in both ways, communication is inherently an important medium for information flow that 
significantly affects the level of SA and DM process between team members. The 
differences in perspective can be said to be due to validation purposes, assessment 
techniques, or the researcher’s point-of-view. In this study, CS has been categorised 
independently because of the nature of the pilotage operation and the independent 
characteristics of the main operational players involved where that skill can be diminished 
if the method of communication fails. 
There is widespread acknowledgement in high-risk industries that leadership (Yule and 
Brown 2012; Riahi et al., 2013) and teamwork (Sasou and Reason, 1999) are crucial for 
efficient and safe team performance. Higher operational performance can be achieved with 
committed, highly qualified leadership (Little, 2004), and teamwork (Sasou and Reason, 
1999). One of the most significant positive moments can be seen when an effective 
collaboration between members takes place after a co-worker has mishandled an operation. 
However, whilst teamwork can be significant in helping to overcome errors during 
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operational stages, it can also be a main motivation for error development. This is the case 
when someone in a leader role fails to regulate operational standards and policy towards a 
corrected procedure. 
As per Berg (2013), desirable leadership qualities, which can improve teamwork 
effectiveness, can be shaped through the following criteria: 
- Establishing clear two-way communication, 
- ‘tough empathy’ 
- Openness to criticism, 
- Empathy towards cultural diversity, 
- Capable of motivating people and developing a community atmosphere, 
- Coping with an operator’s limitations, and 
- Being a key team player.  
 
Therefore, the distinction between being a leader and being a manager is that a leader 
has the capability to inspire and motivate other team members, whereas the manager works 
to organise the existing operation and proposes the next operational process (Lau et al., 
2014). Teamwork and Leadership skills (T&L) support each other in every organisation 
driven by a human element. The definition of leadership is the process of a social influence 
that encourages workers to pursue a set of goals (Quinn and Spreitzer, 2006). The 
importance of a leader appears during organisational crises as he/she tries to make sense of 
the situation (Combe and Carrington, 2015).  
However, an exceptional solution is required when new operational technical and 
routine issues exist on a daily basis, which requires adaptive, experienced, and 
knowledgeable leadership. Therefore, five features of leadership adaptability were also 
identified by Eubank et al. (2012) as follows: 
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1- Identify the adaptive challenge and frame key questions and issues, 
2- Let the organisation feel external pressures within a range it can stand, 
3- Challenge current roles and resist pressure to define new roles too quickly, 
4- Expose conflict or let it emerge, and 
5- Challenge unproductive norms. 
 
These features of leadership necessitate the leader being present when a problem occurs 
in order to handle the new challenges. Effective leadership also requires proactive 
operational thinking and assigning new members’ roles as required towards solving the 
problem (Aronson et al., 2006). In such an operational situation, the leader is always subject 
to operational stresses that need him/her to achieve the goal with an optimum level of 
productivity and efficiency. Accordingly, operational stresses are a common feature at 
every operational stage that have a vital influence on operational outcomes through shaping 
worker productivity. Stresses are an external factor that affect an operator’s mental 
condition and limit his/her ability to lead and perform assigned duties (Healey et al., 2004). 
According to Gill et al. (2006), there is a need to overcome the effect of stress by developing 
a strategic process that helps to reduce its occurrence. The responsibility of a leader in any 
industry is to satisfy the operational requirements to achieve the highest goal. This works 
by monitoring the process throughout the organisation (Aronson et al., 2006).  
In the pilotage operation, most of the reported accidents within ports have been caused 
by bridge team members’ failure to develop a positive teamwork atmosphere. Although the 
pilot, when he/she comes on board to handle the ship, has a responsibility to share similarly 
to the ship’s team members, the master’s role is to ensure a positive working atmosphere 
by encouraging team members to work and share their responsibilities towards achieving 
the overall operational goals. Thus, professional leaders tend to develop more realistic goals 
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by conducting a risk assessment at each operational stage. This will reflect the ability and 
quality of that leader in handling the operation effectively. 
As the pilotage operation is based on teamwork and requires the sharing of information 
and cooperation, effective teamwork development is recognised as an important factor in 
achieving a reliable operation in this (and any) safety-critical industry (Riahi et al., 2012). 
Teamwork must function effectively at the early operational stage to work towards a 
common operational goal (Hetherington et al., 2006). This requires coordination, 
cooperation, and CS to share information with other team members at every operational 
stage. Well-known safety-critical industries such as maritime, nuclear, health, and aviation 
are heavily reliant on T&L effectiveness (Berg, 2013; Flin et al., 2008). This dependence 
on teams has a significant impact on overall operational objectives and must be considered 
in every organisation.   
 
2.8.4 The impact of operator physical ability on operational performance 
The fitness and strength of the operator are crucial in many high-risk industries, and 
physical ability plays a significant role in successful operations. However, fatigue caused 
by a variety of factors (see Section 2.8.2) was found to have significantly impacted operator 
performance (Kim et al., 2009). This relationship occurs naturally in every field that 
requires a high level of physical and mental activity, which is the case in pilotage operations. 
The demanding nature of this job requires the pilot and other operators to maintain a high 
level of physical and mental strength throughout all operational stages. Therefore, a link 
between human fatigue and operator fitness and strength has been identified. Moreover, 
fatigue has an influence on operator NTS, which means that fitness and strength have been 
associated with operator NTS and TP. Consequently, it is important that the port authority, 
when assigning a pilot to handle a ship, ensures that the pilot’s physical and mental strength 
have been properly maintained, as per the IMO resolution A.960 (2004) and the ABS 
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guidance (2003). The fundamental purpose of the pilot fitness assessment is to ensure that 
the individual pilot is fit to handle ships calling at the port. 
According to IMO resolution A.960, the port authority must ensure that a pilot complies 
with minimum requirements of medical fitness and strength (IMO, 2004). It is known and 
recognised within the industry that when an operator becomes older, they may suffer from 
illnesses due to the nature of the operation and fatigue associated with the required duties 
(Hetherington et al., 2006). A reduction in mental capacity has also been observed as people 
age (Sturman, 2003), and muscle strength has also been identified as reducing after the age 
of 50 (Riahi, 2010). 
The performance of operators in different professions has been confirmed as changing 
over time (Sturman, 2003). Despite the huge effort made to enhance operator performance 
(Flin et al., 2003; Aronson et al., 2006; Yule et al., 2012), different organisations know 
relatively little about the influence of natural causes that provoke fluctuations in operator 
performance (Sturman, 2003). 
The operator age (OA) was found to play a significant role on performance level, along 
with other temporal variables (i.e. experience, organisational tenure) considered in 
Sturman’s (2003) investigation. Job experience, as explained in section 2.8.1 above, 
requires the accumulation of work-related knowledge from actions, practices, and 
perceptions related to the assigned duty, which is inherently tied to time scale (Sturman, 
2003). However, as an operator gains work-related experience, he/she is getting older. OA 
can indicate how the performance of an experienced operator changes over time (Waldman 
and Avolio, 1993). Riahi et al. (2012) investigated the influence of age on performance and 
found that operator’s strength after age 25 generally decreases at a rate of about 1 per cent 
per year, remaining relatively high until the age of 50 before starting to decline by 10 per 
cent per year.  
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The negative relationship between age and performance has been confirmed, as age 
increase causes a deterioration in physical and mental strength (i.e. speed thinking, agility 
and coordination) (Mendes, 2013). As a result, a reduction in physical capacities and 
coordination, flexibility, strength, and power can be expected as an operator ages. 
It is worth mentioning that it is not necessarily always the case that performance 
degrades with age. Therefore, the effect of each highlighted criterion in this section does 
not necessarily have a direct influence on performance. However, an accumulation of these 
effects may significantly influence performance over time. Furthermore, these 
characteristics tend to differ across pilots. 
Another significant concern in maintaining higher performance is subject to operator 
health. Health issues (HI) are a major concern for both operators themselves and entire 
organisations. Approximately 80 per cent of organisational accidents in many high-risk 
industries are caused by human error. In maritime sectors, Hetherington et al. (2006) and 
Flin and Mearns (2006) have identified factors strongly associated with accidents at sea, 
and they found that operator health was one of these factors. HI can be a result of human 
fatigue accumulation (Bloor et al., 2010). Moreover, HI were found to be associated with 
the nature of work, geographical location, stress at work, prolonged working hours, 
commercial pressure, and organisational culture.  
In different studies, factors found to be correlated with HI were fatigue, stresses, and 
health problems (Berg, 2013, Riahi et al., 2013; Smith et al., 2008). Fatigue has a direct 
influence and is considered a major risk factor in operators’ mental health (Smith, 2007). 
Conversely, impaired operator health is a key risk factor in operator fatigue (Smith et al., 
2006). The link between fatigue and health problems has been identified as key in ensuring 
safe operations (Wadsworth et al., 2008, Mohren et al., 2001). 
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The nature of the pilotage operation requires the pilot to be physically and mentally fit 
at all times during service as a pilot. The pilot must be able to climb up a ship, where in 
some cases the freeboard is more than 10 metres high, which is followed by a high cognitive 
demand to guide the ship safely owing to, but not limited to, surrounding traffic density 
and weather conditions. Therefore, it is important for the port authority under the 
requirements of resolution A.960 to maintain the pilot’s proper health and physical 
condition at all times. 
Performance changes over time (Sturman, 2003), which means that an operator is 
developing his/her experience after a period of time, and meanwhile, getting older. As per 
Riahi (2010), body strength reaches a peak at 50, followed by a decline of about 10 per cent 
per year. However, this does not necessarily always occur at this age. The process of higher 
degradation may begin before this age, for example, depending on the operator’s lifestyle 
and condition. Thus, as OA, degradation of physical and mental strength (i.e. thinking 
speed, agility, and coordination) can be expected (Mendes, 2013). 
 
2.9 Research gap 
The following research gaps were identified by conducting a literature review 
highlighting previous efforts in assessing human reliability in different industries: 
1- Previous efforts to assess the reliability of an operator focusing on specific factors 
independently, rather than considering other factors more holistically; 
2- Comprehensive guidelines that would show how an operator in a complex socio-
technical working environment can be effectively assessed are unavailable; 
3- A lack of studies on factors believed to be essential in assessing the reliability of an 
operator and how they can be assessed; 
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4- A need to highlight the degree of interdependence between identified factors and how 
they influence each other; 
5- A lack of information on the pilotage operation, including how it is conducted and 
regulated, as well as information on participants involved in the operation;  
6- Within marine port operations, an urgent need to develop an effective and rational 
quantitative reliability assessment tool (Board, 1994) capable of assessing the reliability 
of humans involved in a highly uncertain working environment. 
Accordingly, this study aims to fill the gaps identified in the literature through systematic 




Within this chapter, an overview of pilotage operations has been conducted showing 
the significance of the operations in global logistics. Marine accidents remain a major 
concern for port management, port stakeholders, and the public. A number of reported 
marine accidents indicate that human error is the most dominant contributing factor across 
the analysed data. The lack of an assessment model to assess the reliability of a human 
element within the maritime industry was mentioned by researchers, and the need to 
develop an effective tool is urgent. The lack of understanding on how the human element 
contributes to port safety has been highlighted. Different organisations take some steps to 
analyse and develop their tools to evaluate human performance. These efforts were also 
highlighted in order to examine the feasibility of the application of such identified models 
in maritime operations. Moreover, most of these models have been presented in an 
independent form, which is believed, to some extent, to not be feasible. The American 
Bureau of Shipping has highlighted different sets of essential factors when selecting 
operators to maintain overall organisational safety. In light with these factors, this chapter 
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has comprehensively detailed other industries’ efforts to identify the most dominant 
performance shaping factors. Previous studies have focused on factors influencing the 
operator’s reliability independently. This approach does not effectively mitigate human 
error, as evidenced by the continuous existence of error. Moreover, these studies have not 
identified the degree of correlation between factors as one set. Therefore, this investigation 
integrates the aforementioned factors that challenge operators’ reliability during pilotage 
operation as one set. Moreover, these factors require further examination for applicability 
to incorporate them into the proposed model in a holistic form. The next chapter aims to 
highlight the current organisational practices, as it found an absence of this information 









3.1  Chapter Summary 
This chapter highlights the current organisational working practices in the maritime industry, 
particularly those working practices during marine port pilotage operation and it is aimed at 
developing an effective model to be used in solving pilotage operational issues. This investigation 
has been conducted sequentially over three phases. Firstly, in terms of research design, the 
researcher has chosen to conduct a qualitative investigation, whose usage is justified in this 
chapter. Secondly, in terms of research tools and data collection, the researcher has collected data 
from a major marine port using three different data sets obtained by conducting field observation, 
focus-group interview and analysing four incidents, which occurred during marine pilotage 
services at this port. Thirdly, in terms of data analysis, the researcher identifies the main pilotage 
operators involved in pilotage service and their roles. Moreover, it highlights the main criteria 
constituting the reliability of a marine pilot. Lastly, it analyses four marine port pilotage incidents 
to partly validate the findings obtained from the interviews. The result obtained from this chapter 
will be used for the quantitative research analysis that would be presented in chapter four. This 
chapter’s investigation processes are presented in Figure 3.1.  
 
 
Figure 3.1. Chapter investigation process 
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Accidents in the maritime industry have serious consequences, and a major 
contributory factor is identified as human error (Ramin et al., 2012; Hethrington et al., 
2006; Safahani, 2015). According to P&I Club and the UK MAIB, human error was a root 
of 75-96 per cent of reported accidents (Rothblum, 2000; Ung and Shen, 2011; Ramin et 
al., 2012). Based on Hsu’s (2012) investigation, there was a significant increase in marine 
accidents within the last century, and the accidents have mostly occurred during ship/port 
interface. Therefore, to handle different types and sizes of ships, a high level of safety is 
required during a pilotage operation. The aim of this study is to contribute to developing 
and assessing the reliability of marine pilots during pilotage operations by investigating 
the current pilotage practices after analysing empirical data from this study. Subject to the 
lack of information on factors shaping marine pilot reliability, the literature has highlighted 
efforts made to identify human performance shaping factors. The applicability of these 
factors varies depending on many elements. These elements must be carefully examined 
by employing effective research methods capable of elucidating beliefs around the topic. 
For this reason, this chapter analyses data collected during real pilotage operations within 
a seaport. The data was gathered by observing pilot’s actions and procedures conducted 
within marine pilotage operations. The employed research methods are described in more 
detail in the following section. 
 
3.3 Research background 
3.3.1 A brief review of qualitative methods 
Qualitative research methods are widely used across different disciplines in studies that 
seek to understand phenomena in specific settings (Golafshani, 2003). Unlike quantitative 
research, qualitative research produces findings that cannot be identified when using 
statistical or quantification research methods (Strauss and Corbin, 1990). The qualitative 
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approach’s philosophy describes developing knowledge in a particular field by 
determining the nature of that knowledge. This procedure is essential for identifying 
knowledge that cannot be described quantitatively. Accordingly, an analysis of several 
philosophical approaches is essential to scholars in order to select the most appropriate 
approach for the selected study. 
According to Easterby-Smith et al. (2015), the researcher is required to clarify the 
philosophical assumption underlying the research methodology. Therefore, the researcher 
is required to specify under which paradigm the research is positioned. The research is 
significantly influenced by the paradigm selection, as it includes the framing and 
comprehension of the highlighted phenomena (Wahyuni, 2012).  
 
3.3.2 Research paradigms 
Research paradigms have been defined as “a set of fundamental assumptions and 
beliefs as to how the world is perceived, which then serves as a thinking framework that 
guides the behaviour of the research” (Wahyuni, 2012; p. 69). In conducting research, the 
researcher must ascertain the most appropriate philosophical paradigm at the beginning of 
the study in order to propose a viewpoint onto the nature of knowledge (ontology) in 
addition to the method used to know it (epistemology) (Creswell, 2009). The concept of 
‘ontology’ refers to the researcher’s perspective and understanding of the nature of social 
reality, whereas ‘epistemology’ encompasses the nature of knowledge and how it can be 
attained, with the behaviour of subjects not being influenced in any way (Ary et al., 2018; 
Creswell, 2009). 
The fundamental philosophical research paradigms are positivism, realism, 
interpretivisim, and pragmatism (Table 3.1) (Saunders et al., 2012; p.119). These 
paradigms consist of three dimensions, namely ontology, epistemology, and axiology. 
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Ontology focuses on the nature of reality and existence, whereas epistemology emphasises 
the theory of knowledge, and axiology focuses on the research values (Easterby-Smith et 
al., 2015; Saunders et al., 2012). These paradigms have a significant impact on research 
and aid the researcher in understanding appropriate exploratory processes. Table 3.1 
provides an insight into how to employ these paradigms and prompts the proper selection, 
which is dependent on the nature of the research and data analysis methods employed. 
In this chapter, the researcher obtains data via operational observations, interviews, and 
operational accident data analysis, which require the researcher to adopt a paradigm that 
can handle the processed data. Moreover, the nature of the collected data is partly analysed 
quantitatively (see Chapter 4) and partly qualitatively. Therefore, the most appropriate 
approach for this research is ontological pragmatism.  
 
3.3.3 Pragmatism approach 
Pragmatism encompasses a mixed-methods approach, which is known as the third 
research method (Tashakkori and Teddlie, 2010; Johnson and Onwuegbuzie, 2004; 
Mayring, 2007). Methodological considerations arise in relation to ‘instrumentation and 
data collection’ (Cohen et al., 2013:5). The mixed-method approach uses both quantitative 
and qualitative research methods either independently to one another concurrently or 
sequentially, where the results obtained from one paradigm can be used to inform the other 
paradigm and address the research questions (Creswell, 2009). Venkatesh et al. (2013) 
noted that, “regardless of the type of research design used, the key characteristic of mixed-
methods research is the concurrent or sequential combination of qualitative and 
quantitative methods within a single research inquiry”. In addition, Guba and Lincoln 
(1994) suggested that, both qualitative and quantitative methods may be used appropriately 
with any research paradigm. Questions of method are secondary to questions of paradigm, 
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which was defined as the basic belief system or world view that guides the investigation, 
not only in choices of method but in ontologically and epistemologically fundamental ways. 
According to Saunders et al. (2012), the usefulness of pragmatism is that it allows the 
researcher to concurrently position him or herself in positivist and interpretivist 
investigations. In addition, this approach applies a practical integration of different 
perspectives to support collect and interpret data. Accordingly, the researcher can achieve 
valuable insights into a phenomenon that may not be comprehended using only one 
paradigm. Therefore, pragmatism contemplates both real effect and practical consequences 
as essential mechanisms of meaning and truth (Venkatesh et al., 2013). 
 
3.4 Selecting a research method  
A key component of any research is choosing a research method. Choosing an adequate 
research method allows the researcher to achieve research objectives. Researchers must 
first state the research design and the data collection process, along with the tools necessary 
to analyse data. Clarifying this information provides the researcher with a systematic 
approach that can organise the researcher’s work and help achieve research goals. Research 
design has been defined as “a plan of the research project to investigate and obtain answers 
to research questions” (Blumberg et al., 2014). The advantage of designing a research 
project is to elucidate the research limitations by highlighting the setting of the study, the 
investigation type, the unit of analysis, and the issues established for further research. The 
diversity of research methods employed to investigate problems in a work place 
characterised as highly dynamic can be considered a major strength; they can be broadly 
categorised into two methods: quantitative and qualitative (Lee and Hubona, 2009; Myers 
and Avison, 2002; Sidorova et al., 2008). However, many scholars have combined the 




The mixed-methods approach was defined by Johnson and Onwuegbuzie (2004, p.17) 
as “the class of research where the researcher mixes or combines quantitative and 
qualitative research techniques, methods, approaches, concepts or language into a single 
study”. Similarly, Creswell (2009) defines the mixed-methods approach as “an approach 
to inquiry that combines or associates both qualitative and quantitative forms. It involves 
philosophical assumptions, the use of qualitative and quantitative approaches, and the 
mixing of both approaches in a study”.  
The advantage of using the mixed-methods approach is that it could help in 
highlighting theoretical credible answers to the topic in question by providing assistance 
that helps overwhelm practical or cognitive barriers associated with carrying out this 
particular type of research (Tashakkori and Creswell, 2008). It is worth mentioning that 
the researcher must have the ability to handle considerable paradigmatic, cultural, 
cognitive, and physical challenges to employ the mixed-method in a research study 
(Mingers, 2001). Moreover, using the mixed-method approach, especially if it is built on 
a common scientific basis, is vital to advancing and sustaining the traditions of 
methodological diversity in a research and creating a cumulative body of knowledge in a 






Table 3.1. Comparison between the four research philosophies (Adapted from Saunders et al., 2012; p.119) 
Research 
Philosophy 
Ontology: the researcher’s view of 
the nature of reality or being 
 
Epistemology: the researcher’s view 
regarding what constitutes acceptable 
knowledge 
 
Axiology: the researcher’s view of 
the role of values in research 
Data collection techniques 
most often used 
Positivism 
External, objective and 
independent of social actors 
 
Only observable phenomena can provide 
credible data, facts. Focus on causality 
and law like generalisations, reducing 
phenomena to simplest elements 
 
 
Research is undertaken in a value-
free way, the researcher is 
independent of the data and 
maintains an objective stance 
 
Highly structured, large 
samples, measurement, 
quantitative, but can use 
qualitative 
Realism 
Is objective. Exists independently 
of human thoughts and beliefs or 
knowledge of their existence 
(realist), but is interpreted through 
social conditioning (critical realist) 
 
Observable phenomena provide credible 
data, facts. Insufficient data means 
inaccuracies in sensations (direct realism). 
Alternatively, phenomena create 
sensations which are open to 
misinterpretation (critical realism). Focus 
on explaining within a context or contexts 
 
Research is value laden; the 
researcher is biased by world 
views, cultural experiences and 
upbringing. These will impact on 
the research 
Methods chosen must fit the 
subject matter, quantitative 
or qualitative 
Interpretivist 
Socially constructed, subjective, 
may change, multiple 
Subjective meanings and social 
phenomena. Focus upon the details of 
situation, a reality behind these details, 
subjective meanings motivating actions 
Research is value bound, the 
researcher is part of what is being 
researched, cannot be separated 
and so will be subjective 





External, multiple, view chosen to 
best enable answering of research 
question 
Either or both observable phenomena and 
subjective meanings can provide 
acceptable knowledge dependent upon the 
research question. Focus on practical 
applied research, integrating different 
perspectives to help interpret the data 
Values play a large role in 
interpreting results, the researcher 
adopting both objective and 
subjective points of view 
Mixed or multiple method 





Although using the mixed-methods approach can enrich the data collection, the 
researcher initially must focus on the research question, purpose, and context (Creswell, 
2009; Myers and Klein, 2011; Venkatesh et al., 2013). There are four types of mixed-
method paradigm, namely triangulation, embedded, explanatory, and exploratory 
(Creswell and Clark, 2007) (see Table 3.2). 
 
Table 3.2. Types of mixed-method research (Creswell and Clark, 2007) 
Mixed-method 
Type 
Description of usage 
Triangulation 
through merging qualitative and quantitative data to understand a 
research problem 
Embedded 
through using either quantitative or qualitative data to answer a 
research question within a largely qualitative or quantitative study 
Explanatory through using qualitative data to explain quantitative results 
Exploratory 
through collecting quantitative data to test and explain a relationship 
found in qualitative data 
 
 
Venkatesh et al. (2013) summarised seven reasons for using mixed-methods (Creswell, 
2009; Greene et al., 1989; Tashakkori and Teddlie, 2008) (see Table 3.3).  
 
Table 3.3. Purposes of mixed-methods research (Venkatesh et al., 2013) 
Reason of use Description 
Complementarity 
Mixed-methods are used in order to gain complementary 
views about the same phenomena or relationships. 
Completeness 
Mixed-methods designs are used to make sure a complete 
picture of a phenomenon is obtained. 
Developmental 
Questions for one strand emerge from the inferences of a 
previous one (sequential mixed-methods), or one strand 
provides hypotheses to be tested in the next one. 
Expansion 
Mixed-methods are used in order to explain or expand upon 
the understanding obtained in a previous strand of a study. 
Corroboration/Confirmation 
Mixed-methods are used in order to assess the credibility of 
inferences obtained from one approach (strand). 
Compensation 
Mixed-methods enable compensating for the weaknesses of 
one approach by using the other. 
Diversity 
Mixed-methods are used with the hope of obtaining 
divergent views of the same phenomenon. 
 
The motivations behind using the mixed-method were highlighted in the literature as 
it is able to address exploratory and confirmatory research simultaneously (Teddlie and 
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Tashakkori, 2009). Walsham (2006) highlighted that qualitative methods have been 
employed in social science studies for exploratory research with the aim of understanding 
a phenomenon and/or generating new theoretical insights. Other scholars have suggested 
that stronger inferences can be achieved when using mixed-methods paradigm than using 
a single method (Teddlie and Tashakkori, 2009). This point of view has been supported by 
Johnson and Turner (2003), who emphasised, as a result of their study, that mixed-methods 
research can strengthen both quantitative and qualitative methods and provide further 
insights into a phenomenon than each method when used individually. Moreover, mixed-
method research paradigms can do the following:  
1- Overcome the weaknesses of using single paradigm (qualitative or quantitative) by 
taking advantage of the strengths of both; 
2- Provide stronger evidence for conclusions through convergence and corroboration 
of findings; and 
3- Produce a more complete knowledge essential to informing theory and practice 
(Johnson and Onwuegbuzie, 2004). 
 
Lastly, mixed-methods offers a larger assortment of contradictory and/or 
complementary findings to further improve the reliability of the study (Teddlie and 
Tashakkori, 2009). 
The advantage of discussing contradictory findings is not limited to improving 
understanding the phenomena. Addressing contradictory findings helps to assess the 
study’s limitations or interrelations between its components, opening new opportunities 
for future investigation (Venkatesh et al., 2013). Complementary findings are equally 
valuable in providing a holistic view of a phenomenon and supplementary insight into 
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relationships among the components of a study. Bryman (2006) has presented seven key 
motives to use a mixed-methods research paradigm (see Table 3.4). 
 
Table 3.4. Motivations for using the mixed-method design (Bryman, 2006; p.82) 
Reason of use                                  Description 
Triangulation 
Use of two or more independent sources of data or data collection 
methods to corroborate research findings within a study 
Facilitation 
Use of one data collection method or research strategy to aid research 
using another data collection method or research strategy within a study 
Complementarity 
Use of two or more research strategies in order that different aspects of 
an investigation can be dovetailed 
Generality 
Use of independent source of data to contextualise main study or use 
quantitative analysis to provide sense of relative importance 
Aid interpretation 




Quantitative to look at macro aspects and qualitative to look at micro 
aspects 
Solving a puzzle 
Use of an alternative data collection method when the initial method 
reveals unexplainable results or insufficient data 
 
Creswell (2009) identified six research strategies within the mixed-method approach, 
namely sequential explanatory, sequential exploratory, sequential transformative, 
concurrent triangulation, concurrent nested, and concurrent transformative. These 
strategies have been summarised by Al Ahbabi (2016) (Table 3.5). 
In this study, the most appropriate research paradigm was ‘pragmatism’ as helps in 
developing a comprehensive overview of various phenomena of interest that cannot be 
totally understood when using an independent method, such as qualitative or quantitative. 
Moreover, mixed-methods requires the use of both paradigms as it requires both subjective 
and objective points of view. The subjective view helps to identify factors that affect 
operator reliability as a result of the presence of “work stress”, and the objective view helps 
the researcher examine the influence and impact of these factors. In addition, the ability to 
integrate different perspectives can help in the collection and interpretation of the required 
data. For this reason, this research uses a pragmatist approach that reflects a practical and 
applied research philosophy. 
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Table 3.5. Mixed-methods strategies and their key features (Al Ahbabi, 2016, p.129) 
Strategy Implementation Priority 
Stage of 
integration 






























































































Hence, the mixed-methods approach has been applied in this research because it could 
help in highlighting plausible theoretical answers to the topic in question by providing 
assistance that overwhelms any practical or cognitive barriers associated with carrying out 
this particular type of research. Moreover, the combination of induction and deduction 
allows for abductive reasoning, which is required in this type of research. Lastly, this 
method enables the researcher to validate results by developing integrative types of finding. 
Since the strategy followed in this research involved addressing the qualitative data in an 
exploratory form followed by a confirmatory form to represent the quantitative set of data, 
77 
 
the particular nature of the research questions in this study compel the implementation of 
the sequential exploratory mixed-methods strategy. The reason for selecting this strategy 
is that the researcher is required to ascertain the current organisational practices at the port 
that affect operator reliability during marine port pilotage operations. This process is 
qualitative in nature and will help in understanding and identifying the factors perceived 
as being prevalent in terms of importance to conceptualise a reliability index that can be 
used by decision-makers in order to predict daily operational practices. The quantitative 
data (as discussed in Chapter 4) was used in developing research tools to extend and 
validate the findings. Thus, by applying the qualitative data in order to expand on 
quantitative results, both methods were used. 
 
3.5 Research tools and data collection 
The way that a researcher collects the required data in order to meet the objectives of 
the research is defined as the research methodology (Ghauri and Gronhaug, 2005). The 
research methodology builds upon a systematic, focused, and orderly data collection 
process, which helps to answer the research questions and to achieve the research 
objectives. In this research, the process used combined both inductive and deductive 
reasoning. This choice was because the literature on the research subject confirmed a lack 
of theoretical, fragmented, and empirical knowledge on the topic. Therefore, this research 
began with an inductive reasoning approach followed by deductive reasoning. Moreover, 
a sequential exploratory mixed-methods strategy was chosen for this study. This strategy 
was represented by a qualitative data collection process in the first stage of the research 
(Chapter 3) by observing field operations, semi-structured focus group interviews, and an 
investigation of the accidents that had occurred at the selected port. This process is 
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followed by a quantitative data analysis using different techniques, which is presented in 
Chapter 4. 
 
3.5.1 Field observation 
Observations are used to identify naturally occurring events in order to investigate field 
experience, represent social activities, and understand social processes within the acquired 
field. Since the literature does not provide an insight into the nature of the pilotage 
operation and the degree of interactions between various parties working there, the 
researcher has decided to use a suitable method that can provide an overview of how the 
operation is conducted, and identify the role and degree of importance of each participant 
in the marine pilotage operation. Therefore, observations are one of the qualitative 
techniques used in this research to gain a further understanding of the subject under 
investigation (Bryman, 2003). Moreover, observation was used amongst a group of 
workers to explore and generate organisational concepts and models (Steyaert and Bouwen, 
2004). This method has been used widely across different fields of study, such as 
organisational ethnography (Rosen, 1991) and cognitive mapping (Brown, 1992). The 
researcher can use observation to complement findings obtained through other methods, 
such as interviews, to build an understanding of how daily operations are managed and 
conducted. Observation allows the researcher to investigate the day-to-day experiences and 
behaviour of subjects in a particular environment (Cassell and Symon, 2004).  
Observation has two distinct categories, structured and unstructured. Structured 
observation is used to record physical activities and verbal behaviour, whereas 
unstructured observation is used to understand and interpret cultural behaviour (Mulhall, 
2003). This investigation employed unstructured observation to understand the role of each 
participant and identify the degree of operational interactions between each operator in a 
highly dynamic operation. The researcher used this method to structure interactions 
79 
 
between operators within an operation, which helped to identify the key parties in a real-
world setting. 
 
3.5.2 Focus-group semi-structured interview 
One of the important steps in collecting data is the way in which the researcher 
interviews experts for their opinions. The interview is a common research practice and 
works as a primary means of gathering the required data to achieve research objectives. 
Cohen et al., (2013, p.351) have cited that, 
“By providing access to what is ‘inside a person’s head’, it makes it possible to 
measure what a person knows (knowledge or information), what a person likes or 
dislikes (value and preferences), and what a person thinks (attitude and beliefs)”. 
The order of the interview may be controlled while still allowing room for spontaneity 
and the interviewer can press not only for complete answers, but also for responses to 
complex and deep issues. The interview approach varies as the topic of the investigation 
and the nature of the working environment under assessment varies too. Since this research 
starts by collecting qualitative data to support the quantitative processes in the next chapter, 
a focus-group semi-structured interview data collection process was employed. The main 
reason for choosing focus-group semi-structured interviews in this research is that it is 
ideally suited to exploring the complexity surrounding the reliability of operators who are 
subject to daily influences that affect their performance, behaviour, and attitude at work by 
encouraging participants to engage positively with the process of the research.  
Rabiee (2004) described the focus-group interview technique as in-depth group 
interviews where participants involved are selected because they purposively form a part 
of a specific population, although they are not necessarily representative. The focus group 
is then given a specific topic to discuss. Moreover, focus group participants are chosen 
based on certain criteria, such as specialist knowledge of the topic in question, are within 
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a specific age range, have similar demographic characteristics, and are comfortable 
discussing the topic and being interviewed with one another (Richardson and Rabiee, 
2001). According to Burrows and Kendall (1997) the concept of applicability should be 
applied to this approach, as participants are selected because of their knowledge of the 
study area. It is worth mentioning that the group dynamic is one of the distinct features of 
this approach, and the type and range of generated data through the social interactions 
between experts are often deeper and richer compared to the data obtained in individual 
interviews (Rabiee, 2004).  
The semi-structured interview offers an opportunity to probe, discuss answers in detail, 
and build on the interviewees’ responses. In this research, a semi-structured interview 
protocol was followed and began with general questions about the topic and pilots’ 
experiences in the organisation. The design of the semi-structured interviews enabled the 
researcher to ask open-ended questions that outline the criteria to be covered and was 
supported with a focus group that helped the pilots in making conversation and retelling 
experiences that might have been missed in an individual interview. Therefore, adopting 
focus-group semi-structured interviews serves as a valuable data collection method that 
helps meet the objectives of the study. 
Accordingly, facilitating the semi-structured focus-group interviews is considered 
effective in allowing the participant to express freely their own opinions and experiences 
(Flick, 2014). The focus group helps further by providing a wide range of information, 
ideas, and feelings about existing issues, and highlighting the differences between 
participants’ perspectives (Rabiee, 2004). Moreover, facilitating the semi-structured 
interviews aids in ensuring that the discussions between participants cover all areas of a 
topic (Silverman, 2014), while the focus-group process generates deeper data sets and 
richer information than those collected from individual participants (Rabiee, 2004). 
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3.5.3 Accident investigation 
As part of the qualitative data collection process, the main aim of this section is to 
further the researcher’s understanding of the current organisational standards applied in 
daily operational practices. Accident investigation adds valuable insight into the current 
phenomenon surrounding the operational practices that influence operator reliability. This 
approach makes vital contributions to this study by looking back on existing operational 
accidents to determine the facts surrounding the cause of an accident and identifying the 
contributory factors that led up to the event. In addition, accident investigation plays a 
fundamental role in meeting the objectives of this study and provides a clear overview of 
operational safety issues that imply urgent operational, managerial, and structural changes, 
in the form of regulatory levels, in order to improve future system safety and accident 
prevention through recommendations and corrective actions.  
In this section, the researcher highlights four accidents that occurred during marine port 
pilotage operations at the port selected for study. Three of these events were from the 
selected port’s accident investigation record, and one event occurred when the researcher 
was undertaking field observations. Moreover, the researcher was later involved in event 
investigation and addressing the main operational issues surrounded this operation by 
interviewing the key operational parties identified from the observation section. To 
summarise, the researcher has been able to identify a number of issues associated with 
marine pilotage operations. 
 
3.6 Research process 
In this section, the researcher explains the process followed in collecting the required 
data during port visits. This research aims to investigate the current working practices 
within the pilotage operations by conducting a case study in one of the busiest and 
strategically located ports in a particular Asian country. Duo to the security and 
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confidentiality of this country’s economy and operator security, any information that could 
lead to the identification of the operators or the location of the port is withheld. This port 
was selected because the researcher gained official access to some critical operational 
information. Moreover, this information has had a significant positive impact on the 
collection of the required data, contacting the participants easily, and accessing sensitive 
data that is often hidden from public due to governmental policies. This data is to remain 
anonymous during the process of this study to maintain the port’s required confidentiality. 
The port’s anonymity is maintained because port management has requested that the 
researcher does not release the name of this port nor release any information that could 
lead to identification of the port. 
The selected port is considered as a hub-port to its country for two reasons. Firstly, the 
selected port is the only port in the country that can receive the majority of ships of different 
sizes, such as the Ro-Ro, container, tanker, passenger, bulk, and car carrier. Secondly, most 
of the cargo imported into that country first arrives through this port. According to the port 
statistics, over 55 million tonnes of cargo handling moved through this port in 2017. In 
addition, the International Association of Ports and Harbours (IAPH) placed the selected 
port within the top 40 of the World Port League in containerisation increment, and one of 
the top 5 in the area (IAPH, 2017).  Furthermore, this port is located in a strategic location, 
as all of the ships crossing the area must pass close to that port, which means that the port 
is often used for shelter in cases of emergency. Accordingly, this port has been 
continuously increasing in size, infrastructure, and marine services over the last decade 
aiming to handle as many ship sizes and as much cargo tonnage as possible in limited time 
following effective operational standards. 
Therefore, port management emphasises optimising the port’s operational working 
procedures and practices to comply with international working practices in place. This 
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study will help the management of that port to investigate in depth any deficiencies and 
provide the decision-makers with recommendations and operational tools to enhance 
operational reliability during pilotage operation, specifically focusing on a pilot as an 
essential part of the marine pilotage operation. 
The following sections detail data collection, which began by contacting the port for 
approval. 
 
3.6.1 Establishing port contact 
The researcher contacted the port authority officially by sending an official letter 
addressed to the senior management. The letter contained researcher details, the research 
topics and objectives, the expected outcomes, and an offer of future operational support to 
aid management in enhancing the operational standards. The management replied with 
conditional approval and requested further formal clarification of items such as the targeted 
experts and the places that would be visited by the researcher. This information was 
required by the Port State Control (PSC) and the Maritime Coast Guard Agency (MCGA) 
of the country in order to issue the access permit. The researcher gained a permit to access 
the port for three months, which started from July 2017 and ran until September of the 
same year. 
 
3.6.2 Obtaining port operational documents 
The researcher approached the management of the marine operation department and 
introduced himself, the nature of the study, and its main objectives. This step was important, 
as the researcher was able to make a positive first impression on management. The 
management then offered support to the researcher and direct contact if any problem 
emerged or clarification was needed during the research process. This contact allows the 
researcher to access almost-confidential port accident statistics, operational policies and 
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procedures, access on board the arriving ships, and the arrangement of meetings with all 
parties involved in pilotage operations to conduct focus-group semi-structured interviews 
and review port operational plans that are in place. This section highlights the internal 
policies, regulations, and standards related to operations and compares them with the real 
working situation at the port by analysing the port’s accident data analysis, carrying out 
field observations on ships under pilotage command, and considering interview comments. 
 
3.6.2.1 Port operational procedures 
The most essential part of every organisation is setting organisational goals and visions. 
For this selected port, visions, goals, and standards are clearly stipulated and written, well 
maintained, and updated to adhere to international maritime recommendations and 
standards. Through a literature review, and due to the nature of the marine pilotage 
operation, which is characterised as highly dynamic and more practical than theoretical, 
there is no evidence of who is involved in the pilotage operation, particularly at the front 
line of the operation. However, the only identified operators within the literature were the 
pilot and vessel traffic service (VTS) from the port’s side (Mokhtari et al., 2012; Praetorius 
et al., 2015), and the shipmaster (Trucco et al., 2008) on the other side without identifying 
other involved parties such as the tug master, and the harbour master. Thus, this research 
highlight the key factors involved in the operation to identify the degree of influence 
among them. Due to time constrains, the research will focus on the marine pilot as an 
essential driver of the operation, and how the pilot is the first priority during an operation. 
 
3.6.2.2 Port pilotage operational policies and standards 
In 1968, the IMO recognises the significance of employing qualified pilots in port 
approaches and other areas where the local knowledge is required when the organisation 
adopts assembly resolution A.159 (ES.IV), “recommendation on pilotage”. This resolution 
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recommends that the government enhance pilotage services by defining the most 
appropriate safety measures as well as defining the ships and classes of ships mandatory 
to be piloted by an official designated pilot. Accordingly, in 2004, the resolution A.960 
(23) adopted by the IMO encouraged pilotage authorities to provide marine pilots with 
regular effective training, certifications, and operational procedures. The IMO has 
recognised the significant role that the pilots play in promoting maritime safety and 
protecting the environment. Therefore, port authorities have both statutory and non- 
statutory powers, which allow the port authority to state the minimum requirements and 
qualifications needed to assign a person for berthing and un-berthing ships and ensuring 
port safety. In sum, there are no international standards when employing a pilot to conduct 
pilotage services at a port, as the discretion remains based on port authority requirements. 
However, in this study, the port under investigation regulates the pilotage operations 
as compulsory for all ships that use the port at any time for any reason. There were 
exemptions for certain types of ships, which are the following: 
1- War ships that belong to that country; 
2- Governmental ships designated for non-commercial purposes; 
3- Ships with a gross registered tonnage (GRT) lower than 150 GRTs; 
4- Yachts and boats designed for entertaining; 
5- Port units used for port services, such as tugs, pilot boats, floating cranes; and 
6- Ships with a certificate of pilotage exemption granted by the port authority, such 
as bunker barges. 
 
The port authority, in regulating the pilotage operation, has placed certain requirements 
on qualified pilots. Any pilot assigned to conducting a pilotage service is selected based 
on the ship tonnage, specification, and types. It is the responsibility of the port authority to 
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provide the operators with all required training, regulatory policies, and the proper 
equipment for the operation. 
The pilot gains experience over time and is subsequently placed in the pilot ranking 
system. Four pilot ranks are used based on the requirement of the chosen port, as shown in 
Table 3.6. 
 
Table 3.6. Marine port pilot ranking system  
Rank Definition 
Trainee pilot 
Has attended and successfully accomplished classes on pilotage training 
conducted at an accredited institute by the port authority and has 
conducted a practical pilotage operation with an experienced first-degree 
pilot on ships with limited tonnages for a certain period of time. 
Third-degree 
pilot 
Has successfully accomplished practical pilotage training and the on 
board, written, and oral exams. The pilot with this rank is allowed to pilot 
ships with no more than 8000 GRTs. 
Second-degree 
pilot 
Has successfully passed the written, practical, and oral exam designed to 
examine pilot’s eligibility to be promoted from third-grade. The total 
tonnage permissible for pilotage at this rank is limited at 16000 GRTs’. 
First-degree pilot 
Is eligible to conduct pilotage services on all ship types with unlimited 
tonnages.  
 
The selection of a pilot to conduct the pilotage operation is based on the decision of 
the duty harbour master. The duty harbour master is an experienced first-degree pilot with 
experience in pilotage operation of more than 10 years at this level and is usually assigned 
by the port authority. The responsibilities of the harbour master are as follows: 
1- Assure navigational safety within port limits and inside navigational channels; 
2- Monitor all navigational movement inside and outside of the port; 
3-  Supervise the VTS operations; 
4-  Update local and Admiralty navigational charts; 
5- To check and assure the proper function and working conditions of all the 
navigational equipment used for monitoring ships’ movements; 




7-  Supervise issuing fines, maintenance permissions, and accident investigations. 
 
The harbour master, due to the nature of his/her daily operation, must be aware of any 
pilot’s limitations on their ability to conduct the operation. The selection process for the 
harbour master is subject to either the pilotage service history or subject to a present daily 
situation. For instance, if the harbour master is aware that a first-degree pilot is stressed 
due to external factors, then the harbour master is obligated to ensure the safety of 
navigation and must choose another qualified pilot who is capable of handling the 
approaching and leaving ships. 
 
3.6.3 Compiling interview groups  
To conduct effective interviews, the researcher developed a general overview of how 
the operation runs, as highlighted on Section 3.7.1. The main objectives behind this process 
are as follows: 
1- to identify the key operators involved at the front line of marine port pilotage 
operation; 
2- to identify the link between those operators; and 
3- to identify the role of each operator at each operational stage.  
 
Moreover, the literature review was facilitated to offer interview guidance. This step 
helps to form a set of questions to structure the interviews and generate effective discussion 
points. In addition, the researcher facilitated the interview by forming participant groups. 
Accordingly, this study was conducted in semi-structured focus-group interviews.  
Conducting semi-structured interviews requires the interviewer to establish a general 
approach by deciding what topics or grounds are to be covered and, which questions need 
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to be asked (Drever, 1995). The nature of the questions was open-ended and was guided 
by general questions to allow the respondent to respond freely and comfortably. 
The researcher collaborated with the marine department to organise a participant group, 
arrange a time, and place for the interviews. The head of the marine department encouraged 
pilots to participate in this research and followed up with notices to ensure their 
participation. Using this approach, 35 marine pilots were recruited to participate in this 
investigation. These pilots worked different shifts and had different ranks and levels of 
work experience (see Table 3.7). 
Since this study focuses on the pilot as the key factor in conducting marine pilotage 
operations, the participants selected were pilots. No exclusions were applied to the sample, 










Dip. +PL 3rd +PL 2nd +PL 1st +PL Master +PL Total (%) 
1. Gender 
Male 19 3 7 0 6 35 (100%) 
Female 0 0 0 0 0 0   (0%) 
Total 19 (54%) 3 (9%) 7 (20%) 0 (0%) 6 (17%) 35 (100%) 
2. Age Group 
20- 29 8 1 0 0 0 9 (25.7%) 
30 – 39 3 2 2 0 1 8 (22.9%) 
40 – 49 3 0 3 0 2 8 (22.9%) 
50 – 59 5 0 2 0 2 9 (25.7%) 
60 and above 0 0 0 0 1 1 (2.8%) 
Total 19 (54%) 3 (9%) 7 (20%) 0 (0%) 6 (17%) 35 (100%) 
3. Pilot’s 
Rank 
Trainee Pilot 0 0 1 0 1 2 (6%) 
Third Pilot 4 1 0 0 0 5 (14%) 
Second Pilot 3 2 1 0 0 6 (17%) 
First Pilot 12 0 5 0 5 22 (63%) 
Total 19 (54%) 3 (9%) 7 (20%) 0 (0%) 6 (17%) 35 (100%) 
4. Pilotage 
Experience 
≤ 5 Years 8 0 2 0 1 11 (31%) 
6 – 10 Years 3 3 0 0 2 8 (23%) 
11 – 15 Years 0 0 1 0 1 2 (6%) 
16 – 20 Years 0 0 1 0 0 1 (3%) 
˃ 20 Years 8 0 3 0 2 13 (37%) 
Total 19 (54%) 3 (9%) 7 (20%) 0 (0%) 6 (17%) 35 (100%) 
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The first demographic characteristic is the pilots’ age groups. The balance between 
participants’ numbers per each different age group can be observed. This might help to 
balance the answers in accordance with the expert’s experience and position. The youngest 
and most senior pilots represent the age groups of 20-29 and 50-59 make up 26 % each of 
the participant group. Pilots of age 30-39 and 40-49 make up 23 % each of participants. 
These age differences will help in obtaining a wide range of perspectives. 
The second demographic characteristic is pilot ranking. 63% of the participants of this 
study are first-grade pilots. This percentage will add value to the results, as first-grade 
pilots are required to have over 10 years’ experience of pilotage, which will aid them in 
providing accurate perceptions and responses. 6, 5, and 2 % of the participants were 
second-grade, third-grade, and trainee-level pilots, respectively. These percentages allow 
for the maximum possible amount of information to come from experienced, senior pilots, 
while also allowing junior pilots to express their opinions. 
The above variance has valuable outputs, since almost two thirds of the participants 
were senior pilots. The seniority of those participants can complement the answers given 
by the lower ranked participants through the group interviews. For this reason, a focus-
group interview was chosen as it is proven to be effective at eliciting feelings, stories, and 
other aspects of an individual’s experiences, as highlighted by Flick (2014), Rabiee (2004), 
and Silverman (2014). 
Participant selection was purposive since they are selected for their particular 
characteristics that will aid in understanding and exploring central criteria of the acquired 
phenomenon (Ritchie et al., 2013). The two reasons for selecting purposive groups are 
highlighted by Ritchie et al. (2013): 




2- to ensure that, within each of the identified key criteria, diversity is included so that 
the impact of the characteristic concerned is explored. 
 
For instance, work experience is a common criterion and is used to ensure that any 
differences in operational perspectives can be identified. Accordingly, this research 
focuses only on assessing the port marine pilot in order to provide a picture of the current 
operational phenomenon, which forms a homogeneous group as it represents only marine 
port pilots. In contrast, the selected group is varied in its internal characteristics such as 
operator’s age range and working experience. This aims to identify central criteria that are 
prevalent across a range of operators (Ritchie et al., 2013).Thirteen questions were used in 
conducting and directing these interviews. 
However, these questions were used by the researcher to open discussions and allow 
interviewees to tell their own stories and discuss with their different points of view. 
Moreover, the researcher might identify more factors present within the working practices 
that were not identified in the literature reviews. 
The selected questions were tested through a pilot study aiming to ensure the 
cohesiveness and clarity of the given questions. These questions were sent to five senior 
pilots who had a considerable amount of experience as a pilot. These pilots’ suggestions 
were considered and incorporated into the amended version of the questionnaire, to 
simplify and ease the selected terminology. This process is considered essential and allows 
the expert to understand the given questions and reply without confusion. Although the 
researcher gained considerable support from the literature in developing an overall picture 
of the topic under investigation and identifying a research gap, it is highly essential that 
the researcher does not direct interviews based on the literature. In other words, the 
researcher can use the identified questions to open a discussion about the topic and let 
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interviewees tell their own story with other colleagues for further discussion and 
knowledge sharing. This step has significant outcomes for the research result and can 
reduce the existence of research bias and eliminate any pre-conditioned answers 
(Abdelrahman et al., 2011). Moreover, the researcher has conducted a confirmatory test 
using the Delphi method in Chapter 4 to test the agreements among the examined pilots in 
terms of the factors identified in this chapter. This step forms the quantitative component 
of this study. The researcher used the comments and suggestions returned by the officials 
from the pilot study to refine questions for the actual study. 
Before conducting the interviews, the researcher informed interviewees that the 
information of the participants will remain anonymous, and the written results will not be 
indicative of the identities of any of them. Moreover, the interviewees were informed that 
the process would be recorded to allow the researcher to return to the script and consider 
revising pilots’ answers to avoid missing any useful information. Participants were also 
informed that the recordings would be kept private to ensure their anonymity. Accordingly, 
each group was asked to confirm their approval of the interview being recorded for the 
aforementioned reason by signing the consent form. According to Walsham (2006), 
recording the interviews is useful and can help in providing the investigator with full and 
detailed descriptions of what the interviewees said. The interviews were conducted in the 
local language used at this port to ensure overcoming any language difficulties that could 
hinder the research process. The recordings were then transcribed by the researcher and 
translated into English. 
The researcher checked the translated transcriptions with a bilingual language speaker 
who is a native speaker of the two language. This person has lived since birth and studied 
in the country where this investigation took place for more than 18 years and moved to the 
UK to obtain a degree and work as a senior officer in a commercial company for over 20 
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years. Moreover, this speaker has held both nationalities since birth, the UK and the 
nationality of that country where this study was conducted. Accordingly, the researcher 
received constructive comments, and some aspects of the translation were amended. The 
researcher assured the participants of their confidentiality and privacy, as their information, 
as well as the name of the port and country, will not be revealed to any third parties for 
privacy and economic security purposes. The interviews took place in the pilotage main 
building where there was less navigational movement due to the full berth occupancy at 
that time. It was hard to ensure lesser movement, which forced the researcher to maintain 
direct contact with different departments on a daily basis and monitor the operational 
movements on that day. Moreover, this process was time-consuming, and arranging an 
interview that suited all pilots took nearly two months. During this period, the researcher 
spent time reading the port policy, accident reports, and making operational observations 
in order to conduct further investigations on board the ship during pilotage operations, 
which is discussed later in this chapter. 
When the researcher had gained enough information from the pilots, he ended the 
interview by thanking all participants for their effort and added that he hoped to support 
the industry to implement new operational strategies if needed. The researcher ended the 
interviews when he noticed a repetition of given answers and agreement between pilots 
that all operational aspects were covered. At the end of the interview, the researcher 
expressed his sincere appreciation and thanked them all for their efforts. Furthermore, the 
researcher asked the participants for permission to contact them if any further details are 
required, and gained the approval. Pilots expressed their interest in the topic and ask the 
researcher to get a copy to them of the research results at the end of the study. 
Those participants continued with their participation in this study across the following 
chapters and responded to the given questionnaires developed by the researcher. The 
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interviewees were cooperative with the researcher. However, the participants felt that their 
support in terms of explaining the current study findings would help port management and 
decision-makers to introduce the necessary changes and improve current operational 
practices. Indeed, this interest may imply honest answers to the questions and feeling free 
to convey their perceptions and comments. 
 
3.7 Field investigation and data collection 
In this section, the researcher employed the proposed research tools highlighted in 
Section 3.5 to collect the required data. This section provides an overview of marine 
pilotage operation processes, followed by an interview with an expert and a discussion on 
the number of reported marine accidents occurring during pilotage operation. 
 
3.7.1 Observing the pilotage operational process 
The researcher has summarised his observations into the way that the operation was 
conducted, starting from the point at which the ship sends the information to the vessel 
traffic service (VTS), who represents the port to contact, monitor, and provide assistance 
to ships around and inside the port, until the ship is moored on the designated terminal (see 
Figure 3.2). It is essential to summarise the operation to identify the degree of 
interdependence between the key operational drivers and value the criticality of the 
operation. Since the main objective of a marine pilotage operation is to maintain the safety 
of ships navigating within a confined port area, cargoes, port equipment, and the marine 
environment, the criticality of the operator reliability is focused on in this research. The 
majority of marine accident investigations point to human error as the main cause of 
accidents during port pilotage operations. 
The researcher observed 17 pilotage operations, 14 of which involved ships entering 
the port, and 3 involved ships leaving the port. The reason for observing these operations 
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was to monitor the pilot while conducting the operation and to identify every reported order 
either to the shipmaster or to any other parties involved in the operation. Moreover, the 
researcher gained some useful insights that may help in assessing pilot reliability in the 
next chapter of this study. The researcher has summarised the operation through the 
following points: 
 
3.7.1.1 Establishing organisational communication (EOC) 
The first link starts with the Ship Operational Department (SOD) contacting the Port 
Operational Department (POD) to provide the required information to allocate the suitable 
jetty. This port requires the ship to provide the following: 
1- Ship specification (type, length, draft, etc.);  
2- Ship registration details (IMO number, flags, GRT, etc.); 
3- Estimated Time of Arrival (ETA) 
4- Last and next port of call 
5- Cargo types (container, general, etc.) 
6- Crew list 
7- Agent details 
The POD will then advise the harbour master (HM) to allocate the proper ship’s berth 
before arrival. Once the berth has been allocated, the POD grants permission to the SOD. 
Once this permission has been granted, the SOD confirms to the shipmaster (SM) the 
approval with further port details and requirements. The role of the POD is to arrange all 
facilities to ensure operational safety. The POD confirms the arrival and the specification 
of the ship with the HM in order to ensure a safe operation. The HM then confirms with 
the jetty operator (JO), who is responsible for arranging for cargo handlings, clearance of 
the jetty from any obstacles and termination of ship paperwork. In addition, the HM 
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informs Vessel Traffic Services (VTS) with the above information provided by the SOD 
to the POD and the assigned marine pilot (MP) in order to conduct the operation. 
 
3.7.1.2 Before arrival 
According to the port regulation, it is mandatory to all ships calling at this port to report 
essential arrival information (i.e. ship’s name, call sign, cargo types, ETA, etc.) to the VTS 
five, two, and one day(s) before arrival. Once received, it is the role of the VTS to confirm 
with the HM the details to make sure all safety requirements are met before arrival. This 
information is useful and allows the VTS operator to monitor ships’ movement using one 
of the monitoring electronic navigational systems, such as Radar or AIS, that are available 
at the VTS station once the ship enters the range of these devices. Moreover, this system 
helps port management decide how to reschedule the entry in accordance with the current 
operational situation, if the reported ship is expected to be delayed or to have given false 
information for any reason. 
 
3.7.1.3 Before arriving to the pilot station (PS) 
Before the ship approaches the PS located on the outer gate of the port designed by the 
port authority in accordance with the international standards to pick the pilot from, the SM 
must get updated instruction and relevant navigational information from the VTS operator. 
The information includes current port navigational movement, readiness of pilots and tugs, 
navigational hazards, the tide, and the movements of the current. It is the role of the VTS 
operator to inform the MP and the tug master (TM) that the ship is arriving in order to 
prepare for the conducting of the operation. The MP must be informed of the operational 
details, such as the ETA, the terminal, and the shipside on the jetty, in order to arrange a 
time to embark the ship and the required tugs and prepare operational plans. The TM must 
be informed of similar information to plan for safe operations. A direct communication 
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must be established and checked regularly with the VTS, SM, MP, and TM to ensure a 
clear order understanding and share any required operational information. Although the 
SM does not make direct contact with the TM by sending orders, a clear communication 
understanding must be maintained at all times during the operation. Moreover, the role of 
the HM is to supervise the operation to ensure the clarity of all orders, transparency of all 
navigational information, and maintenance of port operational standards. Once all parties 
are ready to conduct the operation, and the procedures have been agreed upon, the VTS 
operator will grant the SM permission to proceed at a safe speed towards the PS for the 
MP boarding process. 
 
3.7.1.4 MP on board 
The MP must identify himself to the SM, and the SM must present the pilot card. The 
pilot card contains important ship details, such as engine power, bow thruster power, and 
length of the ship that the MP must consider before conducting an operation to assess the 
manoeuvrability and make any necessary decisions. For instance, if the ship has a single 
screw right-handed propeller, this information is essential to the pilot in determining how 
to use the engine, as this decision leads to different movements to the aft side of the ship 
compared to the single screw left-handed propeller. Moreover, the SM must declare all 
available deficiencies present on a ship’s hull and machinery equipment to ensure safe 
operations. Any deliberate misleading or omission of defects incurs serious legal 
consequences. More importantly, the MP must be aware that his role is only to advise the 
SM by updating him or her with the required information on the operation, local 
regulations, and assist in solving any conflicts that might occur with any other parties. The 
SM must be aware that the control of the ship cannot be handed to the MP as he / she can 
question the MP on any decisions made. In addition, the MP must check during all 
operational stages that proper communication channels are maintained with all other 
98 
 
involved parties in the pilotage operation. The MP must inform the VTS once arriving to 
the bridge, and the TM must be positioned in accordance with the designated point for 
pushing or pulling and attach the lines used for towage. The VTS must inform the MP of 
any navigational hazards appearing or changes during the operation. The MP must inform 
the TM of any action taking place in advance to avoid endangering the tug and its crew. 
These actions include use of the ship engine, thruster, course alteration, and the occurrence 
of any emergency, such as engine failure or loss of steering control. In addition, the TM 
must inform the MP of any changes that occur during the operation, such as the towing 
line being parted, to make the pilot aware and allow him or her take further action as 
required.  
The role of the TM requires higher vigilance and to be cautious at all times supporting 
the MP and the SM when observing something that can affect the safety of the operation. 
It is essential that the MP is aware about the ability of the TM and the nature of the tug, 
limitations, capabilities, and how they can be operated to give feasible orders in order to 
ensure the safety of the operation at all operational stages. In addition, the language used 
during the operation must be in English at all times in compliance with port operational 
policies and standards. It is the port’s policy that all operators be capable of communicating 
in English. Moreover, using the local language and making small talk during the operation 
is not permissible at any time. The role of the JO is limited in terms of providing the pilot 
with information related to the position of the ship on the jetty. 
 
3.7.1.5 Ship alongside the jetty 
When the operation has been accomplished and the ship is alongside the jetty, the tug 
masters have to maintain their position until the MP ensures that all shore lines are made 
and the ship secured. Moreover, the MP must remain on board until this process is 
completed and report to the VTS with the time that the ship is alongside and secured. At 
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this point, the MP can request the tug master to cast off the lines and leave towards the 
service jetties. 
By referring to operational procedures, the author built a diagram (Figure 3.2) that 
shows operational processes between the main parties involved in marine pilotage 
operations. The number on each arrow represents the threshold point of operational process 
and information flow sequences between involved parties when conducting pilotage 
operations. Moreover, Figure 3.3 illustrates the hierarchy developed based on the 
operational observation, the standards followed by the port authority and highlighted by 
Alderton and Saieva (2013), for the main parties involved in marine pilotage operations. 
 
 




Figure 3.3. A hierarchy structure for the main parties involved in pilotage operations (Alderton 
and Saieva, 2013) 
 
3.7.1.6 Researcher’s observational comments 
The researcher conducted observation of 17 pilotage operations, 14 arrivals, and 3 
departure ships aiming to observe the actions taken by those central to the operation. The 
preconditions of the 17 operations conducted are briefly outlined as follows. 
- Nature of the operations: 
 14 entry operations (12 morning movements + 2 evening movements); 
 3 departure operations (morning movements); 
- Weather and sea conditions: 
 Extremely hot weather in the morning; 
 High levels of humidity both at night and in the morning; 
 Wind speed fluctuating from 0 to 20 knots; 
 Sea current ranging from 5 to 15 knots; 
 Wave and swell ranging from 0 to 5 on Beaufert scale (see Table 3.8) 
- Ship types: 
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 11 operations conducted on container carrier with sizes ranging from 50 to 102 K 
GRT; 
 6 operations conducted on bulk carrier with sizes ranging from 40 to 50 K GRT; 
- Location of the terminal: 
 8 operations on the south jetties; 
 9 operations on the new terminals located at the north jetties; 
- Duration of the operation: 
 Entry operations: From the pilot station, 1 hour to the south jetty and 50 minutes 
to the north jetty; 
 Departure operations: From the south jetty, 35–45 minutes to the pilot station, and 
from the north jetty, 25–35 minutes to the pilot station.  
- All operations conducted with the support of two tugs 
 
Table 3.8. Beaufort number scale (Ramin, 2010) 
Beaufort Number Sea Conditions 
0 Flat 
1 Ripples without crests 
2 Small wavelets 
3 Large wavelets 
4 Small wave 
5 Moderate (1.2m) longer waves. Some foam and spray 
6 Large wave with foam crests and some spray 
7 Sea heaps up and foam begins to be blown in steaks in wind direction 
8 Moderately high waves with breaking crests forming spindrift 
9 High waves (6-7m) with dense foam 
10 Very high waves 
 
The central parties in the pilotage service are the pilot and shipmaster. All other parties 
are important to the operation and take actions when ordered to. The first of these is the 
tug master, but the VTS operator and harbour master also play key roles. One of the main 
objectives of this observational process is to monitor the development of human error 
during pilotage operations and compare the results with those of the data collection from 
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other sources, namely the interview and accident analysis. The researcher collected the 
following observations: 
1- The shipmaster gave control of the entire operation to the pilot, who gave orders to 
the tug master, the shipmaster, and the helmsman without being challenged by any 
other operator. Although it is not obligatory that the shipmaster challenge the 
pilot’s orders, on five instances, the pilot exceeded the speed limit, which resulted 
in fines for both him and the SM. In addition, on a further two instances, the ship 
got very close to the jetty, which required the pilot to put the engine on full power. 
Finally, there was another instance where the towing lines were parted, because the 
pilot ordered the tug master to pull at full power. It is key to note that all discussions 
made between the pilot and tug master were conducted in the local language. 
2- The pilot did not always ask for the pilot card, which contains essential information. 
3- The pilot did not use any electronic navigational devices, such as the radar. 
4- The pilot did not always report to the tug master with any changes, such as using 
the engine or bow thruster. 
5- The pilot was complaining about the performance of the tug master for not 
following orders. 
6- The pilot embarked the ship after the ship had entered into the channel, which is 
not allowed by port regulation. Moreover, the pilot disembarked the ship at or just 
after the inner gate and before arriving at the pilot station, which is located after 
the outer gate. 
7- Orders made to the tug for pulling and pushing next to the jetty were considerable 
in number, which increasingly irritated the tug master and put an immense amount 
of pressure on him. Moreover, these orders were made because the ship was 
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approaching very quickly to the jetty as the pilot delayed conveying orders to the 
tug master to stop pushing and to the shipmaster to stop the engine.  
8- Neither the harbour master nor the VTS operator stopped the pilot and the tug 
master when they communicated using the local language. 
9- Other parties involved in the operation must be interviewed to identify the degree 
of conflict, since the pilot complained about the performance of the tug master, the 
VTS operator never challenged the pilot on ship speed, and the harbour master 
never discussed the rules that were breached by the pilot during the operation. 
However, this study focuses only on pilot reliability, and due to the time constraints, 
other factors involved in pilotage are suggested for further study. 
 
3.7.2 Interview data analysis 
Analysing the collected interview data is a vital, but difficult, component of qualitative 
research (Braun and Clarke, 2006). According to Ary et al. (2018), when analysing 
qualitative data, the researcher must follow three main phases in handling the data: (1) 
organising and familiarising; (2) coding and reducing; and (3) interpreting and representing. 
The researcher, before analysing the collected data, is encouraged to read and reread notes 
taken from the interviews and organise comments made by respondents on the questions 
and sub-questions. This process allows the researcher to identify the main concepts 
expressed by the group of interviewees, categorise their concerns, and develop research 
criteria accordingly. The researcher will then be able to reduce the data and codify 
identifiable criteria and categories to interpret data and report findings. 
It was suggested by Abdelrahman (2013) that, when writing up a thematic study, a 
researcher is required to describe and discuss each central criterion by offering examples 
from the data and using quotes to facilitate criterion characterisation. However, it is not 
necessary for the researcher to refer to every constituent identifiable code within each 
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criterion, particularly when handling descriptive code (King and Harrocks, 2010). The 
researcher must concentrate on the robust and effective codes that illustrate and address 
criteria and answer the research questions (King and Harrocks, 2010). Similarly, Braun 
and Clarke (2006) have argued that the aim of the thematic approach is not merely a 
descriptive summary of the identifiable criterion, but also useful in developing a narrative 
that informs the reader of the process of the research findings in terms of the phenomenon 
that is under investigation. In addition, others have pointed to the significance of using 
direct, short quotes given by participants in order to allow for comprehension of particular 
points of interpretation made by the researcher (Symon and Cassell, 2012). 
This section presents the data collected from the interviews conducted with the three 
groups of marine pilots working on a daily basis at marine ports. The aim of this process 
is to elicit a qualitative set of data underlining the nature of the operations by allowing the 
pilots involved in the process the chance to express their feelings and experiences freely. 
Since the main objective of this study is to identify factors that influence the reliability of 
an MP as the main driver in the marine port pilotage operation, this section aims to 
highlight these factors in depth. With the support of existing literature, the researcher must 
open general discussions relevant to the operation. As such, the researcher has initially 
prepared 13 questions that cover the main features required for maintaining operators that 
are more reliable. Moreover, these questions ask “why” and “how” and are open-ended in 
nature. The objective of these questions was to gain in-depth insight into pilot’s 
experiences and beliefs. 
Semi-structured focus group interviews were conducted to develop a reliability model 
that can be used to assess the reliability of operators on a daily basis. Section 3.7.1 
highlights that the main operators are directly involved in front level operations (see Figure 
3.3). Moreover, those operators are subject to internal and external factors that could 
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adversely affect their ability to conduct safe operations. Internal factors include personal 
willingness to learn something new or personal characteristics. External factors include 
stress due to the impact of the external environment. Through a comprehensive literature 
review, a lack in studies investigating the reliability of a human in the maritime sector was 
determined. Other industries investigated the issue by considering factors independently. 
The majority of these studies, for instance, focus on developing operator’s non-technical 
skills rather considering a holistic approach and considering other factors in conjunction 
with the requirements to maintain a higher operational reliability level. In this research, the 
developed model aims to overcome this issue by developing a holistic model based on the 
perceptions of pilots followed by identifying the degree of interdependence between these 
factors. 
The following sections discuss the dimensions that conceptualise the framework of this 
study. 
 
3.7.2.1 Operator Technical Proficiency (OTP)  
According to the IMO, Resolution A. 960 (2004), operators conducting a pilotage 
operation are required to have specialised work-related knowledge and experience in the 
field of pilotage operations. It is the obligation of the competent pilotage authority to 
encourage the establishment of an adequate pilotage system within a port by assessing and 
maintaining the pilot’s qualifications with the support of additional specific training, which 
enhances the pilot’s work-related experience. 
According to the interview discussions, three sub-criteria were identified under the 






 Competencies and Licensing (OTP-CL) 
A qualified operator has a set of competencies, licences, and certifications that exhibit 
his/her achievements in compliance with the minimum work-related knowledge essential 
for carrying out certain duties. These competencies cannot be achieved if not accompanied 
by training, knowledge of the nature of the operation, and a certain level of work 
experience. Therefore, a competent pilotage authority must ensure that the pilot holds an 
approved pilotage certificate, a licence recognised by the authority, and fulfilment of the 
minimum operational standards (IMPA, 2004). 
 In terms of competency and licensing, participants highlighted the importance of 
qualifications in developing their operational practices. Each pilot was asked about his 
certification (see Table 3.7). The pilots recognised the significant role that certification 
plays in their daily life. The majority of participating pilots stated that, 
“The maritime industry requires higher levels of operational, policy, and safety 
knowledge, which are a result of years of experience and training”. 
Another pilot commented that, 
“We are assigned as pilot after accomplishing a maritime diploma course provided by 
the port authority and getting certified. Some of our colleagues have higher degrees or 
certificate of competencies. However, higher certificate must be attached to the years 
of pilotage experience in accordance with the port system of pilotage ranking”. 
Pilots gave varying answers as to whether certification was important in enhancing pilot 
reliability. Some pilots stated that, 
“Although some pilots with master licences came from shipping industries with 
prolonged maritime experience, pilotage requires very specific skills. Having a higher 
certificate of competency helps for better operational adaptation. We observed those 
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who came with maritime background as having better working practices, as they adapt 
a lot more quickly than those with lower certification or no maritime background”. 
The majority of pilots agreed that, 
“We deal with many ships daily, the better and higher the certification, the better we 
do at understanding crew and ship behaviour”. 
Three groups of interviewees revealed that there is no stipulated system within the port 
to ensure the validity of the pilots’ certificates. The pilots are interested in improving their 
ability and knowledge through training courses and workshops. However, due to 
managerial process and procedures they are not able to improve further unless they decide 
to enrol in a private academy or course. 
The majority of the pilots agreed on the significance of certification, licensing, and 
knowledge in maintaining their ability to conduct operations at more reliable standards, 
and stated that, 
“Gaining operational knowledge from a well-recognised maritime academy and 
getting certified will add valuable expertise enabling us to handle different operational 
situations and crises more professionally in accordance with maritime standards. This 
certification also helps us be respected across the industry”. 
Moreover, these pilots stated that their ability and reliability cannot be built only 
through certification. Certification must be supported by different operational skills, either 
managerial or personal. The pilot must improve his knowledge, not only in classes, but 
also through work experience. 
 
 Training Courses (OTP-TC) 
During the discussions, the pilots pointed to training several times as a significant 
factor that shaped operator reliability. According to Alvarenga et al. (2014), training has 
been identified as one of the most dominant factors in organisational performance. A lack 
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of training within the maritime sector has been found to be a prominent cause of accidents 
(House, 2007). Training courses might include a set of compulsory or additional 
operational requirements (Riahi et al., 2013). As human error accounts for 80% of maritime 
accidents, the International Maritime Organisation (IMO) has implemented the 
International Safety Management (ISM) code in 2008 (Berg, 2013). This code addresses 
the issue of human error by emphasising the significant role that operator training and 
education can play in ensuring operational performance safety. Therefore, implementing 
effective training on top of having suitable certification and experience was the aim of the 
ISM code in order to reduce the probability of human error during maritime operations 
(Berg, 2013).  
This portion of the interview concentrates questions on how training can help improve 
operators’ skills and to what extent training can complement pilots’ certificates in 
maintaining higher operator reliability. 
A senior pilot stated that, 
“Training helps in shaping our operational procedures, learn about new technology, 
and adapt our personal behaviour towards safe working practices. Personal skills must 
be accompanied with proper, high quality training courses and our up-to-date licence”. 
All of the pilots at this port agreed with this statement. The pilots pointed to the 
significance of training courses on their daily operational standards and stated that, 
“We consider training courses the most dominant factor in shaping our operational 
performance, since training provides us with valuable knowledge and practical 
experience that help us adapt our beliefs and behaviour to daily operations”. 
However, when asked about regular training, one of the pilots stated that, 
“We are having difficulties in completing required training that we had before 
obtaining our pilot licences in order to cope with the new international standards that 
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are recommended by pilotage international bodies. We frequently urge the 
management to organise training programmes”. 
Other pilots have stated that, 
“We consider training courses much more important than the certification. The 
training provides us with valuable knowledge and practical experience. These details 
we can use in our daily operations”. 
The implications of having no training courses can be seen in the following statement: 
“We need training courses that are related to our operation, as they allow us to feel 
important within the organisation. Training also prevents us from getting bored by 
refreshing our knowledge with new ideas and operating styles”. 
Another pilot stated that, 
“I believe there have been massive improvements in the maritime industry, and 
sometime I feel that I just drive a hunk of metal without understanding my actions and 
the consequences of these actions”. 
This statement was justified by another pilot, as many juniors and senior pilots stated that, 
“Special training courses help us improve our personal thinking skills, personal 
management styles, and teamwork buildings skills, which enable us to manage 
operations even when we are under stress”. 
Another pilot offered further clarification: 
“We face huge operational stress from management, the shipmaster, and due to the 
nature of the operations. Each pilot has different characteristics and operational style 
for dealing with this stress effectively”. 
Therefore, one important criterion developed here was operational stress and how it relates 




 Pilotage Experience (OPT-PE) 
Experience is obtained over years through a pilot conducting different types of ship 
handling operations, training courses, or the sharing personal pilotage experience.  
Practical experience has a huge impact on operator reliability and operational safety. One 
pilot stated that, 
“Work experience has a huge impact on our daily operations. We learn from past 
personal or shared experiences, through training that we have received, and during 
our preparation for becoming certified pilots”. 
A number of pilots agreed with this statement and argued that, 
“We learn everyday differently, each pilot has experienced different operational 
demands, since every operation is subject to different parties and problems”. 
This statement has been confirmed, since maritime operations are considered dynamic 
and subject to different circumstances every day. The dynamic nature of the operation adds 
extra stress to the pilot to learn and share experiences. One pilot stated that, 
“We learn from one another. Other pilots can face different types of ships with different 
operational characteristics and particular handling skills. We might not be subject to 
any problems for a long time but maybe we will experience handling difficulties due to 
variations of the crew’s mentality and equipment defects, which add stress to the pilot 
in implementing new operational strategies to ensure operational safety”. 
In this research, participants have a wide range of experience of pilotage operations, 
which provides useful inputs to this research and highlight what is required in order to 
evaluate pilot’s reliability. Maritime operations demand and require special training, 
seminars, and lectures to share knowledge and understand the nature of the other operators 
involved in the pilotage operation. All pilots confirmed the significant role of work 
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experience in a pilot’s operational reliability. A general statement agreed upon by all 
participants was that, 
“Work experience adds valuable skills to operators and enables the pilot to conduct 
pilotage services within different working environments that provoke stress. Work 
experience can add something that colleges cannot provide us with”. 
In addition, some of the pilots at this port consider work experience much more 
important than certification and training. However, some other pilots stated that, 
“Work experience cannot compensate for the training and qualifications in terms of a 
pilot’s personal reliability. They all work adjacently to each other, as the training 
courses are developed based on working experience, and working experience is taught 
on the training courses”. 
Other pilots have stated that, 
“We gain experience over time and learn different operational skills. However, current 
operational improvements require us to have higher certificate and training that can 
shape our skills and reliability. Work experience must build on the right upon our skills 
obtained in training courses and qualifications that are recognised worldwide”. 
It is apparent from the above responses that work experience can be shaped through 
training, obtaining higher qualifications, and sharing knowledge and personal development. 
Pilots have stated that work experience is the most important factor in maintaining 
reliability in terms of personal qualification and personal training. 
 
3.7.2.2 Operator fatigue (OF) 
Fatigue was defined by Yule and Brown (2012, p. 47) as “a state of sleepiness 
characterized by feeling drowsy or tired that results in a reduced ability to maintain 
concentration, make decisions, and carry out skilled tasks”. The word “fatigue” describes 
the workers’ feelings of tiredness and depression, either mentally or physically (Kim et al., 
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2009). A fatigued operator is usually unable to keep working at the required level due to a 
lack of energy and motivation. As a result, forgetfulness and loss of memory or the ability 
to think clearly will happen for a short or extended time (Kim et al., 2009). Thus, a review 
of the current status of safety within the maritime industry and the human influence on 
operations indicated that fatigue was one of the most dominant factors in adversely 
influencing overall operational safety performance (Hetherington et al., 2006). Three 
criteria were identified to have a significant influence on fatigue, namely working hours 
and, operational stress, and working environment. 
 
 Working Hours (OF-WH) 
There are two factors that were discussed in distinguishing the effect of working hours 
on pilot reliability. One senior pilot states that, 
“We work in an environment that is incredibly physically demanding. We are subject 
to many factors that affect our reliability. One of them is the working hours in 
conducting pilotage services. Our working hours affect not only the number of hours 
we spend at work, but also our leisure time during the rest of the day”. 
Many pilots agreed upon the importance of working hours in operator reliability. The 
majority of pilots have agreed that, 
“Working stress during the night shift increases, as the required level of pilot vigilance 
in monitoring all unusual navigational hazards at night increases. This can add lots of 
pressures to pilots’ mental demands. In contrast, when working in the day, pilots are 
subject to direct sunlight, which may also have an adverse effect”. 
All pilots, who confirmed the significance of training and work experience of a pilot 
in managing these factors more efficiently, agreed with the above statement. Moreover, 
the second factor was also highlighted by pilots, who stated that, 
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“Working two 12-hour days might not harm the pilot reliability unless he has been 
asked to cover the shift of an absent pilot, has health issues, or is a more senior pilot 
who requires more rest hours than younger pilots”. 
The nature of the operation requires pilots to work on shifts similarly to many other 
industries. The pilotage services at this port provide the service 24/7, even during public 
and national holidays. The operators work in a pattern of 2 days on duty followed by 2 
days off duty. Each day on duty has an operation of a continuous 12 hours per day. This 
schedule means that the pilot works for 24 hours followed by 48 hours of rest. 
This pattern was confirmed by the majority of pilots. However, some of the pilots stated 
that, 
“Although I’m familiar with shift patterns, I feel stressed if it’s changed, or if I’ve been 
asked to cover the shift of a colleague. I work at night and I like this shift, but during 
my working experience, I’m always tired because working at night requires higher 
operational vigilance than in the morning. This means I’m a lot more stressed as I am 
getting older. Also, I’m stressed because of changes made by management because of 
the implementation of new work demands without supporting us with proper training, 
promotions, places to rest, and proper provisions”. 
It is the role of the management to ensure proper rest spots are available to pilots, 
particularly when they are working for long hours and subject to high operational demands. 
These factors have an adverse influence on pilot's reliability and escalate the level of 
operational stress, which has been confirmed across different industries as one of the 
leading factors in operational accidents. Accordingly, a general statement concludes the 
discussion with one about the working hours, which states that, 
“Working in the day forces me to work under the sun for a long time. The sun light and 
the high temperature make me dizzy and unable to conduct further pilotage operations. 
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Because of the frustration caused by the sun, I won’t accept any constructive comments 
or suggestions and I try to conduct the operation as quickly as possible, which often 
leads to unsafe decisions”. 
The above statement was agreed with by the majority of the pilots at this port, who 
want management to look at their operational needs in order to eliminate the effect of 
operational stress during pilotage services. 
 
 Operational stress (OF-OS) 
Stress during operations has various forms. There exist, for instance, management 
stress, financial stress, commercial stress, and environmental stress. Management requires 
pilots to maintain high operational standards and practices to ensure the health and safety 
of their employees while operating and conducting port services. On the other hand, 
operators are required to observe their safety during their daily duties, which can be 
identified and managed by experience or training courses. In this port, pilots are subject to 
high stress, which is stated in the following summarised statement: 
“We are subjected to high level of operational stress, and the management of the port 
has a central role in this stress. Management do not provide the required training, 
adversely affect operations, create conflicts amongst team members, and work without 
operational strategies and development”. 
It is apparent from previous discussions that stress due to management practices exists 
in the form of a lack of adequate training and career progression. However, personal stress 
is also related to a number of factors, such as financial stress, family issues, health issues, 
and teamwork issues. Finally, stress caused by the behaviour of other operators can be due 
to conflicts with other operators, tug operational failures, and improper teamwork, which 
affect proper decision-making. Accordingly, pilots have stated that, 
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 “Stress caused by other team members is important, since any failures made by other 
operators can adversely affect the performance, especially if that operator does not 
report that failure immediately”. 
The majority of the pilots interviewed report that, 
“It’s common that the shipmaster misrepresents some non-existent equipment failure 
on board, which raise stress levels”. 
The prevalence of operational stress can be identified since higher levels of stress can 
degrade or slow down the operator's ability to make proper decisions, adversely affect 
operator health, thereby preventing other team members from conducting operations safely. 
Maintaining the above factors will create a positive working environment that helps ensure 
safe marine pilotage operations. 
 
 Working environment (OF-WEnv) 
To maintain high levels of organisational safety, it is essential that management 
maintain high operational standards by enhancing operational practices and encouraging a 
positive working atmosphere. The management of the organisation plays a vital role in 
ensuring a positive operational atmosphere by providing their employees with training, 
rewards, and listening to their needs. In addition, the pilot has a duty in conjunction with 
management and other team workers to ensure that effective working practices are in place. 
Some of the pilots have stated that, 
“The management of our organisation has an impact on our daily working practices. 
We need training, promotions, better rewards, and nicer places to rest while we wait 
for further operations”. 
Some other pilots have stated that, 
“The adverse involvement of the management causes conflicts with other team 
members, which makes for an unpleasant working environment”. 
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Maintaining effective working practices helps maintaining high operator reliability on a 
daily operational basis. The management of any organisation must ensure a positive 
working environment in order to ensure high operational and safety standards. 
 
3.7.2.3 Non-technical skills (NTS) 
The knowledge base and technical proficiency of employees within high-risk industries 
are essential, and a large amount of a company’s resources is spent on enhancing 
employees’ technical proficiency. Around the mid 1980s, the aviation industry’s focus was 
on the technological and technical aspects of aircraft and pilot training (Moorthy et al., 
2005). This focus prompted research conducted by National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration (NASA), which found that human errors constituted around 70% of 
reported accidents, due to failures of interpersonal communication, decision-making, and 
leadership (Helmreich et al., 1999) which comprise non-technical skills. Moreover, 
operators’ non-technical skills and component failures (situational awareness, decision-
making, etc.) were revealed in accident analyses as culpable for adverse events in complex 
organisations, even when the operator has a high level of technical competencies (Sharma 
et al., 2011). Since the 1980s, researchers have tried to tackle the problem caused by NTS 
deficiency by developing a behavioural marker tool (Sharma et al., 2011; Flin et al., 2003; 
Yule et al., 2006; Yule et al., 2008; Sevdalis et al., 2008; and Healey et al., 2004). This 
tool is widely used in different industries and aims to structure the required training needs 
and evaluate those needs in aviation (Flin et al., 2003), maritime (Saeed et al., 2016) and 
health (Fletcher et al., 2004; Yule et al., 2012). 
Operators’ NTS are composed of a set of social and cognitive skills that demonstrate 
the operators’ ability to perform their work. Variability in researchers’ points of view in 
studying factors that adversely influence NTS was observed and is due to the varying 
nature of the industries where NTS are important. Proper enhancement of operators’ NTS 
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in high-risk industries is crucial in order to eliminate the consequences of human error 
(Helmreich et al., 1999). Due to the absence of investigation of NTS in marine pilotage 
operations, this research aims to highlight the negative consequences caused due to 
improper maintenance of NTS among pilots in a complex working environment. The aim 
of this research is to develop a comprehensive model for assessing the reliability of marine 
pilots by identifying the most dominant factors shaping operator reliability and the degree 
of interdependencies between those factors. 
For that reason, an intensive literature review across different disciplines was 
conducted to open the discussion, identify operator concerns, and stipulate the main 
components of operator NTS relevant to the pilotage operation. In the interviews, pilots 
emphasised the significance of the following four NTS sub-criteria: Decision-Making 
skills (NTS-DM), Situational Awareness skills (NTS-SA), Communication and 
information sharing skills (NTS-CS) and Teamwork and Leadership skills (NTS-T&L). 
 
 Decision-making (NTS-DM) 
Making proper decision requires the operator to maintain high levels of vigilance. 
Decision-making is not an easy process and is built upon numerous factors. The way that 
someone makes a decision varies depending on a number of conditions. Making a decision 
is a skill that can be built over time, not only within the organisation, but also in one’s 
personal life. Accordingly, pilots must take into account other operational factors before 
making decision to ensure the safety of other operators. Some pilots argued that, 
“Making decisions is a process only completed after developing a comprehensive 
operational picture that is developed based on different sources of information attained 
literally or explicitly from other team members involved in the pilotage operation”. 
Making proper decisions requires decision-makers to gather the relevant information, 
establish communication links with different participants to share useful information, 
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revise current operational circumstances, and implement new operational strategies. 
Accordingly, one pilot stated that: 
“Proper decisions can only be made if all parties have properly expressed their thoughts”.  
This statement initiated a discussion confirming what these thoughts referred to. The 
pilot discussed cases when shipmasters hid useful information that adversely affected 
pilots’ decisions. Shipmasters hide information because they do not wish to leave the port 
until they fix the problem or conduct specific pilotage operations, for which there is a 
higher financial cost. Moreover, direct contact with other team workers helps to re-shape 
and consolidate the pilot's decisions to meet the demands of any situation. For instance, 
the tug master has an important role in supporting the ship’s manoeuvre inside the port; 
whenever the tug master updates the pilot during the operation in terms of distance, the 
pilot can move on to making the next decision. However, sometimes the tug does not reply 
or does not tell the pilot when he starts applying the given order, which forces the pilot to 
ask him whether he has started working in order to develop a useful operational picture. In 
this case, the tug master increases the effort and stress placed on the pilot, and so it is useful 
to ensure the correct action in place. If the VTS operator informs the pilot that he is 
approaching danger or moving closer to another navigating ship, the pilot must reconsider 
his decision and reform his action. 
However, the pilot's decision being agreed with by all the participants builds upon a 
comprehensive operational overview that is accumulated through different procedures with 
support from other parties involved in the same operation with similar operational 
objectives. This overview provides the pilot with awareness of the current operational 





 Situational awareness (NTS-SA) 
The pilot, during the pilotage operation, is required to monitor all activities and other 
team members involved in the operation. It is the obligation of the pilot and other workers 
to share all pilotage related information to make adequate decision. Situational awareness 
is a core skill that all decision-makers must maintain and observe closely to ensure proper 
orders, implementing procedure, and option generation. Accordingly, a number of pilots 
stated that, 
“Observing all operational actions is a difficult process. We, as pilots, focus on the 
actions and response of the tug masters, ship engine, and ship movements to maintain 
and reassess current operational circumstances”. 
It is difficult to comprehend all operational actions without having support from other 
parties. Pilotage operations are built upon the actions of teamwork and those with different 
operational responsibilities and procedures but the same operational goals. Accordingly, 
some pilots stated that, 
“Situational awareness is a skill that is learnt through experience or courses that allow 
the pilot to understand the surrounding working processes shared by other team 
workers involved in the operation”. 
Another pilot stated that, 
“Situational awareness requires all parties to share the required information to all 
other team members and ensure operational safety and standards. It is highly 
dependent on the performance of other workers involved in the operation”. 
Situational awareness is subject to the mental capacity of the operator and highly 
influenced by operator fatigue and body strength. It is key to maintain high operational 
awareness since proper decisions are subjected to the quality of situational awareness. This 
statement is confirmed by the majority of pilots, who have stated that, 
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“We can develop and maintain high operational awareness based on the performance 
and the quality of the information shared by other operators. The management also 
can adversely affect personal awareness since higher operational demand and stress 
could lead to fatigue, which adversely increases the probability of personal failures in 
maintaining operational awareness and leads to improper decisions being made”. 
The significance of this personal skill can be seen in IMO, Resolution A.960 as 
amended, which recommends to all pilots that they have a bridge resource management 
course that explains the process through which the pilot can develop his/her situational 
awareness and other factors, such as decision-making and leadership, to maintain higher 
operational standards. 
In this investigation, pilots considered situational awareness an essential process in 
decision-making. Thus, pilots have emphasised the significant role that situational 
awareness in their reliability and maintenance of higher operational performance. 
Moreover, since all parties involved in the operation work in different places, the only way 
that the operator can share the required information is via communication, which requires 
higher personal skill to adequately communicate with other parties. 
 
 Communication skills (NTS-CS) 
Communication skills are a key ability that can critically affect the safety of the 
operation. Inadequate communication skills can reflect a lack of operational awareness, 
poor team working, and poor decision-making. 
Many interviewed pilots stated that, 
“Communicating all significant operational information clearly and cohesively is a 
skill that cannot be managed by all parties. It plays a critical role in our decisions, 
since missing data and reporting unclear information leads to developing a situational 
picture that does not reflect reality”. 
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This skill can affect the nature of the team and leadership style for which an operator 
is characterised. This skill is built upon the ability of the operator to manage external 
factors that require operator reliability, such as management and operator complacency. 
Accordingly, many participants stated that, 
“As previously said, stress that occurs due to management working practices are found 
to adversely affect operator communication style and clarity. Pilots tend not to 
communicate all relevant information”. 
Moreover, pilots have emphasised the importance of other operators involved in 
operations and stated that, 
“The involvement of other team members can adversely impact pilots’ personal 
reliability. This includes the ability to make decisions, build proper teamwork, and 
communicate adequately”. 
To summarise, all pilots seem to agree that the main purpose of communication is to 
regulate, control, motivate, express feelings, and convey information with other team 
members. Improper use or lack of transparency in the communication channel between 
members are the principal causes of most conflicts that occur during operations. 
 
 Teamwork and leadership (NTS-T&L) 
An operator’s ability to maintain adequate non-technical skills can be built upon 
teamwork and leadership skills. Working as a team in a complex working environment is 
considered challenging, since it requires each party to understand the operational process 
and the nature of each party’s role. Conflicts between parties is one of the main influential 
factors that degrades operator reliability. However, managing conflicts between parties 
requires managerial skills that can be formed through an operator’s leadership and 
teamwork style. 
The majority of pilots stated that, 
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“Teamwork is an essential component and the heart of our operation, since we find it 
difficult to manage all parties with so many different operational roles and perspectives. 
It requires a lot of personality to manage other team members in an effective, friendly 
way”. 
Leadership style and personality are developed in highly qualified operators. Managers 
and leaders must possess a specific skill-set. Effective and skilful leaders are supportive 
and open to criticism from other workers and can successfully manage groups of any size 
Moreover, the leader should always be the key player in a team, motivate other team 
workers based on their operational limitations, and be open towards diverse cultures. 
Accordingly, most pilots interviewed pointed to the significance of leadership in 
managing efficient teamwork to maintain higher operator reliability in the form of non-
technical skills. One pilot stated that, 
“Skilful leadership has the ability to manage operational conflictions that arise due to 
managerial or personal conflicts. Leaders can cope with operational stress, 
degradation of team member reliability, and critical situations professionally. A team 
depends on its leader, so proper communication should be established in order to share 
operational knowledge and make proper decisions”  
It is apparent that effective teamwork is a skill subject to personal leadership styles. 
Moreover, effective teamwork leads to collaborative operational alliance in the form of 
operational sharing goals and information that helps decision-makers receive the required 
information through adequate communication processes and make decisions that best 




3.7.2.4 Fitness and strength (F&S) 
Operator fitness and strength are crucial in many high-risk industries and have a 
significant role to play in successful operations. However, fatigue caused by a variety of 
factors has been found to have a significant impact on operator fitness and strength (Riahi 
et al., 2012). This relationship is prevalent in all fields that require high levels of physical 
and mental performance, which is the case in pilotage operations. Pilotage requires the 
pilot and other operators involved to maintain high levels of physical and mental strength 
throughout all stages of an operation. Stress at work cannot be fully eliminated, though the 
organisation’s management and the operators can manage stress through a variety of 
approaches.  
The links between human fatigue and operator fitness and strength have been identified 
across different industries (Riahi et al., 2013). Moreover, fatigue has an influence on the 
operator NTS, which means that fitness and strength are associated with operator NTS and 
TP. Consequently, it is important for the port authority, when assigning a pilot to handle a 
ship, to ensure that the pilot is physically and mentally prepared. Moreover, the 
International Maritime Organisation (IMO) resolution A.960 (2004) and the American 
Bureau of Shipping (ABS) Guidance (2003) have stated that, “The fundamental purpose 
of the pilot fitness assessment is to ensure that the individual pilot is fit to handle the ships 
calling at that port”. 
Based on interview responses, three criteria were identified that constitute operator 
fitness and strength. These factors are considered by the operators to be essential to their 
performance. In addition, pilots have highlighted the current organisational factors that 





 Operator age (F&S-OA) 
Pilots have stated that operator age is essential to pilots, as their job is physically 
demanding and requires them to be physically fit at all times. It is recognised that the pilots 
gain valuable experience with time, though getting older potentially weakens their body 
strength. Accordingly, some pilots have stated that, 
“Getting older might not change a pilot’s ability to conduct safe operations, as it is not 
necessarily true that the pilot gets weaker. In our case, management does not provide 
us with proper medical care as many other companies do. It is difficult to get treatment 
in the hospitals here as the majority of them aren’t free”. 
Some other pilots added that, 
“Since management does not provide us with proper provisions, such as well-
ventilated resting areas and complementary fitness plans, it is hard for the operators 
to keep fit when getting older”. 
Operator age is essential since a number of variables of operational performance 
depend on this factor. It can be observed across the participants that older pilots have a 
wider range of skills than younger pilots because of their extensive experience. Older pilots 
have further operational understanding than junior pilots. However, these pilots are also 
subject to stress and must be able to deal with the same issues with which they have dealt 
for their entire lives. The number of working hours, operational demands, and working 
environment, as highlighted in Section 3.7.2.2, were linked negatively with operator age, 
as stated by one pilot: 
“Working demand increases operational stress, which affects our ability to conduct a 




This statement has been agreed with by most of the seniors of age 40 and above. Some 
senior pilots stated that, 
“Operator age can be advantageous to operations, since older pilot have more 
experience and are better at analysing different situations and managing different 
cases, especially if they maintain their health by avoiding detrimental habits like 
smoking and drinking”. 
Another pilot stated that, 
“The majority of older pilots have the ability to analyse operations sensibly as their 
operational awareness is considered, in most cases, better than the younger pilots”. 
Another pilot stated that, 
“It is not necessarily true that we get weaker as we get older, it depends on many 
circumstances. However, management can help us to monitor this issue by providing 
us with medical care and monitoring personal activities with complementary fitness 
programmes”. 
Accordingly, most pilots are judged on their ability to conduct a variety of operations. 
All pilots agree that getting older means being more prone to disease, irritated by the 
opinions of others, and becoming weaker in terms of physical strength. However, getting 
older also means being highly ranked, conducting many ships’ operations, and having a 
wealth of experience. 
 
 Personal health (F&S-PH) 
One of the main concerns raised by pilots is health. The majority of pilots agreed that 
health is essential in maintaining higher operational reliability. Since pilotage operations 
require considerable concentration, physical exertion, and proper decision-making, health 
is a priority for pilots. Health can be ensured by managing operational stress, maintaining 
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proper management style, providing operators with proper provisions and places to rest, 
and the pilots looking after their own health. Accordingly, a number of pilots stated that, 
“We as pilots are subjected to higher operational stress provoked by the nature of the 
operation and the management practices”. 
Other pilots stated that, 
“Management introduced new rules and operational standards without allowing us as 
pilots to learn the objectives and goals behind the new rules. This implementation 
increased our operational stress, since they punish us if we don’t follow regulation”. 
Stress as a result of interactions between other operators involved in the pilotage 
service is considered influential in pilot health. Since inappropriate behaviour and 
inadequate operational information can result in higher operational stress, there is a greater 
chance that the pilot suffers from nervousness and health problems. Stress was prevalent 
at all stages of the operation and fluctuated based on the ship position, ship condition, and 
the status of the workers involved in the operation. 
 
 Physical and mental strength (F&S-Ph&MS) 
The majority of operators suffered from decreases in body strength. Older pilots are 
highly subject to illness and loss of strength. Pilotage service, due to the physical demand, 
requires higher body strength. The pilot at this port stated that,  
“We are regularly checked medically by an authorised medical centre, to ensure our 
ability to conduct operations. It’s just a routine procedure”.  
Another employee stated that,  
“Although we undergo medical checks on a regular basis, management does not 
provide us with a proper working environment, as mentioned before”. 
Although medical checks can confirm some health issues, some major diseases or 
illnesses leave pilots unfit to conduct operations, and management should not allow the 
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pilot to continue with further operations. Pilots at this port have confirmed the significance 
of body strength in conducting pilotage services. Moreover, the pilots confirm that 
management do follow their medical policy, as pilots can continue conducting pilotage 
services upon passing the routine medical test to confirm their ability to safely conduct 
operations. 
Accordingly, an updated hierarchy structure for the main operators involved in a 
marine pilotage operation including criteria of an MP’s and sub-criteria development that 
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3.7.3 Port accident analysis 
This section analyses four accidents that occurred during port pilotage operation. Three 
of these accidents, two groundings and one collision with the jetty, occurred over the last 
five years. The fourth accident occurred while the researcher was conducting this 
investigation, and two big ships were close to collision in the middle of the port in a near-
miss situation. The researcher investigated all parties involved in the operation and has 
commented on the current organisational working practices within this port. The details of 
this port are not revealed for economical, personal security, and privacy reasons. 
 
3.7.3.1 Case one (grounded ship) 
A ship ran aground during night shift when preparing to leave the port after completing 
her cargo operation. Different parties, namely the shipmaster, pilot, VTS operator, and 
harbour master, shared the fault. 
According to the regulations that manage the safe navigation of ships, the shipmaster 
was largely responsible for this incident for the following reasons: 
1- He did not apply the rule of the road standards stipulated by the international 
maritime organisation in accordance with collision avoidance regulations. 
2- He did not challenge the pilot’s decision to leave the ship before arriving at the 
pilot station located after the outer gate navigational buoys. 
3- He misunderstood the instructions given by the pilot to pass the inner gate 
navigational buoys, which reflects improper communication that caused improper 
decision-making. 
4- He was fatigued after prolonged working hours filling in paperwork, supervising 





The pilot’s faults were as follows: 
1- He conducted the operation and left the ship even before entering the channel 
through the inner gate navigational buoys. Leaving the ship before the pilot station 
is not allowed for any reason, and port policy stipulates punishment that can void 
this pilot’s licence and mean a significant wage reduction for several months. 
2- The pilot left the ship as he wanted to meet his friends for a dinner. 
The VTS operator’s faults were as follows:  
1- It is his responsibility to monitor the movements of ships using any means of 
navigational equipment to provide advice to the pilot and shipmaster. This 
communication was not applied at the time of the incident. 
The harbour master’s faults were as follows: 
1- He did not ensure that the operation was conducted in accordance with port policy. 
2- He was not monitoring the operation closely nor listening to the pilot’s orders. 
Because of the actions of the above mentioned parties the ship ran aground (see Figure 
3.5). The ship experienced minor damage as it was not at full speed and had just cast off 
from the jetty. Consequently, in accordance with port policy, all parties were punished. 




Figure 3.5. Grounded ship footage (case number one) 
 
3.7.3.2 Case two (grounded ship) 
A ship ran aground during the night shift while approaching the jetty from the pilot 
station, at which point the pilot was on board. Going from the pilot station to the jetty in 
normal conditions takes around 35 minutes. When the ship was approaching the jetty, it 
ran aground in shallow water. The grounding was largely due to the shipmaster relying on 
the pilot to conduct the operation without ever challenging his actions. Moreover, the 
shipmaster did not monitor the ship’s position as required nor comply with the COLREG 
rules. The pilot in control of the ship was a senior pilot and working on his second 
consecutive night shift. The pilot fell asleep at the time, and so the ship was not controlled 
by any official, of which the bridge team was not aware. In addition, the VTS operator was 
not monitoring the ship as it approached the shallow water and was therefore unable to 
warn the pilot and shipmaster of the proximate hazards. The harbour master also never 
warned the pilot and the shipmaster of the circumstance. The ship ran aground without 
causing pollution, loss of life, and navigational hazard. 
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3.7.3.3 Case three (ship collided with jetty) 
The pilot conducted the berthing operation with the support of two powerful tugs. The 
pilot was a senior pilot and experienced in conducting pilotage operations for several years 
with a variety of ship types. The main catalyst of this incident was that the pilot had spent 
a lot of time on side talks and jokes with other pilots and tug masters while closely 
approaching the jetty. The pilot not fully aware of the operation as the side ship speed 
increased rapidly. The channels used to communicate between parties were full at the time, 
so the communication was interrupted, and a collision occurred. 
The different parties involved were the shipmaster, the pilot, the tug, the VTS operator, 
and the harbour master. In accordance with port policy, it is not permissible to 
communicate with the equipment used during operations at any time. Communication 
between parties must be relevant to the operation at hand. All communication during 
operation should be in the port’s official language, English. 
The shipmaster did not challenge nor pay attention to any of the ship safety concerns. 
The pilot lost control of the situation because of improper or delayed actions. The tug 
master was dismissed, as he was unreasonably unable to assist properly. The VTS and 
harbour master did not force operational standards in terms of preventing irrelevant 
communication to concentrate on the operation. As a result, the jetty was severely damaged 
along with the ship’s hull. This incident cost the shipping company millions of dollars in 
order to repair damage caused to the jetty. 
 
3.7.3.4 Case four (near-miss) 
This incident occurred during an investigation that was taking place at this port. The 
researcher has experience as a seafarer on international ships and as a former tug master. 
An incident between the two ships, a bulk carrier and a large container ship, was observed 
in which both ships met together at the middle of the port docks, as shown in Figure 3.6. 
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The bulk carrier was approaching the designated jetty, and the container ship had 
completed its cargo operation and was heading towards its next port of call. According to 
port regulations, it is not permissible for any pilot to conduct simultaneous ship handling 
operations, i.e. to have one ship departing as another ship is approaching, or to pass side-
to-side inside the navigational channel or docks. Therefore, the pilot handling this 
operation breached the port’s regulations. 
The investigation involved different parties in this operation. First, the tug masters 
involved in the operation were approached and questioned. The tug masters who were on 
standby and assisting the approaching ship were suddenly called by the container pilot to 
clear the path. This call shocked the tug masters. After the incident, the tug masters filed a 
complaint, as they had already been in position and then been required to change their 
plans, which reportedly caused them significant stress. The VTS operator was also 
approached to discuss the incident. 
Surprisingly, the VTS operator was not aware of the incident and stated that,  
“I noticed that the departed containership met the bulk carrier in the middle of the 
dock, where the container pilot cast off ship lines without permission, while the 
approaching bulk carrier was in the middle of the channel and had permission to 
proceed towards the designated jetty with the pilot. The container pilot announced, 
which attracted my attention, that he left the jetty without using tugs when reaching the 
middle of the front port’s dock”.  
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Figure 3.6. Near-miss incident (case four) 
 
No pilot is allowed to proceed with any action without permission from the VTS 
operator, who in turn takes orders from the HM. The pilot on board the bulk ship was then 
approached to discuss the case. The pilot commented on the incident and stated that he was 
unaware of the leaving ship until reaching the middle of the channel, at which point there 
was no chance to stop and return. He stated that,  
“The captain was frustrated when he noticed that the ship was leaving and would meet 
another ship so closely in the dock”.  
The same pilot commented that,  
“Although the pilot on board the container ship has a very long experience and is one 
of our most highly valued experts, it is not okay to breach port policy”. 
Lastly, the HM was asked if he had noticed any near misses during the last few days, to 
which the harbour master replied that nothing had happened. The harbour master was then 
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asked again about the last few days, but he still insisted that he had no memory of the 
occurrence. 
Accordingly, this case has been organised into the following stages: 
1- The shipmaster of the container carrier did not challenge the actions of the pilot 
when another ship was approaching them in a single navigational channel. 
2- The pilot, despite being experienced, did not obey the port’s policy stipulated to 
maintain higher operational safety standards. 
3- Other team members, such as the pilots and tug masters, did not complain to 
management because of loyalty amongst colleagues. 
4- The harbour master was completely unaware of the situation, although he should 
monitor all navigational movement as his first priority. Furthermore, it is the VTS 
duty to inform the HM immediately of MP misconduct. 
5- It is apparent that shipmasters did not contradict the action of the pilot because of 
fatigue and being focused on other tasks, such as paperwork, cargo plans, and 
emailing the company. As such, shipmasters were unable to conduct navigational 
processes to aid the pilot. 
6- The teamwork at this port was affected by poor management practices that affected 
those conducting the pilotage operation. 
In summary, to analyse the findings from the above investigation, the four accidents, 
and the findings from the field interviews and observations, the Delphi technique and AHP 
are used and results are presented in Chapter 4. 
 
3.8 Conclusion 
This chapter highlighted current marine pilotage operational practices at a marine port. 
The methodology used in this chapter identified factors that influence marine pilot 
reliability during port pilotage operations. Most of the identified factors highlighted in the 
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literature were confirmed as essential during field investigation. However, some factors 
mentioned fall outside the scope of this study and require further investigation. The 
identified factors were combined for quantitative analysis, as highlighted in Section 4.4.1 
(see Table 4.3), in order to build an effective MPRI. For the research triangulation and to 
ensure research validity and reliability, the study used various data collection methods. First, 
the researcher conducted a field observation of marine port pilotage operations to identify 
key operators and the degree of interaction between them. Secondly, semi-structured 
interviews were conducted using focus groups to gain an accurate understanding of the 
entire operation. The experts involved in the discussions  expressed their perspectives on 
the topic, including factors that contributed to their performance. This stage confirmed that 
most of the identified factors used in different disciplines are essential in developing an 
effective MPRI for the study. The novelty of this step is on developing a holistic model 
consisting of the identified factors from different disciplines as one set. Moreover, the 
degree of interactions among factors are pointed out through the discussions. Third, a 
comparative investigation was conducted by investigating accidents under pilotage 




4. Chapter Four: Quantitative Analysis of the Weights for the 
Marine Pilot’s Reliability Index (MPRI) using a Delphi 
Technique (DT) and Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP) 
 
 
4.1 Chapter Summary 
The previous chapter identified key factors that critically shape a marine pilot’s reliability 
index. Four main criteria, along with 13 sub-criteria, were identified qualitatively. Since this work 
proposes a mixed-method approach, this chapter will cover the quantitative part, which 
complements the qualitative part from chapter three, to test the validity, reliability, and 
trustworthiness of criteria identified qualitatively based on experts’ opinions; the researcher has 
proposed the Delphi technique to achieve this aim. The Delphi technique (DT) has been used widely 
across different disciplines to test the validity and degree of acceptance among experts on identified 
criteria. This step will validate the structured model for the next step in achieving this research 
topic’s objectives. Following the model validation process, the researcher will use analytical 
hierarchy process (AHP) to assign weights to the identified factors, which represent the degree of 
importance based on experts’ opinions toward each criterion and sub-criterion regarding shaping 
a marine pilot’s reliability index. The weight identified from this chapter will complement the next 
chapter’s method as appropriate. The framework of the proposed methods for this chapter are 
presented in Figure 4.1. 
 
 




The dynamic and transient features of maritime industry make investigating a marine 
port pilotage operation highly challenging. Scholars tend to use non-traditional research 
methods such as surveys, interviews, and group brainstorming to achieve research 
objectives, but those methods involve confounding factors and accessing sensitive 
information (Hallowell and Gambatese, 2009). This study aims to develop a reliability 
index for a marine pilot within port pilotage operations using a set of criteria identified 
qualitatively based on the experts’ opinions presented in chapter three, along with support 
from academic literature in different fields. Given the lack of certain and clear criteria for 
developing a pilot reliability index that helps assess an operator’s reliability during the 
operation, it was first necessary to examine the incorporated criteria identified through 
chapter three’s qualitative process and collect feedback and reach consensus among these 
criteria using an effective iterative group communication process. This was to be done by 
using different assessment tools that define criteria and then selecting the most appropriate 
factors for developing the index. This qualitative tool can provide a comprehensive view 
into social interactions within organisational process, but the challenge is how to meet the 
organisational needs through developing a novel tool. 
The majority of studies require engaging the experts' opinions on the first stage, which 
is called a participatory research method. The aim of participatory research is to obtain a 
methodological assessment tool that engages experts in the research efficiently, adopting 
a proper communication method throughout the research process to achieve a useful result 
that can be applied in reality (Morris, 2017). This tool’s characteristics will provide the 
experts with opportunities to share knowledge and operational ideas with each other. 
During the discussion that was conducted in the focus-group interviews presented in 
chapter three, the experts expressed their feelings towards the operation in different ways. 
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Some agreed with the statement while others objected or said nothing. This variance could 
affect the results and the analysis that the researcher follows in developing the general 
criterion as the researcher has used different expressions to present these variances such as 
‘the majority’ ‘most of the participants’ and ‘this statement was agreed by’. To avoid bias 
with this type of information, the researcher used a technique called the Delphi method to 
reach a consensus among experts regarding the identified criteria. Moreover, this step will 
confirm the validity and trustworthiness of the identified factors that built upon the 
qualitative research. 
 
4.3 Research backgrounds 
The techniques proposed to achieve the desired outcomes in this chapter are the DT 
and the AHP. The DT was used to elicit a consensus among experts in terms of the 
identified criteria highlighted in the literature, which was later confirmed through field 
investigation in Chapter 3. The AHP was used to assign a relative weight to each identified 
factor and rank them accordingly. Therefore, the following sub-sections provide an 
overview of the proposed methods used in this chapter. 
 
4.3.1 Delphi method 
The Delphi method is a participatory technique that deals with experts’ opinions by 
collecting their views on studies that lack a conceptual framework. It has a structural 
process that builds upon a number of sequential questionnaires sent out in rounds and then 
subjected to controlled feedback (Keeney et al., 2001); this acquires a consensus opinions 
among a group of experts on that particular study (Linstone and Turoff, 1975; Powell, 2003; 
Kennedy, 2004). Delphi was invented by RAND Corporation in the 1950s by Dalkey and 
Helmer (1963) as an effective means for collecting and soliciting expert judgments. Its 
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main objective is addressing an incomplete state of knowledge or lack of agreement on an 
issue that must achieve consensus among a group of experts (Powell, 2003). 
This method has been used for decades to investigate the scientific use of expert 
opinions strictly on matters of defence and military strategy (Keeney et. al., 2001; Landeta, 
2006; Morris, 2017). For sensitive reasons, it remained privately in use within that period 
(Dalkey et al., 1969) before it was used in public research for the first time by Helmer and 
Quade (1963), to investigate the development and planning of economies. Since then, 
Delphi became widely popular across a broad spectrum of subjects (Asghari et al., 2017; 
Aengenheyster et al., 2017; Ab Latif et al., 2016; Stebler et al., 2015; Landeta, 2006; 
Powell, 2003; Graham et al., 2003; Hasson et al., 2000; Gibson, 1998; Beech, 1997; 
Butterworth and Bishop, 1995).  
One of the main objectives of the Delphi technique is to gather and clarify information 
on a related topic by synthesising experts’ judgements to develop a conceptual framework 
and obtain the most reliable consensus (Dalkey and Helmer, 1963; Okoli and Pawlowski, 
2004; Gordon and Pease, 2006; Landeta, 2006). Moreover, since this method is widely 
used for quantifying uncertain variables and reaching a statistical consensus, it can be used 
to help clarify or develop conceptual frameworks. Delphi has proven its applicability and 
is widely used to support policy-makers’ decisions and predictions (Pill, 1971; Gordon and 
Pease, 2006; Landeta, 2006). Moreover, it is capable of structuring and organising effective 
communication among a group of people (Powell, 2003), which helps obtain information 
that lacks theoretical forms or has not been conceptualised systematically, and solving a 
complex problem (Linstone and Turoff, 1975). Therefore, most of Delphi studies gather 
experts’ opinions in a field that has non-solid and dynamic notions in a sequential process 




4.3.1.1 The Delphi process 
Although there is no standardised process for conducting Delphi research, many studies 
indicate its varying degrees of interpretation and flexibility (Green et al., 1999; Powell, 
2003). However, the main principle that characterises the method remains consistent, as it 
provides an accurate consensus on information (Rowe et al., 1991; Jones and Hunter, 1995) 
via repetitive sets of sequential questionnaire rounds.  
The sequential approach that Delphi utilises via conducting a set of multiple 
questionnaire rounds aims to gather a consensus on information among a group of experts 
(Green et al., 1999; Keeney et al., 2001). Utilising a questionnaire has an advantage as it 
gathers a large set of information across a large number of experts in different geographical 
locations (Keeney et al., 2001). Accordingly, this method is repetitive, as experts involved 
in the study must be consulted at least twice on the same set of questions. The main 
objective of this process is to let the experts reconsider their answers when compared to 
other experts’ opinions. It maintains a higher level of participant anonymity with their 
answers, as participants cannot recognise each other. The advantage of anonymity is that 
it encourages true opinions by eliminating the negative pressures to appease other experts. 
Another feature of the Delphi method is controlled feedback, in which a group coordinator 
exchanges information between the expert panels and dismisses all unrelated information. 
This process helps form questions that can assess experts’ responses statistically and 
quantitatively (Landeta, 2006). Therefore, the process of Delphi is composed of four 
features: anonymity, iteration with controlled feedback, statistical group response, and 
expert input (Goodman, 1987; Landeta, 2006). The following section will discuss these 




4.3.1.2 The expert panel and sample size 
According to Powell (2003), studies using the Delphi method cannot succeed without 
an expert panel. The Delphi method is built on the expertise of the panel members (Green, 
et al., 1999), because the method does not use a random population sample when carrying 
out research (Goodman, 1987; Keeney et al. 2001); rather, it employs expert respondents 
on the particular research topic. Therefore, according to McKenna (1994), the expert 
panellists are a group of ‘informed individuals’ and field specialists. The Delphi method 
can thereby reflect and test the concerned investigation more precisely because the study 
is run by these expert panellists. This practice assures content validity, as the representative 
experts have working knowledge, while non-experts will not yield better results. Therefore, 
the ‘expert panel’ must consist of experts with related working knowledge on the specific 
subject being studied (Green et al., 1997; Green et al., 1999).  
The panel of experts must have a number of experts involved actively throughout the 
process stages. The variation on Delphi process reflects variation on how many 
incorporated experts are needed. The number of panellists suggested by Reid (1988) ranges 
from 10 to 1,685, while others estimate a number according to the scope of the study and 
available sources (i.e., time and money) (Hasson et al., 2000; Powell, 2003). Some point 
out that the reliability of answers increases steadily if the number of participant judges 
increases. However, there is a lack of empirical evidence showing that the number of 
participants can affect the reliability and validity of expert opinions (Murphy et al., 1998). 
Moreover, the Delphi process does not target the number of experts participating for 
statistical purposes, but rather looks to experts’ qualities for more valuable outputs (Powell, 
2003). To achieve this, it is important to ensure the ability and willingness of participants 
to express their valid contributions, and they must have sufficient knowledge and 




4.3.1.3 Participant anonymity 
The advantage of anonymity, as aforementioned, is that it encourages honest opinions 
not pressured by other participants’ personalities and statuses. Expert opinions lose 
accountability if there is lack of anonymity (Goodman, 1987). The advantage of being 
anonymous is that it enables the expert to express unbiased opinions in regards to the 
concerned study (Couper, 1984). This supports the analysis carried out in chapter three in 
identifying significant criteria that constitute operators’ characteristics during a marine 
pilotage operation. Moreover, it helps overcome any possible biases by encouraging 
respondents to be honest and open in their opinions on certain issues. This provides useful 
data sets to any researcher using this method for further investigation on that subject. 
Moreover, each expert’s opinion is given the same weight and importance in the analysis, 
as the responses to given questions are independently answered (Keeney et al., 2001). 
Therefore, bias is eliminated because respondents are not identified to each other (Jeffery, 
1995). 
Researchers, such as Goodman (1987), highlight that complete anonymity may 
encourage ‘ill-considered judgement’ if the expressed views lose accountability. Other 
researchers, such as Keeney et al (2001), state that complete anonymity when using this 
method cannot be guaranteed for two reasons; first, the researcher knows the participants 
and their answers; second, in some studies, panel members know each other, but their 
answers remain anonymous, as their answers cannot be attributed to the speaker. 
Maintaining higher level of participant anonymity may prompt other members to 
participate especially if they know they have a shared interest in participating in that study. 
Therefore, McKenna’s (1994) term ‘quasi-anonymity’ means that the panellists may 
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identify one another, but individual judgements remain strictly confidential when 
conducting Delphi rounds and analysis.  
 
4.3.1.4 Delphi questionnaire rounds and data analysis 
Delphi is a systematic process employing a number of structured questionnaires that 
aim to elicit agreement among experts on a certain subject of interest. Prior to the process, 
the subject of interest is marked by a lack of consensus regarding multiple criteria as 
highlighted through the interview process, and that lack of consensus may significantly 
impact the process of a study. Typically, this method involves a number of rounds 
comprised of panellists who elicit data, followed by a data analysis to refine expert 
opinions in a repetitive process (Green et al., 1999). The number of questionnaire rounds 
varies from at least two rounds and is subject to consensus among panellists (Beretta, 1996). 
On each round, the panellists are encouraged to freely express their opinions and suggest, 
reject, and reconsider their judgement from previous rounds on any given criteria, which 
in turn indicates the degree of consensus. Therefore, the greatest difficulties are posed in 
the first round (Green et al., 1999).  
The first round starts with an open-ended questionnaire, which allows the panellists to 
express their opinions freely (Powell, 2003). This process might generate a large number 
of factors, especially if the researcher uses an inclusive approach (Procter and Hunt, 1994; 
Keeney et al., 2001), and could discourage panellists from participating in the subsequent 
rounds. As the main scope of the first round’s questionnaire is to generate ideas and ask 
panellists to respond and comment on identified issues, researchers tend to provide pre-
existing information for ranking or response (Keeney et al., 2001). This approach might 
bias the responses or limit the available options. However, the pre-existing information 
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could efficiently tackle the amount of time consumed getting responses (Duffield, 1993; 
Jenkins and Smith, 1994). 
After obtaining first round results, any subsequent rounds are structured questionnaires 
incorporating feedback from round one. According to Walker and Selfe (1996), the 
analysed data obtained by each round must be circulated back to panel members, as the 
data can encourage panel members to stay involved in the study. This process efficiently 
collects experts’ opinions and subjects them to controlled feedback (Buck et al., 1993). 
The feedback given to panellists is vital, as it is the only mode of communication among 
experts (Murphy et al., 1998). In addition, returning feedback to participants is a unique 
and interesting practice for all concerned (McKenna et al., 1994). Therefore, the 
development of the organisation and its staff’s needs can be linked by engaging experts in 
the study, as the experts present their concerns collectively. 
One of the main concerns when applying the Delphi method is the decline in the rate 
of response as the study progresses (Keeney et al., 2001). According to Buck et al (1993), 
achieving a consensus among panellists requires involving participants in the research until 
the end of the process. The declining rate of response issue is one of the main criticisms of 
this method, and it mostly happens during the final round. This can explain why most 
researchers limit their study to two or three rounds rather the traditional Delphi method of 
four rounds (Keeney et al., 2001). Moreover, researchers are encouraged to balance factors 
that significantly influence willingness to participate, such as time, cost, and fatigue (Rowe 
et al., 1991; Powell, 2003).  
 
4.3.1.5 Reliability and validity issue 
Some researchers criticise the Delphi as having no evidence of information reliability 
(Williams and Webb, 1994; Walker and Selfe, 1996). This was justified by Walker and 
Selfe (1996) as if similar information were given to a number of panel members when 
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using the Delphi method, the same result could not be guaranteed. However, other 
researchers have found the technique to have reliable results and effectively report the 
same results after 16 years in the same field of study (Ono and Wedemeyer, 1994). In 
addition, the technique has been criticised for its content validity. As Goodman (1987) 
asserts, the researcher cannot influence the survey development stage, which could have 
implications on its content validity. Contrastingly, if the participants have knowledge in 
the area of the study to represent the panellists, content validity can be expected (Goodman, 
1987). Thus, using criteria such as transferability, credibility, and applicability of results 
might be more appropriate than relying on psychometric criteria (Keeney et al., 2001). 
Jairath and Weinstein (1993) have repeatedly reported the importance of conducting a pilot 
study to not only identify wording difficulties but also enhance the feasibility of the 
administered questionnaire. Few researchers conduct a pilot survey before the 
questionnaire round. As a result, the pilot survey must take place before every 
questionnaire round or be limited to the first implemented survey (Keeney et al., 2001). 
 
4.3.2 Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP) 
The AHP technique is considered one of the most powerful and widely used methods to 
express fuzzy information, which conventional techniques, such as fault tree analysis (FTA) 
and failure mode effect and criticality analysis (FMECA), are unable to account in 
discussing the uncertainty that results from system operations (Al Yami et al., 2017). Fuzzy 
information cannot be expressed formally using crisp variables. However, using fuzzy 
forms of assessment enables a gradual transition between assessment states to overcome 
uncertain expressions (Wang, 2003). Accordingly, many advanced multi-criteria decision-
making (MCDM) techniques have been incorporated using fuzzy theory such as fuzzy 
hierarchical aggregation method and conjunction implication methods (Sun, 2010; Al Yami 
et al., 2017). The AHP is regarded as a suitable technique when making a choice between 
147 
 
complex criteria derived from a rational scale known as a membership function and was 
first developed by Saaty (1965). AHP is based on the subdivision of a problem in a 
hierarchical structure and aids in organising the rational analysis of the problem by dividing 
it into smaller constituent parts. Therefore, the main objective of the AHP is to derive the 
degree of importance, in terms of weight, for a set of operational activities (Saaty and 
Vergas, 2012). The AHP method is a comprehensive framework used to manage rational 
and irrational data, when dealing with multi-objective, multi-criterion, and multi-actor 
decisions, with and without certainty for any number of criteria and/or alternatives (Al 
Yami et al., 2017). This is a multi-criteria decision-making (MCDM) approach that can be 
used for solving complex decision problems built in hierarchical forms that contain 
multiple levels, namely objectives, criteria, and alternatives. Moreover, this method can 
also give a preference list of the considered alternative solutions in the form of a hierarchy 
structured model (Bentivegna et al., 1994), as it can be used to analyse different types of 
research using both qualitative and quantitative variables (Chang and Chen, 2011). Such a 
hierarchal structure helps the analyst provide decision makers conducting a multi pairwise 
comparison, with a tool to observe the influence of an element that significantly affects the 
operation in a hierarchical model. Moreover, it can also allocate a resource among different 
activities by highlighting the most significant activity through ranking or weighting 
operational objectives (Saaty, 1977). 
As per Drake (1998), there are four main steps in structuring an AHP model: 
1- Selection of criteria. 
2- Evaluation of the relative importance of these criteria using pairwise comparisons. 
3- Evaluation of each alternative relative to each other on the basis of each selection 
criteria using the pairwise comparison technique. 
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4- Combination of the ratings acquired in steps 2 and 3 to obtain an overall relative 
rating for each alternative. 
 
The selection of criteria will help cultivate the AHP graphical illustration for the 
investigated problem in terms of the main goal, criteria, and alternatives (Anderson et al., 
2008). After developing the AHP model, the decision maker can appoint the preference of 
each decision’s alternatives in accordance with each sub goal’s criteria’ (Anderson et al., 
2008). This means that the weight and the relative importance of each element in the 
hierarchy can be obtained through a pairwise comparison method (Ramin et al., 2012) 
using preference scales. Therefore, decision alternatives can be prioritised in ranking form 
following a mathematical calculation used to synthesise the information and preferences 
of each criterion and alternatives, permitting a quantitative interpretation of the judgement 
among these attributes (Pillay and Wang, 2003).  
Saaty developed the AHP method in 1965. The AHP method rates lies on a scale from 1, 
which represents ‘Equally important’, to 9, which represents ‘Extremely important’ (see 
Table 4.1) (Saaty, 1980; Sarkis and Talluri, 2004).  
 
Table 4.1. 9-point intensity of relative importance scale (Saaty, 2008) 
Intensity of Relative Importance Definition 
1 Equal Importance 
3 Moderate Importance of one over another 
5 Essential or strong importance 
7 Demonstrated importance 
9 Extreme importance 
2,4,6,8 Intermediate values between the two adjacent judgments 
 
 
According to the above table, if the importance degree of a factor ‘A’ compared to ‘B’ 
is given, then the importance of ‘B’ is reciprocally compared to ‘A’. Therefore, weighting 
149 
 
the importance of quantifiable or non-quantifiable sets of information can be expressed 
either by ratio scale or verbally (Pohekar and Ramachandran, 2004).  
 
4.3.2.1 AHP algorithms 
According to Anderson et al. (2008), it is essential to develop a pairwise comparison 
matrix to determine factors’ priorities. This matrix, which is represented by 𝑛-by-𝑛 and 
called matrix D, quantifies experts’ judgments on 𝐴𝑖and 𝐴𝑗  pairs of attributes. The 𝑎𝑖𝑗 
entries are determined by the following rules: 
Rule 1. If 𝑎𝑖𝑗 = 𝛼, then 𝑎𝑖𝑗 = 1/𝛼, 𝛼 ≠ 0. 
Rule 2. If 𝐴𝑖is decided to be of equal relative importance as 𝐴𝑗, then 𝑎𝑖𝑗 = 𝑎𝑗𝑖 = 1. 
It is important to mention that the average values configuring the matrix are based on three 
experts’ opinions (Saini and Kumar, 2014). Accordingly, matrix D can be constructed 





















   (4.1) 
Where 𝑖, 𝑗 = 1,2,3, ……… , 𝑛 and each 𝑎𝑖𝑗 is the relative importance of characteristic 𝐴𝑖to 
characteristic 𝐴𝑗. 
In 1977, Satty used a theory called the Perron-Frobenius theory, which was created in 
1960 by Gantmacher to ensure the existence of one of the largest real positive eigenvalues 
for a matrix D with positive entries whose associated eigenvector is the vector of weights. 
This normalised weight vector was unique in having its entries amount to a unit (Saaty, 
1977). Therefore, in the lowest hierarchy level activity, the vector of weights associates 
with the next level criterion and can be derived by a pairwise comparison matrix with 
respect to that criterion (Saaty, 1994). By recording a compared quantified judgment on 
150 
 
(𝐴𝑖, 𝐴𝑗) pairs as a numerical entry as 𝑎𝑖𝑗 in matrix D, it is essential to assign a numerical 
weight 𝜔1, 𝜔2, …𝜔𝑛  to the 𝑛  contingences 𝐴1, 𝐴2, … . . , 𝐴𝑛  to reflect that recorded 











𝑗=1  (𝑖 = 1,2,3,… . . , 𝑛)                (4.2) 
Where 𝑎𝑖𝑗 characterises a comparison matrix of order 𝑛 by the input of rows 𝑖 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑗. 
When various numbers of a pairwise comparison are weighed, inconsistent values were 
expected. The AHP method provides a consistency measure – Consistency Index (CI) and 
Consistency Ratio (CR) – for any given set of pairwise comparisons (Riahi et al., 2012; 
Ung et al., 2006) as shown in equations 4.3 and 4.4. When the CR indicates that the value 
of the pairwise comparison for matrix D is less than or equal to 0.1, the consistency of the 
pairwise comparison is reasonable and can be used (Andersen et al., 2008; Yang et al., 
2011; Riahi et al., 2012). However, if the CR indicates more than 0.1, then the decision 
makers should consider revising the pairwise judgement due to inconsistency. Moreover, 

















       (4.5) 
Where: 
CR is the consistency ratio 
CI is the consistency index 
RI is the average random index (Table 4.2) 
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𝑛 is the matrix order 
𝜆𝑚𝑎𝑥 is the maximum weight value of the 𝑛 − 𝑏𝑦 − 𝑛 comparison matrix D. 
 
Table 4.2. Value of RI versus matrix order (Saaty, 2013) 
n 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
RI 0 0 0.52 0.89 1.11 1.25 1.35 1.4 1.45 1.49 
RI: average random index 
 
4.3 Empirical application of DT and AHP 
This section examines the feasibility of the identifiable criteria that the researcher 
highlighted following the discussions conducted with the three groups through the 
interviews in chapter three. The identifiable factors are based on a qualitative process, 
which will be examined using the Delphi method, and aims to seek agreement among 
experts on these identifiable factors. This analysis will be followed by the use of AHP as 
a decision-making technique to prioritise these factors according to the degree of 
importance in significantly influencing the reliability of operations. Therefore, this section 
will highlight the process data collection that fits the methods used to achieve this research 
objective.  
 
4.3.1 Pilot study for Delphi method 
The researcher developed an initial survey based on the results obtained via group 
interviews conducted in chapter three. Although the researcher discussed in detail each 
selected criterion highlighted by the experts, the researcher must give an operational 
definition of each essential, highlighted criterion to assess the reliability of the pilot (see 
Table 4.3). Since variance in operators’ perceptions was observed during discussions, this 
process will help clarify the meaning of factors that built the criterion and make it available 
to all participants at all times. Accordingly, the developed questionnaire was sent to five 
152 
 
senior pilots with master licences and pilotage experience in three different countries and 
nationalities beyond where this study was conducted. The returned comments were 
valuable in order to ensure the rationality of the questionnaire. Some minor clarification 
was asked along with minor amendments. The researcher amended the comments and the 






Table 4.3. Operational definitions for alternatives 


































A set of competencies (educational level, licences and certifications) that exhibit his/her achievement in 
order to comply with the minimum work-related knowledge required to carry out certain duties. 
Port accident case 1 (see section 3.7.3); Experts 
interviews; IMO, 2004; Riahi et al., 2012 
1.2. ST 
A set of compulsory or additional work-related courses and refresher training required to maintain the 
minimum operational standard. 
Expert interviews; Alvarenga et al., 2014; Berg, 
2013 
1.3. WEx The accumulation of knowledge or skills gained over time as a pilot. Expert interviews; Yule and Brown, 2012;  
2. PF 
2.1. WH The number of working hours per day or the time of the day when the operator is carrying out his/her duty. 
Port accident cases 2 and 4 (see section 3.7.3); 
Experts interviews; Kim et al., 2009; Hetherington 
et al., 2006; Raby and McCallum, 1997 
2.2. WS 
Commercial and economic stresses, management stresses, work-related demand, high level of traffic, 
management style, etc. 
Field observation (see section 3.7.1); Port accident 
cases 2 and 4 (see section 3.7.3); Josten et al., 
2003; Flin et al., 2003 
2.3. WEnv Physical working environment, ergonomic design, the status of the operative’s environment. 
Field observation (see section 3.7.1); James and 
Walters, 2002; Bhattacharya and Tang, 2013 
3. NTS 
3.1. DM 
Encompasses a set of structural sequences that includes defining and diagnosing problems, generating 
options, assessing risks and option selection through different available alternatives, followed by an 
outcome review. 
Port accident case 1 and 4 (see section 3.7.3); 
Moorthy et al., 2005; Sharma et al., 2011 
3.2. SA 
Is the perception of elements in the current situation through information gathering, followed by assessing 
the significance of the information gathered from different resources to form a clear picture to implement a 
procedure for the current operational event, and finally implement the necessary action to avoid an 
unfavourable event. 
Field observation (see section 3.7.1); Port accident 
cases 1, 2, 3 and 4 (see section 3.7.3); Fletcher et 
al., 2004; Saeed et al., 2016 
3.3. CS 
Is the ability of a member to regulate, control, motivate, express feelings and convey information to other 
team members involved in an operation. 
Field observation (see section 3.7.1); Port accident 
cases 3 and 4 (see section 3.7.3); Flin et al., 2008; 
Salmon et al., 2009; Blundel, 2004 
3.4. T&L 
Is the way to establish a clear two-way channel of communication, openness to criticism, empathy towards 
cultural diversity, capability to motivate people and develop a community atmosphere, cope with an 
operator’s limitations, and be a key team player. 
Field observation (see section 3.7.1); Port accident 
cases 1, 2, 3 and 4 (see section 3.7.3); Combe and 




As an operator gains work-related experience, he/she is getting older. Operator age can indicate how the 
performance of an experienced operator changes over time. For example, a reduction in physical capacities 
and coordination, flexibility, strength and power can be expected when getting older. 
Port accident case 2 (see section 3.7.3); Kim et al., 
2009; Josten et al., 2003 
4.2. HI 
This has been identified as a factor that is strongly associated with accidents at sea. It can be a result of the 
nature of the work, geographical location, stresses at work, prolonged working hours, commercial pressure 
and organisational culture as well as historic family illness. 
Expert interviews; Sturman, 2002; Josten et al., 
2003 
4.3. BS 
Pilots are required to maintain a high level of body strength, as they need to climb a ladder from time to 
time, this will be followed by a high level of cognitive demand required to guide the ship safely during 
pilotage operations. Any reduction in body strength will affect a pilot’s ability to work effectively and limits 
cognitive ability. 
Expert interviews; Wadsworth et al., 2008; 
Mohren et al., 2001 
((TP: Technical Proficiency; QPL: Qualification and Pilotage Licencing; ST: Special Training: WEx: Working Experience), (PF: Personal Fatigue; WH: Working Hours; 
WS: Work Stresses; WEnv: Working Environment), (NTS: Non-Technical Skills; DM: Decision-Making; SA: Situation Awareness; CS: Communication skills; T&L: 




4.3.2 Delphi round one 
The first Delphi questionnaire, along with the participant information sheet (PIS) and 
an invitation letter, was transmitted electronically through SurveyMonkey to allow 
participants to access the survey through their personal devices. The researcher benefited 
from the conducted group interviews by accessing the personal details given by the experts 
after they expressed their willingness to participate through to the end of this study and as 
highlighted in chapter three. This support eased the process of collecting essential data 
needed for this round via sending direct emails to the experts and using phone calls as 
reminders. The questionnaire link was sent directly through email to all participating pilots, 
forming the panel members, which consisted of 35 pilots with varying and considerable 
working experience. The panellists were asked to access the survey through the given link 
and read the PSI before answering the questions. The main objective of the PSI was to gain 
an overview of the participants with a key element and the objective from conducting this 
research. Although this information is known from previous qualitative analysis steps, it 
was essential to present it to the participants again to make sure they understand the study’s 
main purpose. Moreover, participants were given the chance to accept or reject the survey 
at any stage. In addition, participants were required to tick an implied consent field to 
proceed to accessing the questions. The first questionnaire round was completed by the 35 
pilots participating in the interview. The demographic characteristics of the Delphi expert 
panel are presented in Table 4.4. It is apparent from the demographic distribution of 
participants that a higher number of participants – 19 – have maritime diplomas along with 
a pilot licence, followed by three, seven, and nine pilots with third, second, and master’s 
mariner degrees along with a pilot licence respectively. The first demographic 
characteristics represent gender, revealing that 100% are male. There is almost equal 
distribution among the four groups in terms of age, except for the 60 and over group. Pilots 
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falling within the 20-29 and 50-59 age groups are comprised of nine pilots each, while the 
age groups 30-39 and 40-49 are comprised of eight pilots each; finally, the age group over 
60 consists of only one pilot. This distribution could benefit this study as proven by 
different literature studies that show that variance in operators’ perception, safety-related 
issues, ability to learn new things, and experience were observed among different age 
groups in different fields. Moreover, the importance of identified criteria can be 
highlighted and stressed differently if compared between different participants’ age groups. 
However, the third participant characteristic is the pilot rank. The majority of the 
participants were ranked as first pilots, with 22 pilots representing 63% of the total number 
of participants followed by numbers of six, five, and two pilots representing second, third, 
and trainee pilots respectively. In addition, the pilot experience  represented the fourth 
demographic characteristic, reflecting, 13 and a majority of pilots have more than 20 years 
of experience. Nonetheless, pilots with five years or less of experience represent the second 
highest pilotage experience. These two main characteristics provide reasonable operational 
opinions, since the majority of pilots have pilotage experience of more than 20 years and 
are ranked as seniors. Moreover, this advantage can result in valuable comments and reflect 
a real operational picture, since these pilots have prolonged operational experience and 
stabilised mental opinions. More importantly, the total number of experts distributed based 
on the above main demographic characteristics, in accordance with their 
qualification/pilotage license or category, shows the majority of participants (54%) having 
a diploma with a pilotage license (see figure 4.2). The participants’ qualifications were 
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20 - 29 8 1 0 0 0 9 (25.7%) 
30 – 39 3 2 2 0 1 8 (22.9%) 
40 – 49 3 0 3 0 2 8 (22.9%) 
50 – 59 5 0 2 0 2 9 (25.7%) 















Trainee Pilot 0 0 1 0 1 2 (6%) 
Third Pilot 4 1 0 0 0 5 (14%) 
Second Pilot 3 2 1 0 0 6 (17% 










≤ 5 Years 8 0 2 0 1 11 (31%) 
6 – 10 Years 3 3 0 0 2 8 (23%) 
11 – 15 Years 0 0 1 0 1 2 (6%) 
16 – 20 Years 0 0 1 0 0 1(3%) 
















































20 - 29 YEARS 30 - 39 YEARS 40 - 49 YEARS 50 - 59 YEARS OVER 60 YEARS
Age Group








Figure 4.5. Pilot’s experience/qualification 
 
 
In round one, the panel members were asked to rate the degree of importance to each 
identifiable criterion using a five-point Likert scale, where 1 represents not important at all 
and 5 represents significantly important. The Likert scale was treated as interval data, used 
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degree of consensus among highlighted criteria was measured to increase objectivity and 
comparable degree of consensus (Redmond et al., 2006). Faherty (1979) suggested that 
using the median and inter-quartile range is essential for analysing data and statistical 
feedback for the collected data obtained by Delphi rounds. Thus, for each identifiable 
criterion, the median and the inter-quartile range were calculated. 
According to the experts’ responses, the researcher computed the rating statistics for 
each identifiable criterion that constituted the developed marine pilots’ reliability index 
(MPRI). The experts’ responses from the first round were presented in Table 4.5, showing 
the median (Med) and the inter-quartile range (IQR). Criteria that reached the ‘Med’ level 
‘Med’ of 4 or more and IQRs of 1 or less were considered a consensus and agreed upon by 
participants as important. The ‘Med’ and IQR ranges obtained from the first round are 
summarised in Table 4.5. 
In this study, the expert panel members ranked the degree of agreement and the 
importance of each proposed reliability indicator using the Likert five-point scale. 
Accordingly, the researcher calculated the given responses from the 35 experts using 
statistical methods for each proposed reliability indicator. Table 4.5 shows the experts’ 
opinions in round one by listing the proposed reliability indicator with medians, averages, 
and inter-quartile ranges (IQR). If any of these indices are not important or agreed upon, 
this index will be highlighted and underlined in bold font. If the median of an index is 
valued to four or greater and the IQR one or less, this index is important and achieves 
consensus and will not be highlighted in bold or even underlined. 
The results obtained in this study surprisingly, showed that experts agreed that all 
proposed MPRIs are important, achieving an adequate consensus level from round one 
(see Table 4.5). This result could be justified because the participants were involved in the 
interviews. In addition, the researcher successfully identified the main concerns that the 
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marine pilot highlighted and presented as significant criteria; this set of criteria may have 
confirmed the reliability of the results. Moreover, the researcher’s investigation and 
analysis of the literature were to some extent proven adequate since the results from round 
one achieved consensus. Accordingly, the results from round one show that the importance 
degree of all the MPRIs exceeded the agreed threshold of the suggested median. Moreover, 
the entire reliability indicator exceeded the threshold for a consensus on distribution. This 
means that there is no need to change any operational definition or add any additional 
indicator for the second round questionnaire. The minimum number of rounds proposed 
by previous studies is two, so the second round aims to display the participant positions 
based on their opinions compared to the expert panel. Therefore, the experts have the 
choice to reconsider their answers or keep the same opinion, as explained in next section. 
 
Table 4.5. Round-one panel opinions 
Reliability indicator 
(Likert scale from 1 to 5) 
Panel opinions 
n Med Aver. IQR 
Operator Qualifications 35 4 3.8 1 
Specific Training 35 5 4.5 0 
Working Experience 35 5 4.5 0 
Working Hours 35 4 4.2 0 
Work Stresses 35 4 4.3 0 
Working Environment 35 4 4.1 0 
Decision-Making 35 5 4.5 0 
Situation Awareness 35 4 4.2 0 
Communication Skills 35 4 4.1 0 
Teamwork and Leadership 35 4 4.03 0 
Operator Age 35 4 3.77 1 
Health Issues 35 4 4.23 0 
Body Strength 35 4 3.77 1 
Likert scale used (1=not at all important and 5= very important) 
n: the number of participants 
Med: median; Aver.: the average; IQR: the inter-quartile range 
 
 
4.3.3 Delphi round two 
The questionnaire for the second round followed the quantitative data analysis from 
the first round. The inclusion of statistical data obtained from the first round is a feature of 
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the second round questionnaire: the panel members’ ratings of importance levels and 
consensus were presented in a new questionnaire version. As the first round found 
consensus and there was no additional criterion to add, this questionnaire round included 
the same MPRIs along with the statistical results from the first round, which were sent 
back to the same experts showing their answers along with the group answer. This step 
aimed to encourage experts with different answers from the group to justify their choices. 
The second round started by inviting participants from round one (n=35) to participate 
in the second round. The panellists were encouraged to rate every reliability indicator using 
the same procedure from round one using Likert 5-point scale. This questionnaire 
presented the median, average, and the IQR for every reliability indicator from the previous 
round. The reason for presenting these factors was to ask experts if they would reconsider 
the answers or explain their dissenting choices in the comment box. Response variations 
were justified, as the discussion conducted during the group interviews showed variance 
on experts’ opinions. This was confirmed within this experimental process, as selection 
variants were observed across experts’ feedback on Delphi rounds. 
In this round, every participant was sent a questionnaire by email with his original 
answers to maintain confidentiality. During the previous round, the questionnaires were 
transmitted electronically via SurveyMonkey to allow participants to easily access them. 
However, this round required a follow-up email reminder to encourage participants to 
return the questionnaire by the deadline, stipulated to be accomplished within two weeks. 
This process was a success, as the experts’ panel in round two answered the second round 
survey. Therefore, in round two, the 35 participants represented 100% of the total 
participants from round one. The results obtained from this round are stated in Table 4.6. 
The consensus among the group for the identified MPRIs were achieved from the first 
round and the second round conducted with the Delphi method, which requires at least two 
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rounds. However, the second round, as previously mentioned, encouraged participants to 
compare their answers with the group and update or justify their choices. Accordingly, 
Table 4.6 represents both Delphi rounds and highlights in red font the improved M, Aver., 
and IQR. 
Following this process, the researcher developed the hierarchy structure of the 








Table 4.6. Round two panel opinions 
Reliability indicator 
(Likert scale from 1 to 5) 
  Panel opinions  
n Med (R1) Med (R2) Aver. (R1) Aver. (R2) IQR (R1) IQR (R2) 
Operator Qualifications 35 4 4 3.8 4.1 1 0 
Specific Training 35 5 5 4.5 4.7 0 0 
Working Experience 35 5 5 4.5 4.7 0 0 
Working Hours 35 4 4 4.2 4.4 0 0 
Work Stresses 35 4 5 4.3 4.5 0 0 
Working Environment 35 4 4 4.1 4.3 0 0 
Decision-Making 35 5 5 4.5 4.6 0 0 
Situation Awareness 35 4 5 4.2 4.5 0 0 
Communication Skills 35 4 4 4.1 4.4 0 0 
Teamwork and Leadership 35 4 4 4.0 4.3 0 0 
Operator Age 35 4 4 3.8 3.8 1 1 
Health Issues 35 4 4 4.2 4.4 0 0 





4.3.4 AHP application to field investigation 
As mentioned above, the main objective of utilising the AHP method is to enable the 
decision-makers to find relative weights of risk factors and determine the most significant 
one to select the best alternatives for different criteria. Showing the importance of each 
criterion is extremely important in this study. These important judgements are based on 
experts’ points of view. The pilots who participated in this research assigned the relative 
importance to each criterion by filling in a questionnaire designed for the AHP method 
(see Appendix I). The participants were encouraged by the marine department to 
participate through the end of this study and were reminded by emails to return the 
questionnaire. Therefore, all the questionnaires were returned.  
However, let us assume that, 𝐴1, 𝐴2, 𝐴3, and 𝐴4 represent decision-making, situation 
awareness, communication, teamwork, and leadership respectively. Based on the given 
information, matrix D was developed. This is followed by the application equations 4.1-
4.5, which were applied to calculate the weight for each criterion to assign weight to each 
sub-criterion. 
After receiving the complete questionnaires from all the participants, the hierarchy criteria 
were weighted by applying AHP equations 4.1-4.5 as follows: 
The following pairwise comparison matrix 4×4 was  constructed  to obtain the weight of 










Decision-making 1 (𝑎11) 0.35 (𝑎12) 0.21 (𝑎13) 0.23 (𝑎14) 
Situation awareness 2.85 (𝑎21) 1 (𝑎22) 0.40 (𝑎23) 0.40 (𝑎24) 
Communication 
Skills 
4.73 (𝑎31) 2.5 (𝑎32) 1 (𝑎33) 1.22 (𝑎34) 
Teamwork & 
leadership 






In the first step, we need to form matrix D, as follows: 
𝐷 = [
𝑎11 𝑎12 𝑎13 𝑎14
𝑎21 𝑎22 𝑎23 𝑎24
𝑎31 𝑎32 𝑎33 𝑎34
𝑎41 𝑎42 𝑎43 𝑎44
] = [
1 0.35 0.21 0.23
2.84 1 0.40 0.40
4.73 2.50 1 1.22
4.44 2.52 0.82 1
] 
 

















𝑎11 + 𝑎21 + 𝑎31 + 𝑎41
) + (
𝑎12
𝑎12 + 𝑎22 + 𝑎32 + 𝑎42
) + (
𝑎13












1 + 2.84 + 4.73 + 4.44
) + (
0.35




0.21 + 0.40 + 1 + 0.82
) + (
0.23
0.23 + 0.40 + 1.22 + 1
)] 







𝑎11 + 𝑎21 + 𝑎31 + 𝑎41
) + (
𝑎22
𝑎12 + 𝑎22 + 𝑎32 + 𝑎42
) + (
𝑎23












1 + 2.84 + 4.73 + 4.44
) + (
1
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1 + 2.84 + 4.73 + 4.44
) + (
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0.21 + 0.40 + 1 + 0.82
) + (
1
0.23 + 0.40 + 1.22 + 1
)] 
𝑊𝑇&𝐿 = 0.3563 
 
The third step is to find the Consistency Ratio (CR), by Equation 4.5. This step is required 
to find 𝜆𝑚𝑎𝑥, using Equation 4.3, and the Consistency Index (CI), using Equation 4.4. 







, and the Consistency Index 























































+1.2028+0.9181+1] = 16.13 










 = 4.03 
Then, CI = 
4.03−4
4−1
 = 0.011 
Therefore, Equation 4.5, CR = 
𝐶𝐼
𝑅𝐼




 = 0.012 
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However, if the CR is greater than 0.10, there is inconsistency in the pairwise 
judgements, which must be reviewed by the decision-makers before taking an additional 
step (Riahi et al., 2012). This means that if the CR is equal to or less than 0.1, it is considered 
reasonable for such a comparison, which allows the AHP to proceed further to calculate 
the weight. In this research, the returned questionnaires were inconsistent for 24 of the 
returned questionnaires. Thus, it was essential to reconsider those participants’ answers 
until reaching consistency. Those participants were provided with an explanation on how 
to ensure consistency when answering the questionnaire (see AHP questionnaire in 
Appendix I). Therefore, the assigned pilots were asked to reconsider their opinions until 
the appropriate level of consistency was achieved. Because of the above experts’ 
evaluations, the consistency ratio was found reasonable to proceed to weight calculation 
for each criterion. The information collected from the pilots was entered into a software 
package called AHP calc. version 12.08.13, and the weight for each criterion, sub-criterion, 
and even sub-sub-criterion was evaluated. 
Based on the data analysis, the reliability of the marine port pilotage operation was 
dependent on many participants. According to the experts’ opinions, the pilot was ranked 
the most important factor in the operation, as shown on Table 4.7, with a relative weight of 
0.36, followed by the tug master and the ship master, with relative weights of 0.25, and 
0.15, respectively. The harbour master and the VTS operator where ranked fourth and fifth 
with relative weights of 0.15 and 0.09, respectively. Each of those participants are subjected 
to different variables that shape their reliability, and changes of variable value will 
eventually change the reliability of the pilots and teamwork. This research focused on 
assessing the reliability of a marine port pilot. Criteria that shape marine pilot reliability 
were ranked using AHP based on the experts’ opinions as shown in Table 4.8. The results 
show the local weight of each criterion using the AHP method to identify the independent 
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relative weights for each of the MPRI’s. The participants in this research ranked the four 
main criteria that were identified as central to shaping operator reliability as follows: PF 
(0.4451), NTS (0.3643), TP (0.1154), and F&S (0.0751). The following outlines the beliefs 
of experts involved in this research on the degree of importance of these main criteria in 
shaping reliability. Factors constituting operators’ TP are: QPL, ST, and WEx. The AHP 
method was used to ranked the degree of importance with ST (0.4518), WEx (0.3651), and 
QPL (0.1832). Similarly, factors constituting PF were ranked from highest to lowest as 
follows: WS (0.5472), WEnv (0.3394), and WH (0.1134). In addition, factors constituting 
NTS were ranked as follows: CS (0.3996), T&L (0.3573), SA (0.1690), and DM (0.0740). 
Lastly, factors constituting operator F&S were ranked as follows: BS (0.6847), HI (0.2041), 
and OA (0.1112). Global weights were identified to highlight the degree of influence of 
each criterion on marine pilot reliability. For instance, ST was ranked as the most 
significant factor in shaping marine pilot TP with a value of 0.4518, while ST ranked as the 
sixth most significant factor in shaping pilots’ reliability with a global weight value of 0.052. 
The distinction between the local weight and global weight is that the local weight 
represents the significance of that particular criterion in shaping the associated upper level 
criterion (i.e. TP), while the global weight represents the degree of influence of the criterion 
on overall reliability. The top five factors found significant in shaping the reliability of a 
marine pilot are WS, WEnv, CS, T&L, and SA, from most to least significant. The 
identified weights presented in Table 4.8 are used in the following chapters to prioritise 
factors that significantly affect the reliability of the pilotage operation. However, for this 
time-constrained research, the researcher focused on the pilot and left other factors involved 





Table 4.7. Pilotage operation main criteria 
Main Criteria Weights Importance Rank 
Pilot 0.362 1 
Ship Master 0.151 3 
Tug Master 0.250 2 
VTS Operator 0.089 5 
Harbour Master 0.148 4 
 
 
Table 4.8. Pilot’s Sub-Criteria 















QPL 0.183 3 0.021 11 
ST 0.452 1 0.052 6 
WEx 0.365 2 0.042 9 
PF 
(0.445) 
WH 0.113 3 0.050 8 
WS 0.547 1 0.243 1 
WEnv 0.340 2 0.151 2 
NTS 
(0.364) 
DM 0.074 4 0.027 10 
SA 0.169 3 0.062 5 
CS 0.400 1 0.146 3 
T&L 0.357 2 0.130 4 
F&S 
(0.075) 
OA 0.111 3 0.008 13 
HI 0.204 2 0.015 12 




Human errors were the most significant factors in marine port pilotage operation as 
shown in the previous chapters, the interviews, accident analyses, and field observations. 
Furthermore, the marine port pilotage operation is a series network subjected to the 
reliability of its main teamwork. The marine pilot is one of the team of workers conducting 
the marine pilotage operation, and the reliability of marine port pilotage service can be 
evaluated through the reliability evaluation of its participants. 
Therefore, in this chapter and with the support of the literature review, the criteria 
identified from Chapter 3 were examined for consensus based on experts’ opinions of these 
criteria. These criteria identify the main, significant criteria that influence the reliability of 
a marine port pilot as the main driver proposed for this research. The DT was used for two 
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questionnaire rounds confirming agreement among the participants for the identified 
criteria highlighted through the data analysis in Chapter 3. Moreover, the experts were 
encouraged to assign weights to every identifiable criterion using AHP. 
As revealed in this chapter, the proposed MPRI to evaluate the reliability of a marine 
pilot was found dependent upon many variables, and the value of a criterion will change 
the reliability of a pilot and team workers. The proposed methodology confirms the 
significance of the identified criteria and weights each criterion considered essential to 
assessing the reliability of a marine pilot. However, it is important to identify the degree of 
dependencies between criteria. During the interviews, the researcher discussed dependent 





5. Chapter Five: A proposed hybrid methodology to preference 
the developed Marine pilot reliability indices (MPRIs) using 
a fuzzy decision-making trial and evaluation laboratory 
(FDEMATEL) and an analytical network process (ANP) 
 
5.1 Chapter Summary 
Obtaining higher reliability requires careful monitoring and evaluation of the identified 
criteria highlighted in previous chapters. In this study, marine pilots were subjected to higher 
operational demands that affected their ability to maintain safer and reliable operational 
standards. Identifying an effective reliability evaluation and the most significant reliability 
influence was the goal of the first stage. Accordingly, assigning the weight to each identified 
reliability indicator was essential in developing a rational decision and a precise reliability 
evaluation tool. Identified Marine pilot reliability indices (MPRIs) are usually presented in a 
hierarchical structure, but this can complicate the identification of criteria. This study takes into 
account independent influences and interdependencies between MPRIs using Multi-Criteria 
Decision Making (MCDM) techniques. The MCDM is now widely used among scholars for solving 
various problems where different criteria are involved. This chapter aims to highlight the degree 
of interdependency among the identified criteria highlighted in previous chapters. The analytical 
hierarchy process (AHP) was used to assign interdependency among the criteria followed by 
assigning the local weight. However, the interdependent relationship between factors can be 
obtained using a fuzzy decision-making trial and evaluation laboratory (FDEMATEL) in order to 
assign the global weights to each criterion using an analytical network process (ANP). This work 
has successfully identified the interdependencies among the criteria and assigned the weight 
amongst the factors in order to carry further examination towards assessing the reliability of a 




Previous studies have focused on factors influencing the operator’s reliability in 
different disciplines independently, such as non-technical skills (Sharma et al., 2011; Flin 
et al., 2003), technical proficiency (Riahi et al., 2013; Alvarenga et al., 2014), and personal 
fatigue (Kim et al., 2009; Hetherington et al., 2006). This approach does not effectively 
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mitigate human error, as evidenced by the continued existence of human failure leading to 
marine accidents (MAIB, 2016). Moreover, these studies have not identified the degree of 
interdependencies between factors as a single set, and they have not investigated the factors 
within marine port pilotage operations specifically; this points to a current research gap 
that needs to be filled. Therefore, this study investigates the factors highlighted in chapter 
3 that challenge operator reliability during a pilotage operation as one set. This 
investigation is followed by development of novel MPRI that can enable decision makers 
to identify the risks to pilot performance associated with these factors. 
In this research project, the researcher identified the primary qualitative contributing 
factors that expert pilots have highlighted as essential to their reliability during marine 
pilotage operations (see chapter 3). An investigation was conducted using different 
techniques (i.e., Delphi and AHP) and presented in chapter 4 to confirm the identified 
criteria highlighted throughout the interviews presented in former chapters and weight 
assignments. In this chapter, the researcher uses a systematic approach (see Figure 5.1), to 
identify the interdependencies among the identified MPRIs. Given the complexity of 
human interactions along with their subjective judgements in port activities and operations, 
developing effective MPRI will help decision makers to understand the interdependencies 
among the MPRIs and to select the appropriate measures to enhance the reliability of a 
marine pilot conducting an efficient pilotage operation. The presence of the subjective 
evaluations and feelings toward the identified criteria could have directly affected the 
evaluation process. Therefore, the researcher used a fuzzy decision making trial and 
evaluation laboratory (FDEMATEL) to identify the degree of interdependency among the 
identified factors constituting the MPRIs, followed by the use of analytical network 





Obtaining init ial  direct-
relation matrix ‘R’
Obtaining a normalised 
direct-relation matrix ‘B’
Obtaining a total relation 
matrix ‘T’
Obtaining a threshold 
value (α)  and identify 
independent relationships
Obtaining super matrix 
and global weight




Set the ANP questionnaire
No
Yes
Figure 5.1. Research method framework  
 
5.3 Research background 
Solving such a complex operational issue, especially one that is intensively based on 
decision making and involves multiple players, necessitates development of a network that 
can explain how various factors influence other factors and what relations and 
interrelationships exist between factors (Saaty, 2001). Developing a network instead of a 
hierarchy helps decision makers to understand and identify the cause and effect 
relationship between criteria (Chen and Chen, 2010). The hierarchal model allows decision 
makers to examine the responses between factors (Ha and Yang, 2017). According to Saaty 
(2001), there are two forms of a hierarchal network: linear and non-linear (Figure 5.2). The 
non-linear network allows for identification and analysis of the interdependency between 
factors within a cluster and between clusters. Both the linear and non-linear network can 
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be used to identify the interdependency between factors within a cluster (Saaty and Vargas, 
2012). Interdependency can constitute outer dependence or inner dependence. 
 
  




For this study, the author used a method with the ability to analyse and identify the 
interdependency between factors, as highlighted in Chapter 3. Structuring identified factors 
in a hierarchal model allows for a comprehensive understanding of the interactions among 
the complex operational and reliability shaping factors within an operation. This method is 
a hybrid approach that incorporates a FDEMATEL (Mohammadi et al., 2013) and ANP 
(Saaty, 1996). Although the ANP approach can identify the degree of interdependence 
between clusters and within clusters effectively, it was not feasible to use this approach 
independently for this study for the following two reasons: 
1- It is costly and time consuming. 
2- Experts will confuse pairwise comparisons of interdependencies. 
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The FDEMATEL method was used, due to ease of use, which makes it possible to 
determine if there were significant interdependencies among the criteria identified in 
previous chapters. Next, the ANP method was used based on factors that exceeded the 
threshold, resulting from the FDEMATEL application, which helped to quantify the 
intensity of the relationships among identified factors. This hybrid approach was used as it 
was difficult to quantify precise values when evaluating a complex system (Liou et al., 
2007). The approach allowed the author to divide a complex system into subsystems to 
perform an effective measurement. It is worth mentioning that most critical situations 
involved in engineering practices when using an MCDM are subjected to quantitative and 
qualitative criteria with diverse types of uncertainties (Alyami et al., 2016). In most cases, 
qualitative criteria cannot be adequately assessed in a subjective form, since human 
judgments are inevitably associated with higher levels of uncertainties. This subjectivity 
manifests in the difficulties that humans face during assessments to provide complete 
judgements or when there is a lack of information, which is referred to as “ignorance” 
(incompleteness) (Alyami et al., 2016). Moreover, the vagueness on attribute meanings and 
their assessments were identified as the second factor, which is referred to as “fuzziness” 
(vagueness) (Guo et al., 2009).  
 
5.4 MCDM methods in the literature 
MCDM techniques have been widely recognised and used across disciplines. For 
instance, Boer et al. (2001) has suggested using MCDM methods in logistic investigations. 
Riahi et al. (2012) have also used MCDM techniques to assess the reliability of offshore 
seafarers. Chang et al. (2011) used one of the current MCDM techniques to develop 
supplier selection criteria. Liou and Tzeng (2012) addressed the importance of new 
MCDM methods and current trends. Zavadskas and Turskis (2011) illustrated and 
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presented the main MCDM methods along with the primary steps. The primary steps of 
MCDM as seen in Opricovic and Tzeng (2004) are: 
1- Establishing system evaluation criteria that relate system capabilities to goals; 
2- Developing alternative systems for attaining the goals (generating alternatives); 
3- Evaluating alternatives in terms of criteria (the value of the criterion functions); 
4- Applying normative multi-criteria analysis methods; 
5- Accepting one alternative as “optimal” (preferred); 
6- If the final solution is not accepted, gather new information and go into the next 
iteration of multi-criteria optimisation. 
The use of MCDM techniques has become more popular across different disciplines 
since it proves applicable in addressing different operational issues. For instance, Chen et 
al. (2011) and Ho et al. (2012) proposed a new Hybrid Dynamic Multiple Criteria Decision 
Making (HDMCDM) method for problem solving in interdependent and feedback-
producing situations. Tzeng and Huang (2011) analysed the degrees of influence among 
criteria using an Influential Network Relation Map (INRM) that was generated and 
developed using a decision-making trial and evaluation laboratory (DEMATEL) technique 
in conjunction with ANP forming a DEMATEL-based Analytical Network Process 
(DANP). Chen and Yang (2011) applied fuzzy analytical network process FANP to 
evaluate firm risks under high uncertainty. Akyuz and Celik (2015) used a fuzzy decision-
making trial and evaluation laboratory (FDMATEL) to evaluate critical operational 
hazards during a gas freeing operation in oil tankers. A new technique was employed by 
Yang et al. (2009) based on DEMATEL influential relation maps aimed to reduce the gap 
between aspiration level and performance: VIsekriterijumsko KOmpromisno Rangiranje 
(VIKOR). This technique was used in conjunction with a DEMATEL and DEMATEL-
based Analytical Network Process (DANP) to assess and improve strategies; the technique 
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was also used to streamline and improve strategies among dimensions and criteria to 
achieve desired levels (Chiu et al., 2013). This literature confirmed that the MCDM 
technique has shifted to assess and improve management performance compared to the 
traditional methods of ranking and selecting the most appropriate criteria (Opricovic and 
Tzeng, 2004). 
In this study, the researcher used the DEMATEL MCDM technique in a fuzzy form 
along with the application of ANP. This approach was appropriate given the nature of the 
information available for achieving the main goal of this study. The integration of the 
DEMATL and ANP has been shown to be applicable for measuring dependency and 
obtaining feedback among criteria through application in several different fields (Liou et 
al., 2007; Shieh et al., 2010; Ha et al., 2017; Mohammadi et al., 2013; Alkhatib et al., 2015). 
This hybrid method was used to calculate the weight of each interdependent factor 
identified that affects the reliability of a marine pilot in a pilotage operation. This method 
can also be used with a mixed-method approach to weighing and identifying 
interdependencies, and it can be easily applied since it requires a relatively small number 
of participants for data analysis (Buyukozksn and Cifci, 2012).  
The integration of the basic and the fuzzy form of DEMATEL and ANP, has been 
proven to be a successful tool for measuring dependency and feedback among elements in 
the complex decision problems in various applications. 
Liou et al. (2007) investigated the safety of a Taiwanese airline using hybrid techniques 
of DEMATEL along with ANP through developing a new safety measurement model. The 
relationship between the cause and effect among the safety factors was identified and the 
safety measurement model was developed using the DEMATEL method. The researcher 




Other scholars have used AHP and DEAMTEL to identify factors that critically affect 
the performance in a supply chain industry (Najmi and Makui, 2010). AHP serves to value 
the relative weights of factors, while DEMATEL is used to investigate the interdependency 
among the factors. 
In a study conducted by Alkhatib et al. (2015), researchers aimed to develop a method 
capable of evaluating and selecting the logistics service providers. This study was built 
based on the use of FDEMATEL and the Fuzzy Technique for Order Preference by 
Similarity to Ideal Solution (FTOPSIS). The use of FDEMATEL was used to address the 
impact relationship among decision criteria, while the FTOPSIS was used to rank the 
selected logistic service provider based on their resources. 
A Taiwanese study conducted by Wu and Tsai (2012) evaluated the criteria in the auto 
spare parts industry by combining the AHP and DEMATEL. The researchers used the AHP 
to highlight the critical criteria to address a short-term improvement strategy for supplier 
performance. The DEMATEL was used to suggest a long-term improvement opportunity 
for the industry.  
A study conducted by Chiu et al. (2013) used a DEMATEL-based Analytical Network 
Process (DANP) and VIšekriterijumsko KOmpromisno Rangiranje (VIKOR) to assess and 
improve strategies that would ensure customer satisfaction when shopping from e-stores. 
This study aimed to provide knowledge to e-store managers to assess and improve 
strategies that influence customer satisfaction by interdependent and feedback problems 
among dimensions and criteria. Moreover, this study will help to reduce the performance 
gap among the dimensions and criteria to encourage customer purchases in the store. 
Another study applied FDEMATEL to evaluate critical operational hazards in a crude 
oil tanker during the gas freeing process (Akyuz and Celik, 2015). This study identified 
and analysed the hazards that occurred during the gas freeing process with respect to cause 
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and effect relationships. This study contributed to maritime safety at sea and environmental 
protection as well as to protection of human life on board seagoing tankers. 
The use of FDEMATEL and ANP in a hybrid form has not yet been applied to evaluate 
the reliability of a human element in a marine pilotage operation in an interdependent 
situation. This study uses the integrated method for modelling MPRI interdependency for 
several reasons. First, the integrated method has been successfully applied in complex 
decision problems for group decision making. Second, it can illustrate the 
interdependencies among criteria in both quantitative and qualitative MPRIs, and add 
weights to the criteria. Third, this method requires a relatively small sample size for 
analysis. 
For this study, the proposed methods were used in sequential form. The FDEMATEL 
was used first, followed by the use of ANP. The former was used to identify the 
interdependent relationship between the MPRIs, and the latter was used to determine the 
degree of relationship strength among the MPRIs. However, use of FDEMATEL to 
identify relations between the MPRIs is a novel application, and these relations have not 
been previously investigated in a holistic form within marine port pilotage operations. 
More importantly, the identified factors have been identified and investigated by different 
scholars in more independent forms (i.e. Alvarenga et al., 2014; Yule and Brown, 2012; 
Hetherington et al., 2006). However, through this study, factors highlighted by experts as 
significant in shaping the reliability were used in holistic forms, as can be seen in chapter 
4. This study aims to highlight the degree of interdependency between these factors in 
shaping an operator’s reliability in order to develop an effective set of MPRIs using the 
proposed hybrid method.  
The FDEMATEL method was used first to identify if there were any significant 
interdependencies among the criteria identified in previous chapters. Next, the ANP 
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method was used to help quantify the intensity of the relationships among the identified 
factors. 
 
5.4.1 The use of FDEMATEL for MPRIs interdependency identification 
The DEMATEL method was invented by the Science and Human Affairs Program of 
the Battelle Memorial Institute in Geneva Research Centre around the mid-1970s. The 
objective behind the invention of DEMATEL was to investigate and solve social 
complexity and intertwined problems (Wu et al., 2010). This method has a structural 
approach that distinguishes between cause and effect, and builds an influential network 
relation map (INRM) (Chiu et al., 2013) According to Liou et al. (2007), a diagraph makes 
it possible to demonstrate the direct relationships and interdependency among the criteria. 
The diagraph can help predict the behaviour of the firm when taking into account the 
interdependency among the criteria (Lee and Lin, 2013). The DEMATEL method was 
modified to a fuzzy form due to the multiplicity of the criteria that the MCDM’s methods 
used; the alternatives were then judged either qualitatively or quantitatively by the decision 
makers (Dalalah et al., 2011). This form of assessment was used to identify the value of 
each alternative with respect to the overall objective of the problem. This assessment was 
also used to make the complex and challenging process of the operational decision making 
much easier. However, the assessment resulted in uncertain, imprecise, indefinite, and 
subjective data, which confused decision makers and forced them to decide in a fuzzy 
environment. To model the uncertainty and imprecise data, the fuzzy sets theory is an 
efficient method to employ (Alyami et al., 2014). Fuzzy sets provide essential flexibility 
for decision makers to manage the uncertainty and imprecision caused by lack of 
knowledge or ill-defined information (Chang et al., 2011). This method was invented by 
Zadeh in 1965 and used to describe the linguistic information across different disciplines. 
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Moreover, this method has proved its capability to represent gradual changes in people’s 
recognition of a concept unlike when using conventional evaluations such as True/False, 
High/Low, Yes/No, etc. (Alyami et al., 2014; Dalalah et al., 2011; Zadeh, 1975). 
Lin and Wu (2008) developed a fuzzy DEMATEL to apply to matrices and graphs for 
viewing the structure of complex causal relationships. This method incorporates group 
decision making that aims to gather ideas to analyse the cause and effect relationship that 
occurs in complex issues. Therefore, to cope with the fuzzy data in this study, the 
researcher used linguistic evaluations in order to rate the identified criteria within the 
proposed MPRIs. To manage the vagueness in the evaluation, fuzzy logic and triangular 
fuzzy sets were proposed as per Dalalah et al. (2011). A fuzzy subset 𝐴 can be defined by 
a membership function 𝜇𝐴(𝑥), which maps each element 𝑥 in 𝑋 to a real number in the 
interval [0,1] (Alkhatib et al., 2015). A fuzzy number ‘𝐴’ can be defined as a triangular 
fuzzy number if its membership function is 0 < 𝑙 ≤ 𝑚 ≤ 𝑢 ≤ ∞ (Ding and Liang, 2005; 
Akyuz and Celik, 2015). 
𝜇𝐴(𝑥) = {
0, 𝑥 < 𝑙
(𝑥 − 𝑙)/(𝑚 − 𝑙), 𝑙 ≤ 𝑥 ≤ 𝑚,
(𝑢 − 𝑥)/(𝑢 − 𝑚), 𝑚 ≤ 𝑥 ≤ 𝑢,
0, 𝑥 ≥ 𝑢
         (5.1) 
Where 𝑙, 𝑚, and 𝑢 represent crisp values. A triangular fuzzy number can be denoted by 
(𝑙,𝑚, 𝑢), lower, medium and upper numbers of the fuzzy sets (𝑥 ≤ 𝑦 ≤ 𝑧). In light of the 





 Figure 5.3. Triangular fuzzy number 
 
The distance between fuzzy numbers can be calculated using different approaches 
(Heilpern, 1997; Fu, 2008). In this study, the researcher calculated the distance for a pair 
of triangular fuzzy numbers (TFN), ?̃? = (𝑎1, 𝑎2, 𝑎3)  and ?̃? = (𝑏1, 𝑏2, 𝑏3)  with the 
following equation (Dalalah et al., 2011): 
𝑑(?̃?, ?̃?) = |?̃?𝑑𝑒𝑓 − ?̃?𝑑𝑒𝑓|,    (5.2) 
Where ?̃?𝑑𝑒𝑓and ?̃?𝑑𝑒𝑓are the defuzzification points of ?̃? and ?̃?. For any fuzzy number, 
the defuzzification point can be obtained by calculating the point that divides the area of 
the fuzzy set into two equal parts. Accordingly, the defuzzification point can be given by 
the following equation (Alkhatib et al., 2015):  
 
𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑢𝑧𝑧. 𝑝𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡 = {
𝑢 − √(𝑢 − 𝑙)(𝑢 − 𝑚)/2, 𝑢 − 𝑚 > 𝑚 − 𝑙
√(𝑢 − 𝑙)(𝑢 − 𝑚)/2 − 𝑙, 𝑢 − 𝑚 < 𝑚 − 𝑙
𝑚, 𝑢 − 𝑚 = 𝑚 − 𝑙
   (5.3) 
 
It should be noted that this calculated distance satisfies the following properties: first, 
𝑑(?̃?, ?̃?)= 0; second, 𝑑(?̃?, ?̃?)= 𝑑(?̃?, ?̃?); and the last property, the TFN ?̃? is closer to ?̃? than 
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to ?̃? if and only if 𝑑(?̃?, ?̃?)< 𝑑(?̃?, ?̃?) (Dalalah et al., 2011). If the distance is equal to zero 
between two fuzzy sets, then a similarity measure of 1 will result. However, the farther the 
distance the lower similarity obtained. 
It is worth mentioning that the use of the TFN membership function and its associated 
parameters helps to reflect the fuzziness of the evaluation data, where the narrower the 
interval [𝑙, 𝑢], the lower the fuzziness of the evaluation data. 
The FDEMATEL application consists out of four main steps (Alkhatib et al., 2015) 
starting with identifying the initial direct-relation matrix, obtaining normalised direct-
relation matrix, obtaining a total-relation matrix and obtaining a threshold value for 
constructing the diagraph. Therefore, the relation among the MPRIs can be calculated using 
FDEMATEL approach as follows: 
 
Step 1: Obtain the average matrix of an initial direct-relation matrix R. 
The initial direct-relation matrix (R) is an average 𝑛 × 𝑛 matrix constructed by pairwise 
comparison in terms of directions and strength of influences between MPRIs. The pairwise 
comparison scale for this study ranged from 0 to 4: 0 (No influence), 1 (Very low influence), 
2 (Low influence), 3 (High influence), and 4 (Very high influence). This is the standard as 
proposed by the DEMATEL method seen in Ha et al. (2017). However, as aforementioned, 
a fuzzy DEMATEL was proposed in this study. Accordingly, the value of a fuzzy form to 








Table 5.1. Influence measures using linguistic terms 
Rating scale Linguistic terms Linguistic values 
0 No influence (No) (0,0,0.25) 
1 Very low influence (VL) (0,0.25,0.5) 
2 Low influence (L) (0.25,0.5,0.75) 
3 High influence (H) (0.5,0.75,1.0) 
4 Very high influence (VH) (0.75,1.0,1.0) 
 
 
In this research, defuzzyfication processes were applied using equation 5.3 at the 
beginning when obtaining the initial-direct relation matrix, as seen in Ha et al. (2017). As 
shown in equation 5.4, the initial direct-relation matrix 𝑅 = [𝑟𝑖𝑗]𝑛×𝑛 , where 𝑟𝑖𝑗  is an 
average directed-relation value if 𝑥𝑖𝑗and all principal diagonal 𝑟𝑖𝑗(𝑖 = 𝑗) are equal to zero, 
𝑋𝑘 = [𝑥𝑖𝑗
𝑘 ] is an expert judgement on the causal relationship of 𝑥𝑖𝑗 by the 𝑘th expert. 





𝑘=1 ,       𝑖, 𝑗 = 1…… . 𝑛   (5.4) 






Where each ?̃?𝑖𝑗= (𝑙𝑖𝑗, 𝑚𝑖𝑗 , 𝑢𝑖𝑗) is a TFN and ?̃?𝑖𝑗(𝑖-1,2,…, 𝑛) is the average of experts’ 
evaluations of the 𝑖𝑡ℎand 𝑗𝑡ℎ factors impact-relation and regarded as a TFN (0,0,0) since 
all principal diagonal ?̃?𝑖𝑗(𝑖 = 𝑗) are equal to zero.  
 
Step 2: Calculate a normalised direct-relation matrix B. 
The normalised direct-relation matrix𝐵 = [𝑏𝑖𝑗]𝑛×𝑛, where the value of each MPRI in 















Step 3: Obtain a total-relation matrix T. 
By using equation 5.6, the total-relation matrix 𝑇 can be obtained via normalising the 
matrix B, which represents the direct-relation matrix explained above.  
𝑇 = lim
𝑚=∞
(𝐵1 + 𝐵2 + ⋯+ 𝐵𝑚) = ∑ 𝐵𝑖∞𝑚=1 = 𝐵(𝐼 − 𝐵)
−1   (5.6) 
Where 𝐼 is representing the identity matrix. 










Where ?̃?𝑖𝑗is TFN, and the ?̃?matrix is developed based on 
?̃? = 𝐵(𝐼 − 𝐵)−1  
Where 𝐼 is the fuzzy identity matrix (Hosseini and Tarohk, 2013). 
Following the development of matrix ?̃? , the sum of the rows (𝑅𝑖) and the sum of 
columns (𝐶𝑗) , in which (𝑡𝑖𝑗)  indicates the interdependent value of each pair of the 
investigated MPRIs. Since 𝑟𝑖 + 𝑐𝑖 is shows all effects that are given and received by 
criterion 𝑖. Therefore, 𝑟𝑖 + 𝑐𝑗shows both criterion 𝑖’s impact on the entire system and other 
system factors impact upon factor 𝑖. Thus, the indicator 𝑟𝑖 + 𝑐𝑗can present the degree of 
importance of criterion 𝑖 with respect to the total system. On the contrary, the difference of 
the two, 𝑟𝑖 − 𝑐𝑗, represents the net effect that the criterion 𝑖 has on the system. Precisely, if 
𝑟𝑖 − 𝑐𝑗 results in a positive value, then the factor 𝑖 will be a net cause. On the other hand, if 
𝑟𝑖 − 𝑐𝑗 shows a negative value, then the factor will be an effect group (Yang et al., 2008; 
Akyuz and Celik, 2015). 
Eq. 5.7 shows how to classify the cause and effect values. 
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+ = 𝑅𝑖 + 𝐶𝑖,   𝑝𝑟𝑖
− = 𝑅𝑖 − 𝐶𝑖    (5.7) 
 
Step 4: Obtain a threshold value (α) and construct a diagraph. 
Determining the value of the threshold can be obtained subjectively, with an expert’s 
judgement, or mathematically (Liou et al., 2007; Shieh et al., 2010; Ha et al., 2017). The 
significance of setting a threshold value (α) is that it is used to eliminate the factors that 
have less influence on others in the total-relation matrix (𝑇). In this study, the value of the 








     (5.8) 
Where N represents the total number of elements (𝑖 × 𝑗) 
When the identified value of the MPRI whose influence on the values of (𝑡𝑖𝑗) is more 
than the identified threshold, these MPRIs can be selected and converted into a causal 
relationship diagram (Ha et al., 2017). 
 
5.4.2 The use of ANP to determine the interdependency weights between MPRIs 
The use of DEMATEL helps to identify the interdependent relationships between factors 
that constitute the MPRIs. However, the essential part of using the ANP method is to obtain 
the final adjusted weight of the entire identified interrelated criterion. According to Saaty 
(1996), the ANP was developed on the basis of the analytical hierarchy process (AHP) to 
elucidate the dependence and feedback among the criteria and alternatives. As 
aforementioned, the AHP allows interaction and feedback within the cluster. Unlike the 
AHP, the ANP allows the interaction within and between clusters (Saaty, 2001). The initial 
step of the ANP method is comparing the criteria in the entire system to form a super 
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matrix through pairwise comparison. The common question when asking the expert to 
compare is “how much importance does criterion ‘a’ influence criterion ‘b’?” (Ha et al., 
2017). Similar to the AHP method, the ANP utilises the scale ranging from 1 (equal 
importance) to 9 (extreme importance) (Huang et al., 2005). Accordingly, the unweighted 
super matrix consists of the local weights identified by the pairwise comparisons, thus 
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    (5.9) 
The ANP is a non-linear network where the unweighted super matrix of this network 











Where 𝑊12 is a matrix that represents the weight of cluster 1 with respect to cluster 2, 
𝑊23represents the weight of cluster 2 with respect to cluster 3. In addition, 𝑊31 represents 
the weight of cluster 3 with respect to cluster 1. Finally the 𝑊22 and 𝑊33 are indicated as 
the inner dependence and feedbacks within clusters 2 and 3, respectively. It is important to 
highlight that the unweighted super matrix (𝑊𝑁𝑁 ) includes their associated elements’ 
unweighted super matrix (Ha and Yang, 2017), where the (𝑖, 𝑗) block of the matrix (𝑊𝑁𝑁) 




































A weighted super matrix (𝑤𝐴𝑁𝑃 ) can be developed by multiplying the partitioned 
matrix (𝐵 = 𝑊𝑖𝑗) in the unweighted super matrix by the associated cluster weights 𝑤𝑖 
using equation 5.10 (Saaty, 2001). 
𝑤𝐴𝑁𝑃 = 𝐵𝑤𝑖    (5.10) 
Where 𝐵  represents the partitioned matrix in the unweighted super matrix and 𝑤𝑖 
denotes the weights for their associated cluster weights.  
The matrices (𝐵 ) and (𝑤𝑖𝑗 ) were developed based on the pairwise comparisons 
conducted based on the diagraph of DEMATEL (Ha and Yang, 2017). Moreover, these 
pairwise comparisons are conducted using the nine-point scale developed by Saaty in 
1980’s, which forms a number of comparison matrices that help to identify the relative 
impacts of the MPRIs’ interdependency. The weights are then derived from these 
comparisons and entered as the elements of columns of the matrix (𝐵). Then, a weighted 
super matrix can be normalised by setting all columns sum to unity. The sum of the 
probabilities of all states is set equal to one. Finally, the limit super matrix can be obtained 
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by raising the weighted super matrix to limiting powers using 𝑊∞ = lim
𝑘→∞
𝑊𝑘 until the 
column numbers are the same in every column. The values in the column represent the 
global weights of the associated MPRIs. 
 
5.5 A case study to identify MPRIs’ interdependency and evaluate their weights using 
FDEMATEL and ANP  
5.5.1 FDEMATEL 
Several senior pilots were asked to participate in the study to determine the 
interdependencies among the four main dimensions and the 13 sub-criteria by providing 
their opinions in a questionnaire. The questionnaire was used to ascertain expert opinions 
on the selected methodology. Similar to the study done by Buyukozksn and Cifci (2012), 
this method required a relatively small number of participants to collect data for analysis. 
Accordingly, five senior marine port pilots with significant work experience were 
contacted by email, to complete the questionnaire. The demographic details of those 
participating pilots are shown in Table 5.2.  
 
Table 5.2. Experts’ demographic 
Expert Gender Age Group Rank Qualification 
Working 
Experience 
1 Male 30-39 Senior Pilot Master + PL 6 – 10 Years 
2 Male 40-49 Senior Pilot Second Officer + PL >20 years 
3 Male 40-49 Senior Pilot Master + PL >20 years 
4 Male 50-59 Senior Pilot Diploma + PL >20 years 
5 Male 50-59 Senior Pilot Diploma + PL >20 years 
 
The four main dimensions that shape MPRIs were identified in previous chapters of 
this study. However, this chapter aims to re-test and identify the main contributing factors 
that are essential in shaping a marine pilot’s reliability. Moreover, this chapter aims to 
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identify the degree of interdependency among factors and assigning weights. The four 
main dimensions are operator technical proficiency (TP), personal fatigue (PF), non-
technical skills (NTS), and fitness and strength (F&S). As a higher level of uncertainty was 
present when experts expressed their opinions, the marine pilots were asked to evaluate, 
based on their opinions, the extent to which they believe that factor ‘𝑖’ influenced factor 
‘𝑗’ using the linguistic terms used for a triangular membership function (see Table 5.1). 
 
First step: Developing the initial direct-relation matrix (𝑅) for main dimensions 
The average constructed fuzzy initial-directed matrix ‘?̀?’ was obtained using Eq. 5.4. 
The same process was used on each dimension and sub-dimension to obtain the ?̀? 4 × 4 
and 13 × 13 matrix R forming the main dimensions and sub-criteria, respectively. A 
demonstration process was thereby developed for the matrices wherein the full response 
from the experts based on the four main dimensions was given as shown in Table 5.3. This 
table shows the degree of influence that experts perceive exists between the four main 
dimensions. 
 














































































1 L VH NO L H VH VL VL VL H VH H 
2 L H NO H H VH L L NO L H VH 
3 H VH VL H VH VH VL H L L VH VH 
4 L VH L L VH VH L L L H VH H 
5 L H VL L VH VH NO H NO L VH VH 
(TP: Technical Proficiency; PF: Personal Fatigue; NTS: Non-Technical Skills; F&S: Fitness & Strength), 




Accordingly, an aggregated ?̀? matrix can be developed by taking the average of each 
comparison to form the initial fuzzy direct-relation matrix (?̀?) as shown in Table 5.4. 
 
Table 5.4. Initial fuzzy direct-relation matrix (R ̀) for MPRIs’ main dimensions 
?̀? matrix TP PF NTS F&S 
TP (0,0,0) (0.30,0.55,0.80) (0.65,0.90,1.00) (0.05,0.20,0.45) 
PF (0.35,0.60,0.85) (0,0,0) (0.65,0.90,1.00) (0.75,1.00,1.00) 
NTS (0.10,0.30,0.55) (0.30,0.55,0.80) (0,0,0) (0.10,0.25,0.50) 
F&S (0.35,0.60,0.85) (0.70,0.95,1.00) (0.65,0.90,1.00) (0,0,0) 
(TP: Technical Proficiency; PF: Personal Fatigue; NTS: Non-Technical Skills; F&S: Fitness & Strength) 
 
The researcher defuzzified the ?̀?  matrix and formed the defuzzified initial direct-
relation matrix (𝑅) as seen in Table 5.5 by using equation 5.3. 
 
Table 5.5. Initial defuzzified direct-relation (R) matrix for MPRIs’ main dimensions 
𝑹 matrix TP PF NTS F&S 
TP 0 0.55 0.78 0.23 
PF 0.60 0 0.78 0.75 
NTS 0.31 0.55 0 0.28 
F&S 0.60 0.79 0.78 0 
(TP: Technical Proficiency; PF: Personal Fatigue; NTS: Non-Technical Skills; F&S: Fitness & Strength) 
 
Second step: Developing a normalised direct-relation matrix (𝑩) for main dimensions 
The second step of the DEMATEL technique is to normalise the initial direct-relation 
matrix (𝐵) (Table 5.5) using equation 5.5 as shown in Table 5.6. This can be achieved by 
dividing each 𝑟𝑖𝑗from the 𝑅 matrix by the maximum sum of column and rows in the matrix 
𝑅. The maximum sum was obtained and equalled 2.3469. Subsequently, matrix 𝐵 values 




Table 5.6. Normalised direct-relation matrix (B) for MPRIs’ main dimensions 
𝑩 matrix TP PF NTS F&S 
TP 0 0.23 0.33 0.10 
PF 0.26 0 0.33 0.32 
NTS 0.13 0.23 0 0.12 
F&S 0.26 0.34 0.33 0 
(TP: Technical Proficiency; PF: Personal Fatigue; NTS: Non-Technical Skills; F&S: Fitness & Strength) 
 
Third step: obtaining total relation matrix (𝑇) for main dimensions 
The normalised direct-relation matrix (𝐵) helps transform the scale of differing criteria 
into a comparable form; the process completes the third step of the DEMATEL method. 
The third step of the method aims to identify the total relation matrix (𝑇) using equation 
5.6 as shown in Table 5.7. 
 
 Table 5.7. Total relation matrix (T) for MPRIs’ main dimensions  
𝑇 matrix TP PF NTS F&S 
TP 0.40 0.68 0.84 0.45 
PF 0.75 0.67 1.05 0.73 
NTS 0.45 0.59 0.48 0.41 
F&S 0.76 0.93 1.06 0.50 
(TP: Technical Proficiency; PF: Personal Fatigue; NTS: Non-Technical Skills; F&S: Fitness & Strength) 
 
Table 5.7 summarises the influence ratings that the experts expressed in the 
questionnaire regarding the four main dimensions that shape MPRIs. Each figure within 
this matrix represents the total direct and indirect influence of each dimension ‘𝑖’ over 
dimension ‘𝑗’. For instance, the total direct and indirect influence of the TP over PF is 
(0.68). The sum of the TP row (𝑅𝑖 ) (2.3705) represents the total direct and indirect 
influence that the TP has over an operator’s reliability. In contrast, the total sum of the TP 
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column (𝐶𝑖) (2.3662) represents the total direct and indirect influence of the operator’s 
reliability over the TP dimension, as shown in Table 5.8. 
 
Table 5.8. Direct, indirect relations and type of MPRIs main dimensions 
MPRI’s 𝑹𝒊 𝑪𝒊 𝑹𝒊 + 𝑪𝒊 𝑹𝒊 − 𝑪𝒊 Type 
TP 2.3705 2.3662 4.7367 0.0043 Cause 
PF 3.1961 2.8613 6.0573 0.3348 Cause 
NTS 1.9327 3.4362 5.3689 -1.5036 Effect 
F&S 3.2457 2.0812 5.3268 1.1645 Cause 
(TP: Technical Proficiency; PF: Personal Fatigue; NTS: Non-Technical Skills; F&S: Fitness & Strength) 
Out of the 𝑇 matrix, only factors with effect greater than the average value, which called 
 
Fourth step: obtaining threshold out of the total relation matrix (𝑇) for main dimensions 
Out of the 𝑇 matrix, only factors with an effect greater than the average value, called 
‘Threshold’ (Tzeng et al., 2007; Shieh et al., 2010; Alkhatib et al., 2015), of the matrix 
were chosen and in turn shown in the visual diagram of the relation and influence matrix. 
The threshold indicates the interdependent relationships between the relevant factors. 
Identifying the threshold value is the fourth step of the DEMATEL method. In this case 
study, the threshold value of the four main dimensions in the 𝑇  matrix is (0.6716). 
Accordingly, only the shaded cells in Table 5.7 were represented in the influence and 




Figure 5.5. MPRIs main dimensions relation and influence diagram 
 
In the diagram, the horizontal axis (𝑹𝒊 + 𝑪𝒊) provides an index representing the total 
effects both given and received by factor ‘𝑖’, which shows the degree of importance that 
factor ‘𝑖’ plays within the model. On the other hand, the vertical axis (𝑹𝒊 − 𝑪𝒊), represents 
the net effect that factor ‘𝑖’ contributes to the model. When (𝑹𝒊 − 𝑪𝒊) showing a negative 
relation, this means that factor ‘𝑖’ is a net receiver and belongs to the effect group (Dalalah 
et al., 2011; Tzeng et al., 2007; Tamura et al., 2002), such as NTS. Nonetheless, if (𝑹𝒊 −
 𝑪𝒊) is positive, this means that factor ‘𝑖’ is a net causer and belongs to the cause group 
such as TP, PF and F&S. 
Similar to the above process, the initial direct-relation matrix ‘𝑅’, the normalised 
relation matrix ‘𝐵’, the total relation matrix ‘𝑇’, and the cause and effect relationships table, 
including all of the identified dimensions and associated criteria, and using an identified 
threshold value of 0.0791 for the 13 sub-criteria, were summarised in Tables 5.9–5.12. In 
addition, only the shaded cells in Table 5.11 were represented in the influence and relation 
























Figure 5.6. MPRIs main dimensions relation and influence diagram 
 
Among the 13 identified MPRIs, the highest influential factors shown in Table 5.12 
are personal fatigue, work environment, work stresses, and work hours. These were 
followed by operator HI, BS and WEx. To work towards maintaining higher operators’ 
reliability, the decision makers must consider placing higher standards on these factors, 
since these factors can degrade the reliability of a marine pilot when conducting pilotage 
services. The least influential factors were SA , CS, T&L. For instance, WEnv is one of 
the factors that cause fatigue in a marine pilot, but it can be diminished by other factors 
including, but not limited to, relationships with co-workers, management strategies, and 
the weather. Therefore, work environment has an effect on the pilot’s ability to obtain new 
qualifications and to attend ST about management strategies, and therefore, WEnv affects 
the pilot’s experience level. Moreover, poor relationships with co-workers or bad weather 
can affect a marine pilot’s DM. Namely, high-level CS are needed to convey essential 
operational information to a team and thereby to build proper operational images and make 
the required decision. Since lower-level WEnvs’ have an influence on PF, the results also 
show that WEnv has an effect on the health and BS of the pilot. WEnv is also influenced 



























TP-QPL TP-ST TP-Wex PF-WH PF-WS PF-Wenv NTS-DM
NTS-SA NTS-CS NTS-T&L F&S-OA F&S-HI F&S-BS
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the WEnv in such a way that if the pilot is not capable of managing team members as a 
leader and defusing conflict among team members, then the WEnv is likely to carry high 
tension, and therefore the pilot will become fatigued under the influence of stress. 
The interdependencies among the criteria can be seen from the examples elaborated in 
the previous paragraph, as well as illustrated by the shaded cells in Table 5.11. However, 
the degree of interdependencies and how much these factors are influenced and affected 




Table 5.9. Initial direct-relation matrix (R) for 13 sub-criterion of MPRIs’ 
𝑹 MPRIs 
TP PF NTS F&S 
QPL ST WEx WH WS WEnv DM SA CS T&L OA HI BS 
TP 
QPL 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.30 0.55 0.60 0.77 0.72 0.65 0.77 0.00 0.00 0.00 
ST 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.77 0.72 0.70 0.75 0.78 0.78 0.71 0.00 0.00 0.00 
WEx 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.76 0.77 0.71 0.79 0.79 0.78 0.78 0.00 0.00 0.00 
PF 
WH 0.23 0.18 0.77 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.77 0.79 0.66 0.60 0.55 0.77 0.71 
WS 0.23 0.23 0.55 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.75 0.75 0.79 0.79 0.45 0.79 0.77 
WEnv 0.66 0.71 0.60 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.79 0.75 0.79 0.79 0.35 0.78 0.77 
NTS 
DM 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
SA 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
CS 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
T&L 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
F&S 
OA 0.66 0.71 0.79 0.78 0.79 0.45 0.78 0.79 0.67 0.72 0.00 0.00 0.00 
HI 0.76 0.70 0.70 0.66 0.75 0.60 0.79 0.75 0.77 0.73 0.00 0.00 0.00 
BS 0.78 0.65 0.60 0.66 0.79 0.60 0.77 0.78 0.60 0.61 0.00 0.00 0.00 
((TP: Technical Proficiency; QPL: Qualification and Pilotage Licencing; ST: Special Training: WEx: Working Experience), (PF: Personal Fatigue; WH: Working Hours; 
WS: Work Stresses; WEnv: Working Environment), (NTS: Non-Technical Skills; DM: Decision-Making; SA: Situation Awareness; CS: Communication skills; T&L: 




Table 5.10. Normalised direct-relation matrix (B) for the 13 sub-criteria of MPRIs 
𝑩 MPRIs 
TP PF NTS F&S 
QPL ST WEx WH WS WEnv DM SA CS T&L OA HI BS 
TP 
QPL 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.08 0.08 0.11 0.10 0.09 0.11 0.00 0.00 0.00 
ST 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.11 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.11 0.11 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.00 
WEx 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.11 0.11 0.10 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.00 0.00 0.00 
PF 
WH 0.03 0.02 0.11 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.11 0.11 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.11 0.10 
WS 0.03 0.03 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.10 0.11 0.11 0.06 0.11 0.11 
WEnv 0.09 0.10 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.11 0.10 0.11 0.11 0.05 0.11 0.11 
NTS 
DM 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
SA 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
CS 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
T&L 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
F&S 
OA 0.09 0.10 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.06 0.11 0.11 0.09 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.00 
HI 0.11 0.10 0.10 0.09 0.10 0.08 0.11 0.10 0.11 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.00 
BS 0.11 0.09 0.08 0.09 0.11 0.08 0.11 0.11 0.08 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.00 
((TP: Technical Proficiency; QPL: Qualification and Pilotage Licencing; ST: Special Training: WEx: Working Experience), (PF: Personal Fatigue; WH: Working Hours; 
WS: Work Stresses; WEnv: Working Environment), (NTS: Non-Technical Skills; DM: Decision-Making; SA: Situation Awareness; CS: Communication skills; T&L: 





Table 5.11. Total relation matrix (T) for the 13 sub-criteria of MPRIs 
𝑻 MPRIs 
TP PF NTS F&S 
𝑹𝒊 
QPL ST WEx WH WS WEnv DM SA CS T&L OA HI BS 
TP 
QPL 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.05 0.09 0.09 0.15 0.14 0.13 0.14 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.93 
ST 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.13 0.12 0.11 0.16 0.17 0.16 0.15 0.02 0.04 0.04 1.20 
WEx 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.12 0.13 0.12 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.02 0.04 0.04 1.24 
PF 
WH 0.07 0.06 0.15 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.19 0.19 0.17 0.16 0.09 0.13 0.12 1.52 
WS 0.07 0.07 0.12 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.07 0.13 0.12 1.49 
WEnv 0.14 0.14 0.13 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.21 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.06 0.13 0.13 1.74 
NTS 
DM 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
SA 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
CS 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
T&L 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
F&S 
OA 0.12 0.13 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.11 0.21 0.21 0.19 0.20 0.03 0.05 0.04 1.76 
HI 0.14 0.13 0.15 0.14 0.16 0.13 0.21 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.03 0.05 0.04 1.77 
BS 0.14 0.12 0.13 0.14 0.16 0.13 0.21 0.21 0.18 0.18 0.03 0.05 0.04 1.71 
𝑪𝒊 0.76 0.73 0.95 0.91 1.01 0.86 1.69 1.68 1.59 1.59 0.36 0.63 0.60  
((TP: Technical Proficiency; QPL: Qualification and Pilotage Licencing; ST: Special Training: WEx: Working Experience), (PF: Personal Fatigue; WH: Working Hours; 
WS: Work Stresses; WEnv: Working Environment), (NTS: Non-Technical Skills; DM: Decision-Making; SA: Situation Awareness; CS: Communication skills; T&L: 






Table 5.12. Direct, indirect relations and type for the 13 sub-criteria of MPRIs 
MPRI’s 𝑹𝒊 𝑪𝒊 𝑹𝒊 + 𝑪𝒊 𝑹𝒊 − 𝑪𝒊 Type 
TP 
QPL 0.927 0.764 1.691 0.163 Cause 
ST 1.204 0.730 1.934 0.475 Cause 
WEx 1.238 0.952 2.189 0.286 Cause 
PF 
WH 1.520 0.908 2.429 0.612 Cause 
WS 1.491 1.009 2.500 0.482 Cause 
WEnv 1.736 0.860 2.596 0.876 Cause 
NTS 
DM 0.000 1.694 1.694 -1.694 Effect 
SA 0.000 1.678 1.678 -1.678 Effect 
CS 0.000 1.589 1.589 -1.589 Effect 
T&L 0.000 1.589 1.589 -1.589 Effect 
F&S 
OA 1.765 0.361 2.125 1.404 Cause 
HI 1.774 0.625 2.399 1.148 Cause 
BS 1.707 0.603 2.310 1.104 Cause 
((TP: Technical Proficiency; QPL: Qualification and Pilotage Licencing; ST: Special Training: WEx: Working Experience), (PF: Personal Fatigue; WH: Working Hours; 
WS: Work Stresses; WEnv: Working Environment), (NTS: Non-Technical Skills; DM: Decision-Making; SA: Situation Awareness; CS: Communication skills; T&L: 




5.5.2 The use of ANP for weighting interdependent MPRIs 
The use of FDEMATEL in the previous section has identified the interdependent 
relationships between MPRIs (Table 5.11). However, the use of ANP aims to set the final 
weighting adjustment according to the interrelated factors. Based on the result shown in 
the total relation matrices (𝑻) for the four main dimensions (Table 5.7) and for the 13 sub-
criteria (Table 5.11), the researcher asked the same experts who participated in the 
DEMATEL survey to respond to the pairwise comparison questionnaire to rank the degree 
of importance in relation to the given question (see Appendix I). For instance, the experts 
were asked ‘Which dimension has more influence on pilot’s TP, PF or NTS, and how much 
more influence?’ The same question was asked in relation to another dimension and pair 
of sub-criteria as follows: ‘Which MPRIs have more influence on the pilot’s TP, QPL or 
ST, and how much more influence?’ According to this step, the weighted matrix for the 
main four dimensions are presented in Table 5.13. Any presented zero value means the 
factor was not interdependent with the compared factor. 
 
Table 5.13. Four main dimensions weighted matrix 
MPRIs TP PF NTS F&S 
TP 0 0.3782 0.6218 0 
PF 0.1071 0 0.1351 0.7578 
NTS 0 0 0 0 
F&S 0.1075 0.6908 0.2017 0 
(TP: Technical Proficiency; PF: Personal Fatigue; NTS: Non-Technical Skills; F&S: Fitness & Strength) 
 
In a similar way, the interdependent matrix of the 13 sub-criteria of the MPRIs can be 
developed by forming an unweighted super matrix (Table 5.14). The aim is to obtain the 
weighted super matrix (Table 5.15), and that can be done by using values shown on the 
unweighted super matrix from Table 5.14. For instance, the value of (TP, TP) on Table 
5.13 can be multiplied by the value of TP rows of QPL, ST and WEx from Table 5.14. To 
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illustrate this, the value of (TP, TP) on the weighted matrix on Table 5.13, is 0.34. This 
value is multiplied by the WEx, the third row under the TP column on Table 5.14, WEx = 
1. This can be calculated as [0.34 × 1= 0.34], and this value can be seen in Table 5.15, the 
third row of the weighted super matrix (TP-WEx) under the first column (TP-QPL). 
Accordingly, the rest of the values on the weighted super matrix can be formed similarly 
and the values are between 0 and 1. However, if the sum of each column is not equal to 
one, then, the matrix must be normalised (Table 5.16). 
To normalise the weighted matrix, each value was divided by the sum of the same 
column. To illustrate this, row ‘WEnv’ is compared with the column ‘QPL’, which is equal 
to (0.014). By dividing this value by the sum of the QPL column, which is equal to 0.059, 
the resulting value is 0.24, as shown on Table 5.16. 
To form the limited matrix, the limited power of the weighted super matrix (Table 5.15), 
can be generated using the equation 𝑊∞ = lim
𝑘→∞
𝑊𝑘 to develop the limited matrix shown 
in Table 5.17. The researcher used Super Decisions software (V2.8) to obtain the 
unweighted results, weighted results, normalised super matrix, and the limited matrices 
(Tables 5.14–5.16). 
The results shown in Table (5.17) represent the local and global weight of the 13 
MPRIs.  The AHP can be used to obtain the local weight, which is the weight of each 
criterion with respect to the same cluster, i.e., it represents the internal interrelationship 
between factors. The ANP can be used to obtain the global weight, which shows the degree 
of interdependency of each criterion externally with respect to other clusters. For example, 
using data from Table 5.17, T&L, CS, and SA were ranked as significant in terms of 
developing a reliable pilot. Specifically, they ranked as first, second, and third with respect 
to the main dimension of NTS, with a global weight of 0.325, 0.142, and 0.094, 
respectively. Moreover, the criteria HI and WEnv ranked fourth and fifth, with a weight 
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value of 0.091 and 0.079, respectively. The most significant factors were two main 
dimensions: NTS and PF. This result can be justified by the number of ship accidents 
during port pilotage operations caused by the factors stemming from these two main 
dimensions (MBIA, 2017; Hsu, 2012; Sharma et al., 2011; Havold, 2005, Hetherington et 
al., 2006). 
The international maritime organisation (IMO) attempted to reduce the effect of fatigue 
by presenting a practical guide on fatigue during the 71st session of the Maritime Safety 
Committee (MSC) in 1999. This guide was approved at the 74th session to produce a 
comprehensive document of IMO fatigue management. Approximately 10 years later, the 
IMO has recognised the continued existence of human failure, and the fact that most 
accidents are not directly due to human fatigue. However, due to a rapid technological 
advancement on board ships, the IMO has established the amendment of MANILA 2010 
on the International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watch-
keeping (STCW 2010) (Saeed et al., 2016). One of the main changes that the convention 
features is a new training requirement that aims to enhance the non-technical skills of all 
seafarers serving on board ships, which confirms the need to maintain higher levels of NTS 
to ensure higher levels of operator reliability. The significance of this study is that it 
identifies the degree of interrelationships among these criteria in order to predict the degree 
of influence on a criterion when a failure exists in another criterion. For instance, having 
higher level of NTS with higher level of fatigue means lower reliability and unsafe 
operations. As a result, this model aims to assess the reliability of a marine pilot to assist 
decision makers in taking steps toward insuring safer operational outcomes.
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Table 5.14. Unweighted super matrix for the 13 sub-criteria of MPRIs 
MPRIs 
TP PF NTS F&S 
QPL ST WEx WH WS WEnv DM SA CS T&L OA HI BS 
TP 
QPL 0 0 0 0 0.195 0.805 0.084 0.145 0.231 0.541 0 0 0 
ST 0 0 0 0.230 0.145 0.626 0.081 0.189 0.192 0.534 0 0 0 
WEx 0 0 0 0.269 0.324 0.407 0.060 0.150 0.198 0.592 0 0 0 
PF 
WH 0 0 1 0 0 0 0.062 0.179 0.296 0.463 0.234 0.447 0.319 
WS 0 0 1 0 0 0 0.064 0.245 0.312 0.380 0 0.622 0.378 
WEnv 0.129 0.583 0.289 0 0 0 0.050 0.125 0.268 0.558 0 0.555 0.445 
NTS 
DM 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
SA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
CS 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T&L 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
F&S 
OA 0.155 0.143 0.701 0.146 0.320 0.534 0.064 0.106 0.241 0.589 0 0 0 
HI 0.123 0.390 0.487 0.220 0.412 0.368 0.085 0.104 0.191 0.622 0 0 0 
BS 0.141 0.319 0.540 0.188 0.394 0.419 0.102 0.172 0.268 0.458 0 0 0 
((TP: Technical Proficiency; QPL: Qualification and Pilotage Licencing; ST: Special Training: WEx: Working Experience), (PF: Personal Fatigue; WH: Working Hours; 
WS: Work Stresses; WEnv: Working Environment), (NTS: Non-Technical Skills; DM: Decision-Making; SA: Situation Awareness; CS: Communication skills; T&L: 




Table 5.15. Weighted super matrix for the 13 sub-criteria of MPRIs 
MPRIs 
TP PF NTS F&S 
QPL ST WEx WH WS WEnv DM SA CS T&L OA HI BS 
TP 
QPL 0 0 0 0 0.074 0.305 0.052 0.090 0.143 0.336 0 0 0 
ST 0 0 0 0.087 0.055 0.237 0.053 0.118 0.120 0.332 0 0 0 
WEx 0 0 0 0.102 0.123 0.154 0.037 0.093 0.123 0.368 0 0 0 
PF 
WH 0 0 0.107 0 0 0 0.008 0.024 0.040 0.063 0.177 0.339 0.242 
WS 0 0 0.107 0 0 0 0.009 0.033 0.042 0.051 0 0.471 0.287 
WEnv 0.014 0.062 0.031 0 0 0 0.007 0.017 0.036 0.075 0 0.420 0.337 
NTS 
DM 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
SA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
CS 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T&L 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
F&S 
OA 0.017 0.015 0.075 0.101 0.221 0.369 0.013 0.021 0.049 0.119 0 0 0 
HI 0.013 0.042 0.052 0.152 0.284 0.254 0.017 0.021 0.038 0.125 0 0 0 
BS 0.015 0.034 0.058 0.130 0.272 0.289 0.021 0.035 0.054 0.092 0 0 0 
Sum 0.059 0.153 0.430 0.572 1.029 1.608 0.217 0.452 0.645 1.561 0.177 1.230 0.866 
((TP: Technical Proficiency; QPL: Qualification and Pilotage Licencing; ST: Special Training: WEx: Working Experience), (PF: Personal Fatigue; WH: Working Hours; 
WS: Work Stresses; WEnv: Working Environment), (NTS: Non-Technical Skills; DM: Decision-Making; SA: Situation Awareness; CS: Communication skills; T&L: 





Table 5.16. Normalised super matrix for the 13 sub-criteria of MPRIs 
MPRIs 
TP PF NTS F&S 
QPL ST WEx WH WS WEnv DM SA CS T&L OA HI BS 
TP 
QPL 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.19 0.24 0.20 0.22 0.22 0.00 0.00 0.00 
ST 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.15 0.05 0.15 0.24 0.26 0.19 0.21 0.00 0.00 0.00 
WEx 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.18 0.12 0.10 0.17 0.21 0.19 0.24 0.00 0.00 0.00 
PF 
WH 0.00 0.00 0.25 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.04 1.00 0.28 0.28 
WS 0.00 0.00 0.25 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.07 0.07 0.03 0.00 0.38 0.33 
WEnv 0.24 0.41 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.04 0.06 0.05 0.00 0.34 0.39 
NTS 
DM 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
SA 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
CS 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
T&L 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
F&S 
OA 0.29 0.10 0.17 0.18 0.21 0.23 0.06 0.05 0.08 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.00 
HI 0.22 0.27 0.12 0.27 0.28 0.16 0.08 0.05 0.06 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.00 
BS 0.25 0.22 0.13 0.23 0.26 0.18 0.10 0.08 0.08 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Total 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
((TP: Technical Proficiency; QPL: Qualification and Pilotage Licencing; ST: Special Training: WEx: Working Experience), (PF: Personal Fatigue; WH: Working Hours; 
WS: Work Stresses; WEnv: Working Environment), (NTS: Non-Technical Skills; DM: Decision-Making; SA: Situation Awareness; CS: Communication skills; T&L: 




Table 5.17. Ranking for the 13 sub-criteria of MPRIs 
Goal Sub-level MPRIs 
AHP ANP 















QPL 0.183 0.021 11 0.004 0.089 13 
ST 0.452 0.052 6 0.013 0.289 11 
WEx 0.365 0.042 9 0.028 0.622 10 
PF 
(0.186) 
WH 0.113 0.050 8 0.039 0.210 9 
WS 0.547 0.243 1 0.068 0.366 6 
WEnv 0.340 0.151 2 0.079 0.424 5 
NTS 
(0.606) 
DM 0.074 0.027 10 0.045 0.075 8 
SA 0.169 0.062 5 0.094 0.155 3 
CS 0.400 0.146 3 0.142 0.234 2 
T&L 0.357 0.130 4 0.325 0.536 1 
F&S 
(0.163) 
OA 0.111 0.008 13 0.008 0.049 12 
HI 0.204 0.015 12 0.091 0.558 4 
BS 0.685 0.051 7 0.064 0.393 7 
((TP: Technical Proficiency; QPL: Qualification and Pilotage Licencing; ST: Special Training: WEx: 
Working Experience), (PF: Personal Fatigue; WH: Working Hours; WS: Work Stresses; WEnv: Working 
Environment), (NTS: Non-Technical Skills; DM: Decision-Making; SA: Situation Awareness; CS: 
Communication skills; T&L: Teamwork and Leadership), (F&S: Fitness & Strength; OA: Operator Age; 




Figure 5.7. AHP and ANP Global weight flowchart for the 13 sub-criteria of MPRIs 
 
5.6 Conclusion 
This chapter examined the MPRIs identified in previous chapters with respect to the 
degree of interdependency among factors by using a hybrid approach. Previous studies on 
human reliability treat the identified factors independently (e.g., Riahi et al., 2012). This 
QPL ST Wex WH WS Wenv DM SA CS T&L OA HI BS
ANP 0.004 0.013 0.028 0.039 0.068 0.079 0.045 0.094 0.142 0.325 0.008 0.091 0.064


















study has addressed the gap by focusing on developing an effective reliability measurement 
tool in an integrated form by addressing the significant factors as a set that influence the 
reliability of a marine pilot, and the degree of interdependency among them. Therefore, this 
is a new hybrid approach combining FDEMATEL and ANP methodology. Using the 
FDMATEL helps the decision makers to understand how factors that constitute reliability 
of the operator affect each other and therefore how they affect the reliability of a marine 
pilot during the port pilotage operation. The use of the DEMATEL approach provides a 
smart approach for decision makers to assess potential factors that affect an operator’s 
reliability by dividing them into groups of cause and effect. Moreover, understanding the 
nature of human interactions in addition to the operational hazards that initiate a vague 
working environment has increased the difficulties involved in making proper decisions 
and, in turn, signified the need to incorporate a fuzzy sets approach to handle the imprecise 
and vague judgements of group decision making. The direct and indirect relation matrices, 
relative importance, global and local weights of each cluster, and the sub-criteria 
constituting these clusters were examined to clarify the degree of interdependency amongst 
the identified factors. 
Thus, amongst the four main dimensions, the most influential factors were NTS 
followed by PF, F&S, and TP, respectively. Moreover, PF, TP, and F&S clusters are the 
cause factors, while the NTS considered as the effect cluster. This means that, the NTS has 
a direct influence on the pilot’s TP, PF, and F&S, but the TP, PF, and F&S have a direct 
effect on the pilot’s NTS. This can be seen in Table 5.11, where the degree of 
interdependency among the sub-criteria are compared in terms of clusters. The shaded cells 
show the relationships among the factors, which in turn are examined under the method of 
ANP, which aims to set the final weighting adjustment according to the identified 
interrelated factors towards developing a reliable marine pilot. The next chapter examines 
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the validity of the proposed model through case studies done on three marine pilots in a 
major marine port to synthesise the evaluation of quantitative and qualitative MPRIs in 




6. Chapter Six: Quantities Analysis of a Marine Pilot’s 
Reliability Using Fuzzy Evidential Reasoning (FER) 
approach 
  
6.1 Chapter Summary 
This chapter proposes a novel assessment tool based on the concept of the fuzzy evidential 
reasoning (FRE) approach to assess the reliability of a marine port pilot. The proposed method is 
able to deal with uncertainties raised due to the subjective judgement involved in this assessment. 
Previous chapters have identified, ranked, and highlighted the degree of interdependency among 
the main criteria shaping the proposed MPRIs. Results obtained from previous chapters are 
incorporated into this chapter to conduct an empirical reliability assessment. Three senior marine 
port pilots are involved in the reliability assessment in this work to validate the proposed research 
framework. The results indicate the effectiveness of the proposed method for assessing the 
reliability of a marine pilot at a major marine port. The proposed reliability assessment framework 
is presented in Figure 6.1. 
 
 





In every dynamic working environment, team reliability is vital, requiring operators to 
be continually monitoring situations and adjusting their decisions accordingly (Rouse et al., 
1992). Decision-making is a central process in all organisations, and a successful operation 
requires a reliable team. For a team conducting a pilotage operation, variation in the 
decision-making process can be expected due to the dissimilarity of operators’ 
responsibilities (Rouse et al., 1992). Therefore, a generic MPRI assessment model is 
proposed in this study to assess the reliability of a marine pilot during marine port pilotage 
operations. 
Following the development of the MPRIs, the selection of criteria (see Chapter 3) was 
endorsed using a confirmatory assessment tool and ranked in accordance to their 
importance as an independent form of influence (see Chapter 4). This endorsement was 
followed by the identification of interdependency among criteria (see Chapter 5) in order 
to re-rank the criteria based on their interactions. This resulted in constructing a generic 
assessment model, as shown in Figure (6.2). The model consists of three levels. Level 1 
represents the goal of this study, which is assessing the reliability of a marine pilot within 
port pilotage operations. Level 2 consists of four main factors that are directly involved in 
shaping an operator’s reliability within the operation. Within each individual main factor 
are sub-factors that shape out the main factor, as presented in Level 3. In the last level, a 
proposed index for each sub-factor is presented, aiming to help point out the influencing 
factors in detail. These indices will help the decision-makers predict the development of an 
error in ample time and to take appropriate action. 
This chapter aims to transform the results from the lower level MPRIs toward assessing 
the reliability of a marine pilot by synthesising the lower level towards the upper level by 
employing the proposed methods of FER and utility theory. This chapter discusses in brief 
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the background of the research methods used in the first stage. It then presents the 
algorithms of the method with an explanation of their use. Then, a real assessment 




 Figure 6.2. Generic model for pilot reliability 
 
6.3 Research background 
Developing a generic model enables decision-makers to understand the marine pilotage 
process, where the nature of the pilotage operation is characterised as complex in nature. 
However, as far as the marine pilot is concerned in this study, operational information and 
statistical data on how to assess the reliability of a marine pilot in a complex working 
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environment are scarce. Therefore, selecting a reliable marine pilot to conduct the operation 
safely and efficiently based on the proposed MPRIs, rather than adapting a traditional 
approach, is a challenging process, and generating novel and informed methodologies is 
urgent.  
When solving complex problems, it is essential to employ an appropriate method that 
is able to handle operational complexity. In this research, the use of the ER and fuzzy logic 
(i.e. fuzzy set theory) seems an appropriate way to cope with the complexity of fuzzy 
information obtained through multiple sources. This combination helps to process both 
crisp and fuzzy information simultaneously. 
The following section contains a brief overview of the selected methods and their 
application in the literature. 
 
6.3.1 Fuzzy logic (FL) 
Fuzzy logic (FL) is a superset of conventional Boolean logic with extensions to account 
for imprecise or vague information that is capable of dealing with uncertainties (Zadeh, 
1975). It permits using vague information and concepts in an exact mathematical manner 
(Riahi et al., 2012). In a fuzzy assessment environment, the grades used for assessment are 
normally formed by fuzzy numbers rather than crisp values (Ha and Yang, 2017). Fuzzy 
assessment studies use linguistic variables, which are a useful tool for modelling fuzzy 
working environments and one of the most recognised approaches in decision systems 
where experts are involved. 
The principle on which FL is based is that every crisp value is relevant to all sets of fuzzy 
numbers by the degree of membership (Riahi, 2010). The use of a membership function 
helps when dealing with inherent ambiguity when describing an event. Fuzzy sets and 
fuzzy rule based techniques are used to treat uncertainty under FL. The use of these two 
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techniques depends on the assessment situation and they are widely used by scholars across 
different disciplines. Most fuzzy techniques are developed using the fuzzy sets theory (FST) 
(Lee, 1990; Yen and Langari, 1999; Mendel, 2001). 
 
6.3.2 Fuzzy set theory (FST) and fuzzy membership function 
Since the notion of FL was introduced, one of the aims of FST is to formulate a 
methodological solution for complex or ill-defined problems in order to assess the problem 
when using conventional techniques (Kandel, 1986). When measuring uncertain variables, 
crisp variables cannot be expressed in a formal way, but using fuzzy forms when assessing 
variables enables the gradual transition between assessment states to overcome uncertain 
expressions (Wang, 2003). Using linguistic variables helps when describing assessment 
parameters, where the subjective nature of the information helps measure the parameters 
in a more convenient way. These linguistic terms (i.e. very high, high) are necessary media 
that can be used to describe contentious and overlapping states (Riahi, 2010). This helps 
to incorporate qualitative and imprecise reasoning statements when dealing with fuzzy 
algorithms. The linguistic terms are further defined in terms of fuzzy membership 
functions. A membership function is a set of objects mapped as a membership degree 
ranging between 0 and 1. The linguistic variables can be easily defined in terms of a simple 
form of a membership function (i.e. triangular, trapezoidal). This theory allows 
incorporating mathematical operators and programming to apply to the fuzzy domain 
(Mokhtari et al., 2012). Thus, a membership function is expected to be flexible in terms of 
its definition to suit various circumstances in allowing the decision-makers to interpret 
subjective information represented as input variables in more convenient way. 
There are different shapes of membership functions, namely triangular, trapezoidal, S 
curves, bell curves, Gaussian curves, piecewise linear and 𝜋 curves (Ramin et al., 2012; 
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Aziz, 2009; Madau et al., 1996). The most commonly used shapes in the literature are 
triangular and trapezoidal because of their ease of use (Ertugrul and Karaksouglu, 2007; 
Mokhtari et al., 2012; Bloch and Maitre, 1995). Developing a suitable membership 
function is highly dependent on a psychometric scale chosen by the model builder (Liu et 
al., 2012; Liu et al., 2005; Sii et al., 2005); it can be based on the model builder’s 
knowledge of the problem, historical system records, and the help of experts. The 
psychometric scale is a subjective scale composed of a range of granularity and fine detail 
(Ishola, 2017). For the purpose of this study, the psychometric scale used to develop the 
membership function is developed based on expert consultation, port requirements, and 
knowledge acquisition through literature (Liu et al., 2005; Riahi et al., 2012; Gaonkar et 
al., 2013).   
 
6.3.3 Fuzzy rule-based logic 
Fuzzy rule-based logic, known as a knowledge-based or rule-based logic, produces 
simpler, more intuitive, and better-behaved models. It is comprised of the set of a realistic 
subjective assessment approach based on fuzzy IF-THEN rules (Yang et al., 2009; Sii et 
al., 2001). Because an IF-THEN rule is capable of implementing a conditional statement 
easily and efficiently in a more reasonable manner, it is considered the core of a FL system 
(Ha et al., 2017). According to Yang et al. (2009), unavailable or incomplete objective data 
that helps with analysing the highlighted topic requires employing a realistic subjective 
assessment approach based on fuzzy IF-THEN rules in FST. Thus, the assessment is 
subject to conditional parts and contains linguistic variables capable of modelling the 
qualitative features of human knowledge and reasoning processes without employing 
precise quantification analysis (Yang et al., 2009; Sii et al., 2001). This process enables 
the assessor to handle the linguistic information that is commonly used for safety 
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assessment, since it provides a useful assessment tool that is capable of dealing with this 
type of information (Sii et al., 2001). The IF-THEN rule consists of two parts: an 
antecedent (i.e. fuzzy inputs) and a consequent (i.e. fuzzy output) (Pillay and Wang, 2003). 
According to Sii et al. (2001), the fuzzy rule-based logic has several useful properties, 
since the rules can be formulated linguistically rather than in numerical form. Moreover, 
they are often expressed based on fuzzy conditional statements based on IF-THEN rules, 
which can be easily implemented. Accordingly, the fuzzy rules based on IF-THEN rules 
can be expressed as follows (Yang et al., 2009; Liu et al., 2005): 
𝑅𝑘: 𝐼𝐹𝑥1𝑖𝑠𝐴1
𝑘𝑎𝑛𝑑 … . 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑥𝑛𝑖𝑠 𝐴𝑛
𝑘 , 𝑇𝐻𝐸𝑁 𝑦 𝑖𝑠 𝐵𝑘   (6.1) 
This form of statement is a multi-input-single-output case, in which 𝐴1
𝑘 … .𝐴𝑛
𝑘  and 𝐵𝑘 
represent the sets of fuzzy inputs and fuzzy output, respectively. 𝑥1 … . 𝑥𝑛and 𝑦 represent 
the input and output linguistic variables of the fuzzy sets, respectively. 
In this study, when using FER to assess the reliability of a marine pilot, the expression of 
the qualitative input and output can achieve a degree of belief when using linguistic 





𝑘𝑎𝑛𝑑 … . 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐴𝑛
𝑘 , 𝑇𝐻𝐸𝑁 {(𝐻1, 𝐵1




𝑗=1 ≤ 1    (6.2) 
Where 𝐴1
𝑘 represents the linguistic terms used for 𝑖𝑡ℎ antecedent MPRI used in the 𝑘𝑡ℎ 
rule (𝑅𝑘), and 𝐵𝑗





6.3.4 Fuzzy logic application 
FL has been applied widely across different disciplines. Liu et al. (2005) applied a fuzzy 
rule-based approach in conjunction with ER for modelling the safety system of an 
engineering system or project. Sii et al. (2001) developed a qualitative safety model for 
maritime systems based on the FL approach. Riahi et al. (2012) assessed the reliability of 
seafarers using a FL approach in a hybrid form with ER. Yang et al. (2009) assessed the 
security of a maritime transport system using a fuzzy evidential reasoning approach. 
Alyami et al. (2014) evaluated the criticality of hazardous events in container terminals 
using a fuzzy rule-based Bayesian Network (FRBN) approach. Yang et al. (2008) used 
FRBN to prioritise failures in a failure mode and effect analysis (FMEA). Wang et al. 
(2009) used fuzzy weighted geometric means to evaluate risks in FMEA. Li et al. (2010) 
used a fuzzy logic-based approach to identify human error risk importance. 
 
6.3.5 Mapping process 
Following the determination of the fuzzy estimate for the attributes of each MPRI 
element, the measurement of reliability includes different numbers and linguistic variables 
in the lower level of the proposed MPRIs. The associated upper level also includes 
different grades of belief. Since assessing the reliability of an expert cannot be estimated 
precisely, especially in a fuzzy situation, transforming fuzzy information into a belief 
degree can provide the same grades of evaluation that represent the reliability profile of 
the attribute associated with each MPRI. It is essential to transform the assessment grades 
and variables into a concise format for assessing their associated upper criterion (Yeo et 
al., 2014). The application of ER requires the assessment grades to be in the same universe; 
therefore, the mapping process approach has been proofed for use in transforming 
qualitative and quantitative fuzzy input data into their upper associated criteria in a form 
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of fuzzy output (Ha et al., 2017; Yeo et al., 2014; Riahi et al., 2012; Yang et al., 2009). 
The mapping process can help capture any ambiguity and uncertainty resulting from an 
expert’s subjectivity. The fuzzy IF-THEN rule, developed by Yang (2001), is the most 
suitable technique for transforming fuzzy input to fuzzy output. The input of 𝑙𝑖(∑ 𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑖=1 ≤
1), indicates the fuzzy input associated with one of the lower levels of the MPRIs, while 
𝑂𝑗(𝑂𝑗 = ∑ 𝑙𝑖𝛽𝑖
𝑗𝑛
𝑖=1 ) represents the fuzzy output transformed from 𝑙
𝑖. The degree of belief 
( 𝐵𝑖
𝑗
) can be formed based on the experts’ judgement, representing the degrees of 
relationship among given assessment grades between different levels, and must be equal 
to 1 (∑ 𝛽𝑖
𝑗
= 1)𝑛𝑖=1  (see Figure 6.3). For instance, let us assume the assessment grades of 
one of the upper level MPRIs, 'Personal Fatigue (PF)', is evaluated using the linguistic 
variables 'Neutral', 'Slightly Fatigued', 'Moderate', 'Fatigued', and 'Very Bad', while the 
qualitative assessment grades used to assess the sub-level of PF 'Working Hours (WH)' 
that influencing PF is evaluated as 'Very Good', 'Good', 'Moderate', 'Bad', and 'Very Bad'. 
Assigning the fuzzy rule, in this case, is usually based on the decision-makers, who have 
considerable experience within the field of assessment. Assigning the fuzzy rules helps 
map fuzzy inputs to fuzzy outputs (See Figure 6.3). The relationships between fuzzy inputs 
and fuzzy outputs can be evaluated using the following equations: 
∑ 𝛽1
𝑗5
𝑗=1 = 1, ∑ 𝛽2
𝑗5
𝑗=1 = 1, ∑ 𝛽3
𝑗5
𝑗=1 = 1, ∑ 𝛽4
𝑗5
𝑗=1 = 1, ∑ 𝛽5
𝑗5
𝑗=1 = 1           (6.3) 
𝑂𝑗 = ∑ 𝑙𝑖𝛽𝑖
𝑗5
𝑖=1          (6.4) 





 Figure 6.3. Example of fuzzy mapping process 
 
6.3.6 Evidential reasoning (ER) approach 
The ER approach is one of the most powerful MCDM tools when used under uncertain 
assessment environments. This theory of evidence was established by Dempster (1968) 
and further improved by Shafer (1976), and is known as the Dempster-Shafer (D-S) theory 
of evidence. It was originally used for data aggregation as an approximate reasoning tool 
in an expert system (Dubois and Prade, 1991). It has also been used to make operational 
decisions under uncertainty by exploiting an expert’s knowledge and experience in the 
form of belief functions (Yang, 2001; Riahi et al., 2012).  
The development of the ER approach began in the 1990s, following a need to deal with 
a hybrid form of data that had both qualitative, and quantitative attributes found in MCDM 
problems under uncertainties (Yang and Singh, 1994). The ER approach was further 
updated by Yang and Sen (1994), and then further modified by Yang (2001). Yang and Xu 
(2002) generated new ER algorithms. Since then, ER has been applied widely in literature 




 It is capable of handling incomplete, uncertain, and vague, as well as complete and 
precise, data. 
 It allows ER users to express their judgments subjectively and quantitatively in a 
more flexible way. 
 It is capable of accommodating or representing the uncertainty and risks inherent 
in the decision analysis. 
 As a hierarchical evaluation process, it offers a rational and reproducible 
methodology to aggregate the assessed data. 
 It can easily obtain the assessment output using mature computing software called 
an intelligent decision system (IDS). (Yang and Xu, 2002). 
 
The process of aggregating criteria when using the ER approach is a non-linear process 
when compared to a traditional weighting assignment that other MCDM approaches 
employ (Riahi, 2010). The non-linearity is decided by the weights of the criteria and the 
way each criterion is assessed. In addition, the framework of the ER approach provides not 
only a flexible description of an MCDM problem, but also helps prevent information loss 
when converting the distribution into a single value in the modelling process. Handling 
incomplete information requires establishing utility intervals to describe the impact of the 
missing information on the decision analysis. This helps provide a basis to improve the 
originality of the data and to conduct sensitivity analysis.  
Several applications of the ER approach have been addressed in the literature (Wang et 
al., 1996; Yang et al., 2009; Liu et al., 2011; Mokhtari et al., 2012; Ha et al., 2017). Some 
studies contribute towards the use of ER in representing and managing uncertainty in 
decision-making processes, such as port selection (Yeo et al., 2014), assessing the 
reliability of seafarers (Riahi et al., 2012), executive car assessment (Yang and Xu, 2002), 
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human error probability quantification (Xi et al., 2017), assessing the risk of seaports (John 
et al., 2014), safety analysis and synthesis (Wang et al., 1996), and vessel selection (Yang 
et al., 2009). As seen in the identified studies, using FER can provide a useful tool for 
evaluating the reliability of a marine pilot under uncertain working environments. The 
following section discusses the application of FER in evaluating the reliability of three 
senior marine pilots during pilotage operations on the selected port of this study. 
 
6.3.7 Evidential reasoning algorithm 
The use of the ER approach in this research was employed for aggregating all the outputs 
of the degrees of belief (DoB) derived from each fuzzy rule to generate a conclusion. The 
first step of the ER process is to transform the DoB into two parts of basic probability mass 
(i.e. individual assigned and unassigned belief degrees) in order to aggregate all the output 
from each fuzzy rule into a combined set of DoB. To explain the application of the 
algorithms, let’s suppose ‘ 𝑅 ’ represents a set group of five reliability expressions 
synthesised by two evaluators using two sub sets, ‘𝑅1’ and ‘𝑅2’. The following reliability 
expressions based on their judgements are: 














‘V. Low’, ‘Low’, ‘Medium’, ‘High’, and ‘V. High’ are the reliability terms associated with 
their DoBs, used to describe the status of the assessed target. 
The normalised comparative weight can be evaluated based on the selected weighing 
techniques, such as simple rating methods or based on pairwise comparison techniques 
such as ANP or AHP, as suggested by Yang et al. (2001). The normalised relative weight 
222 
 
is given as 𝜔1and 𝜔2(𝜔1 + 𝜔2 = 1). 𝑀1
𝑚and 𝑀2
𝑚(𝑚 =1,2,3,4 or 5) are single degrees that 
constitute 𝑅1 and 𝑅2, which helps the assumption that the reliability estimation is set to the 
five reliability terms. Therefore, obtaining 𝑀1
𝑚and 𝑀2




𝑚      (6.6) 
Where: 
𝑀j
𝑚 ( 𝑗 = 1,… ,𝑁;𝑚 = 1,… , L ) denotes an individual degree for each fuzzy rule that 
supports the aggregation of R that is assessed using the terms of DoB. 𝜔j indicates the 
relative importance of MPRIs. Based on the above example, 𝑀1
𝑚and 𝑀2




𝑚     
𝑀2
𝑚 = 𝜔2𝛽2
𝑚           
Where: 𝑚 = 1, 2, 3, 4, or 5. 
The unassigned, individual remaining belief values for 𝑀𝐻𝑗are the following: 
 The remaining belief degrees ( ?̅?𝐻𝑗 ) that are not assigned to any individual 
evaluation grades caused by the relative importance. 
 The remaining belief degrees ( ?̃?𝐻𝑗 ) that are not assigned to any individual 
evaluation grades caused by incomplete assessment in subset 𝑅. 
This can be presented by Equation (6.7): 
𝑀𝐻𝑗 = ?̅?𝐻𝑗 + ?̃?𝐻𝑗      (6.7) 
Where: 
𝑀𝐻𝑗(𝑗 = 1,… ,𝑁;𝑚 = 1,… , L) 
To find out ?̅?𝐻𝑗, and ?̃?𝐻𝑗 , the following equation is applied: 
?̅?𝐻𝑗 = 1 − 𝜔j     (6.8) 
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?̃?𝐻𝑗 = 𝜔j(1 − ∑ 𝛽j
𝑚n
𝑗=1 )    (6.9) 
Therefore, for the above example, by using Equations (6.7-6.9), 𝑀𝐻𝑗 , ?̅?𝐻𝑗, and ?̃?𝐻𝑗 , 
can be obtained with:  
?̅?𝐻1 = 1 − 𝜔1 = 𝜔2 
?̅?𝐻2 = 1 − 𝜔2 = 𝜔1 




















Assuming the degree of belief for the non-normalised expressions is represented as 
𝛽𝑚′ (𝑚 = 1, 2, 3, 4 𝑜𝑟 5), this can confirm the mixtures of terms used for a reliability 
evaluation by the two assessors involved in the evaluation.  
Assuming that 𝑀𝐻𝑈
′  represents the non-normalised unassigned remaining belief of the 





𝑚 𝑀𝐻𝑗)   (6.10) 
?̅?𝐻𝑈
′ = 𝐾(?̅?𝐻𝑗?̅?𝐻𝑗+1)    (6.11) 
?̃?𝐻𝑈
′ = 𝐾(?̃?𝐻𝑗?̃?𝐻𝑗+1 + ?̃?𝐻𝑗?̅?𝐻𝑗+1 + ?̅?𝐻𝑗?̃?𝐻𝑗+1)   (6.12) 








    (6.13) 
Where: 
(𝑚 = 1, … . , N), (𝑗 = 1, 2 … , N − 1) 
Following the above two assessor illustrations, by using Equations (6.10-6.13), the 









′ = 𝐾(?̅?𝐻1?̅?𝐻2)  
?̃?𝐻𝑈
′ = 𝐾(?̃?𝐻1?̃?𝐻2 + ?̃?𝐻1?̅?𝐻2 + ?̅?𝐻1?̃?2) 











The aggregation results obtained from Equations (6.10-6.13) can be generated by 
assigning ?̅?𝐻𝑈
′  back to the number of expressions used in the case. Therefore, the 










′      (6.15) 
In the above algorithms, 𝑀𝐻𝑈  signifies the degree of incompleteness as an unassigned 
extent of belief in the whole evaluation. It gives the procedures for how to combine the 
two groups. However, in some cases, the aggregation process may require synthesis of 
more than two criteria. This can be done by aggregating the third fuzzy sets with the result 
from the first aggregations using similar processes and equations. 
 
6.3.8 Obtaining a crisp number using the expected utility approach 
The expected utility approach is utilised to generate numerical values equivalent to the 
distributed assessment for the upper-level criterion, such as the goal, and to find the 
individual crisp number for each alternative in order to rank the alternatives accordingly. 
The expected utility approach was invented by Yang (2001) and is used widely to obtain 
crisp values for the assessed identified criteria. 
To illustrate this approach, assume the utility value of 𝐻𝑛 being assessed as 𝑢(𝐻𝑛) and 
𝑢(𝐻𝑛+1) > 𝑢(𝐻𝑛) if 𝐻𝑛+1 is more desired than 𝐻𝑛 (Yang, 2001; John et al., 2014; Zhang 
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et al., 2016). The utility value for each given linguistic term used can be represented by 
𝑢(𝐻𝑛), which can help estimate the utility value using the decision-maker’s preferences. 
The evaluation grades of the utility value equidistantly distributed in a normalised utility 




    (6.16) 
where 𝑉𝑛  is the assigned ranking value for the linguistic terminology (𝐻𝑛), 𝑉𝑚𝑎𝑥  is the 
decision-makers' most preferable linguistic term of 𝐻𝑁  ranking value, and 𝑉𝑚𝑖𝑛  is the 
decision-makers' least preferable linguistic term of 𝐻1 ranking value.  
𝛽𝐻 = 1 − ∑ 𝛽𝑛
𝑁
𝑛−1       (6.17) 
The utility value for the top criteria (𝑆(𝐸)), such as the goal, is represented as 𝑢(𝑆(𝐸)). 
(𝛽𝐻 ≠ 0) means the assessment is incomplete; therefore, a belief interval of [𝛽𝑛, (𝛽𝑛 +
𝛽𝐻)]  can provide the likelihood of 𝑆(𝐸)  assessed to 𝐻𝑛 . By assuming that the lower 
preferable linguistic term is assigned the lowest utility value and is indicated by 𝑢(𝐻1), 
while the upper preferable linguistic term is assigned with the highest utility value and is 
presented by 𝑢(𝐻𝑛) , the minimum, maximum, and average utility value of 𝑆(𝐸)  are 
identified by (Yang, 2001; Riahi et al., 2012): 
𝑢𝑚𝑖𝑛(𝑆(𝐸)) = ∑ 𝛽𝑛𝑢(𝐻𝑛) + (𝛽1 + 𝛽𝐻)𝑢(𝐻1)
𝑁
𝑛=2     (6.18) 
𝑢𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝑆(𝐸)) = ∑ 𝛽𝑛𝑢(𝐻𝑛) + (𝛽𝑁 + 𝛽𝐻)𝑢(𝐻𝑁)
𝑁−1




   (6.20) 
When all the assessments are completed, 𝛽𝐻 = 0  and the maximum, average, and 
minimum utility values for 𝑆(𝐸)  are equal. Consequently, obtaining 𝑢(𝑆(𝐸))  can be 
carried out by the following equation (Yang, 2001; Zhang et al., 2016): 
𝑢(𝑆(𝐸)) = ∑ 𝛽𝑛𝑢(𝐻𝑛)
𝑁
𝑛=1     (6.21) 
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The above utility values are not used for aggregation procedures; they are just to 
characterise the assessment (Yang and Xu, 2002; Mokhtari et al., 2012). 
 
6.3.9 MPRI validation using sensitivity analysis 
The main objective of the sensitivity analysis is to identify the degree of changes on the 
model caused when a minor change in inputs is made (Yang et al., 2009; Riahi et al., 2013; 
Xi et al., 2017). These changes can result due to a change of the parameters of the model 
or even a change of the degrees of belief assigned to the linguistic variables describing 
these parameters. However, if the methodology is able to provide a logical conclusion, then 
the sensitivity analysis must follow one of the following three axioms (Yang et al., 2009): 
Axiom 1. A slight increase or decrease in the degree of belief associated with any linguistic 
variables of the lowest-level criteria will certainly result in a relative increase or decrease 
in the degree of belief of the linguistic variable and the preference degrees of the model 
output. 
Axiom 2. If the degree of belief associated with the highest-preference linguistic term of 
the lowest-level criterion is decreased by m and n (such that the degree of belief associated 
with the lowest-preference linguistic term is simultaneously increased by m and n (1 >
𝑛 > 𝑚)) and the utility values of the model output are evaluated as 𝑈𝑚 and 𝑈𝑛, respectively, 
then 𝑈𝑚 should be greater than 𝑈𝑛. 
Axiom 3. If ‘N’ and ‘K’ (𝐾 <  𝑁) criteria from all the lowest-level criteria are selected, 
and the degrees of belief associated with the highest-preference linguistic terms of each N 
and K criterion is decreased by the same amount (i.e. simultaneously, the degrees of belief 
associated with the lowest-preference linguistic terms of each N and K criteria are increased 
by the same amount) then the utility values of the model output can be evaluated as 𝑈𝐾 and 




6.4 An empirical pilot’s reliability assessment 
In this study, three senior marine pilots were selected and their reliability evaluated by 
three duty harbour masters (HM) using the proposed model under a fuzzy working 
environment. The three HMs are appointed by the port authority and have considerable 
years of experience as senior marine pilot. Moreover, they have master mariner class 1 
(COC 1) certificates and worked for a period of time on board merchant ships. Accordingly, 
the result obtained highlights the applicability of the proposed model in evaluating the 
reliability of decision-makers to select the right pilot to conduct the pilotage service. The 
given information for the three senior marine pilots is presented in Table 6.1, showing the 
variance of their given criteria. It is worth mentioning that each pilot was assessed based 
on basic information such as pilot qualification, training certificates, experience, medical 
conditions, and age, which are available in their personal records. Moreover, pilot fatigue 
and non-technical skills were assessed with information obtained from HM observations. 
In addition, the HMs’ were involved to set the fuzzy rules required for mapping processes 













Table 6.1. Pilot information 
MPRIs Pilot 1 Pilot 2 Pilot 3 
QPL Diploma COC1 + PL BSc COC3 +PL Diploma +PL 
ST 
 Elementary First Aid 
(EFA); 
 Personal survival 
technique (PST) 
 Proficiency in 
survival craft (PSC); 
 Fire prevention and 
firefighting (FPFF); 






 Global Maritime 
Distress and Safety 
System (GMDSS) 
certificate; 
 Advanced Pilot 
Training (APT) 
certificate; and 
 Bridge Resource 
Management (BRM) 
training course. 




 Fire prevention and 
firefighting (FPFF); 
 Elementary First Aid 
(EFA) certificate; 
 Personal survival 
technique (PST) 
 Proficiency in survival 
craft (PSC); 
 Ship-handling 
simulator certificate;  
 Advance Pilot Training 
(APT) certificate; and  
 Bridge Resource 
Management (BRM) 
training course. 




 Fire prevention and 
firefighting (FPFF); 
 Elementary First Aid 
(EFA) certificate; 
 Personal survival 
technique (PST) 




 Advanced Pilot 
Training (APT) 
course; and 
 Global Maritime 
Distress and Safety 
System (GMDSS) 
certificate. 
WEx 6 Y 13 Y 23 Y 
WH 
30% Good, and 70% 
Moderate 
30% Good, and 70% 
Moderate 
70% V. Bad, and 30% 
Bad 
WS 
70% High, and 30% V. 
High 
60% V. High, and 40% 
High 
40% Moderate and 60% 
High  
WEnv 
60% Good, and 40% 
Moderate 
50% Moderate, and 50% 
Bad 
30% Moderate, and 70% 
Bad 
DM 
20% V. Good, and 80% 
Good 
20% Good, and 80% 
Average 
40% V. Good, and 60% 
Good 
SA 
70% Good, and 30% 
Average 
60% Good, and 40% 
Average 
80% Good, and 20% V. 
Good 
CS 
70% Good, and 30% 
Average 
20% Good, and 80% 
Average 
50% Good, and 50% 
Average 
T&L 
80% Average, and 20% 
Bad 
60% Good, and 40% 
Average 
40% Average, and 60% 
Bad 
OA 37 Y 43 Y 55 Y 
HI 
80% Healthy, and 20% 
Good 
80% Good, and 20% 
Moderate 
100% Moderate 
BS 80% Fit, and 20% Good 
70% Good, and 30% 
Moderate 






6.4.1 A generic model for assessing a pilot’s reliability 
Subject to the generic pilotage operation reliability model presented in Section 3.7.2.4, a 
generic MPRI model can be developed to assess a pilot’s reliability, as shown in Figure 6.2. 
Each criterion was weighted using the AHP and ANP (see Section 6.3.4). The weights 
obtained in this section were used in aggregating the lower level to the associated upper 
level, followed by aggregating the main level towards the goal, as presented in Section 
6.4.6. In addition, quantitative and qualitative criteria were segregated, and the linguistic 
term for each qualitative criterion was defined and presented in Table 6.2. These linguistic 
variables were used to describe the qualitative and quantitative MPRIs, which were adapted 
as presented in Tables 6.3-6.15.  
 
















 TP V. Good Good Average Low Basic 
PF Neutral S. Fatigued Moderate Fatigued V. Bad 
NTS V. Good Good Moderate Bad V. Bad 










TP-QPL Assessed quantitatively 
TP-ST Assessed quantitatively 
TP-WEx Assessed quantitatively 
PF-WH V. Good Good Moderate Bad V. Bad 
PF-WS V. Low Low Moderate High V. High 
PF-WEnv V. Good Good Moderate Bad V. Bad 
NTS-DM V. Good Good Average Bad V. Bad 
NTS-SA V. Good Good Average Bad V. Bad 
NTS-CS V. Good Good Average Bad V. Bad 
NTS-T&L V. Good Good Average Bad V. Bad 
F&S-OA Assessed quantitatively 
F&S-HI Healthy Good Moderate Bad Sever 












Uppermost  Certificate of Competency class 1 (COCI) 




2nd Higher Certificate of Competency class 2 (COCII) 
Average Certificate of Competency class 3 (COCIII) 
2nd minimum Certificate of Competency class 4 (COCIIII) 
Minimum Marine Diploma or BSc in nautical science + pilotage license 
 
 





Have a valid minimum port requirement plus more than 3 additional 
recommended courses, ≥9 out of 10 
Riahi et al., 
2012; Port 
standard 
Trained Have a valid minimum port requirement plus 3, 8 out of 10 
Average Have a valid minimum port requirement plus 2, 7 out of 10 
Low Have a valid minimum port requirement plus 1, 6 out of 10 
Basic Have a valid minimum port requirement 5 out of 10 
 




Very High ≥ 20 Years 
Riahi et al., 
2012; Port 
standard 
High 16 – 20 Years 
Average 11 – 15 Years 
Low 6 – 10 Years 
Very Low 0 – 5 Years 
 
 





Works within the official working hours, had very good rest between the 
operations, had very good sleep before the duty, works at a fixed shift of 
day time  Iwasaki et al., 
1998; Dembe et 
al., 2005; Raby 
and McCallum, 
1997; Embriaco 
et al., 2007; 
Folkard et al., 




Works just above the official working hours, had good rest between the 
operations, had good sleep before the duty, always works at a day time 
shift with few night shift 
Moderate 
Works moderate hours above the official working hours, had average rest 
between the operations, had average sleep before the duty, works in a 
rotation shifts day and night 
Bad 
Overloaded with an extended hours above the official working hours, had 
little rest between the operations, had little sleep before the duty with 
accumulated fatigue, works at night shift with few days of day shift 
V. Bad 
Overloaded with  a contentious hours above the official working hours, 
had no rest between the operations, had very little sleep before the duty 















Subject to normal workloads and physical demands, works in normal 
working condition, gained very good support from the management and 
other team members, works within the designated working hours.  
 
Quick et al., 
1997; Kim et 
al., 2009; 




Subject to slight increase in workloads and physical demands, works in 
good working condition, gained enough support from the management 
and other team members, works with a slight extend on the designated 
working hours. 
Moderate 
Subject to moderate increase in workloads, works in moderate working 
condition, gained moderate support from the management and other team 
members, works with moderate extend on the designated working hours. 
High 
Subject to high increase in workloads and physical demands, works in 
bad working condition, gained little support from the management and 
other team members, works with high extend on the designated working 
hours. 
V. High 
Subject to adverse increase in workloads and physical demands, works in 
adverse working condition, gained very little or no support from the 
management and other team members, works with extreme extend on the 
designated working hours. 
 
 





Excellent physical places for rest, excellent weather and sea conditions, 
excellent managerial practices and safety consideration, excellent relation 
with the management and other team members.   
Celik and Cebi, 
2009; Riahi et 
al., 2013; Saeed 
et al., 2016; 
Bhattacharya 
and Tang, 
2013; Darbra et 
al., 2007 
Good 
Good physical places for rest, good weather and sea conditions, good 
managerial practices and safety consideration, good relation with the 
management and other team members.   
Moderate 
Average physical places for rest, average weather and sea conditions, 
average managerial practices and safety consideration, average relation 
with the management and other team members.   
Bad 
Bad physical places for rest, bad weather and sea conditions, bad 
managerial practices and safety consideration, bad relation with the 
management and other team members.   
V. Bad 
Very bad or no places for rest, adverse weather and sea conditions, very 
bad managerial practices and safety consideration, adverse relation with 


























Perfectly gather all information to identify problem, consider and share 
any changes on the operation with other team members, clearly confirms 
and state all selected options in compliance with the port regulations to 
ensure port safety, and capable at carrying a complete checks of 
operational outcome against plan. 
Yule and 
Brown, 2012 
Flin et al., 





Gathering sufficient pilotage information to identify problem, consider 
and share enough changes on the operation with other team members, 
state and share enough options in compliance with the port regulations to 
ensure port safety, and capable at carrying enough checks of operational 
outcome against plan. 
Average 
Gathering just enough pilotage information to identify problem, consider 
and share some changes on the operation with other team members, state 
and share some options in compliance with the port regulations to ensure 
port safety, and carrying some checks of operational outcome against 
plan. 
Bad 
Gathering few pilotage information to identify operational problem, 
consider and share few changes on the operation with other team 
members, state and share few options in compliance with the port 
regulations to ensure port safety, and carrying few checks of operational 
outcome against plan. 
Very Bad 
The pilot never gather any information to identify operational problem, 
failed to consider and share all operational changes with other team 
members, never state and share operational options in compliance with 
the port regulations to ensure port safety, and never consider carrying 
operational outcome checks against plan. 
 
 





The pilot perfectly carrying full operational assessment to monitor 
operational changes and report to other team members, collect all the 
required information related to the operation, share and discussed all the 
updated operational information with other team members. 
Endsley, 1995; 
Salmon et al., 
2009; Flin et 
al., 2008; 
Johnston et al., 
2011 
Good 
The pilot carrying sufficient operational assessment to monitor 
operational changes and report to other team members, collect enough 
information related to the operation, share and discussed enough updated 
operational information with other team members.  
Average 
The pilot carrying reasonable operational assessment to monitor 
operational changes and report to other team members, collect reasonable 
information related to the operation, share and discussed reasonable 
updated operational information with other team members.  
Bad 
The pilot carrying very little operational assessment to monitor 
operational changes and report to other team members, collect very few 
information related to the operation, share and discussed very brief 
updated operational information with other team members.  
Very Bad 
The pilot never carry operational assessment, do not monitor and report 
operational changes with other team members, never collect the required 
information related to the operation, never share and discussed any 















Perfectly establish open communication atmosphere, effectively 
communicates and share operational information with other team 
members using a perfect language  
Lamb et al., 
2011; Blundel 
and Ippolito, 
2008; Saeed et 
al., 2016 
Good 
Sufficiently establish open communication atmosphere, sufficiently 
communicates and share operational information with other team 
members using a clear language  
Average 
Establish moderate communication atmosphere, moderately 
communicates and share operational information with other team 
members using a moderate language clarity  
Bad 
Establish ineffective communication atmosphere, communicates and 
share little operational information with other team members using 
ineffective language  
Very Bad 
Never establish communication atmosphere, never communicates and 
share operational information and never use proper language 
 
 





Perfectly plan and confirm the operation with other team members, 
actively monitor and respect others capabilities and their operational 
conditions, provide full operational overview to ensure other team 
members safety, fully respect other team member suggestions and 
comments, perfectly motivate and appreciate others. 
Yule and 
Brown 2012; 







Sufficiently plan and confirm the operation with other team members, 
sufficiently monitor and respect others capabilities and theiroperational 
conditions, provide sufficient operational overview to ensure other team 
members safety, respect other team member sufficiently to their 
suggestions and comments, sufficiently motivate and appreciate others. 
Average 
Plan and confirm the operation fairly enough with other team members, 
monitor and respect others fairly enough to their capabilities and their 
operational conditions, provide enough operational overview to ensure 
other team members safety, respect other team member fairly enough to 
their suggestions and comments, just enough motivate and appreciate 
others. 
Bad 
Plan and confirm the operation very little with other team members, 
monitor and respect others very little to their capabilities and their 
operational conditions, provide little operational overview to ensure other 
team members safety, respect other team member very little to their 
suggestions and comments, rarely motivate and appreciate others. 
Very Bad 
Never plan and confirm the operation with other team members, never 
monitor and respect others capabilities and their operational conditions, 
never provide operational overview to ensure other team members safety, 
never respect other team member suggestions and comments, never 
motivate and appreciate others. 
 
 




Very Young 20 – 29 Years 




Young 30 – 39 Years 
Mid Aged 40 – 49 Years 
Old 50 – 59 Years 











Clear from any health problems, mentally very good and perfectly able to 
concentrate during the operation, following perfect preventive medical 
care, having excellent sensory and cardiorespiratory function. 






Clear from any health problems, mentally good and good to concentrate 
during the operation, following good preventive medical care, having 
good sensory and cardiorespiratory function. 
Moderate 
Have minor health problems, average in mental condition and average to 
concentrate during the operation, following average preventive medical 
care, having average sensory and cardiorespiratory function. 
Bad 
Possible to have minor and chronic health problems, bad in mental 
condition and weak to concentrate during the operation, following low 
preventive medical care, having low sensory and cardiorespiratory 
function. 
Severe 
Have minor and chronic health problems, unstable mental condition and 
very weak to concentrate during the operation, not following any 









Perfectly cope with the high physical working demand, have excellent 
work capacity, have excellent mental condition, excellent muscle 
strength 
Wadsworth et 
al., 2008; Riahi 
et al., 2013;  






Sufficiently cope with the high physical working demand, have good 
work capacity, have good mental condition, good muscle strength 
Moderate 
Moderately cope with the high physical working demand, have moderate 
work capacity, have moderate mental condition, average muscle strength 
Weak 
Badly cope with the high physical working demand, have weak work 
capacity, have weak mental condition, weak muscle strength 
Very Weak 
Struggle to cope with the high physical working demand, have very weak 




6.4.2 Mapping process for lower-level MPRIs 
In this section, any transformed DoB sets of the given information for each pilot are 
extracted. The purpose of the mapping process was demonstrated in Section 6.3.5. This 
section gives a demonstration on how to map the bottom levels of the identified MPRIs to 
their associated upper levels. This is followed by mapping the aggregated results from the 
bottom levels of MPRIs towards the main goal. A demonstrative example mapping Pilot 
1's MPRIs is given in the following section. All other mapping processes belonging to Pilot 




6.4.2.1 Working hours (PF-WH) 
Based on the information given in Table 6.1, the fuzzy evaluation for the marine pilot 1’s 
WH is as follows: 
𝑊?̃?𝑝1 = {(𝑉. 𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑, 0), (𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑, 0.3), (𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒, 0.7), (𝐵𝑎𝑑, 0), (𝑉. 𝐵𝑎𝑑, 0)} 
The harbour masters at this port have agreed on the fuzzy rules in Table (6.16) for mapping 
pilots’ WH to its associated criterion, PF, in order to assess pilot reliability based on WH 
(Figure 6.4). 
 





𝑅1: if WH assessed ‘V. Good’, then 100% ‘Neutral’ 
𝑅2: if WH assessed ‘Good’, then 80% ‘S. Fatigued’ and 20% ‘Neutral’ 
𝑅3: if WH assessed ‘Moderate’, then 80% ‘Moderate’ and 20% ‘S. Fatigued’ 
𝑅4: if WH assessed ‘Bad’, then 80% ‘Fatigued’ and 20% ‘V. Bad’ 
𝑅5: if WH assessed ‘V. Bad’, then 100% ‘V. Bad’ 
 
 
The fuzzy outputs from mapping WH to PF can be conducted based on given 
information from Pilot 1 and subject to the fuzzy rules from Table 6.16. They are as follows:  
Based on 𝑅2 and 𝑅3, the result can transform into 0.06 Neutral (𝑂1 = 0.3 × 0.2), 0.38 S. 
Fatigued ( 𝑂2 = (0.3 × 0.8) + (0.7 × 0.2) ), and 0.56 Moderate ( 𝑂3 =  0.7 × 0.8 ), 
respectively. Therefore, the WH for Pilot 1 is assessed as follows: 
𝑃𝐹 − 𝑊𝐻𝑝1




 Figure 6.4. Mapping working hours (WH) to personal fatigue (PF) 
 
6.4.2.2 Working stresses (PF-WS) 
Based on the information given in Table 6.1, the fuzzy evaluation for the marine pilot 
1’s WS is as follows: 
𝑊?̃?𝑝1 = {(𝑉. 𝐿𝑜𝑤, 0), (𝐿𝑜𝑤, 0), (𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒, 0), (𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ, 0.7), (𝑉. 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ, 0.3)} 
The harbour masters at this port have agreed on the fuzzy rules from Table (6.17) for 
mapping pilots’ WS to its associated criterion, PF, in order to assess pilot reliability based 
on WS. 
 





𝑅1: if WS assessed ‘V. Low’, then 100% ‘Neutral’ 
𝑅2: if WS assessed ‘Low’, then 90% ‘S. Fatigued’ and 10% ‘Moderate’ 
𝑅3: if WS assessed ‘Moderate’, then 80% ‘Moderate’ and 20% ‘Fatigued’ 
𝑅4: if WS assessed ‘High’, then 80% ‘Fatigued’ and 20% ‘V. Bad’ 
𝑅5: if WS assessed ‘V. High’, then 100% ‘V. Bad’ 
 
 
The fuzzy outputs from mapping WS to PF, conducted based on given information for 
Pilot 1 and subject to fuzzy rules from Table 6.17, are as follows:  
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Based on 𝑅4 and 𝑅5, the result can transform into 0.56 Fatigued (𝑂4 = 0.7 × 0.8), and 
0.44 V. Bad (𝑂5 = (0.7 × 0.2) + (0.3 × 1)), respectively. Therefore, the WS for Pilot 1 is 
assessed as follows: 
𝑃𝐹 − 𝑊𝑆𝑝1
= {(𝑁𝑒𝑢𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑙, 0), (𝑆. 𝐹𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑔𝑢𝑒𝑑, 0), (𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒, 0), (𝐹𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑔𝑢𝑒𝑑, 0.56), (𝑉. 𝐵𝑎𝑑, 0.44)} 
 
6.4.2.3 Working environment (PF-WEnv) 
Based on the information given in Table 6.1, the fuzzy evaluation for the marine pilot 1’s 
WEnv is as follows: 
𝑊𝐸𝑛?̃?𝑝1 = {(𝑉. 𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑, 0), (𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑, 0.6), (𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒, 0.4), (𝐵𝑎𝑑, 0), (𝑉. 𝐵𝑎𝑑, 0)} 
The harbour masters at this port have agreed to the fuzzy rules of Table (6.18) for 
mapping pilots’ WEnv to its associated criterion, PF, in order to assess pilot reliability 
based on WS. 
 






𝑅1: if WEnv assessed ‘V. Good’, then 100% ‘Neutral’ 
𝑅2: if WEnv assessed ‘Good’, then 80% ‘S. Fatigued’ and 20% ‘Moderate’ 
𝑅3: if WEnv assessed ‘Moderate’, then 80% ‘Moderate’ and 20% ‘Fatigued’ 
𝑅4: if WEnv assessed ‘Bad’, then 80% ‘Fatigued’ and 20% ‘V. Bad’ 
𝑅5: if WEnv assessed ‘V. Bad’, then 100% ‘V. Bad’ 
 
 
The fuzzy outputs from mapping WEnv to PF, conducted based on given information 
from Pilot 1 and subject to fuzzy rules from Table 6.18, are as follows:  
Based on 𝑅2and 𝑅3, the result can transform into 0.48 S. Fatigued (𝑂2 = 0.6 × 0.8), 0.44 
Moderate ( 𝑂3 = (0.6 × 0.2) + (0.4 × 0.8) ), and 0.08 Fatigued ( 𝑂4 = 0.4 × 0.2 ), 
respectively. Therefore, the WEnv for Pilot 1 is assessed as follows: 
𝑃𝐹 − 𝑊𝐸𝑛𝑣𝑝1
= {(𝑁𝑒𝑢𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑙, 0), (𝑆. 𝐹𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑔𝑢𝑒𝑑, 0.48), (𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒, 0.44), (𝐹𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑓𝑢𝑒𝑑, 0.08), (𝑉. 𝐵𝑎𝑑, 0)} 
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6.4.2.4 Decision-making (NTS-DM) 
Based on the information given in Table 6.1, the fuzzy evaluation for the marine pilot 
1’s DM is as follows: 
𝐷?̃?𝑝1 = {(𝑉. 𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑, 0.2), (𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑, 0.8), (𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒, 0), (𝐵𝑎𝑑, 0), (𝑉. 𝐵𝑎𝑑, 0)} 
The harbour masters at this port have agreed to the fuzzy rules from Table (6.19) for 
mapping pilots’ DM to its associated criterion, NTS, in order to assess pilot reliability based 
on DM. 
 






𝑅1: if DM assessed ‘V. Good’, then 100% ‘V. Good’ 
𝑅2: if DM assessed ‘Good’, then 80% ‘Skilful’ and 20% ‘V. Good’ 
𝑅3: if DM assessed ‘Average’, then 90% ‘Moderate’ and 10% ‘Bad’ 
𝑅4: if DM assessed ‘Bad’, then 80% ‘Bad’ and 20% ‘V. Bad’ 
𝑅5: if DM assessed ‘V. Bad’, then 100% ‘V. Bad’ 
 
The fuzzy outputs from mapping DM to NTS, conducted based on given information 
from Pilot 1 and subject to fuzzy rules from Table 6.19, are as follows:  
Based on 𝑅1and 𝑅2, the result can transform into 0.36 V. Good (𝑂1 = (0.2 × 1) + (0.8 ×
0.2)), and 0.64 Good (𝑂2 = 0.8 × 0.8), respectively. Therefore, the DM for Pilot 1 is 
assessed as follows: 
𝑁𝑇𝑆 − 𝐷𝑀𝑝1 = {(𝑉. 𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑, 0.36), (𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑, 0.64), (𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒, 0), (𝐵𝑎𝑑, 0), (𝑉. 𝐵𝑎𝑑, 0)} 
 
6.4.2.5 Situation awareness (NTS-SA) 
Based on the information given in Table 6.1, the fuzzy evaluation for the marine pilot 1’s 
SA is as follows: 
𝑆?̃?𝑝1 = {(𝑉. 𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑, 0), (𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑, 0.7), (𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒, 0.3), (𝐵𝑎𝑑, 0), (𝑉. 𝐵𝑎𝑑, 0)} 
The harbour masters at this port have agreed to the fuzzy rules in Table (6.20) for 










𝑅1: if SA assessed ‘V. Good’, then 100% ‘V. Good’ 
𝑅2: if SA assessed ‘Good’, then 80% ‘Skilful’ and 20% ‘V .Good’ 
𝑅3: if SA assessed ‘Average’, then 90% ‘Moderate’ and 10% ‘Bad’ 
𝑅4: if SA assessed ‘Bad’, then 80% ‘Bad’ and 20% ‘V. Bad’ 
𝑅5: if SA assessed ‘V. Bad’, then 100% ‘V. Bad’ 
 
 
The fuzzy outputs from mapping SA to NTS, conducted based on given information for 
Pilot 1 and subject to fuzzy rules from Table 6.20, are as follows:  
Based on 𝑅2and 𝑅3, the result can transform into 0.14 V. Good (𝑂1 = 0.7 × 0.2), 0.56 
Good (𝑂2 = 0.7 × 0.8), 0.27 Moderate (𝑂3 = 0.3 × 0.9), and 0.03 Bad (𝑂4 = 0.3 × 0.1), 
respectively. Therefore, the SA for Pilot 1 is assessed as follows: 
𝑁𝑇𝑆 − 𝑆𝐴𝑝1 = {(𝑉. 𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑, 0.14), (𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑, 0.56), (𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒, 0.27), (𝐵𝑎𝑑, 0.03), (𝑉. 𝐵𝑎𝑑, 0)}. 
 
6.4.2.6 Communication skills (NTS-CS) 
Based on the information given in Table 6.1, the fuzzy evaluation for the marine pilot 
1’s CS is as follows: 
𝐶?̃?𝑝1 = {(𝑉. 𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑, 0), (𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑, 0.7), (𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒, 0.3), (𝐵𝑎𝑑, 0), (𝑉. 𝐵𝑎𝑑, 0)} 
The harbour masters at this port have agreed to the fuzzy rules in Table (6.21) for mapping 
pilots’ CS to its associated criterion, NTS, in order to assess pilot reliability based on CS. 
 
Table 6.21. Fuzzy rule base belief structure for NTS- CS 
Communication 
Skills (CS) to 
Non-technical 
Skills (NTS) 
𝑅1: if CS assessed ‘V. Good’, then 100% ‘V. Good’ 
𝑅2: if CS assessed ‘Good’, then 80% ‘Skilful’ and 20% ‘V. Good’ 
𝑅3: if CS assessed ‘Average’, then 90% ‘Moderate’ and 10% ‘Bad’ 
𝑅4: if CS assessed ‘Bad’, then 80% ‘Bad’ and 20% ‘V. Bad’ 
𝑅5: if CS assessed ‘V. Bad’, then 100% ‘V. Bad’ 
 
 
The fuzzy outputs from mapping CS to NTS, conducted based on given information for 
Pilot 1 and subject to fuzzy rules on table 6.21, are as follows:  
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Based on 𝑅2and 𝑅3, the result can transform into 0.14 V. Good (𝑂1 = 0.7 × 0.2), 0.56 
Good (𝑂2 = 0.7 × 0.8), 0.27 Moderate (𝑂3 = 0.3 × 0.9), and 0.03 Bad (𝑂4 = 0.3 × 0.1), 
respectively. Therefore, the CS for Pilot 1 is assessed as follows: 
𝑁𝑇𝑆 − CS𝑝1 = {(𝑉. 𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑, 0.14), (𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑, 0.56), (𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒, 0.27), (𝐵𝑎𝑑, 0.03), (𝑉. 𝐵𝑎𝑑, 0)} 
 
6.4.2.7 Teamwork and leadership (NTS-T&L) 
Based on the information given in Table 6.1, the fuzzy evaluation for the marine pilot 
1’s T&L is as follows: 
𝑇&?̃?𝑝1 = {(𝑉. 𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑, 0), (𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑, 0), (𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒, 0.8), (𝐵𝑎𝑑, 0.2), (𝑉. 𝐵𝑎𝑑, 0)} 
The harbour masters at this port have agreed to the fuzzy rules in Table (6.22) for mapping 
pilots’ T&L to its associated criterion, NTS, in order to assess pilot reliability based on 
T&L. 
 






𝑅1: if T&L assessed ‘V. Good’, then 100% ‘V. Good’ 
𝑅2: if T&L assessed ‘Good’, then 80% ‘Skilful’ and 20% ‘V. Good’ 
𝑅3: if T&L assessed ‘Average’, then 90% ‘Moderate’ and 10% ‘Bad’ 
𝑅4: if T&L assessed ‘Bad’, then 80% ‘Bad’ and 20% ‘V. Bad’ 
𝑅5: if T&L assessed ‘V. Bad’, then 100% ‘V. Bad’ 
 
 
The fuzzy outputs from mapping T&L to NTS, conducted based on given information 
for Pilot 1 and subject to fuzzy rules on Table 6.22, are as follows:  
Based on 𝑅3and 𝑅4, the result can transform into 0.72 Moderate (𝑂3 = 0.8 × 0.9), 0.24 
Bad (𝑂4 = (0.8 × 0.1) + (0.2 × 0.8)), and 0.04 V. Bad (𝑂5 = 0.2 × 0.2), respectively. 
Therefore, the T&L for Pilot 1 is assessed as follows: 




6.4.2.8 Health Issues (F&S-HI) 
Based on the information given in Table 6.1, the fuzzy evaluation for the marine pilot 1’s 
HI is as follows: 
𝐻?̃?𝑝1 = {(𝐻𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ𝑦, 0.8), (𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑, 0.2), (𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒, 0), (𝐵𝑎𝑑, 0), (𝑆𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑒, 0)} 
The harbour masters at this port have agreed to the fuzzy rules in Table (6.23) for 
mapping pilots’ HI to its associated criterion, F&S, in order to assess pilot reliability based 
on HI. 
 
Table 6.23. Fuzzy rule base belief structure for F&S-HI 
Health Issue 
(HI) to Fitness 
and Strength 
(F&S) 
𝑅1: if HI assessed ‘Healthy’, then 100% ‘Fit’ 
𝑅2: if HI assessed ‘Good’, then 90% ‘Good’ and 10% ‘Moderate’ 
𝑅3: if HI assessed ‘Moderate’, then 90% ‘Moderate’ and 10% ‘Bad’ 
𝑅4: if HI assessed ‘Bad’, then 80% ‘Bad’ and 20% ‘Unfit’ 
𝑅5: if HI assessed ‘Severe’, then 100% ‘Unfit’ 
 
 
The fuzzy outputs from mapping ‘HI’ to F&S, conducted based on given information 
for Pilot 1 and subject to fuzzy rules on Table 6.23, are as follows:  
Based on 𝑅1 and 𝑅2, the result can transform into 0.8 Fit (𝑂1 = 0.8 × 1), 0.18 Good 
(𝑂2 = 0.2 × 0.9), and 0.02 Moderate (𝑂3 = 0.2 × 0.1), respectively. Therefore, the HI for 
Pilot 1 is assessed as follows: 
𝐹&𝑆 − 𝐻𝐼𝑝1 = {(𝐹𝑖𝑡, 0.8), (𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑, 0.18), (𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒, 0.02), (𝐵𝑎𝑑, 0), (𝑈𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑡, 0)} 
 
6.4.2.9 Body strength (F&S-BS) 
Based on the information given in Table 6.1, the fuzzy evaluation for the marine pilot 
1’s BS is as follows: 
𝐵?̃?𝑝1 = {(𝐹𝑖𝑡, 0.8), (𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑, 0.2), (𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒, 0), (𝑊𝑒𝑎𝑘, 0), (𝑉.𝑊𝑒𝑎𝑘, 0)} 
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The harbour masters at this port have agreed to the fuzzy rules in Table (6.24) for 
mapping pilots’ BS to its associated criterion, F&S, in order to assess pilot reliability based 
on BS. 
 
Table 6.24. Fuzzy rule base belief structure for F&S-BS 
Body Strength 
(BS) to Fitness 
and Strength 
(F&S) 
𝑅1: if BS assessed ‘Fit’, then 100% ‘Fit’ 
𝑅2: if BS assessed ‘Good’, then 90% ‘Good’ and 10% ‘Moderate’ 
𝑅3: if BS assessed ‘Moderate’, then 90% ‘Moderate’ and 10% ‘Bad’ 
𝑅4: if BS assessed ‘Weak’, then 80% ‘Bad’ and 20% ‘Unfit’ 
𝑅5: if BS assessed ‘V. Weak’, then 100% ‘Unfit’ 
 
 
The fuzzy outputs from mapping BS to F&S, conducted based on given information for 
Pilot 1 and subject to fuzzy rules in Table 6.24, are as follows:  
Based on 𝑅1 and 𝑅2, the result can transform into 0.8 Fit (𝑂1 = 0.8 × 1), 0.18 Good 
(𝑂2 = 0.2 × 0.9), and 0.02 Moderate (𝑂3 = 0.2 × 0.1), respectively. Therefore, the BS for 
Pilot 1 is assessed as follows: 
𝐹&𝑆 − 𝐵𝑆𝑝1 = {(𝐹𝑖𝑡, 0.8), (Good, 0.18), (𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒, 0.02), (𝐵𝑎𝑑, 0), (𝑈𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑡, 0)} 
 
6.4.3 Transforming quantitative data into qualitative 
Due to the difficulty of deciding how to assign the degree of belief of a pilot’s special 
training (TP-ST) and age (F&S-OA), a range of assessments was proposed. Based on the 
experts’ opinions, with the support of research conducted by Ramin et al. (2012), the 
membership function can best be utilised in order to transform the grade of given 
quantitative data into qualitative.  
 
6.4.3.1 Pilot’s qualification and pilotage licensing (TP-QPL) 
Based on the previous discussion (Section 6.3.1), harbour masters at this port have 
assigned the following marks of value to fuzzy rules to evaluate pilot reliability based on 
the pilot's QPL: 
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1- If the pilot holds an approved diploma or a BSc in nautical science and an approved 
pilot licence from the port authority, he will be given 50 per cent. The pilot must 
satisfy 100 per cent of the port's minimum requirements. 
2- If the pilot holds an approved diploma with an approved certificate of competency 
class 4 (COC IIII) as a 3rd officer, he will be given 60 per cent. Therefore, the pilot 
is evaluated as 20 per cent at minimum and 80 per cent at second minimum 
requirement. 
3- If the pilot holds an approved diploma with an approved certificate of competency 
class 3 (COC III) as a 2nd officer or BSc with an approved (COC IIII) as a 3rd officer, 
then he will be given 70 per cent. Therefore, the pilot is evaluated as 80 per cent at 
second minimum requirement and 20 per cent on average, which represent the third 
requirement. 
4- If the pilot holds an approved diploma with an approved certificate of competency 
class 2 (COC II) as a 1st officer or BSc with an approved (COC III) as a 2nd officer, 
then he will be given 80%. Therefore, the pilot is evaluated as 80 per cent average 
and 20 per cent second higher requirement. 
5- If the pilot holds an approved diploma with an approved certificate of competency 
class 1 (COC I) as a master mariner or BSc with an approved (COC II) as a 1st 
officer, then he will be given 90%. Therefore, the pilot is evaluated as 80 per cent 
second required qualification and 20 per cent uppermost. 
6- If the pilot holds an approved BSc with an approved (COC I) as a master mariner, 





According to the given pilots’ information, with reference to the above rules, Pilot 1's 
TP-QPL is assessed based on his QPL as follows: 
𝑄𝑃?̃?𝑝1
= {(𝑈𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑜𝑠𝑡, 0.2), (𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑑 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑒𝑟, 0.8), (𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒, 0), (𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑑 𝑀𝑖𝑛. , 0), (𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑚𝑢𝑚. ,0)} 
The harbour masters at this port have agreed to the fuzzy rules in Table (6.25) for 
mapping pilots’ QPL to its associated criterion, TP, in order to assess pilot reliability based 
on QPL. 
 






𝑅1: if QPL assessed ‘Uppermost’, then 100% ‘V. Good’  
𝑅2: if QPL assessed ‘2nd  Higher’, then 80% ‘Good’ and 20% ‘V. Good’  
𝑅3: if QPL assessed ‘Average’, then 80% ‘Average’ and 20% ‘Good’ 
𝑅4: if QPL assessed ‘2nd  Min.’, then 90% ‘Low’ and 10% ‘Average’ 
𝑅5: if QPL assessed ‘Min’, then 100% ‘Basic’ 
 
 
The fuzzy outputs from mapping QPL to TP, conducted based on given information for 
Pilot 1 and subject to fuzzy rules in Table 6.25, are as follow:  
Based on 𝑅1 and 𝑅2, the result can transform into 0.36 V. Good (𝑂1 = (0.2 × 1) + (0.8 ×
0.2)), and 0.64 Good (𝑂2 = 0.8 × 0.8), respectively. Therefore, the QPL for Pilot 1 is 
assessed as follows: 
𝑇𝑃 − 𝑄𝑃𝐿𝑝1 = {(𝑉. 𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑, 0.36), (𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑, 0.64), (𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒, 0), (𝐿𝑜𝑤, 0), (𝐵𝑎𝑠𝑖𝑐, 0)} 
 
6.4.3.2 Pilot’s special training (TP-ST) 
Similar to the requirements of pilot qualifications required by the port authority, there 
are sets of minimum basic training courses that are also essential for a pilot to be endorsed. 
According to the port authority requirements, the following are compulsory basic training 
courses that a pilot must have when applying for a pilotage licence: 
1- Proficiency in Survival Craft (PSC); 
2- Personal Survival Technique (PST); 
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3- Fire Prevention and Firefighting (FPF); 
4- Elementary First Aid (EFA);  
5- Advanced Fire Prevention and Firefighting (AFF). 
 
The authority also recommends some extra training courses, but they are optional. 
These extra courses are: 
1- Global Maritime Distress and Safety System (GMDSS) training;  
2- Radar simulation training; 
3- Advanced Pilot Training (APT) course; 
4- Bridge Resource Management (BRM) training course;  
5- Port State Control (PSC) training;  
6- Ship-handling simulator. 
 
According to the experts’ opinions, having valid course certificates for more than nine 
courses makes one a ‘well-trained’ pilot. This information helps in developing the 
membership function used to evaluate pilots based on their ST. Accordingly, if the pilot 
holds one of these certificates, then 10 per cent will be given for each valid certificate; if 
the certificate is not valid, then 0 per cent is given. Based on the pilot’s given information 
in the test case, the following are the training courses that Pilot 1 has: 
1- Proficiency in survival craft (PSC) (Valid); 
2- Personal survival technique (PST) (Valid); 
3- Fire prevention and firefighting (FPFF) (Valid); 
4- Elementary first aid (EFA) (not valid); 
5- Advanced fire prevention and firefighting certificate (AFF) (Valid);  
6- Ship-handling simulator certificate (not valid); 
246 
 
7- Global Maritime Distress and Safety System (GMDSS) certificate (Valid);  
8- Advanced Pilot Training (APT) certificate (Valid);  
9- Bridge Resource Management (BRM) training course (Valid). 
 
Based on the pilot’s stated valid training certificates, 70 per cent is given to Pilot 1. The 
membership function model constructed is shown in Figure (6.5). 
 
  
 Figure 6.5. The membership function for Pilot 1's special training (TP-ST) 
 
The horizontal axis represents the quantitative number, while the vertical axis 
represents the belief degrees. When a given quantitative number is found not ranging 
between two different grades, then 100 per cent will be given. According to the given pilot's 
information, with reference to the above information, Pilot 1's TP-ST is assessed based on 
his ST as follows: 
𝑆?̃?p1 = {(𝑊𝑒𝑙𝑙 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑑, 0), (𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑑, 0), (𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒, 1), (𝐿𝑜𝑤, 0), (𝐵𝑎𝑠𝑖𝑐, 0)} 
The harbour masters at this port have agreed to the fuzzy rules in Table (6.26) for 












𝑅1:  if ST assessed ‘Well Trained’, then 100% ‘V. Good’  
𝑅2: if ST assessed ‘Trained’, then 80% ‘Good’ and 20% ‘V. Good’  
𝑅3: if ST assessed ‘Average’, then 80% ‘Average’ and 20% ‘Good’ 
𝑅4: if ST assessed ‘Low’, then 80% ‘Low’ and 20% ‘Average’ 
𝑅5: if ST assessed ‘Basic’, then 100% ‘Basic’ 
 
The fuzzy outputs from mapping ST to TP, conducted based on given information for 
Pilot 1 and subject to fuzzy rules in Table 6.26, are as follows:  
Based on 𝑅3 the result can transform into 0.20 Good (𝑂2 =  0.2 × 1), and 0.80 Average 
(𝑂3 = 1 × 0.8), respectively. Therefore, the ST for Pilot 1 is assessed as follows: 
𝑇𝑃 − 𝑆𝑇𝑝1 = {(𝑉. 𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑, 0), (𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑, 0.20), (𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒, 0.80), (𝐿𝑜𝑤, 0), (𝐵𝑎𝑠𝑖𝑐, 0)} 
 
6.4.3.3 Pilot’s working experience (TP-WEx) 
According to the given pilots’ information, a membership function model can be 
constructed based on the number of years served as a pilot, as shown in Figure (6.6). 
 
  
 Figure 6.6. The membership function for Pilot 1's working experience (TP-WEx) 
 
The horizontal axis represents the quantitative number, while the vertical axis 
represents the belief degrees. When a given quantitative number is found in the range of 
ℎ𝑛+1,𝑖(with a grade 𝐻𝑛+1) and ℎ𝑛,𝑖(with a grade 𝐻𝑛), the belief degree can be calculated 






 , if ℎ𝑛,𝑖 < ℎ𝑖 < ℎ𝑛+1,𝑖  
𝛽𝑛+1,𝑖 = 1 − 𝛽𝑛,𝑖 
Where, 𝛽𝑛,𝑖 is the degree of belief of the given quantitative number with the grade 𝐻𝑛+1. 
Based on the given information from Pilot 1, the degree of belief for Pilot’s 1 TP-WEx can 
be calculated as follows: 
1- 𝐻𝑛+1 is the ‘Average’ grade. 
2- 𝐻𝑛 is the ‘Low’ grade. 
3- ℎ𝑖= 6, ℎ𝑛,𝑖= 5, and ℎ𝑛+1,𝑖= 10. 
4- 𝛽𝑛,𝑖 = (10-6)/(10-5) = 0.8 with the ‘Low’ grade, and 𝛽𝑛+1,𝑖 = 1-0.8 = 0.2 with the 
‘Average’ grade. 
Therefore, the assessment of Pilot 1's TP-WExs is as follows: 
𝑊𝐸?̃?𝑝1 = {(𝑉.𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ, 0), (𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ, 0), (𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒, 0.2), (𝐿𝑜𝑤, 0.8), (𝑉. 𝐿𝑜𝑤, 0)} 
The harbour masters at this port have agreed to the fuzzy rules on Table (6.27) for 
mapping pilots’ WEx to its associated criterion, TP, in order to assess pilot reliability based 
on WEx. 
 






𝑅1: if WEx assessed ‘Very High’, then 100% ‘V. Good’  
𝑅2: if WEx assessed ‘High’, then 80% ‘Good’ and 20% ‘V. Good’  
𝑅3: if WEx assessed ‘Average’, then 80% ‘Average’ and 20% ‘Good’ 
𝑅4: if WEx assessed ‘Low’, then 90% ‘Low’ and 10% ‘Average’ 
𝑅5: if WEx assessed ‘V. Low’, then 100% ‘Basic’ 
 
 
The fuzzy outputs from mapping WEx to TP, conducted based on given information 
for Pilot 1 and subject to fuzzy rules on Table 6.27, are as follows:  
Based on 𝑅3 and 𝑅4  the result can transform into 0.04 Good (𝑂2 =  0.2 × 0.2 ), 0.24 
Average (𝑂3 = (0.2 × 0.8) + (0.8 × 0.1)), and 0.72 Low (𝑂4 =  0.8 × 0.9) respectively. 
Therefore, the WEx for Pilot 1 is assessed as follows: 
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𝑇𝑃 − 𝑊𝐸𝑥𝑝1 = {(𝑉. Good, 0), (Good, 0.04), (𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒, 0.24), (𝐿𝑜𝑤, 0.72), (𝐵𝑎𝑠𝑖𝑐, 0)} 
 
6.4.3.4 Pilot’s age 
Due to the difficulty of how to assign a degree of belief to a pilot’s age, a range of 
assessments were proposed. Based on the experts’ opinions, that the membership function 
can be utilised in order to transform the grade for given quantitative data into a qualitative 
degree of beliefs, with reference to a study conducted by Riahi et al. (2012), the following 
rules were used: 
1- If the pilot is 60 years old, he is considered ‘Very old’. 
2- If the pilot is 50 years old, he is considered ‘Old’. 
3- If the pilot is 40 years old, he is considered ‘Mid-Aged’. 
4- If the pilot is 30 years old, he is considered ‘Young’. 
5- If the pilot is 20 years old, he is considered ‘Very Young’. 
 
Based on the information from each pilot, the membership function on Figure (6.7) 
represents the assessment F&S-OA of Pilot 1.  
 
 




The horizontal axis represents the quantitative number, while the vertical axis 
represents the belief degrees. When a given quantitative number is found in the range of 
ℎ𝑛+1,𝑖(with a grade 𝐻𝑛+1) and ℎ𝑛,𝑖(with a grade 𝐻𝑛), the belief degree can be calculated 




 , if ℎ𝑛,𝑖 < ℎ𝑖 < ℎ𝑛+1,𝑖  
𝛽𝑛+1,𝑖 = 1 − 𝛽𝑛,𝑖 
Where, 𝛽𝑛,𝑖 is the degree of belief of the given quantitative number with the grade 𝐻𝑛+1. 
Based on the given information from Pilot 1, the degree of belief for Pilot 1's F&S-OA can 
be calculated as follows: 
1- 𝐻𝑛+1 is the ‘Mid Aged’ grade. 
2- 𝐻𝑛 is the ‘Young’ grade. 
3- ℎ𝑖= 37, ℎ𝑛,𝑖= 30, and ℎ𝑛+1,𝑖= 40. 
4- 𝛽𝑛,𝑖 = (40-37)/(40-30) = 0.3 with the ‘Young’ grade, and 𝛽𝑛+1,𝑖 = 1-0.3 = 0.7 with 
the ‘Mid Aged’ grade. 
Therefore, the assessment of Pilot 1's F&S-OA based on their information is as follows: 
𝑂?̃?p1 = {(𝑉𝑒𝑟𝑦 𝑌𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑔, 0), (𝑌𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑔, 0.3), (𝑀𝑖𝑑 𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑑, 0.7), (𝑂𝑙𝑑, 0), (𝑉𝑒𝑟𝑦 𝑂𝑙𝑑, 0)} 
The harbour masters at this port have agreed to the fuzzy rules in Table (6.28) for mapping 
pilots’ OA to its associated criterion, F&S, in order to assess pilot reliability based on OA. 
 
Table 6.28. Fuzzy rule base belief structure for F&S-OA 
Operator Age 
(OA) to Fitness 
& Strength 
(F&S) 
𝑅1: if OA assessed ‘Very Young’, then 100% ‘Fit’  
𝑅2: if OA assessed ‘Young’, then 80% ‘Good’ and 20% ‘Fit’  
𝑅3: if OA assessed ‘Mid Aged’, then 90% ‘Moderate’ and 10% ‘Bad’ 
𝑅4: if OA assessed ‘Old’, then 80% ‘Bad’ and 20% ‘Unfit’ 
𝑅5: if OA assessed ‘Very Old’, then 100% ‘Unfit’ 
 
 
The fuzzy outputs from mapping OA to F&S, , conducted based on given information 
for Pilot 1 and subject to fuzzy rules in Table 6.28, are as follows:  
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Based on 𝑅2and 𝑅3 the result can transform into 0.06 Fit (𝑂1 =  0.3 × 0.2), 0.24 Good 
(𝑂2 =  0.3 × 0.8 ), 0.63 Moderate (𝑂3 = 0.7 × 0.9 ), and 0.07 Bad ( 𝑂4 =  0.7 × 0.1 ) 
respectively. Therefore, the OA for Pilot 1 is assessed as follows: 
𝐹&𝑆 − 𝑂𝐴𝑝1
= {(𝐹𝑖𝑡, 0.06), (𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑, 0.24), (𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒, 0.63), (𝐵𝑎𝑑, 0.07), (𝑈𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑡, 0)} 
 
6.4.4 Mapping main criteria to goal 
Following the aggregation process of all sub-criteria to their associated criterion, the 
main criterion can be further mapped similarly as above. The aggregation process of all 
sub-criteria is presented in Appendix II. Accordingly, the aggregated main criterion for 
Pilot 1 is as follows: 
𝑇?̃?p1 = {(𝐸𝑥𝑐𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑡, 0.02), (𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙, 0.1), (𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒, 0.37), (𝐿𝑜𝑤, 0.52), (𝐵𝑎𝑠𝑖𝑐, 0)} 
𝑃?̃?p1 = {(𝑁𝑒𝑢𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑙, 0.01), (𝑆. 𝐹𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑔𝑢𝑒𝑑, 0.29), (𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒, 0.31), (𝐹𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑔𝑢𝑒𝑑, 0.24), (𝑉. Bad, 0.15)} 
𝑁𝑇?̃?p1 = {(𝐸𝑥𝑐𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑡, 0.05), (𝑆𝑘𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑓𝑢𝑙, 0.19), (𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒, 0.57), (𝐵𝑎𝑑, 0.16), (𝑈𝑛𝑠𝑘𝑖𝑙𝑓𝑢𝑙, 0.02)} 
𝐹&?̃?p1 = {(𝑉. 𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑, 0.82), (𝐹𝑖𝑡, 0.15), (𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝐹𝑖𝑡, 0.03), (𝐵𝑎𝑑, 0), (𝑈𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑡, 0)} 
The harbour masters at this port have agreed to the fuzzy rules in Table (6.29) for 
mapping 














Table 6.29. Fuzzy rule base belief structure for Main criteria to PR 
Technical 
Proficiency (TP) 
to Main Goal 
(PR) 
𝑅1: if TP assessed ‘V. Good’, then 100% ‘Very High’ 
𝑅2: if TP assessed ‘Good’, then 80% ‘High’ and 20% ‘Very High’  
𝑅3: if TP assessed ‘Average’, then 80% ‘Moderate’ and 20% ‘High’ 
𝑅4: if TP assessed ‘Low’, then 80% ‘Low’ and 20% ‘Very  Low’ 
𝑅5: if TP assessed ‘Basic’, then 100% ‘Very Low’ 
Personal Fatigue 
(PF) to Main 
Goal (PR) 
𝑅1: if TP assessed ‘Neutral, then 100% ‘Very High’ 
𝑅2: if TP assessed ‘S. Fatigued’, then 80% ‘High’ and 20% ‘Very High’  
𝑅3: if TP assessed ‘Moderate’, then 80% ‘Moderate’ and 20% ‘High’ 
𝑅4: if TP assessed ‘Fatigued’, then 80% ‘Low’ and 20% ‘Very Low’ 
𝑅5: if TP assessed ‘Very Bad’, then 100% ‘Very Low’ 
Non-Technical 
Skills (NTS) to 
Main Goal (PR) 
𝑅1: if TP assessed ‘V. Good’, then 100% ‘Very High’ 
𝑅2: if TP assessed ‘Good’, then 80% ‘High’ and 20% ‘Very High’  
𝑅3: if TP assessed ‘Moderate’, then 80% ‘Moderate’ and 20% ‘High’ 
𝑅4: if TP assessed ‘Bad’, then 80% ‘Low’ and 20% ‘Very Low’ 
𝑅5: if TP assessed ‘V. Bad’, then 100% ‘Very Low’ 
Fitness & 
Strength (F&S) 
to Main Goal 
(PR) 
𝑅1: if TP assessed ‘Fit’, then 100% ‘Very High’ 
𝑅2: if TP assessed ‘Good’, then 80% ‘High’ and 20% ‘V. High’  
𝑅3: if TP assessed ‘Moderate’, then 80% ‘Moderate’ and 20% ‘High’ 
𝑅4: if TP assessed ‘Bad’, then 80% ‘Low’ and 20% ‘Very Low’ 
𝑅5: if TP assessed ‘Unfit’, then 100% ‘Very Low’ 
 
 Accordingly, the results obtained from the mapping process for Pilot 1 are as follows: 
𝑃𝑅𝑇𝑃𝑝1 = {(𝑉.𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ, 0.03), (𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ, 0.12), (𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒, 0.33), (𝐿𝑜𝑤, 0.41), (𝑉. 𝐿𝑜𝑤, 0.10)} 
𝑃𝑅𝑃𝐹𝑝1 = {(𝑉.𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ, 0.07), (𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ, 0.26), (𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒, 0.28), (𝐿𝑜𝑤, 0.19), (𝑉. 𝐿𝑜𝑤, 0.20)} 
𝑃𝑅𝑁𝑇𝑆𝑝1 = {(𝑉.𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ, 0.09), (𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ, 0.21), (𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒, 0.52), (𝐿𝑜𝑤, 0.13), (𝑉. 𝐿𝑜𝑤, 0.06)} 
𝑃𝑅𝐹&𝑆𝑝1 = {(𝑉.𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ, 0.85), (𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ, 0.13), (𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒, 0.03), (𝐿𝑜𝑤, 0), (𝑉. 𝐿𝑜𝑤, 0)} 
 
6.4.5 Weight assignment for each MPRI 
The degree of importance plays an important role in the assessment when using the ER 
approach. The criteria of MPRIs can be weighted using any of the techniques capable of 
determining the degree of importance of the criterion used for assessment. Local weights, 
which reflect the degree of importance of each criterion with its associated upper-level 
criterion, can be obtained using one of the weighting techniques, such as a simple rating 
method or pairwise comparisons (Yang and Xu, 2002). One of the most commonly used 
methods capable of addressing the local weight of each criterion is the AHP, which was 
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introduced by Saaty (1980). The AHP employs a unidirectional hierarchal relationship of 
the linear top-down form in the hierarchy, showing the degree of the relationship from the 
goal up to the bottom level in the hierarchy (Saaty, 1990). The ANP method is a non-linear 
approach used to identify the interdependencies among the criteria. It is also capable of 
determining the weight of each criterion in the more complicated interrelationships among 
them. The characteristics and calculations of the AHP and ANP were described in Chapters 
4 and 5, respectively. For further detail, please refer to chapters 4 and 5. The weights 
identified by these two methods are shown in Table 6.30. 
 
Table 6.30. Weight assignment and ranking 
Goal Sub-level MPRIs 
AHP ANP 















QPL 0.183 0.021 11 0.004 0.089 13 
ST 0.452 0.052 6 0.013 0.289 11 
WEx 0.365 0.042 9 0.028 0.622 10 
PF 
(0.186) 
WH 0.113 0.050 8 0.039 0.210 9 
WS 0.547 0.243 1 0.068 0.366 6 
WEnv 0.340 0.151 2 0.079 0.424 5 
NTS 
(0.606) 
DM 0.074 0.027 10 0.045 0.075 8 
SA 0.169 0.062 5 0.094 0.155 3 
CS 0.400 0.146 3 0.142 0.234 2 
T&L 0.357 0.130 4 0.325 0.536 1 
F&S 
(0.163) 
OA 0.111 0.008 13 0.008 0.049 12 
HI 0.204 0.015 12 0.091 0.558 4 
BS 0.685 0.051 7 0.064 0.393 7 
 ((TP: Technical Proficiency; QPL: Qualification and Pilotage Licencing; ST: Special Training: WEx: 
Working Experience), (PF: Personal Fatigue; WH: Working Hours; WS: Work Stresses; WEnv: Working 
Environment), (NTS: Non-Technical Skills; DM: Decision-Making; SA: Situation Awareness; CS: 
Communication Skills; T&L: Teamwork and Leadership), (F&S: Fitness & Strength; OA: Operator Age; 




6.4.6 Fuzzy set aggregation process 
The aggregation process is an essential process that helps to aggregate criteria to their 
associated upper criterion. This process is as essential part of the reliability evaluation and 
can be done with the help of the algorithms of ER. Based on the above mapping process 
for Pilot 1, the following section shows the synthesis of Pilot 1's personal fatigue sub-
criterion using the ER algorithms, followed by the synthesising of the basic criteria in the 
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hierarchal structure. This is done using a multi-criteria assessor software called an 
Intelligent Decision-Making Software (IDS), which was chosen due to its ease of use and 
its accessibility within the industry and academic research. The full aggregation process is 
presented in Appendix II. Please refer to Appendix II for the full explanation of all pilots. 
 
6.4.6.1 Evaluation of the pilot’s personal fatigue criterion (PF)  
The following is an example of how to aggregate three sets of information using the ER 
algorithms. Using ER equations, the aggregation process for personal fatigue (PF), in 
relation to the sub-criteria of working hours (WH), work stresses (WS), and working 
Environment (WEnv) and based on the information given by Pilot 1, is as follows: 
To aggregate the personal fatigue (𝑃?̃?) Sub-Criteria PF̃WH, PF̃WS, and PF̃WEnv using ER 
algorithms, we need to define the following: 
PF̃WH, which represents the sub-criterion Working Hours (WH); 
PF̃WS, which represents the sub-criterion Work Stresses (WS);  
PF̃WEnv, which represents the sub-criterion Working Environment (WEnv). 
Based on the given fuzzy information of WH,WS, and WEnv for Pilot 1, the aggregation 
process is as follows:  
𝑅PF̃WH = {(Neutral, 0.06), (S. Fatigued, 0.38), (Moderate, 0.56), (Fatigued, 0),(V. Bad, 0)} 
𝑅PF̃WS = {(Neutral, 0), (S. Fatigued, 0), (Moderate, 0), (Fatigued, 0.56), (V. Bad, 0.44)} 
𝑅PF̃WS = {(Neutral, 0), (S. Fatigued, 0.48), (Moderate, 0.44), (Fatigued, 0.08), (V. Bad, 0)} 
Weight has been given to each criterion using the AHP and ANP; the AHP gives the local 
weight, while the ANP gives the global weight. The global weight is then normalised and 
used in this section. In addition, the result using the AHP weight is obtained to compare the 
results. Accordingly, the global weights obtained by ANP are as follows: 




𝜔𝑊𝐻, is the global weight assigned for PF-WH; 
𝜔𝑊𝑆, is the global weight assigned for PF-WS;  
𝜔𝑊𝐸𝑛𝑣, represents the global weight assigned for PF-WEnv. 
Since the weights' sums are not equal to 1, they must be normalised. To normalise the 
weight for each criterion, divide the weight of each criterion by the sum of all criteria. In 
our example, the sum of WH, WS, and WEnv are as follows: 
𝜔𝑊𝐻 + 𝜔𝑊𝑆 + 𝜔𝑊𝐸𝑛𝑣 = 0.039 + 0.068 + 0.079 = 0.186. 
A normalised 𝜔𝑊𝐻= 0.039/0.186= 0.21. 
Similarly, 𝜔𝑊𝑆= 0.37 and 𝜔𝑊𝐸𝑛𝑣= 0.42 
When aggregating more than three criteria, we need to aggregate the first two criteria, 
followed by aggregating the result from the first two with the third, and so forth. The 
following is the aggregating process of the first two sub-criteria of PF, 𝑃?̃?𝑊𝐻, and 𝑃?̃?𝑊𝑆. 
𝑀1
𝑚 represents the subset𝑃?̃?𝑊𝐻, and 𝑀2
𝑚 represents the subset 𝑃?̃?𝑊𝑆. Using ER equation 
(6.6) can obtain the following: 
𝑀1
𝑚 = 𝜔𝑊𝐻𝛽1
𝑚,   where (𝑚 = 1,2,3,4,5) 
𝑀2
𝑚 = 𝜔𝑊𝑆𝛽2
𝑚,   where (𝑚 = 1,2,3,4,5) 
As a result, the following table is constructed: 
When,       𝑚= 1,  𝑀1
1= 0.21×0.06 = 0.01,   𝑀2
1= 0.37×0= 0 
𝑚= 2,  𝑀1
2= 0.21×0.38 = 0.08,    𝑀2
2= 0.37×0= 0 
𝑚= 3,  𝑀1
3= 0.21×0.56= 0.12,   𝑀2
3= 0.37×0= 0 
𝑚= 4,  𝑀1
4= 0.21×0= 0,    𝑀2
4= 0.37× 0.18= 0.20 
𝑚= 5,  𝑀1
5= 0.21×0= 0,     𝑀2
5= 0.37× 0.82= 0.16 
When 𝑀𝐻1  represents the individual remaining belief for M1
m , and 𝑀𝐻2  represents the 
individual remaining belief for M2
m; therefore, equation (6.7) can be applied as follows: 
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- 𝑀𝐻𝑊𝐻 = ?̅?𝐻𝑊𝐻 + ?̃?𝐻𝑊𝐻  
- 𝑀𝐻𝑊𝑆 = ?̅?𝐻𝑊𝑆 + ?̃?𝐻𝑊𝑆 
?̅?𝐻𝑊𝐻 , ?̃?𝐻𝑊𝐻 , and ?̅?𝐻𝑊𝑆?̃?𝐻𝑊𝑆  can be found by applying equations (6.8-6.9) as follows: 
- ?̅?𝐻𝑊𝐻 = 1 − 𝜔𝑊𝐻 =1- 0.21 = 0.790 
- ?̅?𝐻𝑊𝑆 = 1 − 𝜔𝑊𝑆 =1- 0.37 = 0.634 
- ?̃?𝐻𝑊𝐻 = 𝜔𝑊𝐻(1 − ∑ 𝛽1
𝑚5
𝑚 ) = 0.21× (1- (0.06+0.38+0.56+0+0)) = 0 
- ?̃?𝐻𝑊𝑆 = 𝜔𝑊𝑆(1 − ∑ 𝛽2
𝑚5
𝑚 ) = 0.37× (1- (0+0+0+0.56+0.44)) = 0 
- 𝑀𝐻𝑊𝐻 = ?̅?𝐻𝑊𝐻 + ?̃?𝐻𝑊𝐻  = 0.790+0= 0.790 
- 𝑀𝐻𝑊𝑆 = ?̅?𝐻𝑊𝑆 + ?̃?𝐻𝑊𝑆 = 0.634+0= 0.634 










′ ), and (?̃?𝐻𝑈
′ ), we need to find 𝑘 using equation (6.13): 































































 𝑘 =  (1 − (− + (0.013 × 0) + (0.013 × 0) + (0.013 × 0.205) + (0.013 × 0.161) +
(0.08 × 0) + − + (0.08 × 0) + (0.08 × 0.205) + (0.08 × 0.161) + (0.117 × 0) +
(0.117 × 0) + − + (0.117 × 0.205) + (0.117 × 0.161) + (0 × 0) + (0 × 0) + (0 ×








─ + 0 + 0 + 0.003 + 0.002 +
0 + ─ + 0 + 0.016 + 0.013 +
0 + 0 + ─ + 0.024 + 0.019 +
0 + 0 + 0 + ─ + 0 +








Then, before using equations (6.13-6.15) to find (𝛽𝑚) and (𝑀𝐻𝑈), we need to utilise 
equations (6.11-6.12) to find (𝛽𝑚′), (?̅?𝐻𝑈
′ ), and (?̃?𝐻𝑈
′ ), as follows: 
?̅?𝐻𝑈
′ = 𝐾(?̅?𝐻𝑊𝐻?̅?𝐻𝑊𝑆) = 1.08× 0.79× 0.63= 0.53   
?̃?𝐻𝑈
′ = 𝐾(?̃?𝐻𝑊𝐻?̃?𝐻𝑊𝑆 + ?̃?𝑊𝐻?̅?𝐻𝑊𝑆 + ?̅?𝐻𝑊𝐻?̃?𝐻𝑊𝑆) =  
1.08×[(0×0)+(0.79×0)+(0×0.63)]=0 
















































5𝑀𝐻𝑊𝐻) = 1.08 × [(0×0.16)+(0×0.63)+(0.79×0.16)]= 
0.14 















4 , and 𝑀12
5 for the first two aggregations. These will be used with the 
third aggregation similar to the above aggregation process. The following are the 
aggregation of the criterion WEnv with the aggregated result from WH and WS: 
𝑀12
𝑚  represents the aggregated subset of 𝑃?̃?𝑊𝐻, and 𝑃?̃?𝑊𝑆, while 𝑀3
𝑚 represents the subset 





𝑚,   where (𝑚 = 1,2,3,4,5) 
When,       𝑚= 1,  𝑀12
1 = 0.01,  𝑀3
1= 0.42×0= 0 
𝑚= 2,  𝑀12
2 = 0.06,    𝑀3
2= 0.42×0.48= 0.20 
𝑚= 3,  𝑀12
3 = 0.08,   𝑀3
3= 0.42×0.44= 0.19  
𝑚= 4,  𝑀12
4 = 0.18,   𝑀3
4= 0.42×0.08= 0.03 
𝑚= 5,  𝑀12
5 = 0.14,     𝑀3
5= 0.42×0= 0 
When 𝑀𝐻12  represents the individual remaining belief for M12
m , and 𝑀𝐻3  represents the 
individual remaining belief for M3
m, equation 6.7 can be applied as follows: 
- 𝑀𝐻𝑊𝐸𝑛𝑣 = ?̅?𝐻𝑊𝐸𝑛𝑣 + ?̃?𝐻𝑊𝐸𝑛𝑣  
?̅?𝐻𝑊𝐸𝑛𝑣 , ?̃?𝐻𝑊𝐸𝑛𝑣  can be found by applying equations (6.8-6.9) as follows:  
- ?̅?𝐻𝑊𝐸𝑛𝑣 = 1 − 𝜔𝑊𝐸𝑛𝑣 = 1- 0.42= 0.58 
- ?̃?𝐻𝑊𝐸𝑛𝑣 = 𝜔𝑊𝐸𝑛𝑣(1 − ∑ 𝛽3
𝑚5
𝑚 ) = 0.42× (1- (0+0.48+0.44+0.08+0))= 0 
- 𝑀𝐻𝑊𝐸𝑛𝑣 = ?̅?𝐻𝑊𝐸𝑛𝑣 + ?̃?𝐻𝑊𝐸𝑛𝑣  = 0.58+0= 0.58 










′ ), and (?̃?𝐻𝑈
′ ), we find 𝑘 using equation (6.13): 































































 𝑘 =  (1 − (− + (0.01 × 0.20) + (0.01 × 0.19) + (0.01 × 0.03) + (0.01 × 0) +
(0.06 × 0) + − + (0.06 × 0.19) + (0.06 × 0.03) + (0.06 × 0) + (0.08 × 0) + (0.08 ×
0.20) + − + (0.08 × 0.03) + (0.08 × 0) + (0.18 × 0) + (0.18 × 0.20) + (0.18 ×
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─ + 0.002 + 0.002 + 0 + 0 +
0 + ─ + 0.010 + 0.002 + 0 +
0 + 0.016 + ─ + 0.003 + 0 +
0 + 0.011 + 0.011 + ─ + 0 +






Before using equations (6.13-6.15) to find (𝛽𝑚) and (𝑀𝐻𝑈), we need to utilise equations 
(6.11-6.12) to find (𝛽𝑚′), (?̅?𝐻𝑈
′ ), and (?̃?𝐻𝑈
′ ): 
?̅?𝐻𝑈
′ = 𝑘(?̅?𝐻12?̅?𝐻𝑊𝐸𝑛𝑣) = 1.19× 0.54× 0.58= 0.37 
?̃?𝐻𝑈
′ = 𝑘(?̃?𝐻12?̃?𝐻𝑊𝐸𝑛𝑣 + ?̃?𝐻12?̅?𝐻𝑊𝐸𝑛𝑣 + ?̃?𝐻𝑊𝐸𝑛𝑣?̅?𝐻12) = 1.19 × 
[(0×0)+(0.54×0)+(0×0.58)] = 0 




















1 𝑀𝐻𝑊𝐸𝑛𝑣 + 𝑀3







2 𝑀𝐻𝑊𝐸𝑛𝑣 + 𝑀3
2𝑀𝐻12) = 1.19 × 






3 𝑀𝐻𝑊𝐸𝑛𝑣 + 𝑀3
3𝑀𝐻12) = 1.19 × 






4 𝑀𝐻𝑊𝐸𝑛𝑣 + 𝑀3









5 𝑀𝐻𝑊𝐸𝑛𝑣 + 𝑀3
5𝑀𝐻12) = 1.19 × [(0.14×0)+(0.14×0.58)+(0.54×0)]= 
0.09 
Accordingly, 𝛽1, 𝛽2, 𝛽3, 𝛽4, 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝛽5can be found using equation (6.14) as follows: 
















































 = 0 
As a result, the aggregation of PF criterion for the first pilot can be presented as follows 
(see Table 6.19): 
𝑃?̃?𝑃𝑖𝑙𝑜𝑡1 ={(1% Neutral), (29% Slightly Fatigued), (31% Moderate), (24% Fatigued), 
(15% Very Bad)} 
Utilising the IDS software, which can help elucidate the above example with other 





















 𝑇?̃?𝑄𝑃𝐿  
ANP 0.089 








0 0.04 0.24 0.72 0 
 AHP 0.365 
Aggregation result (ANP) 0.02 0.10 0.37 0.52 0 

















0.12 0.56 0.32 0 0 
AHP 0.365 
Aggregation result (ANP) 0.09 0.43 0.33 0.14 0 

















1 0 0 0 0 
AHP 0.365 
Aggregation result (ANP) 0.75 0 0 0 0.25 
Aggregation result (AHP) 0.32 0 0 0 0.68 
 
 
Table 6.32. Aggregation of Personal Fatigue (PF) sub-criteria 
Fuzzy output Weight 
Linguistic terms 
















0 0.48 0.44 0.08 0 
 AHP 0.340 
Aggregation result (ANP) 0.01 0.29 0.31 0.24 0.15 

















0 0 0.40 0.50 0.10 
AHP 0.340 
Aggregation result (ANP) 0.01 0.06 0.28 0.36 0.29 

















0 0 0.24 0.62 0.14 
AHP 0.340 
Aggregation result (ANP) 0 0 0.21 0.56 0.22 
Aggregation result (AHP) 0 0 0.26 0.59 0.16 
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Table 6.33. Aggregation of Non-Technical Skills (NTS) sub-criteria 
Fuzzy output Weight 
Linguistic terms 





















0 0 072 0.24 0.04 
AHP 0.357 
Aggregation result (ANP) 0.05 0.19 0.57 0.16 0.02 





















0.12 0.48 0.36 0.04 0 
AHP 0.357 
Aggregation result (ANP) 0.09 0.42 0.45 0.04 0 





















0 0 0.36 0.52 0.12 
AHP 0.357 
Aggregation result (ANP) 0.08 0.17 0.34 0.34 0.08 

















Table 6.34. Aggregation of Fitness & Strength (F&S) sub-criteria 
Fuzzy output Weight 
Linguistic terms 
















0.80 0.18 0.02 0 0 
 AHP 0.685 
Aggregation result (ANP) 0.82 0.15 0.03 0 0 

















0 0.63 0.34 0.03 0 
AHP 0.685 
Aggregation result (ANP) 0 0.70 0.28 0.03 0 

















0 0 0.72 0.24 0.04 
AHP 0.685 
Aggregation result (ANP) 0 0 0.85 0.13 0.02 







Table 6.35. Aggregation of pilot reliability (PR) main criterion 
Fuzzy output Weight 
Linguistic terms 








ANP 0.045 0.03 0.12 0.33 0.41 0.1 
AHP 0.115 0.09 0.22 0.46 0.19 0.05 
𝑃𝑅𝑃𝐹 
ANP 0.186 0.07 0.26 0.28 0.19 0.20 
AHP 0.445 0.04 0.15 0.15 0.31 0.36 
𝑃𝑅𝑁𝑇𝑆 
ANP 0.606 0.09 0.21 0.52 0.13 0.06 
AHP 0.365 0.16 0.33 0.39 0.08 0.03 
𝑃𝑅𝐹&𝑆 
ANP 0.163 0.85 0.13 0.03 0 0 
AHP 0.075 0.82 0.14 0.04 0 0 
Aggregation result (ANP) 0.16 0.21 0.44 0.13 0.06 








ANP 0.045 0.18 0.38 0.30 0.11 0.03 
AHP 0.115 0.09 0.23 0.30 0.30 0.08 
𝑃𝑅𝑃𝐹 
ANP 0.186 0.02 0.08 0.26 0.29 0.36 
AHP 0.445 0.01 0.03 0.13 0.30 0.53 
𝑃𝑅𝑁𝑇𝑆 
ANP 0.606 0.18 0.38 0.40 0.03 0.01 
AHP 0.365 0.15 0.33 0.47 0.04 0.01 
𝑃𝑅𝐹&𝑆 
ANP 0.163 0.14 0.58 0.25 0.02 0.01 
AHP 0.075 0.12 0.53 0.31 0.03 0.01 
Aggregation result (ANP) 0.15 0.38 0.37 0.06 0.04 








ANP 0.045 0.75 0 0 0 0.25 
AHP 0.115 0.32 0 0 0 0.68 
𝑃𝑅𝑃𝐹 
ANP 0.186 0 0.02 0.19 0.45 0.34 
AHP 0.445 0 0.03 0.23 0.47 0.28 
𝑃𝑅𝑁𝑇𝑆 
ANP 0.606 0.11 0.17 0.30 0.27 0.14 
AHP 0.365 0.18 0.27 0.31 0.16 0.08 
𝑃𝑅𝐹&𝑆 
ANP 0.163 0 0.08 0.76 0.10 0.05 
AHP 0.075 0 0.07 0.65 0.17 0 
Aggregation result (ANP) 0.10 0.13 0.34 0.27 0.16 
Aggregation result (AHP) 0.09 0.11 0.27 0.30 0.23 
 
 
6.4.7 Obtaining a pilot’s reliability using utility techniques  
The result obtained from the aggregation of the 4 main criteria for each pilot, as shown 
in Table (6.35), shows this is not a straightforward way to obtain a crisp reliability value 
for the assessed pilot. The utility technique used in this section aims to identify a single 
crisp value for the main level, which is the reliability of a pilot as the goal of this assessment 
model, by ranking the importance of every sub-criterion (Riahi et al., 2012). This will help 
when ranking each assessed pilot based on their reliability value. Using Equations (6.14-
6.19) to obtain the crisp number for a pilot’s reliability will allow the decision-makers to 
practically identify the utility value associated with the linguistic terms used to describe the 
degree of belief.  
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In Table 6.35, an aggregation process for Pilot 1's reliability is identified as follows: 
When using ANP weights: 
𝑃?̃? = {(Very High, 0.16), (High, 0.21), (Moderate, 0.44), (Low, 0.13), (Very Low, 0.06)}  
When using AHP weights: 
𝑃?̃? = {(Very High, 0.12), (High, 0.22), (Moderate, 0.27), (Low, 0.20), (Very Low, 0.19) 
The fuzzy terms used to express the goal use five linguistic variables, where the highest 
preference term used is Very High and the lowest linguistic preference used is Very Low. 
The utility value for assessing the reliability of a marine pilot can be identified using 
equations 6.16-6.21, when using ANP weights as 0.571, and when using AHP weights as 
0.476, as presented in Tables 6.36 and 6.37.  
 
Table 6.36. The reliability value for Pilot 1 using ANP weight 
𝑯𝒏 Very High High Moderate Low Very Low 





















 = 0.16+ 0.21+ 0.44+ 0.13+ 0.06= 1             𝛽𝐻 = 0 
𝜷𝒏𝒖(𝑯𝒏) 0.16 0.158 0.22 0.033 0 
The reliability value for Pilot 1 = ∑ 𝛽𝑛𝑢(𝐻𝑛)
5
𝑛=1 = 0.571 
 
 
Table 6.37. The reliability value for Pilot 1 using AHP weight 
𝑯𝒏 Very High High Moderate Low Very Low 





















 = 0.125+ 0.223+ 0.268+ 0.198+ 0.186= 1             𝛽𝐻 = 0 
𝜷𝒏𝒖(𝑯𝒏) 0.125 0.1673 0.134 0.0495 0 
The reliability value for Pilot 1 = ∑ 𝛽𝑛𝑢(𝐻𝑛)
5




All other utility value calculations for Pilot 2 and Pilot 3 can be found in Appendix II. 
For further details, please refer to Appendix II.  
By comparing the results obtained when using the utility value, the most eligible pilot can 
eventually be selected to conduct the pilotage service. This comparison must be conducted 
among the same pilotage rank. 
 
6.4.8 Sensitivity analysis 
To test the feasibility and the logicality of the obtained results, a sensitivity analysis  
based on the three axioms identified by Yang et al. (2009) is used. These three axioms are 
presented in Section (6.3.9) and aim to analyse how sensitive the outputs are when minor 
changes in input are applied. For the model to show it is robust and its inference reasoning 
is logical, then the sensitivity analysis must satisfy the three identified axioms. 
To conduct this analysis, the degrees of belief associated with the lowest preference 
linguistic variables used to asses each criterion of all sub-criteria for Pilot 1 presented in 
Tables (6.31-6.34) are decreased by 0.1, 0.2, and 0.3. Simultaneously, the degrees of belief 
associated with the highest preference linguistic variables are increased in a similar way 
(i.e. 0.1, 0.2, and 0.3). For instance, the degree of belief of QPL for Pilot 1 as shown in 
Table (6.17) (Excellent, 0.36, and Professional, 0.64) shows that when an increase of 0.1 is 
applied to the highest linguistic preference, the lowest preference is simultaneously 
decreased by 0.1. In this example, the linguistic preference of (Excellent) becomes 0.46, 
and (Professional) becomes 0.54. However, if the lowest preference linguistic variables are 
less than 0.1 (i.e. 0.04), then the remaining belief degree (i.e. 0.1-0.04 = 0.06) can be taken 
from the next preferred linguistic variable. For instance, the 𝑁𝑇?̃?𝑇&𝐿 for Pilot 1 on Table 
(6.33) shows the following evaluation: 
𝑁𝑇?̃?𝑇&𝐿 = {(𝐸𝑥𝑐𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑡, 0), (𝑆𝑘𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑓𝑢𝑙, 0), (𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒, 0.72), (𝐵𝑎𝑑, 0.24), (𝑈𝑛𝑠𝑘𝑖𝑙𝑓𝑢𝑙, 0.04) 
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The value of 0.04 is less than 0.1. Therefore, the next preference variable (i.e. Bad) will 
decrease by the remaining value of 0.06, resulting in the deduction of 0.1-0.04. As a result, 
the following is the evaluation of Pilot 1's 𝑁𝑇?̃?𝑇&𝐿following the above process: 
𝑁𝑇?̃?𝑇&𝐿 = {(𝐸𝑥𝑐𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑡, 0.1), (𝑆𝑘𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑓𝑢𝑙, 0), (𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒, 0.72), (𝐵𝑎𝑑, 0.18), (𝑈𝑛𝑠𝑘𝑖𝑙𝑓𝑢𝑙, 0) 
The result from the above process is applied in Tables (6.31-6.34) for Pilot 1, which is 
then presented in Tables (6.38-6.41). For all other pilots, the results obtained are presented 
in Appendix II. For further details, please refer to Appendix II. 
 




V. Good Good Average Low Basic 
𝑇?̃?𝑄𝑃𝐿 
Main 0.36 0.64 0 0 0 
0.1 0.46 0.54 0 0 0 
0.2 0.56 0.44 0 0 0 
0.3 0.66 0.34 0 0 0 
𝑇?̃?𝑆𝑇 
Main 0 0.20 0.80 0 0 
0.1 0.1 0.20 0.70 0 0 
0.2 0.2 0.20 0.60 0 0 
0.3 0.3 0.20 0.50 0 0 
𝑇?̃?𝑊𝐸𝑥 
Main 0 0.04 0.24 0.72 0 
0.1 0.1 0.04 0.24 0.62 0 
0.2 0.2 0.04 0.24 0.52 0 








Neutral S. Fatigues Moderate Fatigued V. Bad 
𝑃?̃?𝑊𝐻 
Main 0.06 0.38 0.56 0 0 
0.1 0.16 0.38 0.46 0 0 
0.2 0.26 0.38 0.36 0 0 
0.3 0.36 0.38 0.26 0 0 
𝑃?̃?𝑊𝑆 
Main 0 0 0 0.56 0.44 
0.1 0.1 0 0 0.56 0.34 
0.2 0.2 0 0 0.56 0.24 
0.3 0.3 0 0 0.56 0.14 
𝑃?̃?𝑊𝐸𝑛𝑣 
Main 0 0.48 0.44 0.08 0 
0.1 0.1 0.48 0.42 0 0 
0.2 0.2 0.48 0.32 0 0 










V. Good Good Moderate Bad V. Bad 
𝑁𝑇?̃?𝐷𝑀 
Main 0.36 0.64 0 0 0 
0.1 0.46 0.54 0 0 0 
0.2 0.56 0.44 0 0 0 
0.3 0.66 0.34 0 0 0 
𝑁𝑇?̃?𝑆𝐴 
Main 0.14 0.56 0.27 0.03 0 
0.1 0.24 0.56 0.20 0 0 
0.2 0.34 0.56 0.10 0 0 
0.3 0.44 0.56 0 0 0 
𝑁𝑇?̃?𝐶𝑆 
Main 0.14 0.56 0.27 0.03 0 
0.1 0.24 0.56 0.20 0 0 
0.2 0.34 0.56 0.10 0 0 
0.3 0.44 0.56 0 0 0 
𝑁𝑇?̃?𝑇&𝐿 
Main 0 0 0.72 0.24 0.04 
0.1 0.1 0 0.72 0.18 0 
0.2 0.2 0 0.72 0.08 0 








Fit Good Moderate Bad Unfit 
𝐹&?̃?𝑂𝐴 
Main 0.06 0.24 0.63 0.07 0 
0.1 0.16 0.24 0.60 0 0 
0.2 0.26 0.24 0.50 0 0 
0.3 0.36 0.24 0.40 0 0 
𝐹&?̃?𝐻𝐼 
Main 0.80 0.18 0.02 0 0 
0.1 0.90 0.10 0 0 0 
0.2 1 0 0 0 0 
0.3 1 0 0 0 0 
𝐹&?̃?𝐵𝑆 
Main 0.80 0.18 0.02 0 0 
0.1 0.90 0.10 0 0 0 
0.2 1 0 0 0 0 
0.3 1 0 0 0 0 
 
 
According to the above increment and decrement process, the utility value for the goals 
in accordance with these changes when using ANP and AHP weights are presented on 







Table 6.42. Alteration of the median of Pilot 1's reliability using ANP weights  
Sub-criterion 
Alteration of the median reliability value of a pilot due to the following decrease in 
the degree of belief associated to the lowest preferences linguistic term of the 
median fuzzy set of each sub-criterion 
Main - 0.1 - 0.2 - 0.3 
QPL 0.5690 0.5690 0.5690 0.5691 
ST 0.5690 0.5693 0.5695 0.5698 
WEx 0.5690 0.5707 0.5723 0.5739 
WH 0.5690 0.5701 0.5712 0.5723 
WS 0.5690 0.5734 0.5777 0.5821 
WEnv 0.5690 0.5738 0.5771 0.5803 
DM 0.5690 0.5696 0.5702 0.5709 
SA 0.5690 0.5742 0.5786 0.5831 
CS 0.5690 0.5742 0.5786 0.5831 
T&L 0.5690 0.6141 0.6548 0.6918 
OA 0.5690 0.5692 0.5693 0.5694 
HI 0.5690 0.5704 0.5715 0.5715 
BS 0.5690 0.5704 0.5715 0.5715 
 
 
Table 6.43. Alteration of the median of Pilot 1's reliability using AHP weights 
Sub-criterion 
Alteration of the median reliability value of a pilot’s duo to the following decrease 
in the degree of belief associated to the lowest preferences linguistic term of the 
median fuzzy set of each sub-criterion 
Main - 0.1 - 0.2 - 0.3 
QPL 0.4762 0.4763 0.4765 0.4766 
ST 0.4762 0.4784 0.4806 0.4828 
WEx 0.4762 0.4788 0.4813 0.4839 
WH 0.4762 0.4778 0.4793 0.4809 
WS 0.4762 0.5090 0.5415 0.5736 
WEnv 0.4762 0.4878 0.4948 0.5020 
DM 0.4762 0.4764 0.4767 0.4769 
SA 0.4762 0.4793 0.4820 0.4847 
CS 0.4762 0.4793 0.4820 0.4847 
T&L 0.4762 0.4884 0.4995 0.5097 
OA 0.4762 0.4764 0.4765 0.4766 
HI 0.4762 0.4763 0.4765 0.4765 







Figure 6.8. Model sensitivity output for Pilot 1 using ANP weights  
 
 
Figure 6.9. Model sensitivity output for Pilot 1 using AHP weights 
 
Following the proof of the effectiveness of the reliability model for assessing the 
reliability of marine pilots, Table 6.44 shows the reliability value for the given information 
for all involved pilots in this assessment using the ANP weights as this research considers 
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Table 6.44. The reliability value based on the main information 
 MPRI 
Reliability value 

















 TP 0.3875 0.6425 0.7519 3 > 2 > 1 
PF 0.4525 0.2825 0.2469 1 > 2 > 3 
NTS 0.5400 0.6725 0.4574 2 > 1 > 3 











TP-QPL 0.8400 0.6000 0.0000 1 > 2 > 3 
TP-ST 0.5500 0.3000 0.0000 1 > 2 > 3 
TP-WEx 0.3300 0.7000 1.0000 3 > 2 > 1 
PF-WH 0.6250 0.6250 0.0600 1 = 2 > 3 
PF-WS 0.1400 0.0800 0.3000 3 > 1 > 2 
PF-WEnv 0.6000 0.3250 0.2750 1 > 2 > 3 
NTS-DM 0.8400 0.5400 0.8800 3 > 1 > 2 
NTS-SA 0.7025 0.6700 0.8400 3 > 1 > 2 
NTS-CS 0.7025 0.5725 0.6375 1 > 3 > 2 
NTS-T&L 0.4200 0.6700 0.3100 2 > 1 > 3 
F&S-OA 0.5725 0.3925 0.1000 1 > 2 > 3 
F&S-HI 0.9450 0.6750 0.4750 1 > 2 > 3 




This study has presented a novel dynamic marine pilot reliability measurement tool that 
deals with MPRI's interdependence rather than independence. The proposed model shows 
an effective reliability measurement tool capable of predicting the reliability of a marine 
pilot. The distinct features between the AHP and the ANP are discussed in detail in 
Chapters 4 and 5. Due to variations between the methods, the reliability values are different. 
Using the information given in the test case, the reliability of three pilots was assessed 
based on the proposed MPRIs and the research methods. The reliability values for each 
pilot are presented in Table 6.44, showing the reliability value for each criterion and sub-
criterion. This table provides decision-makers with a diagnostic tool that highlights the 
most significant factors for mitigating degradation of the reliability level and further 
improving reliability. The decision-makers can identify the strengths and weaknesses of 
the selected pilot in terms of each individual MPRI. In our example of Pilot 1, based on the 
272 
 
model sensitivity output shown in Figure 6.8, the most significant criterion with the highest 
impact on pilot reliability during a pilotage operation was found to be teamwork and 
leadership skills, while communication skills, situation awareness, work stress, and 
working environment have equivalent effects on pilot reliability. On the other hand, when 
factors are considered independently, the model sensitivity output presented in Figure 6.9 
shows work stress to have the highest impact on pilot reliability, followed by teamwork 
and leadership skills, situation awareness, and communication skills. As aforementioned, 
this research proposed an MPRI to assess the reliability of a marine pilot in a holistic form. 
This approach recognises that MPRIs are interdependent and influence each other. The 
results reveal a difference in the evaluation due to the dissimilarity in methods used. 
However, the pilot’s reliability is not fixed and is subject to change depending on various 
conditions. 
The reliability value for Pilot 1 was evaluated as follows (Figure 6.10): 16 per cent Very 
High, 21 per cent High, 44 per cent Moderate, 13 per cent Low, and 6 per cent Very Low, 
with a reliability value of 0.5710. Pilot 2 was evaluated as (Figure 6.11): 15 per cent Very 
High, 38 per cent High, 37 per cent Moderate, 6 per cent Low, and 4 per cent Very Low, 
with a reliability value of 0.6316. Pilot 3 was evaluated as (Figure 6.12): 10 per cent Very 
High, 13 per cent High, 34 per cent Moderate, 27 per cent Low, and 16 per cent Very Low, 





 Figure 6.10. Reliability evaluation for Pilot 1 
 
 





 Figure 6.12. Reliability evaluation for Pilot 3 
 
According to the findings obtained from applying a decrement on the lowest preference 
(Table 6.42) and the sensitivity analysis shown in Figure (6.8), changing the conditions 
based on the mentioned highest-ranked factors enhances the reliability value of each pilot. 
For example, if work stresses, teamwork/leadership skills, and working environment are 
the main top three criteria that influence pilot reliability, changing the condition of these 
criteria by 100% towards the best grades for these factors results in the following new 
assessment:  
Pilot 1: 81% Very High, 12% High, 6% Moderate, 1% Low and 0% Very Low, with an 
overall reliability value of 93.15%; 
 Pilot 2: 69% Very High, 14% High, 16% Moderate, 1% Low and 0% Very Low, with an 
overall reliability value of 87.31%; and 
Pilot 3: 75% Very High, 10% High, 11% Moderate, 2% Low and 2% Very Low, with an 
overall reliability value of 88.70%. 
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However, the criteria also have an influence on one another. For example, if the pilot 
is working in a highly stressful working environment, his health level will degrade 
accordingly. In addition, if the working environment is bad, and the pilot is under stress 
due to prolonged working hours or working at night, his situational awareness will decrease 
due to limitations on thinking capacity resulting from fatigue, on top of other observable 
deteriorations in his health in some cases. Moreover, if the pilot has a high level of 
experience (i.e. is an expert pilot) with high qualifications and professional training, he is 
most probably older. However, although it was evidenced that, when a pilot gets older, his 
level of experience will eventually increase, his physical strength and health, in most cases, 
will naturally deteriorate accordingly, and his ability to think clearly will be affected. A 
port authority needs expert operators to conduct pilotage operations. Therefore, the port’s 
strategic planner must highlight requirements to improve pilotage operation reliability by 
considering the importance of the human reliability analysis in order to evaluate the factors 
that influence the level of operation efficiency and quality. 
To summarise, the objectives of this chapter have been achieved by assessing the 
pilotage operation’s reliability by highlighting the key elements that significantly affect a 
pilot’s reliability. The model has been validated, which offers decision-makers a suitable 
tool for predicting these factors in ample time. Therefore, the human reliability analysis has 
been found significant for operational safety, where the human element, due to dramatic 
developments in the shipping industry, has been found to be the main root of every accident. 
Further empirical studies are required to benchmark the reliability of a marine pilot by 
conducting more investigations in different ports and at different expert levels and ranks to 





7. Chapter seven: Discussion and conclusion 
 
 
7.1 Chapter summary 
This chapter discusses and summarises the achievements and contributions of the study, as 
well as study limitations and areas for further research. The chapter begins by discussing the 
achievements and methods used to achieve the stated research objectives. The chapter also 
highlights the contributions of the study. Finally, the chapter addresses the limitations of the study 
and recommends areas to be investigated by future research in order to enhance the developed 
reliability model. 
 
7.2 Research achievements 
This research is comprised of four main work packages. The main achievements, along 
with the research methods used, were highlighted in order to achieve the research stated 
objectives and that as follows: 
 
7.2.1 Obtaining objectives one and two 
The research objectives one and two aim to identify the key factors that shape marine 
pilot reliability based on the current operational practices to build a rational MPRI that 
enables decision makers to assess the reliability of a marine port pilot to ensure safer 
operational standards. These two objectives have been achieved in chapter 2 and 3. The 
marine industry is complex and highly dynamic in nature, and it is subject to a high level 
of uncertainty. Due to a lack of information and consensus on the main factors shaping the 
reliability of an operator, a qualitative based analysis was conducted via employing three 
different tools that prove its power in elucidating required information. These tools help to 
understand current operational practices and involve the expert in questions exhibiting 
their concerns in regards to their safety. Moreover, sequential exploratory mixed-method 
paradigms were selected subject to the nature of the required information and research 
objectives. Three qualitative tools were used to collect the required data, namely 
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operational observation, semi-structured focus-group interviews, and port accident data 
analysis. 
The reason to conduct a field observation was to investigate field experience, represent 
social activities, and understand social processes within the acquired field. Since the 
literature does not provide insight into the nature of the pilotage operation and the degree 
of interactions between various parties working there, the use of field observation has been 
decided upon to identify the main key operational players involved in the marine pilotage 
service. Moreover, this step helps identify the degree of interactions among these players 
to draw a full picture on how the operation is conducted and highlight the significant risk 
factors surrounding the operation. Five key operational players are involved in pilotage 
operations with various operational objectives and duties, namely shipmasters, pilots, tug 
masters, VTS operators, and harbour masters. However, this research mainly focuses on 
assessing the reliability of a marine port pilot, and the rest of the operators are left for 
further future investigations. 
The second tool for collecting the required data was applied through conducting semi-
structured focus-group interviews. The semi-structured focus-group interviews were found 
valuable to this research in terms of gathering the required information to build the 
assessment model based on expert opinions. It is ideal to explore the complexity 
surrounding the reliability of operators who are subject to daily influences that affect their 
performance, behaviour, and attitude at work. This can be achieved by encouraging 
participants to engage positively with the process of the research. Unlike any other research 
tools, this tool has some drawbacks which have been highlighted throughout the research 
process. Moreover, the researcher considered this issue via employing an assessment tool 
in the following chapter to confirm the outputs from the interviews. 35 pilots participated 
actively in the interview, and they were grouped into three groups. They freely offered 
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their opinions, and the interviews have been analysed. This analysis resulted in developing 
the first hierarchal pilot reliability model. This model was tested in the following work 
package to ensure the consistency of the identified criteria. 
The last tool used for collecting the data was accident data analysis. The main aim of 
this section is to promote the researcher’s understanding of the current organisational 
standards applied in daily operational practices. Accident investigation adds valuable 
insight into the current phenomena surrounding the operational practices that influence 
operator reliability. This approach makes vital contributions to this study by looking back 
on existing operational accidents to determine the facts surrounding the cause of an 
accident and identifying the contributory factors leading up to the event. In addition, 
accident investigation plays a fundamental role in meeting the objectives of this study and 
provides a clear overview of operational safety issues that imply urgent operational, 
managerial, and structural changes in the form of regulatory levels. This is done in order 
to improve future system safety and accident prevention through recommendations and 
corrective actions. Four incidents were overviewed, aiming to highlight the significance of 
these accident/incidents to the overall safety, describe operational practices, and discover 
the main contributory factors. Surprisingly, one of these incidents occurred during the field 
data collection, and the researcher was asked to get involved in the investigation. The result 
from this chapter achieves its aim and answers one of the main research questions of, ‘What 
are the main factors shaping the reliability of a marine pilot?’. Four main factors are 
detailed that are believed essential by the experts in shaping their reliability. Thirteen sub-
factors which work to shape these four main factors are also described. These factors were 
arranged in a hierarchy structure forming a marine pilot reliability index (MPRI). Although 
these factors are essential in shaping the reliability of a marine pilot, there are other factors 
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such as managerial and policymaker practices which remain essential in overall operational 
reliability. However, they are out of the scope of this research. 
 
7.2.2 Obtaining objective three 
The research objective three aims to examine the degree of consensus among experts on 
the selected factors and highlight the degree of importance of each criterion towards 
shaping the reliability of marine pilots. This objective has been achieved in chapter 4. The 
researcher has employed two research tools. The first was based on a confirmatory 
approach called the Delphi technique. The second tool, called the analytical hierarchy 
process (AHP), aims to find the degree of importance of a criterion with its associated 
upper criteria. The aforementioned approach helps cope with the drawbacks resulting from 
the interviews. During the interviews, each group was formed for interviews ranging 
between 10 and 12 pilots. The pilots formed different ranks, some being senior and some 
being junior. The seniors where highly experienced, and some of them were the supervisors 
of the group. This created, to some extent, an issue to encourage the juniors to participate 
proactively and be open to show their concerns freely due to feeling shy. This is one of the 
drawbacks of focus-group interviews. The Delphi approach was used to cope with this 
issue, as it gave the participants a higher level of anonymity throughout the investigation. 
This was done through a series of questionnaires sent out to experts electronically. In this 
research, two rounds were conducted. In the first round, 35 participants answered the 
designed and open-ended questionnaire to offer their opinions more freely concerning the 
identified factors. The aim of an open-ended questionnaire is to give the participant the 
opportunity to explain their selection or provide their beliefs around the identified factor. 
Moreover, agreement was achieved among participants through the first round with an 
acceptable inter-quartile range as per the method process. The second round aimed to 
return the questionnaire to the same participants, showing their individual answers along 
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with the group answers. This step sought to give the participant a chance to reconsider their 
answer. However, they were asked to give a reason for not changing their answer. The 
result shows a slight improvement in the results in the second round compared with the 
first round. 
The second method used in this chapter was the AHP. This method aimed to rank the 
identifiable criterion based on the experts’ opinions. The same participant involved in the 
interview and Delphi participated here, and the result shows that the marine pilot ranked 
as the first important key player involved in pilotage operations, followed by the tug master, 
shipmaster, harbour master, and the VTS operator. This can justify the significant role that 
pilots play in ensuring the safety of pilotage operations. Moreover, the investigation 
revealed that it is common that the shipmaster is over reliant on the pilot to conduct 
operations. This seems to be done to decrease the shipmaster’s operational stresses. 
Shipmasters are subject to higher operational demands (i.e. quick turnaround, loading and 
unloading, managerial process) which resulted in handing over the command to the marine 
pilot. The marine pilotage key players are subjected to higher levels of operational stresses, 
which are found to significantly influence their reliability. Other factors concerning 
organisational practices were found to be essential, and these were suggested for further 
investigation. Nonetheless, this issue complicates the operational environment to some 
extent, as it was found significant in maintaining operator reliability.  This is one issue 
noticed throughout the observation process in chapter three, and it was also left open for 
further future investigation. On the other hand, the participants ranked the identified four 
main criteria that were found central to shaping operator reliability as follows: personal 
fatigue (0.4451), non-technical skills (0.3643), technical proficiency (0.1154), and fitness 
and strength (0.0751) as first, second, third, and fourth respectively. The following outlines 
the beliefs of experts involved in this research about the degree of importance of these 
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main criteria in shaping their reliability. Factors constituting operators’ technical 
proficiency are: qualification and pilotage licencing (QPL), special training (ST), and work 
experience (WEx). These factors were ranked based on their degree of importance using 
the AHP method as special training (0.4518), working experience (0.3651), and 
qualification, and pilotage licencing (0.1832) as first, second, and third respectively. 
Similarly, factors constituting personal fatigue were ranked from highest to lowest as 
follows: work stresses (0.5472), working environment (0.3394), and working hours 
(0.1134). Moreover, factors constituting non-technical skills were ranked as follows: 
communication skills (0.3996), teamwork and leadership skills (0.3573), situation 
awareness (0.1690), and decision making skills (0.0740). Lastly, factors constituting 
operator’s fitness and strength are ranked as follows: body strength (0.6847), health issues 
(0.2041) and operator age (0.1112), respectively. It is worth mentioning that the AHP 
method was used to rank the MPRIs in accordance with their inner-dependencies among 
each other and with their associated upper main criterion. However, the degree of 
interdependencies among MPRIs are essential to the discussions with the expert. Therefore, 
chapter 5 has proposed a method that is capable of identifying the degree of 
interdependencies among MPRIs. 
 
7.2.3 Obtaining objective four 
The research objective four aims to identify the degree of interactions among the 
identified factors to enable the decision makers to predict the possibility of reliability 
fluctuations. This objective has been achieved in chapter 5, as the degree of 
interdependencies among MPRIs have been detailed. It was found that developing a 
network instead of a hierarchy helps decision makers to understand and identify the cause 
and effect relationship between criteria. Meanwhile, the hierarchal model allows decision 
makers to examine the responses between factors. The AHP method used in the previous 
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chapter can identify the interdependencies between factors only within the cluster, while 
the non-linear strategy can identify the degree of interdependencies among clusters and 
within a cluster. The non-linear strategy represents the ANP method. In this chapter, the 
researcher used a hybrid form method called FDEMATEL and ANP. This hybrid approach 
was used because it was difficult to quantify precise values when evaluating a complex 
system. Moreover, this approach allowed the researcher to easily divide a complex system 
into subsystems and then carry out an effective measurement. The objective behind the 
invention of FDEMATEL was to investigate and solve social complexity and intertwined 
problems in an uncertain working environment. This method has a structural approach that 
distinguishes between cause and effect, and developed an influential network relation map. 
Following the development of an initial direct relation matrix, normalising direct relation 
matrix, total relation matrix, and the identification of the threshold value, the direct and 
indirect relation between MPRIs were identified. Three of the main factors constituting the 
MPRIs have been identified as cause factors which influence the reliability of a marine 
pilot, while the fourth plays as an effect factor. Moreover, nine of the MPRIs have been 
identified as cause factors which influence the reliability of a marine pilot, while four of 
the MPRIs play as effect factors. Following this step, the researcher used an analytical 
network process (ANP) to reweight the identified factors based on the result of the cause 
and effect created by the FDEMATEL approach. The result showed the global weight of 
the MPRIs, which means that each sub-factor constituting the lower level of the MPRIs 
has a degree of influence on each factor in the developed indicator. Accordingly, the five 
highest important factors are teamwork and leadership skills (0.325), communication skills 
(0.142), situation awareness (0.094), health issue (0.091), and working environment 
(0.079). This can be interpreted as operator non-technical skills significantly shaping 
operator reliability. This is because the operation requires higher levels of interpersonal 
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skills to make proper decisions. This is in line with the recommendation of the IMO to 
implement a bridge resource management course for all pilots which can enhance theses 
skills. Moreover, the significance of the health issue was observed throughout the 
interviews, since this issue grows due to higher operational demands, stresses, and fatigue. 
The pilot must maintain an acceptable level of physical capability to conduct the operation. 
Some port authorities conduct a periodical physical assessment for pilots to evaluate their 
capability to conduct pilotage services, as pilotage services require a higher level of fitness 
and strength. In addition, working environment has a significant role in ensuring the 
reliability of a marine pilot at a higher level. This can be maintained through a series of 
managerial actions such as introducing learning opportunities, promotion, encouragement, 
and maintaining pilot scheduling.   
 
7.2.4 Obtaining objectives five and six 
The research objectives five and six aim to develop an effective systematic quantitative 
human reliability measurement tool and test it via conducting a real case study to assess 
the reliability of a marine port pilot and validate the proposed MPRI. Accordingly, an 
empirical reliability assessment was carried out practically. Based on the information given 
in the test case, three pilots were assessed based on the developed MPRIs and the use of 
the proposed method of fuzzy evidential reasoning (FER) based on a fuzzy rule approach. 
The proposed model is proven to be an effective reliability measurement tool capable of 
predicting the reliability of a marine pilot.  
The reliability values for each pilot were identified using a utility technique for each 
criterion and sub-criterion, which offers decision makers a diagnostic tool to highlight the 
most significant factors to mitigate the consequences of factors that degrade reliability 
levels. Decision makers can identify the strengths and weaknesses of the selected pilot in 
terms of each individual MPRI. The given example of Pilot 1, based on the model 
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sensitivity output when using ANP weights, the most significant criterion that has the 
highest impact on pilot reliability during a pilotage operation was found to be teamwork 
and leadership skills. Meanwhile communication skills, situation awareness, work stresses 
and working environment are showing an equivalent effect on pilot reliability.  
However, the pilot’s reliability is not fixed, and it is subject to change depending on various 
conditions. 
Table 6.44 presents findings on the overall reliability value as well as the reliability 
value for each main-criterion and sub-criterion for all assessed marine pilots which can be 
used for ranking the pilots, based on their reliability. A higher reliability value indicates 
that a pilot has a larger capacity to conduct the operation. The decision maker also has the 
ability to identify strengths and weaknesses of each pilot, based on his/her reliability value 
identified for each sub-criterion to improve the reliability of a pilot rationally. As shown in 
Table 6.44, Pilot 2 was ranked first, based on overall reliability value, followed by Pilots 1 
and 3, respectively. When the decision makers look at the sub-criterion, Pilot 3 was ranked 
first, based on his main sub-criterion TP, followed by Pilots 2 and 1, respectively. In 
addition, when looking at lower level criteria, variance on reliability values among the three 
pilots was evident. However, the decision makers were urged to give extra emphasis to 
criterion with higher degrees of importance, as obtained when using techniques such as 
AHP and ANP. In this study, for instance, the top five important criteria obtained by ANP 
were T&L, CS, SA, HI, and WS, respectively. In this case, for example, the decision makers 
may select the higher reliability value among experts, based on the top important criterion, 
which plays a significant role in overall marine pilot reliability. Moreover, the decision 
maker may provide extra support to the pilot to improve operational outcomes, based on 
the value obtained. 
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The top identified important criterion was T&L. The lower reliability value in this 
criterion among the pilots was given to Pilot 3, followed by Pilot 2, with the top being Pilot 
1. In this case, the decision maker may be involved in solving conflicts between team 
members. When Pilot 3 is involved in operations, it is essential to provide training, add 
another pilot to support this pilot, or even replace the pilot with a pilot with reliability value 
in this criterion. However, the significance of other criteria must not be neglected. Instead, 
the overall weighing and balancing of criteria must be conducted by decision makers to 
select the most appropriate pilot to conduct the operation.  
According to the findings obtained from applying a decrement on the lowest preference 
and sensitivity analysis, changing the conditions based on the mentioned highest-ranked 
factors enhances the reliability value of each pilot. For example, if work stresses, 
teamwork/leadership skills, and working environment are the top three criteria that 
influence pilot reliability, changing the condition of these criteria by 100 per cent towards 
the best grades for these factors results in the following new assessment:  
Pilot 1: 81 per cent Very High, 12 per cent High, 6 per cent Moderate, 1 per cent Low 
and 0 per cent Very Low, with an overall reliability value of 93.15%; 
Pilot 2: 69 per cent Very High, 14 per cent High, 16 per cent Moderate, 1 per cent Low 
and 0 per cent Very Low, with an overall reliability value of 87.31%; and 
Pilot 3: 75 per cent Very High, 10 per cent High, 11 per cent Moderate, 2 per cent Low 
and 2 per cent Very Low, with an overall reliability value of 88.70%. 
However, the criteria also have an influence on one another. For example, if the pilot 
is working in a highly stressful working environment, his health level will degrade 
accordingly. In addition, if the working environment is bad, and the pilot is under stress 
due to prolonged working hours or working at night, his situational awareness will decrease 
due to limitations on thinking capacity resulting from fatigue, on top of other observable 
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deteriorations in his health in some cases. Moreover, if the pilot has a high level of 
experience (i.e. is an expert pilot) with high qualifications and professional training, he is 
most probably older. However, although it was evidenced that, when a pilot gets older, his 
level of experience will eventually increase, his physical strength and health, in most cases, 
will naturally deteriorate accordingly and his ability to think clearly will be affected. A port 
authority needs expert operators to conduct pilotage operations. Therefore, the port’s 
strategic planner must highlight requirements to improve pilotage operations reliability by 
considering the importance of the human reliability analysis in order to evaluate the factors 
that influence the level of operational efficiency and quality. 
In summary, the objectives of this chapter have been achieved through assessing the 
pilotage operation’s reliability to highlight the key elements that significantly affect a 
pilot’s reliability. The model has been validated, which offers decision makers a suitable 
tool for predicting these factors in ample time. Therefore, the human reliability analysis has 
been found significant for operational safety. This is because the human element, due to 
dramatic developments in the shipping industry, has been found to be the main cause of 
every accident. Further empirical studies are required to benchmark the reliability of a 
marine pilot. More investigations could be conducted in different ports at different expert 
levels and ranks to determine the most effective practices and solutions for further 
improvements on identified weaker factors. 
 
7.3 Research contribution 
This research’s main contribution was forming a novel marine pilot reliability index 
(MPRI) aimed at assessing the reliability value for estimating, controlling, and monitoring 
operator performance as a complete system. The research framework is comprised of 
relevant tools and techniques that prove their capabilities to perform required assessment 
for measuring, evaluating, and controlling operational influences that affect the desired 
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functions of marine pilots. The study integrated assessments of personal and interpersonal 
aspects believed essential in shaping the reliability of a marine pilot in a complex working 
environment. The developed assessment models are believed to be powerful to assess the 
reliability and have been tailored to assess marine pilots. The model can assist port decision 
makers to prevent risks associated with factors affecting pilot reliability. Furthermore, the 
models work to find links between the featured factors to trace the initiatives of reliability 
degradation in the early stages. The developed model is believed to have the potential to 
enhance the awareness of decision makers in identifying potential risks associated with a 
highly uncertain and complex working environment.  
The originality and novelty of this work is due to the following: 
1- Highlighting the research and operational gap within port industries that urgently 
needs to be covered; 
2- Developing a holistic marine pilot’s reliability index through linking factors 
affecting human performance and finding the interrelationship between them as one 
set; 
3- Estimating the degree of influence among the identified MPRIs through providing 
an effective tool providing the local and global weights for each MPRI to measure 
the significance of that MPRI on operator performance; and 
4- Providing a novel quantitative human reliability assessment tool for decision 
makers to value the reliability of pilots within pilotage operations. 
 
The key achievement of these accomplishments was the synthesis among research 
methods via adopting qualitative assessment methods into several multi-criteria decision-
making approaches (Delphi, AHP, FDEMATEL, and ANP). The outputs are integrated into 
a decision-making technique (i.e. FER) to enable decision makers to improve the safety of 
pilotage. In addition, the sensitivity analysis was adopted as a widely recognised validation 
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method to measure the sensitivity of the developed model by performing a sequence of 
tests. Although it is not decisive, the framework provides a comprehensive reliability model 
to analyse human reliability comprising many approaches and techniques to facilitate the 
acquisition of quantitative and qualitative data in maritime engineering operations. 
 
7.4 Limitations and recommendations for further research 
A number of issues were raised throughout the research process. Some of these issues 
are analysed, described, and merged into the study. However, some issues could not be 
incorporated due to scope and time constraints. Also, the present research has 
conspicuously been exploratory, experimental, and correlational. In this regard, 
incorporated issues that were not covered in much detail are part of the suggestions that 
would be recommended for further investigations as follows. 
1- This research has focused on assessing the reliability of a marine pilot. However, 
there are other key players on marine pilotage services, such as the tug master, 
shipmaster, harbour master, and VTS operator. Each of these individuals has 
reliability shaping factors (Riahi et al., 2012) that must be considered in the first 
stage. To cope with this issue and to work in parallel with this investigation 
conducting a qualitative investigation is recommended to understand the nature of 
the factors affecting other key players. The variance on the selected criteria were 
found to vary, as the factors affecting VTS operator, for instance, are not similar to 
those affecting the tug master in terms of work place design and ergonomics. 
2- This research could be extended to cover wider experimental examination to 
identify more reliability shaping indicators. Moreover, the application of the Delphi 
method proved that increasing the number of participants will provide more reliable 
outputs that do not change over time. Therefore, it is highly recommended to cover 
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a wider number of participants with different cultural backgrounds in different port 
jurisdictions. 
3- The influence of other factors highlighted briefly throughout this investigation, such 
as cultural diversity, different port policies, management influence, safety culture, 
and privatisation, are recommended to be incorporated into the assessment as 
external factors affecting the reliability of the operation. 
4- The proposed methods are required to be assorted to the above recommendations to 
complete the whole picture of this work. Although these tools prove their 
applicability to handle the issue, more powerful tools may exist. 
5- The assessment grades used and the involvement of the subjective judgements have 
drawbacks. However, these drawbacks can be addressed by developing more 
rational and effective assessments for each of the identified criteria by taking 
previous assessments used across different industries for monitoring factors, such 
as fatigue evaluation and psychological degradation. 
6- The assessments have been conducted covering three pilots at the same port with 
wide variances in their abilities. However, it is recommended to address all pilots’ 
reliability within the port as well as across different ports, either within the same 
country, same pilotage jurisdiction, or in public or private ports to address further 
improvement needs to the industry. 
 
The human reliability assessment framework proposed for this research has the 
potential to facilitate a reliability assessment tool for port operations in a wider context. 
This framework must be appropriately tailored to study other topics indicated for 
further recommendation. The framework will also offer practical guidance outside of 
the maritime industry on steps to be taken in implementing an action plan for best 
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importance of all the attributes in the framework through pairwise comparisons technique. This 
step will take place after a consensus is achieved. This stage aims to weigh the proposed 
attributes. It is important to note that each questionnaire will be available for two weeks to the 
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with feedback for the second round, and so forth. The analysis process may take a month to 
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School of Engineering and Technology 
Liverpool John Moores University 
Byrom Street, Liverpool, L3 3AF 
Phone: 0044(0)1512312028 




whether you wish to participate. Through the link, and before you begin answering questions, 
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participate’, this will end the process without you seeing the questions. Although I will be 
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3. What will happen to me if I take part?  
I should be most grateful if you could kindly spare your valuable time to complete the 
accompanying questionnaire. The questionnaire takes a maximum of ten minutes of your time. 
This questionnaire covers factors that are associated with human reliability in pilotage. This 
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The development of a marine pilot reliability index (MPRI) within port pilotage operations 
 Please Circle as appropriate: 
Personal Information 
1- Name (optional): ………………………………….. 
 
2- Nationality: (e.g. British, Singaporean) ………………………………… 
 
3- Country of operation: (e.g. UK, Singapore) …………………………… 
 
4- E-mail: ………………………………………….. 
 
5- Gender: a) Male  b)Female 
 
6- Age Group: (20 – 29) (30 – 39) (40 – 49) (50 – 59) (60 or over) 
 
7- Current Position: (Trainee Pilot) (First Pilot) (Second Pilot) (Third Pilot)  
 
8- Qualification: (Diploma + Pilot Licence) (Third Officer + Pilot Licence) (Second Officer 
+ Pilot Licence) (Chief Officer + Pilot Licence) (Master Mariner + Pilot Licence) 
 
9- Experience as a pilot: (0 – 5 Years) (6 – 10 Years) (11 – 15 Years) (16 – 20 Years) (20 
Years and over) 
 
Questionnaire 
The aim of this questionnaire is to identify how significant are the different reliability indexes that 
influence the marine pilot's reliability during the port pilotage operation based on experts’ opinions. 
 
It is important to be aware of that, the following identified factors have been selected carefully after 
an intensive literature review of different disciplines. The links between these factors can be easily 
observed. For instance, the way that an operator can make an operational decision to proceed with 
the most optimum solution: this requires higher teamwork efficiency and enough experience in the 
field, supported by the appropriate training and qualifications that help enhance the operator’s 
situation awareness and reduce the risk of stresses, and so forth. What is behind this questionnaire 
then is to see the applicability of these selected factors when applied within a marine pilotage 
operation as a novel method to predict pilotage operation reliability and efficiency. 
 
Therefore, based on your experience, kindly rate the level of significance of the reliability indexes 
described below to the overall operational reliability within a marine pilotage operation, using the 
following rating scale: 
 
‘1’ represents ‘Not at all important’ 
‘5’ represents ‘Extremely important’ 
 






Reliability Index Importance scale 
1. Technical Proficiency 
Not at all important < ------ >    
extremely important  
1.1 Qualification: A set of competences (educational level, 
licences and certifications) that exhibit his/her achievement in 
order to comply with the minimum work-related knowledge 
required to carry out certain duties. 
1 2 3 4 5 
     
Comment: 
 
1.2 Specific Training: A set of compulsory or additional work-
related courses and refresher training required to maintain the 
minimum operational standard. 
1 2 3 4 5 
     
Comment: 
 
1.3 Working Experience: The accumulation of knowledge or 
skills gained over time as a pilot. 
1 2 3 4 5 




Reliability Index Importance scale 
2. Personal Fatigue 
Not at all important < ------ >    
extremely important  
2.1 Working Hours: The number of working hours per day or the 
time of the day when the operator is carrying out his/her duty. 
1 2 3 4 5 
     
Comment: 
 
2.2 Work Stresses: Commercial and economic stresses, 
management stresses, work-related demand, high level of traffic, 
management style, etc. 
1 2 3 4 5 
     
Comment: 
 
2.3 Working Environment: Physical working environment, 
ergonomic design, the status of the operative’s environment. 
1 2 3 4 5 















Reliability Index Importance scale 
3. Non-Technical Skills 
Not at all important < ------ >    
extremely important  
3.1 Decision-Making: Encompasses a set of structural sequences 
that includes defining and diagnosing problems, generating 
options, assessing risks and option selection through different 
available alternatives, followed by an outcome review. 
1 2 3 4 5 
     
Comment: 
 
3.2 Situation Awareness: Is the perception of elements in the 
current situation through information gathering, followed by 
assessing the significance of the gathered information from 
different resources to form a clear picture to implement a 
procedure for the current operational event, and finally 
implement the necessary action to avoid an unfavourable event. 
1 2 3 4 5 
     
Comment: 
 
3.3 Communication Skills: Is the ability of a member to regulate, 
control, motivate, express feelings and convey information to 
other team members involved in an operation. 
1 2 3 4 5 
     
Comment: 
 
3.4 Teamwork and Leadership: Is the way to establish a clear 
two-way channel of communication, openness to criticism, 
empathy towards cultural diversity, capability to motivate people 
and develop a community atmosphere, cope with an operator’s 
limitations, and be a key team player. 
1 2 3 4 5 







Reliability Index Importance scale 
4. Fitness and Strength 
Not at all important < ------ >    
extremely important  
4.1 Operator Age: As an operator gains work-related experience, 
he/she is getting older. Operator age can indicate how the 
performance of an experienced operator changes over time. For 
example, a reduction in physical capacities and coordination, 
flexibility, strength and power can be expected when getting 
older. 
1 2 3 4 5 
     
Comment: 
 
4.2 Health Issue: This has been identified as a factor that is 
strongly associated with accidents at sea. It can be a result of the 
nature of the work, geographical location, stresses at work, 
prolonged working hours, commercial pressure and 
organisational culture as well as historic family illness. 
1 2 3 4 5 
     
Comment: 
 
4.3 Body Strength: Pilots are required to maintain a high level of 
body strength, as they need to climb a ladder from time to time, 
this will followed by a high level of cognitive demand required 
to guide the ship safely during pilotage operations. Any reduction 
in body strength will affect a pilot’s ability to work effectively 
and limits cognitive ability. 
1 2 3 4 5 















Before I start the second round of the Delphi survey, I would like to thank you so much for your 
participation in the first round; I deeply appreciate your opinion. Certainly, without your valuable 
opinion and support, this study cannot succeed. 
 
In the first round, I highlighted that this study facilitates a number of questionnaire rounds. The 
minimum number of rounds required to process the Delphi technique are two. Thus, I really 
appreciate you assisting me by participating in this second-round questionnaire. 
 
The second questionnaire round summarises the level of importance of each reliability indicator 
that was given by all the experts in round one. The main objective of this process is to give you, as 
a participant, the opportunity to reconsider yours answers if you believe it may be better to change 
them. 
 
The process for the second round begins by aggregating all the experts’ results, including yours. 
Although the results from the first round revealed a consensus state, all comments given by experts 
have been considered and revised. As a result, there is no additional reliability indicator to be added 
in the second round. 
 
The statistical results obtained from the first round are presented in this round in the form of three 
numbers and next, to each reliability indicator, the median (M), inter-quartile range (IQR) and your 
response (YRes) from the first round. For this research, a greater median indicates greater reliability 
indicator importance. A lower IQR indicates a higher degree of consensus among the participants. 
 
The developed reliability index (RI) for a marine pilot in this research will assist decision-makers 
in predicting changes in a pilot’s performance, in order to maintain operational efficiency; port 
management, in order to improve operational standards and procedures; and port authorities, in 
order to enhance the reliability of the marine pilotage operation. Thus, your valuable opinion and 
comment will significantly contribute towards developing the reliability index for a marine pilot. I 
would appreciate it if you could spare me your time and effort, if you agree to participate, in 
completing the second-round questionnaire. This questionnaire will be available for two weeks, 
ending on 31 Aug 2017. 
 
Thank you in advance for your participation, time and support towards the success of this study. 
Kindly feel free to contact me at the number/e-mail listed below, if you have any questions or 
problems in regard to this study. 
 
I look forward to hearing from you. 
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Atiyah A. Atiyah 
PhD candidate in Maritime Operations 
Department of Maritime and Mechanical Engineering 
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The development of a marine pilot reliability index (MPRI) within port pilotage operations 
 
 Please check your personal information below: 
 
- Personal Information 
 
1- Name : 
  
2- Nationality:   
 
3- Country of operation:   
 
4- E-mail:   
 
5- Gender: Male  
 
6- Age Group: (20 – 29) (30 – 39) (40 – 49) (50 – 59) (60 or over) 
 
7- Current Position: (Trainee Pilot) (First Pilot) (Second Pilot) (Third Pilot)  
 
8- Qualification: (Diploma + Pilot Licence) (Third Officer + Pilot Licence) (Second Officer 
+ Pilot Licence) (Chief Officer + Pilot Licence) (Master Mariner + Pilot Licence) 
 
9- Experience as a pilot: (0 – 5 Years) (6 – 10 Years) (11 – 15 Years) (16 – 20 Years) (20 
Years and over) 
 
- Delphi Questionnaire (round two) 
 
You have rated each reliability indicator described below in round one. However, if you think it 
necessary to reconsider your answers from round one, please rate how important you think this 
particular measure is to the overall level of a pilot’s reliability, using the rating scale 1 to 5, where: 
 
‘1’ represents ‘Not at all important’ 
‘5’ represents ‘Extremely important’ 
 
In round two, each reliability indicator is followed by three numbers, comprising the median (M), 
inter-quartile range (IQR), and your response (YRes) from round one. To achieve the goal of this 
study, the median score must be equal to 3.75 or more on every reliability indicator criterion in 
order to consider that the indicator has reached a suitable level of importance. For a reliability 
indicator to be considered as having reached a suitable level of consensus amongst the expert panel, 
the inter-quartile range must be 1.00 or less. If any of the reliability indicators meet the above two 
criteria at the same time, this means that the reliability indicator has reached a suitable level of 
importance and consensus. Finally, I have presented your response (YRes) score from the first 
round.  
 
In this questionnaire (the second round), you have been given the chance to reconsider your answer 
by comparing it to the average rating from other members of the expert panel or to rate it with the 
same score as you did previously. However, if your response from the previous round is shown to 
be outside of the median and the IQR resulting from the first round, then your response will 
highlighted in red. For instance, if the median of a reliability indicator scored 4, the IQR is 1 and 
your response was 3, then you will see the following: (M = 4, IQR = 1, YRes = 3). If you are still 
satisfied with your response, despite it being outside the IQR, I would appreciate it if you could 
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comment in the “Comment box” as to why you still consider it as an appropriate choice, despite it 
remaining outside the consensus range. 
 
Reliability Index Importance scale 
1. Technical Proficiency 
Not at all important < ------ >    
extremely important  
1.1 Qualification: A set of competences (educational level, 
licences and certifications) that exhibit his/her achievement in 
order to comply with the minimum work-related knowledge 
required to carry out certain duties. (M = 4, IQR = 1, YRes = ) 
1 2 3 4 5 
     
Comment: 
 
1.2 Specific Training: A set of compulsory or additional work-
related courses and refresher training required to maintain the 
minimum operational standard. (M = 5, IQR = 0, YRes = ) 
1 2 3 4 5 




1.3 Working Experience: The accumulation of knowledge or 
skills gained over time as a pilot. (M = 5, IQR = 0, YRes = ) 
1 2 3 4 5 





Reliability Index Importance scale 
2. Personal Fatigue 
Not at all important < ------ >    
extremely important  
2.1 Working Hours: The number of working hours per day or the 
time of the day when the operator is carrying out his/her duty. (M 
= 4, IQR = 0, YRes = ) 
1 2 3 4 5 




2.2 Work Stresses: Commercial and economic stresses, 
management stresses, work-related demand, high level of traffic, 
management style, etc. (M = 4, IQR = 0, YRes = ) 
1 2 3 4 5 




2.3 Working Environment: Physical working environment, 
ergonomic design, the status of the operative’s environment. (M 
= 4, IQR = 0, YRes = ) 
1 2 3 4 5 







Reliability Index Importance scale 
3. Non-Technical Skills 
Not at all important < ------ >    
extremely important  
3.1 Decision-Making: Encompasses a set of structural sequences 
that includes defining and diagnosing problems, generating 
options, assessing risks and option selection through different 
available alternatives, followed by an outcome review. (M = 5, 
IQR = 0, YRes = ) 
1 2 3 4 5 




3.2 Situation Awareness: Is the perception of elements in the 
current situation through information gathering, followed by 
assessing the significance of the gathered information from 
different resources to form a clear picture to implement a 
procedure for the current operational event, and finally 
implement the necessary action to avoid an unfavourable event. 
(M = 4, IQR = 0, YRes = ) 
1 2 3 4 5 




3.3 Communication Skills: Is the ability of a member to regulate, 
control, motivate, express feelings and convey information to 
other team members involved in an operation. (M = 4, IQR = 0, 
YRes = ) 
1 2 3 4 5 




3.4 Teamwork and Leadership: Is the way to establish a clear 
two-way channel of communication, openness to criticism, 
empathy towards cultural diversity, capability to motivate people 
and develop a community atmosphere, cope with an operator’s 
limitations, and be a key team player. (M = 4, IQR = 0, YRes = ) 
1 2 3 4 5 








Reliability Index Importance scale 
4. Fitness and Strength 
Not at all important < ------ >    
extremely important  
4.1 Operator Age: As an operator gains work-related experience, 
he/she is getting older. Operator age can indicate how the 
performance of an experienced operator changes over time. For 
example, a reduction in physical capacities and coordination, 
flexibility, strength and power can be expected when getting 
older. (M = 4, IQR = 1, YRes = ) 
1 2 3 4 5 




4.2 Health Issue: This has been identified as a factor that is 
strongly associated with accidents at sea. It can be a result of the 
nature of the work, geographical location, stresses at work, 
prolonged working hours, commercial pressure and 
organisational culture as well as historic family illness. (M = 4, 
IQR = 0, YRes = ) 
1 2 3 4 5 




4.3 Body Strength: Pilots are required to maintain a high level of 
body strength, as they need to climb a ladder from time to time, 
this will followed by a high level of cognitive demand required 
to guide the ship safely during pilotage operations. Any reduction 
in body strength will affect a pilot’s ability to work effectively 
and limits cognitive ability. (M = 4, IQR = 1, YRes = ) 
1 2 3 4 5 









Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP) Questionnaire 
 
In order to assess the marine pilotage service, weights assignment to each key players 
involved into the operation and for each marine pilot reliability index (MPRIs) plays an 
important role in the context of the assessment process. 
A critical characteristic of the AHP is the consistency of the answers obtained by a pairwise 
comparison. If the value of the CR showing of 0.10 or less, this confirms an acceptable 
level of expert’s judgement consistency. For your better understanding, the following is an 
example in how to conduct the survey. 
 
Example  
Part 1: Group A: If you think the first criterion, Marine Pilot is strongly important on 
influencing the Pilotage Operation Reliability than the second criterion Ship Master, and 
Tug Master is strongly important than the Marine Pilot, then the Tug Master is more 
important than the Ship Master, this can be tick as follows: 
 
Pairwise comparison 
Criterion High Average Low equal Low Average High Criterion 
Pilot 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2  1  2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Ship Master 
Pilot 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2  1  2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Tug Master 
Ship Master 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2  1  2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Tug Master 
 
NB: Please remember to mark only one number on either the left or right side of the scale of 
importance or just the middle of the scale which is equal importance. 
PART A: Weight assignments for main pilotage components 
For marine pilotage operation, there are five main key players involved into the operation: 
marine pilot (MP), ship master (SM), tug master (TM), vessel traffic service operator (VTS), 
and harbor master (HM). Please estimate its relative importance of each key players by 
following the pairwise comparison technique as illustrated above. 
 
Pairwise comparison 
Criterion High Average Low equal Low Average High Criterion 
MP 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2  1  2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 SM 
MP 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2  1  2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 TM 
MP 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2  1  2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 VTS 
MP 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2  1  2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 HM 
SM 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2  1  2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 TM 
SM 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2  1  2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 VTS 
SM 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2  1  2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 TM 
TM 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2  1  2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 VTS 
TM 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2  1  2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 HM 








PART B: Weight assignments for the main criteria of Marine Pilot Reliability Index 
(MPRI) 
For marine pilot reliability index (MPRI), there are FOUR main sub-criteria play 
significantly on shaping pilot’s reliability: technical proficiency (TP), personal fatigue 
(PF), non-technical skills (NTS), and fitness & strength (F&S). Please estimate its relative 




MPRI High Average Low equal Low Average High MPRI 
TP 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2  1  2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 PF 
TP 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2  1  2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 NTS 
TP 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2  1  2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 F&S 
PF 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2  1  2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 NTS 
PF 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2  1  2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 F&S 
NTS 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2  1  2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 F&S 
 
PART C: Weight assignments for the lower criteria of Marine Pilot Reliability Index 
(MPRI) 
1- For marine pilot reliability index (MPRI), Technical Proficiency (TP) is the first main 
criterion of in the MPRI. TP has three sub criteria: qualification and pilotage licensing 
(QPL), special training (ST), and working experience (WEx). Please estimate its 
relative importance of each MPRI’s by following the pairwise comparison technique 
similar as above. 
 
Pairwise comparison 
MPRI High Average Low equal Low Average High MPRI 
QPL 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2  1  2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 ST 
QPL 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2  1  2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 WEx 
ST 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2  1  2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 WEx 
 
2- For marine pilot reliability index (MPRI), Personal Fatigue (PF) is the second main 
criterion of in the MPRI. PF has three sub criteria: working hours (WH), work stresses 
(WS), and working environment (WEnv). Please estimate its relative importance of each 
MPRI’s by following the pairwise comparison technique similar as above. 
 
Pairwise comparison 
MPRI High Average Low equal Low Average High MPRI 
WH 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2  1  2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 WS 
WH 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2  1  2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 WEnv 
WS 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2  1  2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 WEnv 
 
3- For marine pilot reliability index (MPRI), Non-Technical Skills (NTS) is the third main 
criterion of in the MPRI. NTS has four sub criteria: decision-making skills (DM), 
situation awareness skill (SA), communication skill (CS), and teamwork & leadership 
skills (T&L). Please estimate its relative importance of each MPRI’s by following the 








MPRI High Average Low equal Low Average High MPRI 
DM 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2  1  2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 SA 
DM 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2  1  2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 CS 
DM 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2  1  2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 T&L 
SA 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2  1  2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 CS 
SA 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2  1  2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 T&L 
CS 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2  1  2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 T&L 
 
4- For marine pilot reliability index (MPRI), Fitness & Strength (F&S) is the fourth main 
criterion of in the MPRI. F&S has three sub criteria: operator age (OA), health issue 
(HI), and body strength (BS). Please estimate its relative importance of each MPRI’s 
by following the pairwise comparison technique similar as above. 
 
Pairwise comparison 
MPRI High Average Low equal Low Average High MPRI 
OA 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2  1  2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 HI 
OA 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2  1  2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 BS 












Interdependency evaluation on main four MPRIs Dimensions 
The following evaluations based on influence comparisons, kindly, based on your 
experience, use the following 5-linguistic scale to estimate to what extent each Dimension 
(A) affects Dimension (B); where:  
 
(0) NO Influence 
(1) Low Influence 
(2) Medium Influence 
(3) High Influence 
(4) Very High Influence 
 
This part aims to evaluate the causal relationships among the main four dimensions 
constituting the MPRI evaluation and selection framework (Technical Proficiency, 
Personal Fatigue, Non-Technical Skills, and Fitness & Strength) 
 Technical Proficiency (TP) includes qualifications and pilotage licensing (TP-QPL), 
special training (TP-ST), and working experience (TP-WEx). 
 Personal Fatigue (PF) includes working hours (PF-WH), work stresses (PF-WS), and 
working environment (PF-WEnv). 
 Non-Technical skills (NTS) include Decision-making skills (NTS-DM), situation 
awareness skills (NTS-SA), communication skills (NTS-CS), and teamwork & 
leadership skills (NTS-T&L). 
 Fitness & Strength (F&S) includes operator age (F&S-OA), health issues (F&S-HI), 
















  TP      HF 
TP      NTS 
TP      F&S 
PF      TP 
PF      NTS 
PF      F&S 
NTS      TP 
NTS      HF 
NTS      F&S 
F&S      TP 
F&S      HF 





 Interdependency evaluation on main 13 sub MPRIs main dimensions 
 
Based on the causal relationships between the main four dimensions, this part aims to 
evaluate the causal relationships among the sub-main dimensions identified above that 
constituting the MPRI evaluation and selection framework. 
Similarly, the following evaluations based on pairwise comparisons, kindly, based on your 
experience, use the following 5-linguistic scale to estimate to what extent each Indicator 
(A) affects Indicator (B); where:  
 
(0) NO Influence 
(1) Low Influence 
(2) Medium Influence 
(3) High Influence 

















TP-QPL      PF-WS 
TP-QPL      PF-WEnv 
TP-QPL      NTS-DM 
TP-QPL      NTS-SA 
TP-QPL      NTS-CS 
TP-QPL      NTS-T&L 
(TP-QPL: Technical Proficiency-Qualification and Pilotage Licensing; PF-WH: Personal Fatigue-Working Hours; PF-
WS: Personal Fatigue-Work Stresses; PF-WEnv: Personal Fatigue-Working Environment; NTS-DC: Non-Technical 
Skills-Decision-Making skills; NTS-SA: Non-Technical Skills-Situation Awareness: NTS-CS: Non-Technical Skills-

















TP-ST      PF-WH 
TP-ST      PF-WS 
TP-ST      PF-WEnv 
TP-ST      NTS-DM 
TP-ST      NTS-SA 
TP-ST      NTS-CS 
TP-ST      NTS-T&L 
(TP-ST: Technical Proficiency-Special Training; PF-WH: Personal Fatigue-Working Hours; PF-WS: Personal Fatigue-
Work Stresses; PF-WEnv: Personal Fatigue-Working Environment; NTS-DC: Non-Technical Skills-Decision-Making 
skills; NTS-SA: Non-Technical Skills-Situation Awareness: NTS-CS: Non-Technical Skills-Communication skills; 




















TP-WEx      PF-WH 
TP-WEx      PF-WS 
TP-WEx      PF-WEnv 
TP-WEx      NTS-DM 
TP-WEx      NTS-SA 
TP-WEx      NTS-CS 
TP-WEx      NTS-T&L 
(TP-WEx: Technical Proficiency-Working Experience; PF-WH: Personal Fatigue-Working Hours; PF-WS: Personal 
Fatigue-Work Stresses; PF-WEnv: Personal Fatigue-Working Environment; NTS-DC: Non-Technical Skills-Decision-
Making skills; NTS-SA: Non-Technical Skills-Situation Awareness: NTS-CS: Non-Technical Skills-Communication 

















PF-WH      TP-WEx 
PF-WH      NTS-DM 
PF-WH      NTS-SA 
PF-WH      NTS-CS 
PF-WH      NTS-T&L 
PF-WH      F&S-OA 
PF-WH      F&S-HI 
PF-WH      F&S-BS 
(TP-QPL: Technical Proficiency-Qualification and Pilotage Licensing; TP-ST: Technical Proficiency-Special Training; 
TP-WEx: Technical Proficiency-Working Experience; NTS-DC: Non-Technical Skills-Decision-Making skills; NTS-
SA: Non-Technical Skills-Situation Awareness: NTS-CS: Non-Technical Skills-Communication skills; NTS-T&L: 
Non-Technical Skills-Teamwork and Leadership skills; F&S-OA: Fitness and Strength-Operator Age; F&S-HI; Fitness 

















PF-WS      TP-WEx 
PF-WS      NTS-DM 
PF-WS      NTS-SA 
PF-WS      NTS-CS 
PF-WS      NTS-T&L 
PF-WS      F&S-HI 
PF-WS      F&S-BS 
(TP-QPL: Technical Proficiency-Qualification and Pilotage Licensing; TP-ST: Technical Proficiency-Special Training; 
TP-WEx: Technical Proficiency-Working Experience; PF-WS: Personal Fatigue-Work Stresses; NTS-DC: Non-
Technical Skills-Decision-Making skills; NTS-SA: Non-Technical Skills-Situation Awareness: NTS-CS: Non-Technical 
Skills-Communication skills; NTS-T&L: Non-Technical Skills-Teamwork and Leadership skills; F&S-OA: Fitness and 

























PF-WEnv      TP-QPL 
PF-WEnv      TP-ST 
PF-WEnv      TP-WEx 
PF-WEnv      NTS-DM 
PF-WEnv      NTS-SA 
PF-WEnv      NTS-CS 
PF-WEnv      NTS-T&L 
PF-WEnv      F&S-HI 
PF-WEnv      F&S-BS 
(TP-QPL: Technical Proficiency-Qualification and Pilotage Licensing; TP-ST: Technical Proficiency-Special Training; 
TP-WEx: Technical Proficiency-Working Experience; PF-WEnv: Personal Fatigue-Working Environment; NTS-DC: 
Non-Technical Skills-Decision-Making skills; NTS-SA: Non-Technical Skills-Situation Awareness: NTS-CS: Non-
Technical Skills-Communication skills; NTS-T&L: Non-Technical Skills-Teamwork and Leadership skills; F&S-OA: 
Fitness and Strength-Operator Age; F&S-HI: Fitness and Strength-Health Issue; F&S-BS: Fitness and Strength-Body 
Strength).(TP-QPL: Technical Proficiency-Qualification and Pilotage Licensing; TP-ST: Technical Proficiency-Special 
Training; TP-WEx: Technical Proficiency-Working Experience; PF-WH: Personal Fatigue-Working Hours; PF-WS: 
Personal Fatigue-Work Stresses; PF-WEnv: Personal Fatigue-Working Environment; NTS-DC: Non-Technical Skills-
Decision-Making skills; NTS-SA: Non-Technical Skills-Situation Awareness: NTS-CS: Non-Technical Skills-






































F&S-OA      TP-QPL 
F&S-OA       TP-ST 
F&S-OA      TP-WEx 
F&S-OA      PF-WH 
F&S-OA      PF-WS 
F&S-OA      PF-WEnv 
F&S-OA      NTS-DM 
F&S-OA      NTS-SA 
F&S-OA      NTS-CS 


















F&S-HI      TP-QPL 
F&S-HI      TP-ST 
F&S-HI      TP-WEx 
F&S-HI      PF-WH 
F&S-HI      PF-WS 
F&S-HI      PF-WEnv 
F&S-HI      NTS-DM 
F&S-HI      NTS-SA 
F&S-HI      NTS-CS 
F&S-HI      NTS-T&L 
(TP-QPL: Technical Proficiency-Qualification and Pilotage Licensing; TP-ST: Technical Proficiency-Special Training; 
TP-WEx: Technical Proficiency-Working Experience; PF-WH: Personal Fatigue-Working Hours; PF-WS: Personal 
Fatigue-Work Stresses; PF-WEnv: Personal Fatigue-Working Environment; NTS-DC: Non-Technical Skills-Decision-
Making skills; NTS-SA: Non-Technical Skills-Situation Awareness: NTS-CS: Non-Technical Skills-Communication 

















F&S-BS      TP-QPL 
F&S-BS      TP-ST 
F&S-BS      TP-WEx 
F&S-BS      PF-WH 
F&S-BS      PF-WS 
F&S-BS      PF-WEnv 
F&S-BS      NTS-DM 
F&S-BS      NTS-SA 
F&S-BS      NTS-CS 
F&S-BS      NTS-T&L 
(TP-QPL: Technical Proficiency-Qualification and Pilotage Licensing; TP-ST: Technical Proficiency-Special Training; 
TP-WEx: Technical Proficiency-Working Experience; PF-WH: Personal Fatigue-Working Hours; PF-WS: Personal 
Fatigue-Work Stresses; PF-WEnv: Personal Fatigue-Working Environment; NTS-DC: Non-Technical Skills-Decision-
Making skills; NTS-SA: Non-Technical Skills-Situation Awareness: NTS-CS: Non-Technical Skills-Communication 
skills; NTS-T&L: Non-Technical Skills-Teamwork and Leadership skills; F&S-BS: Fitness and Strength-Body Strength). 
 
 




Analytical Network Process (ANP) 
 
Interdependent weights assignment 
 
Part A: Weights assignment (main 4 Dimensions) 
 
There are 4 dimensions that influence a marine pilot’s reliability were identified: 
technical proficiency (TP), personal fatigue (PF), non-technical skills (NTS) and fitness 
& strength (F&S). Kindly, based on your opinion, estimate the relative importance of 
each dimension through the following pairwise matrices.  
 
1- Which dimension influences ‘Technical Proficiency TP’ more: ‘dimension A’ or 
‘dimension B’? and how much more? 
Pairwise comparison 
MPRI (A) High Average Low equal Low Average High MPRI (B) 
PF 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2  1  2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 NTS 
(PF: Personal Fatigue; NTS: Non-Technical Skills) 
 
2- Which dimension influences ‘Personal Fatigue PF’ more: ‘dimension A’ or ‘dimension B’? 
and how much more? 
Pairwise comparison 
MPRI (A) High Average Low equal Low Average High MPRI (B) 
TP 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2  1  2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 NTS 
TP 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2  1  2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 F&S 
NTS 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2  1  2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 F&S 
(TP: Technical Proficiency; NTS: Non-Technical Skills; F&S: Fitness and Strength) 
 
3- Which dimension influences ‘Fitness & Strength F&S’ more: ‘dimension A’ or ‘dimension 
B’? and how much more? 
Pairwise comparison 
MPRI (A) High Average Low equal Low Average High MPRI (B) 
TP 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2  1  2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 PF 
TP 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2  1  2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 NTS 
PF 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2  1  2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 NTS 




Part B: Weights assignment for the 13 MPRIs indicators 
1. With respect to the indicator qualification and pilotage licensing (QPL), which MPRI’s 
influences ‘QPL’ more: ‘indicator A’, or ‘indicator B’? and how much more? 
Pairwise comparison 
MPRI (A) High Average Low equal Low Average High MPRI (B) 
WS 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2  1  2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 WEnv 
(WS: Work Stresses; WEnv: Working Environment) 
 
Pairwise comparison 
MPRI (A) High Average Low equal Low Average High MPRI (B) 
DM 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2  1  2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 SA 
DM 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2  1  2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 CS 
DM 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2  1  2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 T&L 
SA 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2  1  2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 CS 
SA 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2  1  2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 T&L 
CS 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2  1  2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 T&L 
(DC: Decision-Making skills; SA: Situation Awareness skills: CS: Communication skills; T&L: Teamwork and 
Leadership skills) 
2. With respect to the indicator ‘special training (ST)’, which MPRI’s influences ‘output ST’ 
more: ‘indicator A’, or ‘indicator B’? and how much more? 
Pairwise comparison 
MPRI (A) High Average Low equal Low Average High MPRI (B) 
WH 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2  1  2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 WS 
WH 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2  1  2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 WEnv 
WS 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2  1  2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 WEnv 
(WH: Working Hours; WS: Work Stresses; WEnv: Working Environment) 
 
Pairwise comparison 
MPRI (A) High Average Low equal Low Average High MPRI (B) 
DM 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2  1  2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 SA 
DM 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2  1  2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 CS 
DM 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2  1  2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 T&L 
SA 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2  1  2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 CS 
SA 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2  1  2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 T&L 
CS 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2  1  2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 T&L 
(DC: Decision-Making skills; SA: Situation Awareness skills: CS: Communication skills; T&L: Teamwork and 
Leadership skills) 
3. With respect to the indicator ‘working experience (WEx)’, which principal MPRI 
influences ‘output WEx’ more: ‘indicator A’, or ‘indicator B’? and how much more? 
Pairwise comparison 
MPRI (A) High Average Low equal Low Average High MPRI (B) 
WH 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2  1  2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 WS 
WH 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2  1  2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 WEnv 
WS 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2  1  2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 WEnv 












MPRI (A) High Average Low equal Low Average High MPRI (B) 
DM 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2  1  2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 SA 
DM 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2  1  2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 CS 
DM 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2  1  2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 T&L 
SA 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2  1  2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 CS 
SA 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2  1  2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 T&L 
CS 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2  1  2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 T&L 
(DC: Decision-Making skills; SA: Situation Awareness skills: CS: Communication skills; T&L: Teamwork and 
Leadership skills) 
4. With respect to the indicator ‘working hours (WH)’, which MPRI’s influences ‘output WH’ 
more: ‘indicator A’, or ‘indicator B’? and how much more? 
Pairwise comparison 
MPRI (A) High Average Low equal Low Average High MPRI (B) 
DM 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2  1  2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 SA 
DM 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2  1  2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 CS 
DM 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2  1  2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 T&L 
SA 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2  1  2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 CS 
SA 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2  1  2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 T&L 
CS 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2  1  2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 T&L 
(DC: Decision-Making skills; SA: Situation Awareness skills: CS: Communication skills; T&L: Teamwork and 
Leadership skills) 
Pairwise comparison 
MPRI (A) High Average Low equal Low Average High MPRI (B) 
OA 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2  1  2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 HI 
OA 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2  1  2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 BS 
HI 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2  1  2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 BS 
(OA: Operator Age; HI: Health Issue; BS: Body Strength) 
 
5. With respect to output (WS), which principal MPRI influences ‘output WS’ more: 
‘indicator A’, or ‘indicator B’? and how much more? 
Pairwise comparison 
MPRI (A) High Average Low equal Low Average High MPRI (B) 
DM 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2  1  2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 SA 
DM 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2  1  2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 CS 
DM 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2  1  2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 T&L 
SA 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2  1  2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 CS 
SA 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2  1  2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 T&L 
CS 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2  1  2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 T&L 
(DC: Decision-Making skills; SA: Situation Awareness skills: CS: Communication skills; T&L: Teamwork and 
Leadership skills) 
Pairwise comparison 
MPRI (A) High Average Low equal Low Average High MPRI (B) 
HI 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2  1  2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 BS 











6. With respect to the indicator ‘working environment (WEnv)’, which MPRI’s influences 
‘output WEnv’ more: ‘indicator A’, or ‘indicator B’? and how much more? 
Pairwise comparison 
MPRI (A) High Average Low equal Low Average High MPRI (B) 
QPL 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2  1  2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 ST 
QPL 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2  1  2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 WEx 
ST 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2  1  2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 WEx 
(QPL: Qualification and Pilotage Licensing; ST: Special Training; WEx: Working Experience) 
Pairwise comparison 
MPRI (A) High Average Low equal Low Average High MPRI (B) 
DM 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2  1  2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 SA 
DM 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2  1  2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 CS 
DM 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2  1  2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 T&L 
SA 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2  1  2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 CS 
SA 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2  1  2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 T&L 
CS 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2  1  2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 T&L 
(DC: Decision-Making skills; SA: Situation Awareness skills: CS: Communication skills; T&L: Teamwork and 
Leadership skills) 
Pairwise comparison 
MPRI (A) High Average Low equal Low Average High MPRI (B) 
HI 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2  1  2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 BS 
(HI: Health Issue; BS: Body Strength) 
 
7. With respect to the indicator ‘operator age (OA)’, which MPRI’s influences ‘output OA’ 
more: ‘indicator A’, or ‘indicator B’? and how much more? 
Pairwise comparison 
MPRI (A) High Average Low equal Low Average High MPRI (B) 
QPL 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2  1  2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 ST 
QPL 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2  1  2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 WEx 
ST 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2  1  2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 WEx 
(QPL: Qualification and Pilotage Licensing; ST: Special Training; WEx: Working Experience) 
Pairwise comparison 
MPRI (A) High Average Low equal Low Average High MPRI (B) 
WH 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2  1  2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 WS 
WH 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2  1  2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 WEnv 
WS 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2  1  2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 WEnv 
(WH: Working Hours; WS: Work Stresses; WEnv: Working Environment) 
 
Pairwise comparison 
MPRI (A) High Average Low equal Low Average High MPRI (B) 
DM 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2  1  2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 SA 
DM 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2  1  2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 CS 
DM 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2  1  2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 T&L 
SA 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2  1  2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 CS 
SA 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2  1  2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 T&L 
CS 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2  1  2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 T&L 







8. With respect to the indicator ‘health issue (HI)’, which MPRI’s influences ‘output HI’ 
more: ‘indicator A’, or ‘indicator B’? and how much more? 
Pairwise comparison 
MPRI (A) High Average Low equal Low Average High MPRI (B) 
QPL 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2  1  2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 ST 
QPL 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2  1  2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 WEx 
ST 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2  1  2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 WEx 
(QPL: Qualification and Pilotage Licensing; ST: Special Training; WEx: Working Experience) 
Pairwise comparison 
MPRI (A) High Average Low equal Low Average High MPRI (B) 
WH 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2  1  2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 WS 
WH 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2  1  2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 WEnv 
WS 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2  1  2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 WEnv 
(WH: Working Hours; WS: Work Stresses; WEnv: Working Environment) 
Pairwise comparison 
MPRI (A) High Average Low equal Low Average High MPRI (B) 
DM 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2  1  2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 SA 
DM 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2  1  2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 CS 
DM 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2  1  2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 T&L 
SA 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2  1  2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 CS 
SA 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2  1  2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 T&L 
CS 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2  1  2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 T&L 
(DC: Decision-Making skills; SA: Situation Awareness skills: CS: Communication skills; T&L: Teamwork and 
Leadership skills) 
9. With respect to the indicator ‘body strength (BS)’, which MPRI’s influences ‘output BS’ 
more: ‘indicator A’, or ‘indicator B’? and how much more? 
Pairwise comparison 
MPRI (A) High Average Low equal Low Average High MPRI (B) 
QPL 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2  1  2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 ST 
QPL 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2  1  2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 WEx 
ST 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2  1  2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 WEx 
(QPL: Qualification and Pilotage Licensing; ST: Special Training; WEx: Working Experience) 
Pairwise comparison 
MPRI (A) High Average Low equal Low Average High MPRI (B) 
WH 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2  1  2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 WS 
WH 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2  1  2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 WEnv 
WS 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2  1  2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 WEnv 
(WH: Working Hours; WS: Work Stresses; WEnv: Working Environment) 
 
Pairwise comparison 
MPRI (A) High Average Low equal Low Average High MPRI (B) 
DM 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2  1  2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 SA 
DM 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2  1  2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 CS 
DM 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2  1  2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 T&L 
SA 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2  1  2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 CS 
SA 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2  1  2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 T&L 
CS 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2  1  2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 T&L 
(DC: Decision-Making skills; SA: Situation Awareness skills: CS: Communication skills; T&L: Teamwork and 
Leadership skills) 




Appendix II the application process of FER 
approach 
 
II.1 Pilot 1 
II.1.1 Aggregation process of MPRIs 
The synthesis of Pilot 1's personal fatigue sub-criterion using the ER algorithms has been 
demonstrated on section 6.4.6.1. In the following section, the aggregation process for the 
remaining lower criterion towards the main goal were described. 
II.1.1 Technical Proficiency (TP)  
The following is the aggregation process of pilot’s 1 TP, in relation to the sub-criteria of 
qualification and pilotage licensing (QPL), special training (ST), and working experience 
(WEx), based on the information given by Pilot 1. Using ER equations can applied as 
follows: 
Aggregating Pilot’s 1 TP Sub-Criteria TP̃QPL, TP̃ST, and TP̃WEx using ER algorithms, we 
need to define the following: 
TP̃QPL, which represents the sub-criterion Qualification and Pilotage Licensing (QPL); 
 TP̃ST, which represents the sub-criterion Special Training (ST);  
TP̃WEx, which represents the sub-criterion Working Experience (WEx). 
Based on the given fuzzy information of QPL, ST, and WEx for Pilot 1, the results from 
the mapping process are as follows:  
𝑅TP̃QPL = {(V. Good, 0.36), (Good, 0.64), (Average, 0), (Low, 0), (Basic, 0)} 
𝑅TP̃ST= {(V. Good, 0), (Good, 0.2), (Average, 0.8), (Low, 0), (Basic, 0)} 
𝑅TP̃WEx= {(V. Good, 0), (Good, 0.04), (Average, 0.24), (Low, 0.72), (Basic, 0)} 
The global weights obtained by ANP are as follows: 




𝜔𝑄𝑃𝐿, is the global weight assigned for TP-QPL; 
𝜔𝑆𝑇, is the global weight assigned for TP-ST;  
𝜔𝑊𝐸𝑥, represents the global weight assigned for TP-WEx. 
Since the weights' sums are not equal to 1, they must be normalised. To normalise the 
weight for each criterion, divide the weight of each criterion to the sum of all criteria. The 
sum of QPL, ST, and WEx are as follows: 
𝜔𝑄𝑃𝐿 + 𝜔𝑆𝑇 + 𝜔𝑊𝐸𝑥 = 0.004+ 0.013+ 0.028= 0.045. 
A normalised 𝜔𝑄𝑃𝐿= 0.004/0.045= 0.089. 
Similarly, 𝜔𝑆𝑇= 0.289 and 𝜔𝑊𝐸𝑥= 0.622 
The aggregation process of the first two criterion of TP, 𝑇𝑃𝑄𝑃𝐿 and 𝑇?̃?𝑆𝑇, are as follows: 
𝑀1
𝑚represents the subset 𝑇?̃?𝑄𝑃𝐿, and 𝑀2
𝑚  represent the subset 𝑇?̃?𝑆𝑇 . Using ER equation 
(6.4), can obtain the followings: 
𝑀1
𝑚 = 𝜔𝑄𝑃𝐿𝛽1
𝑚,   where (𝑚 = 1,2,3,4,5) 
𝑀2
𝑚 = 𝜔𝑆𝑇𝛽2
𝑚,   where (𝑚 = 1,2,3,4,5) 
As a result, the following table has been constructed: 
When,       𝑚= 1,  𝑀1
1= 0.089×0.36= 0.032,   𝑀2
1= 0.289×0= 0 
𝑚= 2,  𝑀1
2= 0.089×0.64 = 0.057,    𝑀2
2= 0.289×0.20= 0.058 
𝑚= 3,  𝑀1
3= 0.089×0= 0,    𝑀2
3= 0.289×0.80= 0.0231 
𝑚= 4,  𝑀1
4= 0.089×0= 0,    𝑀2
4= 0.289×0= 0 
𝑚= 5,  𝑀1
5= 0.089×0= 0,     𝑀2
5= 0.289×0= 0 
When 𝑀𝐻𝑄𝑃𝐿  represents the individual remaining belief for M1
m, and 𝑀𝐻𝑆𝑇  represents the 
individual remaining belief for M2
m, therefore, equation 6.5, can be applied as follows: 
- 𝑀𝐻𝑄𝑃𝐿 = ?̅?𝐻𝑄𝑃𝐿 + ?̃?𝐻𝑄𝑃𝐿 
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- 𝑀𝐻𝑆𝑇 = ?̅?𝐻𝑆𝑇 + ?̃?𝐻𝑆𝑇 
?̅?𝐻𝑄𝑃𝐿 , ?̃?𝐻𝑄𝑃𝐿 , and ?̅?𝐻𝑆𝑇?̃?𝐻𝑆𝑇 can be found by applying equations (6.6-6.7), as follow: 
- ?̅?𝐻𝑄𝑃𝐿 = 1 − 𝜔𝑄𝑃𝐿 =1- 0.089 = 0.911 
- ?̅?𝐻𝑆𝑇 = 1 − 𝜔𝑆𝑇 =1- 0.289 = 0.711 
- ?̃?𝐻𝑄𝑃𝐿 = 𝜔𝑊𝑄𝑃𝐿(1 − ∑ 𝛽1
𝑚5
𝑚 ) = 0.911× (1- (0.36+0.64+0+0+0)) = 0 
- ?̃?𝐻𝑆𝑇 = 𝜔𝑆𝑇(1 − ∑ 𝛽2
𝑚5
𝑚 ) = 0.711× (1- (0+0.04+0.24+0.72+0)) = 0 
- 𝑀𝐻𝑄𝑃𝐿 = ?̅?𝐻𝑄𝑃𝐿 + ?̃?𝐻𝑄𝑃𝐿 = 0.911+0= 0.911 
- 𝑀𝐻𝑆𝑇 = ?̅?𝐻𝑆𝑇 + ?̃?𝐻𝑆𝑇 = 0.711+0= 0.711 










′ ), and (?̃?𝐻𝑈
′ ), first we need to find 𝑘 using equation (6.8): 































































 𝑘 =  (1 − (− + (0.032 × 0.058) + (0.032 × 0.231) + (0.032 × 0) + (0.032 × 0) +
(0.057 × 0) + − + (0.057 × 0.231) + (0.057 × 0) + (0.057 × 0) + (0 × 0) + (0 ×
0.058) + − + (0 × 0) + (0 × 0) + (0 × 0) + (0 × 0.058) + (0 × 0.231) + − + (0 ×








─ + 0.002 + 0.007 + 0 + 0 +
0 + ─ + 0.013 + 0 + 0 +
0 + 0 + ─ + 0 + 0 +
0 + 0 + 0 + ─ + 0 +








Then, before using equations (6.12-6.13) to find (𝛽𝑚) and (𝑀𝐻𝑈), we need to utilise 
equations (6.8-6.11), to find (𝛽𝑚′), (?̅?𝐻𝑈
′ ), and (?̃?𝐻𝑈
′ ), as follow: 
?̅?𝐻𝑈
′ = 𝐾(?̅?𝐻𝑄𝑃𝐿?̅?𝐻𝑆𝑇) = 1.023× 0.911× 0.711= 0.663 
?̃?𝐻𝑈
′ = 𝐾(?̃?𝐻𝑄𝑃𝐿?̃?𝐻𝑆𝑇 + ?̃?𝑄𝑃𝐿?̅?𝐻𝑆𝑇 + ?̅?𝐻𝑄𝑃𝐿?̃?𝐻𝑆𝑇) = 
1.023×[(0×0)+(0.911×0)+(0×0.711)]=0 















































5𝑀𝐻𝑄𝑃𝐿) = 1.023×[(0×0)+(0×0.711)+(0.911×0)]= 0 















4 , and 𝑀12
5 for the first two aggregations. These will be used with the 
third aggregation similar to the above aggregation process. The following are the 
aggregation of the criterion WEx with the aggregated result from QPL and ST: 
𝑀12
𝑚  represents the aggregated subset of 𝑇?̃?𝑄𝑃𝐿, and 𝑇?̃?𝑆𝑇, while 𝑀3
𝑚 represents the subset 
𝑇?̃?𝑊𝐸𝑥. Using the ER equation (6.6) can obtain the following: 
𝑀3
𝑚 = 𝜔𝑊𝐸𝑥𝛽3
𝑚,   where (𝑚 = 1,2,3,4,5) 
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When,       𝑚= 1,  𝑀12
1 = 0.023,  𝑀3
1= 0.622×0= 0 
𝑚= 2,  𝑀12
2 = 0.099,    𝑀3
2= 0.622×0.04= 0.025 
𝑚= 3,  𝑀12
3 = 0.215,   𝑀3
3= 0.622×0.24= 0.149 
𝑚= 4,  𝑀12
4 = 0,   𝑀3
4= 0.622×0.72= 0.448 
𝑚= 5,  𝑀12
5 = 0,     𝑀3
5= 0.622×0= 0 
When 𝑀𝐻12 represents the individual remaining belief for M12
m , and 𝑀𝐻𝑊𝐸𝑥  represents the 
individual remaining belief for M3
m, equation 6.7 can be applied as follows: 
- 𝑀𝐻𝑊𝐸𝑥 = ?̅?𝐻𝑊𝐸𝑥 + ?̃?𝐻𝑊𝐸𝑥  
?̅?𝐻𝑊𝐸𝑥 , ?̃?𝐻𝑊𝐸𝑥 can be found by applying equations (6.8-6.9) as follows:  
- ?̅?𝐻𝑊𝐸𝑥 = 1 − 𝜔𝑊𝐸𝑥 = 1-0.622= 0.378 
- ?̃?𝐻𝑊𝐸𝑥 = 𝜔𝑊𝐸𝑥(1 − ∑ 𝛽3
𝑚5
𝑚 ) = 0.378× (1- (0+0.04+0.24+0.72+0))= 0 
- 𝑀𝐻𝑊𝐸𝑥 = ?̅?𝐻𝑊𝐸𝑥 + ?̃?𝐻𝑊𝐸𝑥  = 0.378+0= 0.378 










′ ), and (?̃?𝐻𝑈
′ ), we find 𝑘 using equation (6.13): 































































 𝑘 =  (1 − (− + (0.023 × 0.025) + (0.023 × 0.149) + (0.023 × 0.448) + (0.023 ×
0) + (0.099 × 0) + − + (0.099 × 0.149) + (0.099 × 0.448) + (0.099 × 0) +
(0.215 × 0) + (0.215 × 0.025) + − + (0.215 × 0.448) + (0.215 × 0) + (0 × 0) +
(0 × 0.025) + (0 × 0.149) + − + (0 × 0) + (0 × 0) + (0 × 0.025) + (0 × 0.149) +










─ + 0.001 + 0.003 + 0.010 + 0 +
0 + ─ + 0.015 + 0.044 + 0 +
0 + 0.005 + ─ + 0.096 + 0 +
0 + 0 + 0 + ─ + 0 +






Before using equations (6.13-6.15) to find (𝛽𝑚) and (𝑀𝐻𝑈), we need to utilise equations 
(6.11-6.12) to find (𝛽𝑚′), (?̅?𝐻𝑈
′ ), and (?̃?𝐻𝑈
′ ): 
?̅?𝐻𝑈
′ = 𝑘(?̅?𝐻12?̅?𝐻𝑊𝐸𝑥) = 1.212× 0.663× 0.378= 0.304 
?̃?𝐻𝑈
′ = 𝑘(?̃?𝐻12?̃?𝐻𝑊𝐸𝑥 + ?̃?𝐻12?̅?𝐻𝑊𝐸𝑥 + ?̃?𝐻𝑊𝐸𝑥?̅?𝐻12) = 
1.212×[(0×0)+(0.663×0)+(0×0.378)] = 0 




























2 𝑀𝐻𝑊𝐸𝑥 + 𝑀3
2𝑀𝐻12) = 






3 𝑀𝐻𝑊𝐸𝑥 + 𝑀3
3𝑀𝐻12) = 














5 𝑀𝐻𝑊𝐸𝑥 + 𝑀3
5𝑀𝐻12) = 1. 212×[(0×0)+(0×0.378)+(0.663×0)]= 0 
Accordingly, 𝛽1, 𝛽2, 𝛽3, 𝛽4, 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝛽5can be found using equation (6.14) as follows: 
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 = 0 
As a result, the aggregation of TP criterion for pilot 1 can be presented as follows (see 
Table 6.19): 
𝑇?̃?𝑃𝑖𝑙𝑜𝑡1 ={(2% V. Good), (10% Good), (37% Average), (52% Low), (0% Basic)} 
 
II.1.2 Non-Technical Skills (NTS) 
The following is the aggregation process of pilot’s 1 NTS, in relation to the sub-criteria of 
decision-making skills (DM), situation awareness skills (SA), communication skills (CS), 
and teamwork & Leadership skills (T&L), based on the information given by Pilot 1. Using 
ER equations can applied as follows: 
Aggregating Pilot’s 1 NTS Sub-Criteria  NTS̃DM , NTS̃SA , NTS̃CS  and NTS̃T&L using ER 
algorithms, we need to define the following: 
NTS̃DM, which represents the sub-criterion Decision Making skills (DM); 
NTS̃SA, which represents the sub-criterion Situation Awareness skills (SA);  
NTS̃CS, which represents the sub-criterion Communication Skills (CS); and 
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NTS̃T&L, which represents the sub-criterion Teamwork & Leadership skills (T&L) 
Based on the given fuzzy information of DM, SA, CS and T&L for Pilot 1, the results from 
the mapping process are as follows:  
𝑅NTS̃DM = {(V. Good, 0.36), (Good, 0.64), (Average, 0), (Bad, 0), (V. Bad, 0)} 
𝑅NTS̃SA= {(V. Good, 0.14), (Good, 0.56), (Average, 0.27), (Bad, 0.03), (V. Bad, 0)} 
𝑅NTS̃CS= {(V. Good, 0.14), (Good, 0.56), (Average, 0.24), (Bad, 0.03), (V. Bad, 0)} 
𝑅NTS̃T&L= {(V. Good, 0), (Good, 0), (Average, 0.72), (Bad, 0.24), (V. Bad, 0.04)} 
The global weights obtained by ANP are as follows: 
𝜔𝐷𝑀= 0.045, 𝜔𝑆𝐴= 0.094, 𝜔𝐶𝑆= 0.142 and 𝜔𝑇&𝐿= 0.325 
Where: 
𝜔𝐷𝑀, is the global weight assigned for NTS-DM; 
𝜔𝑆𝐴, is the global weight assigned for NTS-SA; 
𝜔𝐶𝑆, represents the global weight assigned for NTS-CS; and 
𝜔𝑇&𝐿, represents the global weight assigned for NTS-T&L. 
Since the weights' sums are not equal to 1, they must be normalised. To normalise the 
weight for each criterion, divide the weight of each criterion to the sum of all criteria. The 
sum of DM, SA, CS and T&L are as follows: 
𝜔𝐷𝑀 + 𝜔𝑆𝐴 + 𝜔𝐶𝑆 + 𝜔𝑇&𝐿 = 0.045 + 0.094 + 0.142 + 0.325 = 0.606. 
A normalised 𝜔𝐷𝑀= 0.045/0.606= 0.075. 
Similarly, 𝜔𝑆𝐴= 0.155, 𝜔𝐶𝑆= 0.234 and 𝜔𝑇&𝐿= 0.536 
The aggregation process of the first two criterion of NTS, 𝑁𝑇?̃?𝐷𝑀  and 𝑁𝑇?̃?𝑆𝐴 , are as 
follows: 
𝑀1
𝑚represents the subset 𝑁𝑇?̃?𝐷𝑀, and 𝑀2
𝑚 represent the subset 𝑁𝑇?̃?𝑆𝐴. Using ER equation 
(6.4), can obtain the followings: 
𝑀1
𝑚 = 𝜔𝐷𝑀𝛽1





𝑚,   where (𝑚 = 1,2,3,4,5) 
As a result, the following table has been constructed: 
When,       𝑚= 1,  𝑀1
1= 0.075×0.36 = 0.027,   𝑀2
1= 0.155×0.14= 0.022 
𝑚= 2,  𝑀1
2= 0.075×0.64 = 0.048,    𝑀2
2= 0.155×0.56= 0.087 
𝑚= 3,  𝑀1
3= 0.075×0= 0,    𝑀2
3= 0.155×0.27= 0.042 
𝑚= 4,  𝑀1
4= 0.075×0= 0,    𝑀2
4= 0.155×0.03= 0.005 
𝑚= 5,  𝑀1
5= 0.075×0= 0,     𝑀2
5= 0.155×0= 0 
When 𝑀𝐻𝐷𝑀  represents the individual remaining belief for M1
m, and 𝑀𝐻𝑆𝐴  represents the 
individual remaining belief for M2
m, therefore, equation 6.5, can be applied as follows: 
- 𝑀𝐻𝐷𝑀 = ?̅?𝐻𝐷𝑀 + ?̃?𝐻𝐷𝑀 
- 𝑀𝐻𝑆𝐴 = ?̅?𝐻𝑆𝐴 + ?̃?𝐻𝑆𝐴 
?̅?𝐻𝐷𝑀 , ?̃?𝐻𝐷𝑀, and ?̅?𝐻𝑆𝐴?̃?𝐻𝑆𝐴  can be found by applying equations (6.6-6.7), as follow: 
- ?̅?𝐻𝐷𝑀 = 1 − 𝜔𝐷𝑀 =1- 0.075 = 0.926 
- ?̅?𝐻𝑆𝐴 = 1 − 𝜔𝑆𝐴 =1- 0.155 = 0.845 
- ?̃?𝐻𝐷𝑀 = 𝜔𝑊𝐷𝑀(1 − ∑ 𝛽1
𝑚5
𝑚 ) = 0.926× (1- (0.36+0.64+0+0+0)) = 0 
- ?̃?𝐻𝑆𝐴 = 𝜔𝑆𝐴(1 − ∑ 𝛽2
𝑚5
𝑚 ) = 0.845× (1- (0.14+0.56+0.27+0.03+0)) = 0 
- 𝑀𝐻𝐷𝑀 = ?̅?𝐻𝐷𝑀 + ?̃?𝐻𝐷𝑀 = 0.926+0= 0.926 
- 𝑀𝐻𝑆𝐴 = ?̅?𝐻𝑆𝐴 + ?̃?𝐻𝑆𝐴 = 0.845+0= 0.845 










′ ), and (?̃?𝐻𝑈
′ ), first we need to find 𝑘 using equation (6.8): 

































































 𝑘 =  (1 − (− + (0.027 × 0.087) + (0.027 × 0.042) + (0.027 × 0.005) + (0.027 ×
0) + (0.048 × 0.022) + − + (0.048 × 0.042) + (0.048 × 0.005) + (0.048 × 0) +
(0 × 0.022) + (0 × 0.087) + − + (0 × 0.005) + (0 × 0) + (0 × 0.022) + (0 ×
0.087) + (0 × 0.042) + − + (0 × 0) + (0 × 0.022) + (0 × 0.087) + (0 × 0.042) +








─ + 0.002 + 0.001 + 0 + 0 +
0.001 + ─ + 0.002 + 0 + 0 +
0 + 0 + ─ + 0 + 0 +
0 + 0 + 0 + ─ + 0 +






Then, before using equations (6.12-6.13) to find (𝛽𝑚) and (𝑀𝐻𝑈), we need to utilise 
equations (6.8-6.11), to find (𝛽𝑚′), (?̅?𝐻𝑈
′ ), and (?̃?𝐻𝑈
′ ), as follow: 
?̅?𝐻𝑈
′ = 𝐾(?̅?𝐻𝐷𝑀?̅?𝐻𝑆𝐴) = 1.007× 0.926× 0.845= 0.788 
?̃?𝐻𝑈
′ = 𝐾(?̃?𝐻𝐷𝑀?̃?𝐻𝑆𝐴 + ?̃?𝐷𝑀?̅?𝐻𝑆𝐴 + ?̅?𝐻𝐷𝑀?̃?𝐻𝑆𝐴) = 
1.007×[(0×0)+(0.926×0)+(0×0.845)]=0 


















































5𝑀𝐻𝐷𝑀) = 1.007×[(0×0)+(0×0.845)+(0.926×0)]= 0 















4 , and 𝑀12
5 for the first two aggregations. These will be used with the 
third aggregation similar to the above aggregation process. The following are the 
aggregation of the criterion CS with the aggregated result from DM and SA: 
𝑀12
𝑚  represents the aggregated subset of 𝑁𝑇?̃?𝐷𝑀 , and 𝑁𝑇?̃?𝑆𝐴 , while 𝑀3
𝑚  represents the 
subset 𝑁𝑇?̃?𝐶𝑆. Using the ER equation (6.6) can obtain the following: 
𝑀3
𝑚 = 𝜔𝐶𝑆𝛽3
𝑚,   where (𝑚 = 1,2,3,4,5) 
When,       𝑚= 1,  𝑀12
1 = 0.044,  𝑀3
1= 0.234×0.14= 0.033 
𝑚= 2,  𝑀12
2 = 0.126,    𝑀3
2= 0.234×0.56= 0.131 
𝑚= 3,  𝑀12
3 = 0.039,   𝑀3
3= 0.234×0.27= 0.063 
𝑚= 4,  𝑀12
4 = 0.004,   𝑀3
4= 0.234×0.03= 0.007 
𝑚= 5,  𝑀12
5 = 0,     𝑀3
5= 0.234×0= 0 
When 𝑀𝐻12  represents the individual remaining belief for M12
m , and 𝑀𝐻𝐶𝑆  represents the 
individual remaining belief for M3
m, equation 6.7 can be applied as follows: 
- 𝑀𝐻𝐶𝑆 = ?̅?𝐻𝐶𝑆 + ?̃?𝐻𝐶𝑆 
?̅?𝐻𝐶𝑆 , ?̃?𝐻𝐶𝑆 can be found by applying equations (6.8-6.9) as follows:  
- ?̅?𝐻𝐶𝑆 = 1 − 𝜔𝐶𝑆 = 1- 0.234= 0.766 
- ?̃?𝐻𝐶𝑆 = 𝜔𝐶𝑆(1 − ∑ 𝛽3
𝑚5
𝑚 ) = 0.766× (1- (0.14+0.56+0.27+0.03+0))= 0 
- 𝑀𝐻𝐶𝑆 = ?̅?𝐻𝐶𝑆 + ?̃?𝐻𝐶𝑆 = 0.766+0= 0.766 
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′ ), and (?̃?𝐻𝑈
′ ), we find 𝑘 using equation (6.13): 































































 𝑘 =  (1 − (− + (0.044 × 0.131) + (0.044 × 0.063) + (0.044 × 0.077) + (0.044 ×
0) + (0.126 × 0.033) + − + (0.126 × 0.063) + (0.126 × 0.007) + (0.126 × 0) +
(0.039 × 0.033) + (0.039 × 0.131) + − + (0.039 × 0.007) + (0.039 × 0) + (0.004 ×
0.033) + (0.004 × 0.131) + (0.004 × 0.063) + − + (0.004 × 0) + (0 × 0.033) +








─ + 0.006 + 0.003 + 0 + 0 +
0.004 + ─ + 0.008 + 0.001 + 0 +
0.001 + 0.005 + ─ + 0 + 0 +
0 + 0.001 + 0 + ─ + 0 +






Before using equations (6.13-6.15) to find (𝛽𝑚) and (𝑀𝐻𝑈), we need to utilise equations 
(6.11-6.12) to find (𝛽𝑚′), (?̅?𝐻𝑈
′ ), and (?̃?𝐻𝑈
′ ): 
?̅?𝐻𝑈
′ = 𝑘(?̅?𝐻12?̅?𝐻𝐶𝑆) = 1.03× 0.788× 0.766= 0.621 
?̃?𝐻𝑈
′ = 𝑘(?̃?𝐻12?̃?𝐻𝐶𝑆 + ?̃?𝐻12?̅?𝐻𝐶𝑆 + ?̃?𝐻𝐶𝑆?̅?𝐻12) = 1.03 × [(0×0)+(0.788×0)+(0×0.766)] 
= 0 






























2 𝑀𝐻𝐶𝑆 + 𝑀3
2𝑀𝐻12) = 






3 𝑀𝐻𝐶𝑆 + 𝑀3
3𝑀𝐻12) = 














5 𝑀𝐻𝐶𝑆 + 𝑀3
5𝑀𝐻12) = 1.03× [(0×0)+(0×0.766)+(0.788×0)]= 0 















4 , and 𝑀123
5 for the first three aggregations. These will be used with 
the fourth aggregation similar to the above aggregation process. The following are the 
aggregation of the criterion T&L with the aggregated result from DM, SA and CS: 
𝑀123
𝑚  represents the aggregated subset of 𝑁𝑇?̃?𝐷𝑀, 𝑁𝑇?̃?𝑆𝐴 and 𝑁𝑇?̃?𝐶𝑆, while 𝑀4
𝑚 represents 
the subset 𝑁𝑇?̃?𝑇&𝐿. Using the ER equation (6.6) can obtain the following: 
𝑀4
𝑚 = 𝜔𝑇&𝐿𝛽4
𝑚,   where (𝑚 = 1,2,3,4,5) 
When,       𝑚= 1,  𝑀123
1 = 0.062,  𝑀4
1= 0.536×0= 0 
𝑚= 2,  𝑀123
2 = 0.222,    𝑀4
2= 0.536×0= 0 
𝑚= 3,  𝑀123
3 = 0.085,   𝑀4
3= 0.536×0.72= 0.386 
𝑚= 4,  𝑀123
4 = 0.009,   𝑀4
4= 0.536×0.24= 0.129 
𝑚= 5,  𝑀123
5 = 0,     𝑀4
5= 0.536×0.04= 0.021 
When 𝑀𝐻123 represents the individual remaining belief for M123
m , and 𝑀𝐻𝑇&𝐿 represents the 
individual remaining belief for M4
m, equation 6.7 can be applied as follows: 
- 𝑀𝐻𝑇&𝐿 = ?̅?𝐻𝑇&𝐿 + ?̃?𝐻𝑇&𝐿 
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?̅?𝐻𝑇&𝐿 , ?̃?𝐻𝑇&𝐿 can be found by applying equations (6.8-6.9) as follows:  
- ?̅?𝐻𝑇&𝐿 = 1 − 𝜔𝑇&𝐿 = 1- 0.536= 0.464 
- ?̃?𝐻𝑇&𝐿 = 𝜔𝑇&𝐿(1 − ∑ 𝛽4
𝑚5
𝑚 ) = 0.464× (1- (0+0+0.72+0.24+0.04))= 0 
- 𝑀𝐻𝑇&𝐿 = ?̅?𝐻𝑇&𝐿 + ?̃?𝐻𝑇&𝐿 = 0.464+0= 0.464 










′ ), and (?̃?𝐻𝑈
′ ), we find 𝑘 using equation (6.13): 































































 𝑘 =  (1 − (− + (0.062 × 0) + (0.062 × 0.386) + (0.062 × 0.129) + (0.062 ×
0.021) + (0.222 × 0) + − + (0.222 × 0.386) + (0.222 × 0.129) + (0.222 × 0.021) +
(0.085 × 0) + (0.085 × 0) + − + (0.085 × 0.129) + (0.085 × 0.021) + (0.009 ×
0) + (0.009 × 0) + (0.009 × 0.386) + − + (0.009 × 0.021) + (0 × 0) + (0 × 0) +








─ + 0 + 0.024 + 0.008 + 0.001 +
0 + ─ + 0.086 + 0.029 + 0.005 +
0 + 0 + ─ + 0.011 + 0.002 +
0 + 0 + 0.004 + ─ + 0 +






Before using equations (6.13-6.15) to find (𝛽𝑚) and (𝑀𝐻𝑈), we need to utilise equations 
(6.11-6.12) to find (𝛽𝑚′), (?̅?𝐻𝑈
′ ), and (?̃?𝐻𝑈
′ ): 
?̅?𝐻𝑈




′ = 𝑘(?̃?𝐻123?̃?𝐻𝑇&𝐿 + ?̃?𝐻123?̅?𝐻𝑇&𝐿 + ?̃?𝐻𝑇&𝐿?̅?𝐻123) = 
1.204×[(0×0)+(0.621×0)+(0×0.464)] = 0 




























2 𝑀𝐻𝑇&𝐿 + 𝑀4
2𝑀𝐻123) = 






3 𝑀𝐻𝑇&𝐿 + 𝑀4
3𝑀𝐻123) = 














5 𝑀𝐻𝑇&𝐿 + 𝑀4
5𝑀𝐻123) = 
1.204×[(0×0.021)+(0×0.464)+(0.621×0.021)]= 0.016 
Accordingly, 𝛽1, 𝛽2, 𝛽3, 𝛽4, 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝛽5can be found using equation (6.14) as follows: 


















































 = 0 
As a result, the aggregation of NTS criterion for pilot 1 can be presented as follows (see 
Table 6.19): 
𝑁𝑇?̃?𝑃𝑖𝑙𝑜𝑡1 ={(5% V. Good), (19% Good), (57% Moderate), (16% Bad), (2% V. Bad)} 
 
II.1.3 Fitness and Strength (F&S)  
The following is the aggregation process of pilot’s 1 F&S, in relation to the sub-criteria of 
operator age (OA), health issue (HI), and body strength (BS), based on the information 
given by Pilot 1. Using ER equations can applied as follows: 
Aggregating Pilot’s 1 F&S Sub-Criteria F&S̃OA, F&S̃HI, and F&S̃BS using ER algorithms, 
we need to define the following: 
F&S̃OA, which represents the sub-criterion Operator Age (OA); 
 F&S̃HI, which represents the sub-criterion Health Issue (HI);  
F&S̃BS, which represents the sub-criterion Body Strength (BS). 
Based on the given fuzzy information of OA, HI, and BS for Pilot 1, the results from the 
mapping process are as follows:  
𝐹&𝑆 − 𝑂𝐴𝑝1 = {(Fit, 0.06), (Good, 0.24), (Moderate, 0.63), (Bad, 0.07), (Unfit, 0)} 
𝐹&𝑆 − 𝐻𝐼𝑝1= {(Fit, 0.80), (Good, 0.18), (Moderate, 0.02), (Bad, 0), (Unfit, 0)} 
𝐹&𝑆 − 𝐵𝑆𝑝1= {(Fit, 0.80), (Good, 0.18), (Moderate, 0.02), (Bad, 0), (Unfit, 0)} 
The global weights obtained by ANP are as follows: 




𝜔𝑂𝐴, is the global weight assigned for F&S-OA; 
𝜔𝐻𝐼, is the global weight assigned for F&S-HI;  
𝜔𝐵𝑆, represents the global weight assigned for F&S-BS. 
Since the weights' sums are not equal to 1, they must be normalised. To normalise the 
weight for each criterion, divide the weight of each criterion to the sum of all criteria. The 
sum of OA, HI, and BS are as follows: 
𝜔𝑂𝐴 + 𝜔𝐻𝐼 + 𝜔𝐵𝑆 = 0.008+ 0.091+ 0.064= 0.163. 
A normalised 𝜔𝑂𝐴= 0.008/0.163= 0.049. 
Similarly, 𝜔𝐻𝐼= 0.558 and 𝜔𝐵𝑆= 0.393 
The aggregation process of the first two criterion of F&S, 𝐹&?̃?𝑂𝐴 and 𝐹&?̃?𝐻𝐼, are as follows: 
𝑀1
𝑚represents the subset 𝐹&?̃?𝑂𝐴, and 𝑀2
𝑚 represent the subset 𝐹&?̃?𝐻𝐼. Using ER equation 
(6.4), can obtain the followings: 
𝑀1
𝑚 = 𝜔𝑂𝐴𝛽1
𝑚,   where (𝑚 = 1,2,3,4,5) 
𝑀2
𝑚 = 𝜔𝐻𝐼𝛽2
𝑚,   where (𝑚 = 1,2,3,4,5) 
As a result, the following table has been constructed: 
When,       𝑚= 1,  𝑀1
1= 0.049×0.06= 0.003,   𝑀2
1= 0.558×0.8= 0.447 
𝑚= 2,  𝑀1
2= 0.049×0.24 = 0.012,    𝑀2
2= 0.558×0.18= 0.100 
𝑚= 3,  𝑀1
3= 0.049×0.63= 0.031,   𝑀2
3= 0.558×0.02= 0.011 
𝑚= 4,  𝑀1
4= 0.049×0.07= 0.003,   𝑀2
4= 0.558×0= 0 
𝑚= 5,  𝑀1
5= 0.049×0= 0,     𝑀2
5= 0.558×0= 0 
When 𝑀𝐻𝑂𝐴  represents the individual remaining belief for M1
m, and 𝑀𝐻𝐻𝐼  represents the 
individual remaining belief for M2
m, therefore, equation 6.5, can be applied as follows: 
- 𝑀𝐻𝑂𝐴 = ?̅?𝐻𝑂𝐴 + ?̃?𝐻𝑂𝐴  
- 𝑀𝐻𝐻𝐼 = ?̅?𝐻𝐻𝐼 + ?̃?𝐻𝐻𝐼  
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?̅?𝐻𝑂𝐴 , ?̃?𝐻𝑂𝐴, and ?̅?𝐻𝐻𝐼?̃?𝐻𝐻𝐼  can be found by applying equations (6.6-6.7), as follow: 
- ?̅?𝐻𝑂𝐴 = 1 − 𝜔𝑂𝐴 =1- 0.049 = 0.951 
- ?̅?𝐻𝐻𝐼 = 1 − 𝜔𝐻𝐼 =1- 0.558= 0.442 
- ?̃?𝐻𝑂𝐴 = 𝜔𝑊𝑂𝐴(1 − ∑ 𝛽1
𝑚5
𝑚 ) = 0.951× (1- (0.06+0.24+0.63+0.07+0)) = 0 
- ?̃?𝐻𝐻𝐼 = 𝜔𝐻𝐼(1 − ∑ 𝛽2
𝑚5
𝑚 ) = 0.442× (1- (0.8+0.18+0.02+0+0)) = 0 
- 𝑀𝐻𝑂𝐴 = ?̅?𝐻𝑂𝐴 + ?̃?𝐻𝑂𝐴  = 0.951+0= 0.951 
- 𝑀𝐻𝐻𝐼 = ?̅?𝐻𝐻𝐼 + ?̃?𝐻𝐻𝐼  = 0.442+0= 0.442 










′ ), and (?̃?𝐻𝑈
′ ), first we need to find 𝑘 using equation (6.8): 































































 𝑘 =  (1 − (− + (0.003 × 0.100) + (0.003 × 0.011) + (0.003 × 0) + (0.003 × 0) +
(0.012 × 0.447) + − + (0.012 × 0.011) + (0.012 × 0) + (0.012 × 0) + (0.031 ×
0.447) + (0.031 × 0.100) + − + (0.031 × 0) + (0.031 × 0) + (0.003 × 0.447) +
(0.003 × 0.100) + (0.003 × 0.011) + − + (0.003 × 0) + (0 × 0.447) + (0 ×








─ + 0 + 0 + 0 + 0 +
0.005 + ─ + 0 + 0 + 0 +
0.014 + 0.003 + ─ + 0 + 0 +
0.002 + 0 + 0 + ─ + 0 +








Then, before using equations (6.12-6.13) to find (𝛽𝑚) and (𝑀𝐻𝑈), we need to utilise 
equations (6.8-6.11), to find (𝛽𝑚′), (?̅?𝐻𝑈
′ ), and (?̃?𝐻𝑈
′ ), as follow: 
?̅?𝐻𝑈
′ = 𝐾(?̅?𝐻𝑂𝐴?̅?𝐻𝐻𝐼) = 1.025× 0.951× 0.442= 0.431 
?̃?𝐻𝑈
′ = 𝐾(?̃?𝐻𝑂𝐴?̃?𝐻𝐻𝐼 + ?̃?𝑂𝐴?̅?𝐻𝐻𝐼 + ?̅?𝐻𝑂𝐴?̃?𝐻𝐻𝐼) = 
1.025×[(0×0)+(0.951×0)+(0×0.442)]=0 
















































5𝑀𝐻𝑂𝐴) = 1.025×[(0×0)+(0×0.442)+(0.951×0)]= 0 















4 , and 𝑀12
5 for the first two aggregations. These will be used with the 
third aggregation similar to the above aggregation process. The following are the 
aggregation of the criterion BS with the aggregated result from OA and HI: 
𝑀12
𝑚  represents the aggregated subset of 𝐹&?̃?𝑂𝐴 , and 𝐹&?̃?𝐻𝐼 , while 𝑀3
𝑚  represents the 
subset 𝐹&?̃?𝐵𝑆. Using the ER equation (6.6) can obtain the following: 
𝑀3
𝑚 = 𝜔𝐵𝑆𝛽3
𝑚,   where (𝑚 = 1,2,3,4,5) 
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When,       𝑚= 1,  𝑀12
1 = 0.438,  𝑀3
1= 0.393×0.8= 0.314 
𝑚= 2,  𝑀12
2 = 0.105,    𝑀3
2= 0.393×0.18= 0.071 
𝑚= 3,  𝑀12
3 = 0.025,   𝑀3
3= 0.393×0.02= 0.008 
𝑚= 4,  𝑀12
4 = 0.002,   𝑀3
4= 0.393×0= 0 
𝑚= 5,  𝑀12
5 = 0,     𝑀3
5= 0.393×0= 0 
When 𝑀𝐻12  represents the individual remaining belief for M12
m , and 𝑀𝐻𝐵𝑆  represents the 
individual remaining belief for M3
m, equation 6.7 can be applied as follows: 
- 𝑀𝐻𝐵𝑆 = ?̅?𝐻𝐵𝑆 + ?̃?𝐻𝐵𝑆 
?̅?𝐻𝐵𝑆 , ?̃?𝐻𝐵𝑆 can be found by applying equations (6.8-6.9) as follows:  
- ?̅?𝐻𝐵𝑆 = 1 − 𝜔𝐵𝑆 = 1- 0.393= 0.607 
- ?̃?𝐻𝐵𝑆 = 𝜔𝐵𝑆(1 − ∑ 𝛽3
𝑚5
𝑚 ) = 0.607× (1- (0.8+0.18+0.02+0+0))= 0 
- 𝑀𝐻𝐵𝑆 = ?̅?𝐻𝐵𝑆 + ?̃?𝐻𝐵𝑆 = 0.607+0= 0.607 










′ ), and (?̃?𝐻𝑈
′ ), we find 𝑘 using equation (6.13): 































































 𝑘 =  (1 − (− + (0.438 × 0.071) + (0.438 × 0.008) + (0.438 × 0) + (0.438 × 0) +
(0.105 × 0.314) + − + (0.105 × 0.008) + (0.105 × 0) + (0.105 × 0) + (0.025 ×
0.314) + (0.025 × 0.071) + − + (0.025 × 0) + (0.025 × 0) + (0.002 × 0.314) +
(0.002 × 0.071) + (0.002 × 0.008) + − + (0.002 × 0) + (0 × 0.314) + (0 ×










─ + 0.031 + 0.003 + 0 + 0 +
0.033 + ─ + 0.001 + 0 + 0 +
0.008 + 0.002 + ─ + 0 + 0 +
0 + 0 + 0 + ─ + 0 +






Before using equations (6.13-6.15) to find (𝛽𝑚) and (𝑀𝐻𝑈), we need to utilise equations 
(6.11-6.12) to find (𝛽𝑚′), (?̅?𝐻𝑈
′ ), and (?̃?𝐻𝑈
′ ): 
?̅?𝐻𝑈
′ = 𝑘(?̅?𝐻12?̅?𝐻𝐵𝑆) = 1.085× 0.663× 0.378= 0.304 
?̃?𝐻𝑈
′ = 𝑘(?̃?𝐻12?̃?𝐻𝐵𝑆 + ?̃?𝐻12?̅?𝐻𝐵𝑆 + ?̃?𝐻𝐵𝑆?̅?𝐻12) = 1.085×[(0×0)+(0.431×0)+(0×0.607)] 
= 0 




























2 𝑀𝐻𝐵𝑆 + 𝑀3
2𝑀𝐻12) = 






3 𝑀𝐻𝐵𝑆 + 𝑀3
3𝑀𝐻12) = 














5 𝑀𝐻𝐵𝑆 + 𝑀3
5𝑀𝐻12) = 1.085× [(0×0)+(0×0.607)+(0.431×0)]= 0 
Accordingly, 𝛽1, 𝛽2, 𝛽3, 𝛽4, 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝛽5can be found using equation (6.14) as follows: 
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 = 0 
As a result, the aggregation of TP criterion for pilot 1 can be presented as follows (see 
Table 6.19): 
𝐹&?̃?𝑃1 ={(82% Fit), (15% Good), (3% Moderate), (0% Bad), (0% Unfit)} 
 
II.1.4 Aggregating main criteria  
The following is the aggregation process of pilot’s 1 sub-criteria towards the main goal 
following the application of mapping process from the sub-criteria towards the main goal, 
in relation to the sub-criteria of technical proficiency (TP) personal fatigue (PF), non-
technical skills (NTS), and fitness &strength (F&S), based on the aggregated result in 
previous section. Using ER equations can applied as follows: 
Aggregating Pilot’s 1 overall goal Sub-Criteria TP̃p1, PF̃p1, NTS̃p1 and F&S̃p1 using ER 
algorithms, we need to define the following: 
TP̃p1, which represents the aggregated results obtained by aggregating sub criterion of pilot 
1 Technical Proficiency (TP); 
367 
 
PF̃p1, which represents the aggregated results obtained by aggregating sub criterion of pilot 
1 Personal Fatigue (PF); 
NTS̃p1, which represents the aggregated results obtained by aggregating sub criterion of 
pilot 1 Non-Technical Skills (NTS); and 
F&S̃p1, which represents the aggregated results obtained by aggregating sub criterion of 
pilot 1 Fitness & Strength (F&S). 
Based on the given fuzzy aggregated results of TP, PF, NTS and F&S for Pilot 1, the results 
from the mapping process are as follows:  
𝑇?̃?𝑃1 ={(0.03, V. Good), (0.12, Good), (0.33, Average), (0.41, Low), (0.10, Basic)} 
𝑃?̃?𝑃1 ={(0.07, Neutral), (0.26, S. Fatigued), (0.28, Moderate), (0.19, Fatigued), (0.20, V. 
Bad)} 
𝑁𝑇?̃?𝑃1 ={(0.09, V. Good), (0.21, Good), (0.52, Moderate), (0.13, Bad), (0.06, V. Bad)} 
𝐹&?̃?𝑃1 ={(0.94, Fit), (0.04, Good), (0.02, Moderate), (0, Bad), (0, Unfit)} 
The global weights obtained by ANP are as follows: 
𝜔𝑇𝑃= 0.045, 𝜔𝑃𝐹= 0.186, 𝜔𝑁𝑇𝑆= 0.606, and 𝜔𝐹&𝑆= 0.163 
Where: 
𝜔𝑇𝑃, is the global weight assigned for PR-TP; 
𝜔𝑃𝐹, is the global weight assigned for PR-PF; 
𝜔𝑁𝑇𝑆, represents the global weight assigned for PR-NTS; and 
𝜔𝐹&𝑆, represents the global weight assigned for PR-F&S. 
The sum of TP, PF, NTS and F&S are as follows: 
𝜔𝑇𝑃 + 𝜔𝑃𝐹 + 𝜔𝑁𝑇𝑆 + 𝜔𝐹&𝑆 = 0.045 + 0.186 + 0.606+ 0.163= 1. 




𝑚represents the subset 𝑇?̃?𝑝1, and 𝑀2
𝑚 represent the subset 𝑃?̃?𝑝1. Using ER equation (6.4), 
can obtain the followings: 
𝑀1
𝑚 = 𝜔𝑇𝑃𝛽1
𝑚,   where (𝑚 = 1,2,3,4,5) 
𝑀2
𝑚 = 𝜔𝑃𝐹𝛽2
𝑚,   where (𝑚 = 1,2,3,4,5) 
As a result, the following table has been constructed: 
When,       𝑚= 1,  𝑀1
1= 0.045×0.03 = 0.002,   𝑀2
1= 0.186×0.07 = 0.013 
𝑚= 2,  𝑀1
2= 0.045×0.12 = 0.005,    𝑀2
2= 0.186×0.26 = 0.049 
𝑚= 3,  𝑀1
3= 0.045×0.33 = 0.015,   𝑀2
3= 0.186×0.28 = 0.052 
𝑚= 4,  𝑀1
4= 0.045×0.41 = 0.019,   𝑀2
4= 0.186×0.19 = 0.035 
𝑚= 5,  𝑀1
5= 0.045×0.10 = 0.005,    𝑀2
5= 0.186×0.20 = 0.037 
When 𝑀𝐻𝑇𝑃  represents the individual remaining belief for M1
m, and 𝑀𝐻𝑃𝐹  represents the 
individual remaining belief for M2
m, therefore, equation 6.5, can be applied as follows: 
- 𝑀𝐻𝑇𝑃 = ?̅?𝐻𝑇𝑃 + ?̃?𝐻𝑇𝑃 
- 𝑀𝐻𝑃𝐹 = ?̅?𝐻𝑃𝐹 + ?̃?𝐻𝑃𝐹  
?̅?𝐻𝑇𝑃 , ?̃?𝐻𝑇𝑃, and ?̅?𝐻𝑃𝐹?̃?𝐻𝑃𝐹  can be found by applying equations (6.6-6.7), as follow: 
- ?̅?𝐻𝑇𝑃 = 1 − 𝜔𝑇𝑃 =1- 0.045 = 0.955 
- ?̅?𝐻𝑃𝐹 = 1 − 𝜔𝑃𝐹 =1- 0.186= 0.814 
- ?̃?𝐻𝑇𝑃 = 𝜔𝑇𝑃(1 − ∑ 𝛽1
𝑚5
𝑚 ) = 0.955× (1- (0.03+0.12+0.33+0.41+0.10)) = 0 
- ?̃?𝐻𝑃𝐹 = 𝜔𝑃𝐹(1 − ∑ 𝛽2
𝑚5
𝑚 ) = 0.814× (1- (0.07+0.26+0.28+0.19+0.20)) = 0 
- 𝑀𝐻𝑇𝑃 = ?̅?𝐻𝑇𝑃 + ?̃?𝐻𝑇𝑃 = 0.955+0= 0.955 
- 𝑀𝐻𝑃𝐹 = ?̅?𝐻𝑃𝐹 + ?̃?𝐻𝑃𝐹  = 0.814+0= 0.814 










′ ), and (?̃?𝐻𝑈
′ ), first we need to find 𝑘 using equation (6.8): 

































































 𝑘 =  (1 − (− + (0.002 × 0.049) + (0.002 × 0.052) + (0.002 × 0.035) + (0.002 ×
0.037) + (0.005 × 0.013) + − + (0.005 × 0.052) + (0.005 × 0.035) + (0.005 ×
0.037) + (0.015 × 0.013) + (0.015 × 0.049) + − + (0.015 × 0.035) + (0.015 ×
0.037) + (0.019 × 0.013) + (0.019 × 0.049) + (0.019 × 0.052) + − + (0.049 ×









─ + 0 + 0 + 0 + 0 +
0 + ─ + 0 + 0 + 0 +
0 + 0.001 + ─ + 0.001 + 0.001 +
0 + 0.001 + 0.001 + ─ + 0.001 +






Then, before using equations (6.12-6.13) to find (𝛽𝑚) and (𝑀𝐻𝑈), we need to utilise 
equations (6.8-6.11), to find (𝛽𝑚′), (?̅?𝐻𝑈
′ ), and (?̃?𝐻𝑈
′ ), as follow: 
?̅?𝐻𝑈
′ = 𝐾(?̅?𝐻𝑇𝑃?̅?𝐻𝑃𝐹) = 1.007× 0.955× 0.814= 0.783 
?̃?𝐻𝑈
′ = 𝐾(?̃?𝐻𝑇𝑃?̃?𝐻𝑃𝐹 + ?̃?𝑇𝑃?̅?𝐻𝑃𝐹 + ?̅?𝐻𝑇𝑃?̃?𝐻𝑃𝐹) = 
1.007×[(0×0)+(0.955×0)+(0×0.814)]=0 



































































4 , and 𝑀12
5 for the first two aggregations. These will be used with the 
third aggregation similar to the above aggregation process. The following are the 
aggregation of the criterion NTS with the aggregated result from TP and PF: 
𝑀12
𝑚  represents the aggregated subset of 𝑇?̃?𝑝1, and 𝑃?̃?𝑝1, while 𝑀3
𝑚 represents the subset 
𝑁𝑇?̃?𝑝1. Using the ER equation (6.6) can obtain the following: 
𝑀3
𝑚 = 𝜔𝑁𝑇𝑆𝛽3
𝑚,   where (𝑚 = 1,2,3,4,5) 
When,       𝑚= 1,  𝑀12
1 = 0.013,  𝑀3
1= 0.606×0.09 = 0.055 
𝑚= 2,  𝑀12
2 = 0.052,    𝑀3
2= 0.606×0.21 = 0.127 
𝑚= 3,  𝑀12
3 = 0.063,   𝑀3
3= 0.606×0.52 = 0.313 
𝑚= 4,  𝑀12
4 = 0.050,   𝑀3
4= 0.606×0.13 = 0.076 
𝑚= 5,  𝑀12
5 = 0.039,     𝑀3
5= 0.606×0.06 = 0.034 
When 𝑀𝐻12 represents the individual remaining belief for M12
m , and 𝑀𝐻𝑁𝑇𝑆  represents the 
individual remaining belief for M3
m, equation 6.7 can be applied as follows: 
- 𝑀𝐻𝑁𝑇𝑆 = ?̅?𝐻𝑁𝑇𝑆 + ?̃?𝐻𝑁𝑇𝑆 
?̅?𝐻𝑁𝑇𝑆 , ?̃?𝐻𝑁𝑇𝑆 can be found by applying equations (6.8-6.9) as follows:  
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- ?̅?𝐻𝑁𝑇𝑆 = 1 − 𝜔𝑁𝑇𝑆 = 1- 0.606= 0.394 
- ?̃?𝐻𝑁𝑇𝑆 = 𝜔𝑁𝑇𝑆(1 − ∑ 𝛽3
𝑚5
𝑚 ) = 0.606× (1- (0.09+0.21+0.52+0.13+0.06))= 0 
- 𝑀𝐻𝑁𝑇𝑆 = ?̅?𝐻𝑁𝑇𝑆 + ?̃?𝐻𝑁𝑇𝑆 = 0.394+0= 0.394 










′ ), and (?̃?𝐻𝑈
′ ), we find 𝑘 using equation (6.13): 































































 𝑘 =  (1 − (− + (0.013 × 0.127) + (0.013 × 0.313) + (0.013 × 0.076) + (0.013 ×
0.034) + (0.052 × 0.055) + − + (0.052 × 0.313) + (0.052 × 0.076) + (0.052 ×
0.034) + (0.063 × 0.055) + (0.063 × 0.127) + − + (0.063 × 0.076) + (0.063 ×
0.034) + (0.050 × 0.055) + (0.050 × 0.127) + (0.050 × 0.313) + − + (0.050 ×









─ + 0.002 + 0.004 + 0.001 + 0 +
0.003 + ─ + 0.016 + 0.004 + 0.002 +
0.003 + 0.008 + ─ + 0.005 + 0.002 +
0.003 + 0.006 + 0.016 + ─ + 0.002 +






Before using equations (6.13-6.15) to find (𝛽𝑚) and (𝑀𝐻𝑈), we need to utilise equations 
(6.11-6.12) to find (𝛽𝑚′), (?̅?𝐻𝑈
′ ), and (?̃?𝐻𝑈
′ ): 
?̅?𝐻𝑈




′ = 𝑘(?̃?𝐻12?̃?𝐻𝑁𝑇𝑆 + ?̃?𝐻12?̅?𝐻𝑁𝑇𝑆 + ?̃?𝐻𝑁𝑇𝑆?̅?𝐻12) = 
1.111×[(0×0.394)+(0.783×0)+(0×0.394)] = 0 




























2 𝑀𝐻𝑁𝑇𝑆 + 𝑀3
2𝑀𝐻12) = 






3 𝑀𝐻𝑁𝑇𝑆 + 𝑀3
3𝑀𝐻12) = 














5 𝑀𝐻𝑁𝑇𝑆 + 𝑀3
5𝑀𝐻12) = 
1.111×[(0.039×0.034)+(0.039×0.394)+(0.783×0.034)]= 0.048 















4 , and 𝑀123
5 for the first three aggregations. These will be used with 
the fourth aggregation similar to the above aggregation process. The following are the 
aggregation of the criterion F&S with the aggregated result from TP, PF and NTS: 
𝑀123
𝑚  represents the aggregated subset of 𝑇?̃?𝑝1, 𝑃?̃?𝑝1 and 𝑁𝑇?̃?𝑝1, while 𝑀4
𝑚 represents the 
subset F&S̃𝑝1. Using the ER equation (6.6) can obtain the following: 
𝑀4
𝑚 = 𝜔F&S𝛽4
𝑚,   where (𝑚 = 1,2,3,4,5) 
When,       𝑚= 1,  𝑀123
1 = 0.055,  𝑀4
1= 0.163×0.94= 0.153 
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𝑚= 2,  𝑀123
2 = 0.140,    𝑀4
2= 0.163×0.04= 0.007 
𝑚= 3,  𝑀123
3 = 0.322,   𝑀4
3= 0.163×0.02= 0.003 
𝑚= 4,  𝑀123
4 = 0.092,   𝑀4
4= 0.163×0 = 0 
𝑚= 5,  𝑀123
5 = 0.048,     𝑀4
5= 0.163×0= 0 
When 𝑀𝐻123 represents the individual remaining belief for M123
m , and 𝑀𝐻𝐹&𝑆 represents the 
individual remaining belief for M4
m, equation 6.7 can be applied as follows: 
- 𝑀𝐻F&S = ?̅?𝐻F&S + ?̃?𝐻F&S  
?̅?𝐻F&S , ?̃?𝐻F&S can be found by applying equations (6.8-6.9) as follows:  
- ?̅?𝐻F&S = 1 − 𝜔F&S = 1- 0.163= 0.837 
- ?̃?𝐻F&S = 𝜔F&S(1 − ∑ 𝛽4
𝑚5
𝑚 ) = 0.163× (1- (0.94+0.04+0.02+0+0))= 0 
- 𝑀𝐻F&S = ?̅?𝐻F&S + ?̃?𝐻F&S  = 0.837+0= 0.837 










′ ), and (?̃?𝐻𝑈
′ ), we find 𝑘 using equation (6.13): 































































 𝑘 =  (1 − (− + (0.055 × 0.007) + (0.055 × 0.003) + (0.055 × 0) + (0.055 × 0) +
(0.140 × 0.153) + − + (0.140 × 0.003) + (0.140 × 0) + (0.140 × 0) + (0.322 ×
0.153) + (0.322 × 0.007) + − + (0.322 × 0) + (0.322 × 0) + (0.092 × 0.153) +
(0.092 × 0.007) + (0.092 × 0.003) + − + (0.092 × 0) + (0.048 × 0.153) + (0.048 ×










─ + 0 + 0 + 0 + 0 +
0.022 + ─ + 0 + 0 + 0 +
0.049 + 0.002 + ─ + 0 + 0 +
0.014 + 0.001 + 0 + ─ + 0 +






Before using equations (6.13-6.15) to find (𝛽𝑚) and (𝑀𝐻𝑈), we need to utilise equations 
(6.11-6.12) to find (𝛽𝑚′), (?̅?𝐻𝑈
′ ), and (?̃?𝐻𝑈
′ ): 
?̅?𝐻𝑈
′ = 𝑘(?̅?𝐻123?̅?𝐻F&S) = 1.107× 0.346× 0.837= 0.317 
?̃?𝐻𝑈
′ = 𝑘(?̃?𝐻123?̃?𝐻F&S + ?̃?𝐻123?̅?𝐻F&S + ?̃?𝐻F&S?̅?𝐻123) = 
1.107×[(0×0)+(0.342×0)+(0×0.837)] = 0 




























2 𝑀𝐻F&S + 𝑀4
2𝑀𝐻123) = 






3 𝑀𝐻F&S + 𝑀4
3𝑀𝐻123) = 














5 𝑀𝐻F&S + 𝑀4
5𝑀𝐻123) = 
1.107×[(0.048×0)+(0.048×0.837)+(0.342×0)]= 0.045 
Accordingly, 𝛽1, 𝛽2, 𝛽3, 𝛽4, 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝛽5can be found using equation (6.14) as follows: 
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 = 0 
As a result, the aggregation of PR main criterion for pilot 1 can be presented as follows 
(see Table 6.19): 











II.2 Pilot 2 
II.2.1 Mapping process for lower-level MPRIs 
Based on the information given for each pilot presented on Table 6.1 (see section 6.4), the 
generic model on Figure 6.2 (see section 6.4.1) and the linguistic terms used for assessment 
presented on Table 6.2 (see section 6.4.1), the following are the mapping process from the 
lower-level MPRIs. This followed by the mapping process from the main criterion towards 
the goal in the following section. 
 
II.2.1.1 Working hours (PF-WH) 
Based on the information given in Table 6.1, the fuzzy evaluation for the marine pilot 2’s 
WH is as follows: 
𝑊?̃?𝑝2 = {(𝑉. 𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑, 0), (𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑, 0.30), (𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒, 0.70), (𝐵𝑎𝑑, 0), (𝑉. 𝐵𝑎𝑑, 0)} 
The harbour masters at this port have agreed on the fuzzy rules in Table (II.1) for mapping 
pilots’ WH to its associated criterion, PF, in order to assess pilot reliability based on WH. 
 





𝑅1: if WH assessed ‘V. Good’, then 100% ‘Neutral’ 
𝑅2: if WH assessed ‘Good’, then 80% ‘S. Fatigued’ and 20% ‘Neutral’ 
𝑅3: if WH assessed ‘Moderate’, then 80% ‘Moderate’ and 20% ‘S. Fatigued’ 
𝑅4: if WH assessed ‘Bad’, then 80% ‘Fatigued’ and 20% ‘V. Bad’ 
𝑅5: if WH assessed ‘V. Bad’, then 100% ‘V. Bad’ 
 
The fuzzy outputs from mapping WH to PF can be conducted based on given information 
from Pilot 2 and subject to the fuzzy rules from Table II.1. They are as follows:  
Based on 𝑅2 and 𝑅3, the result can transform into 0.06 Neutral (𝑂1 = 0.3 × 0.2), 0.38 S. 
Fatigued ( 𝑂2 = (0.3 × 0.8) + (0.7 × 0.2) ), and 0.56 Moderate ( 𝑂3 =  0.7 × 0.8 ), 
respectively. Therefore, the WH for Pilot 2 is assessed as follows: 
𝑃𝐹 − 𝑊𝐻𝑝2
= {(𝑁𝑒𝑢𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑙, 0.06), (𝑆. 𝐹𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑔𝑢𝑒𝑑, 0.38), (𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒, 0.56), (𝐹𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑔𝑢𝑒𝑑, 0), (𝑉. 𝐵𝑎𝑑, 0) 
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II.2.2.2 Working stresses (PF-WS) 
Based on the information given in Table 6.1, the fuzzy evaluation for the marine pilot 2’s 
WS is as follows: 
𝑊?̃?𝑝2 = {(𝑉. 𝐿𝑜𝑤, 0), (𝐿𝑜𝑤, 0), (𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒, 0), (𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ, 0.4), (𝑉. 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ, 0.6)} 
The harbour masters at this port have agreed on the fuzzy rules from Table (II.2) for 
mapping pilots’ WS to its associated criterion, PF, in order to assess pilot reliability based 
on WS. 
 





𝑅1: if WS assessed ‘V. Low’, then 100% ‘Neutral’ 
𝑅2: if WS assessed ‘Low’, then 90% ‘S. Fatigued’ and 10% ‘Moderate’ 
𝑅3: if WS assessed ‘Moderate’, then 80% ‘Moderate’ and 20% ‘Fatigued’ 
𝑅4: if WS assessed ‘High’, then 80% ‘Fatigued’ and 20% ‘V. Bad’ 
𝑅5: if WS assessed ‘V. High’, then 100% ‘V. Bad’ 
 
The fuzzy outputs from mapping WS to PF, conducted based on given information for Pilot 
2 and subject to fuzzy rules from Table II.2, are as follow:  
Based on 𝑅4 and 𝑅5, the result can transform into 0.32 Fatigued (𝑂4 = 0.4 × 0.8), and 0.68 
V. Bad (𝑂5 = (0.4 × 0.2) + (0.6 × 1)), respectively. Therefore, the WS for Pilot 2 is 
assessed as follows: 
𝑃𝐹 − 𝑊𝑆𝑝2 = {(𝑁𝑒𝑢𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑙, 0), (𝑆. 𝐹𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑔𝑢𝑒𝑑, 0), (𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒, 0), (𝐹𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑔𝑢𝑒𝑑, 0.32), (𝑉. 𝐵𝑎𝑑, 0.68)} 
 
II.2.2.3 Working environment (PF-WEnv) 
Based on the information given in Table 6.1, the fuzzy evaluation for the marine pilot 2’s 
WEnv is as follows: 
𝑊𝐸𝑛?̃?𝑝2 = {(𝑉. 𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑, 0), (𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑, 0), (𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒, 0.5), (𝐵𝑎𝑑, 0.5), (𝑉. 𝐵𝑎𝑑, 0)} 
The harbour masters at this port have agreed to the fuzzy rules of Table (II.3) for mapping 











𝑅1: if WEnv assessed ‘V. Good’, then 100% ‘Neutral’ 
𝑅2: if WEnv assessed ‘Good’, then 80% ‘S. Fatigued’ and 20% ‘Moderate’ 
𝑅3: if WEnv assessed ‘Moderate’, then 80% ‘Moderate’ and 20% ‘Fatigued’ 
𝑅4: if WEnv assessed ‘Bad’, then 80% ‘Fatigued’ and 20% ‘V. Bad’ 
𝑅5: if WEnv assessed ‘V. Bad’, then 100% ‘V. Bad’ 
 
The fuzzy outputs from mapping WEnv to PF, conducted based on given information from 
Pilot 2 and subject to fuzzy rules from Table II.3, are as follow:  
Based on 𝑅3 and 𝑅4 , the result can transform into 0.40 Moderate (𝑂3 = 0.5 × 0.8), 0.50 
Fatigued ( 𝑂4 = (0.5 × 0.2) + (0.5 × 0.8) ), and 0.10 V. Bad ( 𝑂5 = 0.5 × 0.2 ), 
respectively. Therefore, the WEnv for Pilot 2 is assessed as follows: 
𝑃𝐹 − 𝑊𝐸𝑛𝑣𝑝2
= {(𝑁𝑒𝑢𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑙, 0), (𝑆. 𝐹𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑔𝑢𝑒𝑑, 0), (𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒, 0.40), (𝐹𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑓𝑢𝑒𝑑, 0.50), (𝑉. 𝐵𝑎𝑑, 0.1)} 
 
II.2.2.4 Decision-making (NTS-DM) 
Based on the information given in Table 6.1, the fuzzy evaluation for the marine pilot 2’s 
DM is as follows: 
𝐷?̃?𝑝2 = {(𝑉. 𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑, 0), (𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑, 0.2), (𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒, 0.8), (𝐵𝑎𝑑, 0), (𝑉. 𝐵𝑎𝑑, 0)} 
The harbour masters at this port have agreed to the fuzzy rules from Table (II.4) for 
mapping pilots’ DM to its associated criterion, NTS, in order to assess pilot reliability based 
on DM. 
 






𝑅1: if DM assessed ‘V. Good’, then 100% ‘V. Good’ 
𝑅2: if DM assessed ‘Good’, then 80% ‘Skilful’ and 20% ‘V. Good’ 
𝑅3: if DM assessed ‘Average’, then 90% ‘Moderate’ and 10% ‘Bad’ 
𝑅4: if DM assessed ‘Bad’, then 80% ‘Bad’ and 20% ‘V. Bad’ 
𝑅5: if DM assessed ‘V. Bad’, then 100% ‘V. Bad’ 
 
The fuzzy outputs from mapping DM to NTS, conducted based on given information from 
Pilot 2 and subject to fuzzy rules from Table II.4, are as follows:  
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Based on 𝑅2and𝑅3, the result can transform into 0.04 V. Good (𝑂1 = 0.2 × 0.2), 0.16 
Good (𝑂2 = 0.2 × 0.8), 0.72 Moderate (𝑂3 = 0.8 × 0.9), and 0.08 Bad (𝑂4 = 0.8 × 0.1), 
respectively. Therefore, the DM for Pilot 2 is assessed as follows: 
𝑁𝑇𝑆 − 𝐷𝑀𝑝2
= {(𝑉. 𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑, 0.04), (𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑, 0.16), (𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒, 0.72), (𝐵𝑎𝑑, 0.08), (𝑉. 𝐵𝑎𝑑, 0)} 
 
II.2.2.5 Situation awareness (NTS-SA) 
Based on the information given in Table 6.1, the fuzzy evaluation for the marine pilot 2’s 
SA is as follows: 
𝑆?̃?𝑝2 = {(𝑉. 𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑, 0), (𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑, 0.6), (𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒, 0.4), (𝐵𝑎𝑑, 0), (𝑉. 𝐵𝑎𝑑, 0)} 
The harbour masters at this port have agreed to the fuzzy rules on Table (II.5) for mapping 
pilots’ SA to its associated criterion, NTS, in order to assess pilot reliability based on SA. 
 






𝑅1: if SA assessed ‘V. Good’, then 100% ‘V. Good’ 
𝑅2: if SA assessed ‘Good’, then 80% ‘Skilful’ and 20% ‘V .Good’ 
𝑅3: if SA assessed ‘Average’, then 90% ‘Moderate’ and 10% ‘Bad’ 
𝑅4: if SA assessed ‘Bad’, then 80% ‘Bad’ and 20% ‘V. Bad’ 
𝑅5: if SA assessed ‘V. Bad’, then 100% ‘V. Bad’ 
 
The fuzzy outputs from mapping SA to NTS, conducted based on given information for 
Pilot 2 and subject to fuzzy rules from Table II.5, are as follows:  
Based on 𝑅2and𝑅3, the result can transform into 0.12 V. Good (𝑂1 = 0.6 × 0.2), 0.48 
Good (𝑂2 = 0.6 × 0.8), 0.36 Moderate (𝑂3 = 0.4 × 0.9), and 0.04 Bad (𝑂4 = 0.4 × 0.1), 
respectively. Therefore, the SA for Pilot 2 is assessed as follows: 






II.2.2.6 Communication skills (NTS-CS) 
Based on the information given in Table 6.1, the fuzzy evaluation for the marine pilot 2’s 
CS is as follows: 
𝐶?̃?𝑝2 = {(𝑉. 𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑, 0), (𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑, 0.2), (𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒, 0.8), (𝐵𝑎𝑑, 0), (𝑉. 𝐵𝑎𝑑, 0)} 
The harbour masters at this port have agreed to the fuzzy rules on Table (II.6) for mapping 
pilots’ CS to its associated criterion, NTS, in order to assess pilot reliability based on CS. 
 
Table II.6 Fuzzy rule base belief structure for NTS- CS 
Communication 
Skills (CS) to 
Non-technical 
Skills (NTS) 
𝑅1: if CS assessed ‘V. Good’, then 100% ‘V. Good’ 
𝑅2: if CS assessed ‘Good’, then 80% ‘Skilful’ and 20% ‘V. Good’ 
𝑅3: if CS assessed ‘Average’, then 90% ‘Moderate’ and 10% ‘Bad’ 
𝑅4: if CS assessed ‘Bad’, then 80% ‘Bad’ and 20% ‘V. Bad’ 
𝑅5: if CS assessed ‘V. Bad’, then 100% ‘V. Bad’ 
 
The fuzzy outputs from mapping CS to NTS, conducted based on given information for 
Pilot 2 and subject to fuzzy rules on table II.6, are as follows:  
Based on 𝑅2and𝑅3, the result can transform into 0.04 V. Good (𝑂1 = 0.2 × 0.2), 0.16 Good 
(𝑂2 = 0.2 × 0.8 ), 0.72 Moderate (𝑂3 = 0.8 × 0.9 ), and 0.08 Bad (𝑂4 = 0.8 × 0.1 ), 
respectively. Therefore, the CS for Pilot 2 is assessed as follows: 
𝑁𝑇𝑆 − CS𝑝2 = {(𝑉. 𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑, 0.04), (𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑, 0.16), (𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒, 0.72), (𝐵𝑎𝑑, 0.08), (𝑉. 𝐵𝑎𝑑, 0)} 
 
II.2.2.7 Teamwork and leadership (NTS-T&L) 
Based on the information given in Table 6.1, the fuzzy evaluation for the marine pilot 2’s 
T&L is as follows: 
𝑇&?̃?𝑝2 = {(𝑉. 𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑, 0), (𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑, 0.6), (𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒, 0.4), (𝐵𝑎𝑑, 0), (𝑉. 𝐵𝑎𝑑, 0)} 
The harbour masters at this port have agreed to the fuzzy rules on Table (II.7) for mapping 











𝑅1: if T&L assessed ‘V. Good’, then 100% ‘V. Good’ 
𝑅2: if T&L assessed ‘Good’, then 80% ‘Skilful’ and 20% ‘V. Good’ 
𝑅3: if T&L assessed ‘Average’, then 90% ‘Moderate’ and 10% ‘Bad’ 
𝑅4: if T&L assessed ‘Bad’, then 80% ‘Bad’ and 20% ‘V. Bad’ 
𝑅5: if T&L assessed ‘V. Bad’, then 100% ‘V. Bad’ 
 
The fuzzy outputs from mapping T&L to NTS, conducted based on given information for 
Pilot 2 and subject to fuzzy rules on Table II.7, are as follows:  
Based on 𝑅2and𝑅3, the result can transform into 0.12 V. Good (𝑂1 = 0.6 × 0.2), 0.48 Good 
(𝑂2 = 0.6 × 0.8 ), 0.36 Moderate (𝑂3 = 0.4 × 0.9 ), and 0.04 Bad (𝑂4 = 0.4 × 0.1 ), 
respectively.Therefore, the T&L for Pilot 2 is assessed as follows: 
𝑁𝑇𝑆 − 𝑇&𝐿𝑝2 = {(𝑉. 𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑, 0.12), (𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑, 0.48), (𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒, 0.36), (𝐵𝑎𝑑, 0.04), (𝑉. 𝐵𝑎𝑑, 0)} 
 
II.2.2.8 Health Issues (F&S-HI) 
Based on the information given in Table 6.1, the fuzzy evaluation for the marine pilot 2’s 
HI is as follows: 
𝐻?̃?𝑝2 = {(𝐻𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ𝑦, 0), (𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑, 0.8), (𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒, 0.2), (𝐵𝑎𝑑, 0), (𝑆𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑒, 0)} 
The harbour masters at this port have agreed to the fuzzy rules on Table (II.8) for mapping 
pilots’ HI to its associated criterion, F&S, in order to assess pilot reliability based on HI. 
 
Table II.8 Fuzzy rule base belief structure for F&S-HI 
Health Issue 
(HI) to Fitness 
and Strength 
(F&S) 
𝑅1: if HI assessed ‘Healthy’, then 100% ‘Fit’ 
𝑅2: if HI assessed ‘Good’, then 90% ‘Good’ and 10% ‘Moderate’ 
𝑅3: if HI assessed ‘Moderate’, then 90% ‘Moderate’ and 10% ‘Bad’ 
𝑅4: if HI assessed ‘Bad’, then 80% ‘Bad’ and 20% ‘Unfit’ 
𝑅5: if HI assessed ‘Severe’, then 100% ‘Unfit’ 
 
 
The fuzzy outputs from mapping ‘HI’ to F&S, conducted based on given information for 
Pilot 2 and subject to fuzzy rules on Table II.8, are as follows:  
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Based on 𝑅2 and𝑅3 , the result can transform into 0.72 Good (𝑂2 = 0.8 × 0.9 ), 0.26 
Moderate (𝑂3 = (0.8 × 0.1) + (0.2 × 0.9)), and 0.02 Bad (𝑂4 = 0.2 × 0.1), respectively. 
Therefore, the HI for Pilot 2 is assessed as follows: 
𝐹&𝑆 − 𝐻𝐼𝑝2 = {(𝐹𝑖𝑡, 0), (𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑, 0.72), (𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒, 0.26), (𝐵𝑎𝑑, 0.02), (𝑈𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑡, 0)} 
 
II.2.2.9 Body strength (F&S-BS) 
Based on the information given in Table 6.1, the fuzzy evaluation for the marine pilot 2’s 
BS is as follows: 
𝐵?̃?𝑝2 = {(𝐹𝑖𝑡, 0), (𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑, 0.7), (𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒, 0.3), (𝑊𝑒𝑎𝑘𝑒, 0), (𝑉.𝑊𝑒𝑎𝑘𝑒, 0)} 
The harbour masters at this port have agreed to the fuzzy rules on Table (II.9) for mapping 
pilots’ BS to its associated criterion, F&S, in order to assess pilot reliability based on BS. 
 
Table II.9 Fuzzy rule base belief structure for F&S-BS 
Body Strength 
(BS) to Fitness 
and Strength 
(F&S) 
𝑅1: if BS assessed ‘Fit’, then 100% ‘Fit’ 
𝑅2: if BS assessed ‘Good’, then 90% ‘Good’ and 10% ‘Moderate’ 
𝑅3: if BS assessed ‘Moderate’, then 90% ‘Moderate’ and 10% ‘Bad’ 
𝑅4: if BS assessed ‘Weak’, then 80% ‘Bad’ and 20% ‘Unfit’ 
𝑅5: if BS assessed ‘V. Weak’, then 100% ‘Unfit’ 
 
 
The fuzzy outputs from mapping BS to F&S, conducted based on given information for 
Pilot 2 and subject to fuzzy rules on Table II.9, are as follows:  
Based on 𝑅2 and𝑅3 , the result can transform into 0.63 Good(𝑂2 = 0.7 × 0.9 ), 0.34 
Moderate (𝑂3 = (0.7 × 0.1) + (0.3 × 0.9)), and 0.03 Bad (𝑂4 = 0.3 × 0.1), respectively. 
Therefore, the BS for Pilot 2 is assessed as follows: 






II.2.3 Transforming quantitative data into qualitative 
II.2.3.1 Pilot’s qualification and pilotage licensing (TP-QPL) 
The harbour masters at this port have assigned the following marks of value to fuzzy rules 
to evaluate pilot reliability based on the pilot's QPL: 
1- If the pilot holds an approved diploma or a BSc in nautical science and an approved 
pilot license from the port authority, he will be given 50 per cent. The pilot must satisfy 
100 per cent of the port's minimum requirements. 
2- If the pilot holds an approved diploma with an approved certificate of competency class 
4 (COC IIII) as a 3rd officer, he will be given 60 per cent. Therefore, the pilot is 
evaluated as 20 per cent at minimum and 80 per cent at second minimum requirement. 
3- If the pilot holds an approved diploma with an approved certificate of competency class 
3 (COC III) as a 2nd officer or BSc with an approved (COC IIII) as a 3rd officer, then he 
will be given 70 per cent. Therefore, the pilot is evaluated as 80 per cent at second 
minimum requirement and 20 per cent on average, which represent the third 
requirement. 
4- If the pilot holds an approved diploma with an approved certificate of competency class 
2 (COC II) as a 1st officer or BSc with an approved (COC III) as a 2nd officer, then he 
will be given 80%. Therefore, the pilot is evaluated as 80 per cent average and 20 per 
cent second higher requirement. 
5- If the pilot holds an approved diploma with an approved certificate of competency class 
1 (COC I) as a master mariner or BSc with an approved (COC II) as a 1st officer, then 
he will be given 90%. Therefore, the pilot is evaluated as 80 per cent second required 
qualification and 20 per cent uppermost. 
6- If the pilot holds an approved BSc with an approved (COC I) as a master mariner, then 




According to the given pilots’ information, with reference to the above rules, Pilot 2's TP-
QPL is assessed based on his QPL as follows: 
𝑄𝑃?̃?𝑝2
= {(𝑈𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑜𝑠𝑡, 0), (𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑑 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑒𝑟, 0.2), (𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒, 0.8), (𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑑 𝑀𝑖𝑛. , 0), (𝑀𝑖𝑛. ,0)} 
The harbour masters at this port have agreed to the fuzzy rules on Table (II.10) for mapping 
pilots’ QPL to its associated criterion, TP, in order to assess pilot reliability based on QPL. 
 






𝑅1: if QPL assessed ‘Uppermost’, then 100% ‘V. Good’  
𝑅2: if QPL assessed ‘2nd  Higher’, then 80% ‘Good’ and 20% ‘V. Good’  
𝑅3: if QPL assessed ‘Average’, then 80% ‘Average’ and 20% ‘Good’ 
𝑅4: if QPL assessed ‘2nd  Min.’, then 90% ‘Low’ and 10% ‘Average’ 
𝑅5: if QPL assessed ‘Min’, then 100% ‘Basic’ 
 
 
The fuzzy outputs from mapping QPL to TP, conducted based on given information for 
Pilot 2 and subject to fuzzy rules on Table II.10, are as follow:  
Based on 𝑅2and𝑅3, the result can transform into 0.04 V. Good (𝑂1 = 0.2 × 0.2), 0.32 
Good (𝑂2 = (0.2 × 0.8) + (0.8 × 0.2)), and 0.64 Average (𝑂3 = 0.8 × 0.8), respectively. 
Therefore, the QPL for Pilot 2 is assessed as follows: 
𝑇𝑃 − 𝑄𝑃𝐿𝑝2 = {(𝑉. 𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑, 0.04), (𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑, 0.32), (𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒, 0.64), (𝐿𝑜𝑤, 0), (𝐵𝑎𝑠𝑖𝑐, 0)} 
 
II.2.3.2 Pilot’s special training (TP-ST) 
Similar to the requirements of pilot qualifications required by the port authority, there are 
sets of minimum basic training courses that are also essential for a pilot to be endorsed. 
According to the port authority requirements, the following are compulsory basic training 
courses that a pilot must have when applying for a pilotage license: 
1- Proficiency in Survival Craft (PSC); 
2- Personal Survival Technique (PST); 
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3- Fire Prevention and Firefighting (FPF); 
4- Elementary First Aid (EFA);  
5- Advanced Fire Prevention and Firefighting (AFF). 
The authority also recommends some extra training courses, but they are optional. These 
extra courses are: 
1- Global Maritime Distress and Safety System (GMDSS) training;  
2- Radar simulation training; 
3- Advanced Pilot Training (APT) course; 
4- Bridge Resource Management (BRM) training course;  
5- Port State Control (PSC) training;  
6- Ship-handling simulator. 
According to the experts’ opinions, having valid course certificates for more than nine 
courses makes one a ‘well-trained’ pilot. This information helps in developing the 
membership function used to evaluate pilots based on their ST. Accordingly, if the pilot 
holds one of these certificates, then 10 per cent will be given for each valid certificate; if 
the certificate is not valid, then 0 per cent is given. Based on the pilot’s given information 
in the test case, the following are the training courses that Pilot 2 has: 
1- Proficiency in survival craft (PSC) (Valid); 
2- Personal survival technique (PST) (Valid); 
3- Fire prevention and firefighting (FPFF) (Not Valid); 
4- Elementary first aid (EFA) (Valid); 
5- Advanced fire prevention and firefighting certificate (AFF) (Valid);  
6- Ship-handling simulator certificate (Valid); 
7- Global Maritime Distress and Safety System (GMDSS) certificate (Not Valid);  
8- Advanced Pilot Training (APT) certificate (Valid);  
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Based on the pilot’s stated valid training certificates, 60 per cent is given to Pilot 2. The 
membership function model constructed is shown in Figures (II.1). 
 
  
Figure II.1. The membership function for Pilot 2's special training (TP-ST) 
 
 
The horizontal axis represents the quantitative number, while the vertical axis represents 
the belief degrees. When a given quantitative number is found not ranging between two 
different grades, then 100 per cent will be given. According to the given pilot's information, 
with reference to the above information, Pilot 2's TP-ST is assessed based on his ST as 
follows: 
𝑆?̃?p2 = {(𝑊𝑒𝑙𝑙 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑑, 0), (𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑑, 0), (𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒, 0), (𝐿𝑜𝑤, 1), (𝐵𝑎𝑠𝑖𝑐, 0)} 
The harbour masters at this port have agreed to the fuzzy rules on Table (II.11) for mapping 
pilots’ ST to its associated criterion, TP, in order to assess pilot reliability based on ST. 
 






𝑅1:  if ST assessed ‘Well Trained’, then 100% ‘V. Good’  
𝑅2: if ST assessed ‘Trained’, then 80% ‘Good’ and 20% ‘V. Good’  
𝑅3: if ST assessed ‘Average’, then 80% ‘Average’ and 20% ‘Good’ 
𝑅4: if ST assessed ‘Low’, then 80% ‘Low’ and 20% ‘Average’ 





The fuzzy outputs from mapping ST to TP, conducted based on given information for Pilot 
2 and subject to fuzzy rules on Table II.11, are as follows:  
Based on 𝑅4 the result can transform into 0.2 V. Average (𝑂3 =  1 × 0.2), and 0.8 Low 
(𝑂4 = 1 × 0.8), respectively. Therefore, the ST for Pilot 2 is assessed as follows: 
𝑇𝑃 − 𝑆𝑇𝑝2 = {(𝑉. 𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑, 0), (𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑, 0), (𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒, 0.20), (𝐿𝑜𝑤, 0.8), (𝐵𝑎𝑠𝑖𝑐, 0)} 
 
II.2.3.3 Pilot’s working experience (TP-WEx) 
According to the given pilots’ information, a membership function model can be 
constructed based on the number of years served as a pilot, as shown in Figure (II.2). 
 
  
Figure II.2. The membership function for Pilot 2's working experience (TP-WEx) 
 
 
The horizontal axis represents the quantitative number, while the vertical axis represents 
the belief degrees. When a given quantitative number is found in the range of ℎ𝑛+1,𝑖(with 





 , if ℎ𝑛,𝑖 < ℎ𝑖 < ℎ𝑛+1,𝑖  
𝛽𝑛+1,𝑖 = 1 − 𝛽𝑛,𝑖 
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Where, 𝛽𝑛,𝑖 is the degree of belief of the given quantitative number with the grade 𝐻𝑛+1. 
Based on the given information from Pilot 2, the degree of belief for Pilot’s 2 TP-WEx can 
be calculated as follows: 
1- 𝐻𝑛+1 is the ‘High’ grade. 
2- 𝐻𝑛 is the ‘Average’ grade. 
3- ℎ𝑖= 13, ℎ𝑛,𝑖= 10, and ℎ𝑛+1,𝑖= 15. 
4- 𝛽𝑛,𝑖 = (15-13)/(15-10) = 0.4 with the ‘Average’ grade, and 𝛽𝑛+1,𝑖 = 1-0.4 = 0.6 with 
the ‘High’ grade. 
Therefore, the assessment of Pilot 2's TP-WExs is as follows: 
𝑊𝐸?̃?𝑝2 = {(𝑉.𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ, 0), (𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ, 0.6), (𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒, 0.4), (𝐿𝑜𝑤, 0), (𝑉. 𝐿𝑜𝑤, 0)} 
The harbour masters at this port have agreed to the fuzzy rules on Table (II.12) for mapping 
pilots’ WEx to its associated criterion, TP, in order to assess pilot reliability based on WEx. 
 







𝑅1: if WEx assessed ‘Very High’, then 100% ‘V. Good’  
𝑅2: if WEx assessed ‘High’, then 80% ‘Good’ and 20% ‘V. Good’  
𝑅3: if WEx assessed ‘Average’, then 80% ‘Average’ and 20% ‘Good’ 
𝑅4: if WEx assessed ‘Low’, then 90% ‘Low’ and 10% ‘Average’ 
𝑅5: if WEx assessed ‘V. Low’, then 100% ‘Basic’ 
 
 
The fuzzy outputs from mapping WEx to TP, conducted based on given information for 
Pilot 2 and subject to fuzzy rules on Table II.12, are as follows:  
Based on 𝑅2 and 𝑅3 the result can transform into 0.12 V. Good (𝑂1 =  0.6 × 0.2), 0.56 
Good (𝑂2 = (0.6 × 0.8) + (0.4 × 0.2)), and 0.32 Average (𝑂3 = 0.4 × 0.8), respectively. 
Therefore, the WEx for Pilot 2 is assessed as follows: 





II.2.3.4 Pilot’s age 
Due to the difficulty of how to assign a degree of belief to a pilot’s age, a range of 
assessments were proposed. Based on the experts’ opinions, that the membership function 
can be utilised in order to transform the grade for given quantitative data into a qualitative 
degree of beliefs, with reference to a study conducted by Riahi et al. (2012), the following 
rules were used: 
1- If the pilot is 60 years old, he is considered ‘Very old’. 
2- If the pilot is 50 years old, he is considered ‘Old’. 
3- If the pilot is 40 years old, he is considered ‘Mid-Aged’. 
4- If the pilot is 30 years old, he is considered ‘Young’. 
5- If the pilot is 20 years old, he is considered ‘Very Young’. 
Based on the information from each pilot, the membership function on Figure (II.3) 
represents the assessment F&S-OA of Pilot 2.  
 
 
Figure II.3. The membership function for Pilot 2's age (F&S-OA) 
 
The horizontal axis represents the quantitative number, while the vertical axis represents 
the belief degrees. When a given quantitative number is found in the range of ℎ𝑛+1,𝑖(with 
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 , if ℎ𝑛,𝑖 < ℎ𝑖 < ℎ𝑛+1,𝑖  
𝛽𝑛+1,𝑖 = 1 − 𝛽𝑛,𝑖 
Where, 𝛽𝑛,𝑖 is the degree of belief of the given quantitative number with the grade 𝐻𝑛+1. 
Based on the given information from Pilot 2, the degree of belief for Pilot 2's F&S-OA can 
be calculated as follows: 
1- 𝐻𝑛+1 is the ‘Old’ grade. 
2- 𝐻𝑛 is the ‘Mid Aged’ grade. 
3- ℎ𝑖= 43, ℎ𝑛,𝑖= 40, and ℎ𝑛+1,𝑖= 45. 
4- 𝛽𝑛,𝑖 = (45-43)/(45-40) = 0.7 with the ‘Mid Aged’ grade, and 𝛽𝑛+1,𝑖 = 1-0.7 = 0.3 with 
the ‘Old’ grade. 
Therefore, the assessment of Pilot 2's F&S-OA based on their information is as follows: 
𝑂?̃?p2 = {(𝑉𝑒𝑟𝑦 𝑌𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑔, 0), (𝑌𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑔, 0), (𝑀𝑖𝑑 𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑑, 0.7), (𝑂𝑙𝑑, 0.3), (𝑉𝑒𝑟𝑦 𝑂𝑙𝑑, 0)} 
The harbour masters at this port have agreed to the fuzzy rules on Table (II.13) for mapping 
pilots’ OA to its associated criterion, F&S, in order to assess pilot reliability based on OA. 
 
Table II.13 Fuzzy rule base belief structure for F&S-OA 
Operator Age 
(OA) to Fitness 
& Strength 
(F&S) 
𝑅1: if OA assessed ‘Very Young’, then 100% ‘Fit’  
𝑅2: if OA assessed ‘Young’, then 80% ‘Good’ and 20% ‘Fit’  
𝑅3: if OA assessed ‘Mid Aged’, then 90% ‘Moderate’ and 10% ‘Bad’ 
𝑅4: if OA assessed ‘Old’, then 80% ‘Bad’ and 20% ‘Unfit’ 
𝑅5: if OA assessed ‘Very Old’, then 100% ‘Unfit’ 
 
The fuzzy outputs from mapping OA to F&S, , conducted based on given information for 
Pilot 2 and subject to fuzzy rules on Table II.13, are as follows:  
Based on 𝑅3and 𝑅4, the result can transform into 0.63 Moderate (𝑂3 =  0.7 × 0.9), 0.31 
Bad (𝑂4 = (0.7 × 0.1) + (0.3 × 0.8)), and  0.06 Unfit (𝑂5 = 0.3 × 0.2), respectively. 
Therefore, the OA for Pilot 2 is assessed as follows: 
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𝐹&𝑆 − 𝑂𝐴𝑝2 = {(𝐹𝑖𝑡, 0), (𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑, 0), (𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒, 0.63), (𝐵𝑎𝑑, 0.31), (𝑈𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑡, 0.06)} 
 
II.2.3.5 Mapping main criteria to goal 
Following the aggregation process of all sub-criteria to their associated criterion, the main 
criterion can be further mapped similarly as above. Accordingly, the aggregated main 
criterion for Pilot 2 is as follows: 
𝑇?̃?p2 = {(𝑉. 𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑, 0.09), (𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑, 0.43), (𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒, 0.33), (𝐿𝑜𝑤, 0.14), (𝐵𝑎𝑠𝑖𝑐, 0)} 
𝑃?̃?p2 = {(𝑁𝑒𝑢𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑙, 0.01), (𝑆. 𝐹𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑔𝑢𝑒𝑑, 0.06), (𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒, 0.28), (𝐹𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑔𝑢𝑒𝑑, 0.36), (𝑉. 𝐵𝑎𝑑, 0.29)} 
𝑁𝑇?̃?p2 = {(𝑉. 𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑, 0.09), (𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑, 0.42), (𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒, 0.45), (𝐵𝑎𝑑, 0.04), (𝑉. 𝐵𝑎𝑑, 0)} 
𝐹&?̃?p2 = {(𝐹𝑖𝑡, 0), (𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑, 0.70), (𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒, 0.28), (𝐵𝑎𝑑, 0.03), (𝑈𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑡, 0)} 
The harbour masters at this port have agreed to the fuzzy rules on Table (II.14) for mapping 
Pilot 2 main criteria (TP, PF, NTS, and F&S) to the main goal, Pilot Reliability (PR). 
 
Table II.14 Fuzzy rule base belief structure for Main criteria to PR 
Technical 
Proficiency (TP) 
to Main Goal 
(PR) 
𝑅1: if TP assessed ‘V. Good’, then 100% ‘Very High’ 
𝑅2: if TP assessed ‘Good’, then 80% ‘High’ and 20% ‘Very High’  
𝑅3: if TP assessed ‘Average’, then 80% ‘Moderate’ and 20% ‘High’ 
𝑅4: if TP assessed ‘Low’, then 80% ‘Low’ and 20% ‘Very  Low’ 
𝑅5: if TP assessed ‘Basic’, then 100% ‘Very Low’ 
Personal Fatigue 
(PF) to Main 
Goal (PR) 
𝑅1: if TP assessed ‘Neutral, then 100% ‘Very High’ 
𝑅2: if TP assessed ‘S. Fatigued’, then 80% ‘High’ and 20% ‘Very High’  
𝑅3: if TP assessed ‘Moderate’, then 80% ‘Moderate’ and 20% ‘High’ 
𝑅4: if TP assessed ‘Fatigued’, then 80% ‘Low’ and 20% ‘Very Low’ 
𝑅5: if TP assessed ‘Very Bad’, then 100% ‘Very Low’ 
Non-Technical 
Skills (NTS) to 
Main Goal (PR) 
𝑅1: if TP assessed ‘V. Good’, then 100% ‘Very High’ 
𝑅2: if TP assessed ‘Good’, then 80% ‘High’ and 20% ‘Very High’  
𝑅3: if TP assessed ‘Moderate’, then 80% ‘Moderate’ and 20% ‘High’ 
𝑅4: if TP assessed ‘Bad’, then 80% ‘Low’ and 20% ‘Very Low’ 
𝑅5: if TP assessed ‘V. Bad’, then 100% ‘Very Low’ 
Fitness & 
Strength (F&S) 
to Main Goal 
(PR) 
𝑅1: if TP assessed ‘Fit’, then 100% ‘Very High’ 
𝑅2: if TP assessed ‘Good’, then 80% ‘High’ and 20% ‘V. High’  
𝑅3: if TP assessed ‘Moderate’, then 80% ‘Moderate’ and 20% ‘High’ 
𝑅4: if TP assessed ‘Bad’, then 80% ‘Low’ and 20% ‘Very Low’ 






Accordingly, the results obtained from the mapping process for Pilot 2 are as follows: 
𝑃𝑅𝑇𝑃𝑝2 = {(𝑉.𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ, 0.18), (𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ, 0.38), (𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒, 0.30), (𝐿𝑜𝑤, 0.11), (𝑉. 𝐿𝑜𝑤, 0.03)} 
𝑃𝑅𝑃𝐹𝑝2 = {(𝑉.𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ, 0.02), (𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ, 0.08), (𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒, 0.26), (𝐿𝑜𝑤, 0.29), (𝑉. 𝐿𝑜𝑤, 0.36)} 
𝑃𝑅𝑁𝑇𝑆𝑝2 = {(𝑉.𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ, 0.18), (𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ, 0.38), (𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒, 0.40), (𝐿𝑜𝑤, 0.03), (𝑉. 𝐿𝑜𝑤, 0.01)} 
𝑃𝑅𝐹&𝑆𝑝2 = {(𝑉.𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ, 0.14), (𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ, 0.58), (𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒, 0.25), (𝐿𝑜𝑤, 0.02), (𝑉. 𝐿𝑜𝑤, 0.01)} 
 
II.2.4 Fuzzy set aggregation process 
This section follows the same process as described on section (II.1.1-II.1.4). the result are 
presented as follows: 
 











 𝑇?̃?𝑄𝑃𝐿 0.089 0.04 0.32 0.64 0 0 
𝑇?̃?𝑆𝑇 0.289 0 0 0.20 0.80 0 
𝑇?̃?𝑊𝐸𝑥 0.622 0.12 0.56 0.32 0 0 
Aggregation result 0.02 0.10 0.09 0.43 0.33 
 
   











 𝑃?̃?𝑊𝐻 0.210 0.06 0.38 0.56 0 0 
𝑃?̃?𝑊𝑆 0.366 0 0 0 0.32 0.68 
𝑃?̃?𝑊𝐸𝑛𝑣 0.424 0 0 0.40 0.50 0.10 
Aggregation result 0.01 0.29 0.01 0.06 0.28 
 
 











 𝑁𝑇?̃?𝐷𝑀 0.075 0.04 0.16 0.72 0.08 0 
𝑁𝑇?̃?𝑆𝐴 0.155 0.12 0.48 0.36 0.04 0 
𝑁𝑇?̃?𝐶𝑆 0.234 0.06 0.24 0.63 0.07 0 
𝑁𝑇?̃?𝑇&𝐿 0.536 0.12 0.48 0.36 0.04 0 




















 𝐹&?̃?𝑂𝐴 0.049 0 0 0.63 0.31 0.06 
𝐹&?̃?𝐻𝐼 0.558 0 0.72 0.26 0.02 0 
𝐹&?̃?𝐵𝑆 0.393 0 0.63 0.34 0.03 0 















 𝑃𝑅𝑇𝑃 0.045 0.18 0.38 0.30 0.11 0.03 
𝑃𝑅𝑃𝐹 0.186 0.02 0.08 0.26 0.29 0.36 
𝑃𝑅𝑁𝑇𝑆 0.606 0.18 0.38 0.40 0.03 0.01 
𝑃𝑅𝐹&𝑆 0.163 0.14 0.58 0.25 0.02 0.01 
Aggregation result 0.15 0.38 0.37 0.06 0.04 
 
 
II.2.5 Obtaining a pilot’s 2 reliability using utility techniques  
The result obtained from the aggregation of the 4 main criteria for each pilot, as shown on 
previous section, shows this is not a straightforward way to obtain a crisp reliability value 
for the assessed pilot. The aggregation process for Pilot 2's reliability is identified as 
follows: 
𝑃?̃? = {(Very High, 0.15), (High, 0.38), (Moderate, 0.37), (Low, 0.06), (Very Low, 0.04)} 
The fuzzy terms used to express the goal use five linguistic variables, where the highest 
preference term used is (Very High) while the lowest linguistic preference used is (Very 
Low). The utility value for assessing the reliability of a marine pilot can be identified as 








Table II.20 The reliability value for Pilot 2 
𝐻𝑛 Very High High Moderate Low Very Low 





















 = 0.15+ 0.37+ 0.37+ 0.06+ 0.04= 1             𝛽𝐻 = 0 
𝛽𝑛𝑢(𝐻𝑛) 0.15 0.281 0.187 0.015 0 
The reliability value for Pilot 2 = ∑ 𝛽𝑛𝑢(𝐻𝑛)
5
𝑛=1 = 0.6298 
 
 
II.2.6 Sensitivity analysis 




V. Good Good Average Low Basic 
𝑇?̃?𝑄𝑃𝐿 
Main 0.04 0.32 0.64 0 0 
0.1 0.14 0.32 0.54 0 0 
0.2 0.24 0.32 0.44 0 0 
0.3 0.34 0.32 0.34 0 0 
𝑇?̃?𝑆𝑇 
Main 0 0 0.2 0.8 0 
0.1 0.1 0 0.2 0.7 0 
0.2 0.2 0 0.2 0.6 0 
0.3 0.3 0 0.2 0.5 0 
𝑇?̃?𝑊𝐸𝑥 
Main 0.12 0.56 0.32 0 0 
0.1 0.22 0.56 0.22 0 0 
0.2 0.32 0.56 0.12 0 0 
0.3 0.42 0.56 0.02 0 0 
 
 




Neutral S. Fatigues Moderate Fatigued V. Bad 
𝑃?̃?𝑊𝐻 
Main 0.06 0.38 0.56 0 0 
0.1 0.16 0.38 0.46 0 0 
0.2 0.26 0.38 0.36 0 0 
0.3 0.36 0.38 0.26 0 0 
𝑃?̃?𝑊𝑆 
Main 0 0 0 0.32 0.68 
0.1 0.1 0 0 0.32 0.58 
0.2 0.2 0 0 0.32 0.48 
0.3 0.3 0 0 0.32 0.38 
𝑃?̃?𝑊𝐸𝑛𝑣 
Main 0 0 0.4 0.5 0.1 
0.1 0.1 0 0.4 0.5 0 
0.2 0.2 0 0.4 0.4 0 

















V. Good Good Moderate Bad V. Bad 
𝑁𝑇?̃?𝐷𝑀 
Main 0.04 0.16 0.72 0.08 0 
0.1 0.14 0.16 0.70 0 0 
0.2 0.24 0.16 0.60 0 0 
0.3 0.34 0.16 0.50 0 0 
𝑁𝑇?̃?𝑆𝐴 
Main 0.12 0.48 0.36 0.04 0 
0.1 0.22 0.48 0.30 0 0 
0.2 0.32 0.48 0.20 0 0 
0.3 0.42 0.48 0.10 0 0 
𝑁𝑇?̃?𝐶𝑆 
Main 0.06 0.24 0.63 0.07 0 
0.1 0.16 0.24 0.60 0 0 
0.2 0.26 0.24 0.50 0 0 
0.3 0.36 0.24 0.40 0 0 
𝑁𝑇?̃?𝑇&𝐿 
Main 0.12 0.48 0.36 0.04 0 
0.1 0.22 0.48 0.30 0 0 
0.2 0.32 0.48 0.20 0 0 
0.3 0.42 0.48 0.10 0 0 
 
 




Fit Good Moderate Bad Unfit 
𝐹&?̃?𝑂𝐴 
Main 0 0 0.63 0.31 0.06 
0.1 0.1 0 0.63 0.27 0 
0.2 0.2 0 0.63 0.17 0 
0.3 0.3 0 0.63 0.07 0 
𝐹&?̃?𝐻𝐼 
Main 0 0.72 0.26 0.02 0 
0.1 0.1 0.72 0.18 0 0 
0.2 0.2 0.72 0.08 0 0 
0.3 0.3 0.70 0 0 0 
𝐹&?̃?𝐵𝑆 
Main 0 0.63 0.34 0.03 0 
0.1 0.1 0.63 0.27 0 0 
0.2 0.2 0.63 0.17 0 0 
0.3 0.3 0.63 0.07 0 0 
 
 
According to the above increment and decrement process, the utility value for the goals in 








Table II.25 Alteration of the median of Pilot 2's reliability due to lowest preference decrement 
Sub-
criterion 
Alteration of the median reliability value of a pilot’s duo to the following decrease 
in the degree of belief associated to the lowest preferences linguistic term of the 
median fuzzy set of each sub-criterion 
Main - 0.1 - 0.2 - 0.3 
QPL 0.6298 0.6299 0.6299 0.6300 
ST 0.6298 0.6302 0.6306 0.6310 
WEx 0.6298 0.6309 0.6320 0.6332 
WH 0.6298 0.6308 0.6317 0.6327 
WS 0.6298 0.6338 0.6379 0.6419 
WEnv 0.6298 0.6354 0.6398 0.6443 
DM 0.6298 0.6323 0.6342 0.6362 
SA 0.6298 0.6348 0.6392 0.6437 
CS 0.6298 0.6388 0.6459 0.6531 
T&L 0.6298 0.6580 0.6824 0.7079 
OA 0.6298 0.6300 0.6302 0.6303 
HI 0.6298 0.6334 0.6370 0.6401 


























Main -0.1 -0.2 -0.3
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II.3 Pilot 3 
II.3.1 Mapping process for lower-level MPRI 
II.3.1.1 Working hours (PF-WH) 
Based on the information given in Table 6.1, the fuzzy evaluation for the marine pilot 3’s 
WH is as follows: 
𝑊?̃?𝑝3 = {(𝑉. 𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑, 0), (𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑, 0), (𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒, 0), (𝐵𝑎𝑑, 0.3), (𝑉. 𝐵𝑎𝑑, 0.7)} 
The harbour masters at this port have agreed on the fuzzy rules in Table (II.26) for mapping 
pilots’ WH to its associated criterion, PF, in order to assess pilot reliability based on WH. 
 





𝑅1: if WH assessed ‘V. Good’, then 100% ‘Neutral’ 
𝑅2: if WH assessed ‘Good’, then 80% ‘S. Fatigued’ and 20% ‘Neutral’ 
𝑅3: if WH assessed ‘Moderate’, then 80% ‘Moderate’ and 20% ‘S. Fatigued’ 
𝑅4: if WH assessed ‘Bad’, then 80% ‘Fatigued’ and 20% ‘V. Bad’ 
𝑅5: if WH assessed ‘V. Bad’, then 100% ‘V. Bad’ 
 
 
The fuzzy outputs from mapping WH to PF can be conducted based on given information 
from Pilot 3 and subject to the fuzzy rules from Table II.26. They are as follows:  
Based on 𝑅4 and 𝑅5, the result can transform into 0.24 Fatigued (𝑂4 = 0.3 × 0.8), and  
0.76 V. Bad (𝑂5 = (0.3 × 0.2) + (0.7 × 1)), respectively. Therefore, the WH for Pilot 2 
is assessed as follows: 
𝑃𝐹 − 𝑊𝐻𝑝3
= {(𝑁𝑒𝑢𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑙, 0), (𝑆. 𝐹𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑔𝑢𝑒𝑑, 0), (𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒, 0), (𝐹𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑔𝑢𝑒𝑑, 0.24), (𝑉. 𝐵𝑎𝑑, 0.76)} 
 
II.3.1.2 Working stresses (PF-WS) 
Based on the information given in Table 6.1, the fuzzy evaluation for the marine pilot 3’s 
WS is as follows: 
𝑊?̃?𝑝3 = {(𝑉. 𝐿𝑜𝑤, 0), (𝐿𝑜𝑤, 0), (𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒, 0.4), (𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ, 0.6), (𝑉. 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ, 0)} 
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The harbour masters at this port have agreed on the fuzzy rules from Table (II.27) for 
mapping pilots’ WS to its associated criterion, PF, in order to assess pilot reliability based 
on WS. 
 





𝑅1: if WS assessed ‘V. Low’, then 100% ‘Neutral’ 
𝑅2: if WS assessed ‘Low’, then 90% ‘S. Fatigued’ and 10% ‘Moderate’ 
𝑅3: if WS assessed ‘Moderate’, then 80% ‘Moderate’ and 20% ‘Fatigued’ 
𝑅4: if WS assessed ‘High’, then 80% ‘Fatigued’ and 20% ‘V. Bad’ 
𝑅5: if WS assessed ‘V. High’, then 100% ‘V. Bad’ 
 
 
The fuzzy outputs from mapping WS to PF, conducted based on given information for Pilot 
3 and subject to fuzzy rules from Table II.27, are as follow:  
Based on 𝑅3and 𝑅4, the result can transform into 0.32 Moderate (𝑂3 = 0.4 × 0.8), 0.56 
Fatigued ( 𝑂4 = (0.4 × 0.2) + (0.6 × 0.8) ), and 0.12 V. Bad ( 𝑂5 = 0.6 × 0.2 ), 
respectively. Therefore, the WS for Pilot 3 is assessed as follows: 
𝑃𝐹 − 𝑊𝑆𝑝3
= {(𝑁𝑒𝑢𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑙, 0), (𝑆. 𝐹𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑔𝑢𝑒𝑑, 0), (𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒, 0.32), (𝐹𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑔𝑢𝑒𝑑, 0.56), (𝑉. 𝐵𝑎𝑑, 0.12)} 
 
II.3.1.3 Working environment (PF-WEnv) 
Based on the information given in Table 6.1, the fuzzy evaluation for the marine pilot 3’s 
WEnv is as follows: 
𝑊𝐸𝑛?̃?𝑝3 = {(𝑉. 𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑, 0), (𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑, 0), (𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒, 0.3), (𝐵𝑎𝑑, 0.7), (𝑉. 𝐵𝑎𝑑, 0)} 
The harbour masters at this port have agreed to the fuzzy rules of Table (II.28) for 
mapping pilots’ WEnv to its associated criterion, PF, in order to assess pilot reliability 













𝑅1: if WEnv assessed ‘V. Good’, then 100% ‘Neutral’ 
𝑅2: if WEnv assessed ‘Good’, then 80% ‘S. Fatigued’ and 20% ‘Moderate’ 
𝑅3: if WEnv assessed ‘Moderate’, then 80% ‘Moderate’ and 20% ‘Fatigued’ 
𝑅4: if WEnv assessed ‘Bad’, then 80% ‘Fatigued’ and 20% ‘V. Bad’ 
𝑅5: if WEnv assessed ‘V. Bad’, then 100% ‘V. Bad’ 
 
The fuzzy outputs from mapping WEnv to PF, conducted based on given information from 
Pilot 3 and subject to fuzzy rules from Table II.28, are as follow:  
Based on 𝑅3and 𝑅4, the result can transform into 0.24 Moderate (𝑂3 = 0.3 × 0.8), 0.62 
Fatigued ( 𝑂4 = (0.3 × 0.2) + (0.7 × 0.8) ), and 0.14 V. Bad ( 𝑂5 = 0.7 × 0.2 ), 
respectively. Therefore, the WEnv for Pilot 3 is assessed as follows: 
𝑃𝐹 − 𝑊𝐸𝑛𝑣𝑝3
= {(𝑁𝑒𝑢𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑙, 0), (𝑆. 𝐹𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑔𝑢𝑒𝑑, 0), (𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒, 0.24), (𝐹𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑓𝑢𝑒𝑑, 0.62), (𝑉. 𝐵𝑎𝑑, 0.14)} 
 
II.3.1.4 Decision-making (NTS-DM) 
Based on the information given in Table 6.1, the fuzzy evaluation for the marine pilot 3’s 
DM is as follows: 
𝐷?̃?𝑝3 = {(𝑉. 𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑, 0.4), (𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑, 0.6), (𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒, 0), (𝐵𝑎𝑑, 0), (𝑉. 𝐵𝑎𝑑, 0)} 
The harbour masters at this port have agreed to the fuzzy rules from Table (II.29) for 
mapping pilots’ DM to its associated criterion, NTS, in order to assess pilot reliability based 
on DM. 
 






𝑅1: if DM assessed ‘V. Good’, then 100% ‘V. Good’ 
𝑅2: if DM assessed ‘Good’, then 80% ‘Skilful’ and 20% ‘V. Good’ 
𝑅3: if DM assessed ‘Average’, then 90% ‘Moderate’ and 10% ‘Bad’ 
𝑅4: if DM assessed ‘Bad’, then 80% ‘Bad’ and 20% ‘V. Bad’ 
𝑅5: if DM assessed ‘V. Bad’, then 100% ‘V. Bad’ 
 
 
The fuzzy outputs from mapping DM to NTS, conducted based on given information from 
Pilot 3 and subject to fuzzy rules from Table II.29, are as follows:  
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Based on 𝑅1and 𝑅2, the result can transform into 0.52 V. Good (𝑂1 = (0.4 × 1) + (0.6 ×
0.2)), and 0.48 Good (𝑂2 = 0.6 × 0.8), respectively. Therefore, the DM for Pilot 3 is 
assessed as follows: 
𝑁𝑇𝑆 − 𝐷𝑀𝑝3 = {(𝑉. 𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑, 0.52), (𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑, 0.48), (𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒, 0), (𝐵𝑎𝑑, 0), (𝑉. 𝐵𝑎𝑑, 0)} 
 
II.3.1.5 Situation awareness (NTS-SA) 
Based on the information given in Table 6.1, the fuzzy evaluation for the marine pilot 3’s 
SA is as follows: 
𝑆?̃?𝑝3 = {(𝑉. 𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑, 0.2), (𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑, 0.8), (𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒, 0), (𝐵𝑎𝑑, 0), (𝑉. 𝐵𝑎𝑑, 0)} 
The harbour masters at this port have agreed to the fuzzy rules on Table (II.30) for mapping 
pilots’ SA to its associated criterion, NTS, in order to assess pilot reliability based on SA. 
 






𝑅1: if SA assessed ‘V. Good’, then 100% ‘V. Good’ 
𝑅2: if SA assessed ‘Good’, then 80% ‘Skilful’ and 20% ‘V .Good’ 
𝑅3: if SA assessed ‘Average’, then 90% ‘Moderate’ and 10% ‘Bad’ 
𝑅4: if SA assessed ‘Bad’, then 80% ‘Bad’ and 20% ‘V. Bad’ 
𝑅5: if SA assessed ‘V. Bad’, then 100% ‘V. Bad’ 
 
The fuzzy outputs from mapping SA to NTS, conducted based on given information for 
Pilot 3 and subject to fuzzy rules from Table II.30, are as follows:  
Based on 𝑅1and 𝑅2, the result can transform into 0.36 V. Good(𝑂1 = (0.2 × 1) + (0.8 ×
0.2)), and 0.64 Good (𝑂2 = 0.8 × 0.8), respectively. Therefore, the SA for Pilot 3 is 
assessed as follows: 
𝑁𝑇𝑆 − 𝑆𝐴𝑝3 = {(𝑉. 𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑, 0.36), (𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑, 0.64), (𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒, 0), (𝐵𝑎𝑑, 0), (𝑉. 𝐵𝑎𝑑, 0)}. 
 
II.3.1.6 Communication skills (NTS-CS) 
Based on the information given in Table 6.1, the fuzzy evaluation for the marine pilot 3’s 
CS is as follows: 
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𝐶?̃?𝑝3 = {(𝑉. 𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑, 0), (𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑, 0.5), (𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒, 0.5), (𝐵𝑎𝑑, 0), (𝑉. 𝐵𝑎𝑑, 0)} 
The harbour masters at this port have agreed to the fuzzy rules on Table (II.31) for mapping 
pilots’ CS to its associated criterion, NTS, in order to assess pilot reliability based on CS. 
 
Table II.31 Fuzzy rule base belief structure for NTS- CS 
Communication 
Skills (CS) to 
Non-technical 
Skills (NTS) 
𝑅1: if CS assessed ‘V. Good’, then 100% ‘V. Good’ 
𝑅2: if CS assessed ‘Good’, then 80% ‘Skilful’ and 20% ‘V. Good’ 
𝑅3: if CS assessed ‘Average’, then 90% ‘Moderate’ and 10% ‘Bad’ 
𝑅4: if CS assessed ‘Bad’, then 80% ‘Bad’ and 20% ‘V. Bad’ 
𝑅5: if CS assessed ‘V. Bad’, then 100% ‘V. Bad’ 
 
The fuzzy outputs from mapping CS to NTS, conducted based on given information for 
Pilot 3 and subject to fuzzy rules on table II.31, are as follows:  
Based on 𝑅2and 𝑅3, the result can transform into 0.10 V. Good (𝑂1 = 0.5 × 0.2), 0.40 Good 
(𝑂2 = 0.5 × 0.8 ), 0.45 Moderate (𝑂3 = 0.5 × 0.9 ), and 0.05 Bad (𝑂4 = 0.5 × 0.1 ), 
respectively. Therefore, the CS for Pilot 3 is assessed as follows: 
𝑁𝑇𝑆 − CS𝑝3 = {(𝑉. 𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑, 0.10), (𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑, 0.40), (𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒, 0.45), (𝐵𝑎𝑑, 0.05), (𝑉. 𝐵𝑎𝑑, 0)} 
 
II.3.1.7 Teamwork and leadership (NTS-T&L) 
Based on the information given in Table 6.1, the fuzzy evaluation for the marine pilot 3’s 
T&L is as follows: 
𝑇&?̃?𝑝3 = {(𝑉. 𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑, 0), (𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑, 0), (𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒, 0.4), (𝐵𝑎𝑑, 0.6), (𝑉. 𝐵𝑎𝑑, 0)} 
The harbour masters at this port have agreed to the fuzzy rules on Table (II.32) for mapping 
pilots’ T&L to its associated criterion, NTS, in order to assess pilot reliability based on T&L. 
 






𝑅1: if T&L assessed ‘V. Good’, then 100% ‘V. Good’ 
𝑅2: if T&L assessed ‘Good’, then 80% ‘Skilful’ and 20% ‘V. Good’ 
𝑅3: if T&L assessed ‘Average’, then 90% ‘Moderate’ and 10% ‘Bad’ 
𝑅4: if T&L assessed ‘Bad’, then 80% ‘Bad’ and 20% ‘V. Bad’ 




The fuzzy outputs from mapping T&L to NTS, conducted based on given information for 
Pilot 3 and subject to fuzzy rules on Table II.32, are as follows:  
Based on 𝑅3and 𝑅4, the result can transform into 0.36 Moderate (𝑂3 = 0.4 × 0.9), 0.52 
Bad (𝑂4 = (0.4 × 0.1) + (0.6 × 0.8)), and 0.12 V. Bad(𝑂5 = 0.6 × 0.2), respectively. 
Therefore, the T&L for Pilot 3 is assessed as follows: 
𝑁𝑇𝑆 − 𝑇&𝐿𝑝3 = {(𝑉. 𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑, 0), (𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑, 0), (𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒, 0.36), (𝐵𝑎𝑑, 0.52), (𝑉. 𝐵𝑎𝑑, 0.12)} 
 
II.3.1.8 Health Issues (F&S-HI) 
Based on the information given in Table 6.1, the fuzzy evaluation for the marine pilot 3’s 
HI is as follows: 
𝐻?̃?𝑝3 = {(𝐻𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ𝑦, 0), (𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑, 0), (𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒, 1), (𝐵𝑎𝑑, 0), (𝑆𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑒, 0)} 
The harbour masters at this port have agreed to the fuzzy rules on Table (II.33) for mapping 
pilots’ HI to its associated criterion, F&S, in order to assess pilot reliability based on HI. 
 
Table II.33 Fuzzy rule base belief structure for F&S-HI 
Health Issue 
(HI) to Fitness 
and Strength 
(F&S) 
𝑅1: if HI assessed ‘Healthy’, then 100% ‘Fit’ 
𝑅2: if HI assessed ‘Good’, then 90% ‘Good’ and 10% ‘Moderate’ 
𝑅3: if HI assessed ‘Moderate’, then 90% ‘Moderate’ and 10% ‘Bad’ 
𝑅4: if HI assessed ‘Bad’, then 80% ‘Bad’ and 20% ‘Unfit’ 
𝑅5: if HI assessed ‘Severe’, then 100% ‘Unfit’ 
 
 
The fuzzy outputs from mapping ‘HI’ to F&S, conducted based on given information for 
Pilot 3 and subject to fuzzy rules on Table II.33, are as follows:  
Based on 𝑅3, the result can transform into 0.90 Moderate (𝑂3 = 1 × 0.9), and 0.10 Bad 
(𝑂4 = 1 × 0.1), respectively. Therefore, the HI for Pilot 3 is assessed as follows: 






II.3.1.9 Body strength (F&S-BS) 
Based on the information given in Table 6.1, the fuzzy evaluation for the marine pilot 3’s 
BS is as follows: 
𝐵?̃?𝑝3 = {(𝐹𝑖𝑡, 0), (𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑, 0), (𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒, 0.8), (𝑊𝑒𝑎𝑘𝑒, 0.2), (𝑉.𝑊𝑒𝑎𝑘𝑒, 0)} 
The harbour masters at this port have agreed to the fuzzy rules on Table (II.34) for mapping 
pilots’ BS to its associated criterion, F&S, in order to assess pilot reliability based on BS. 
 
Table II.34 Fuzzy rule base belief structure for F&S-BS 
Body Strength 
(BS) to Fitness 
and Strength 
(F&S) 
𝑅1: if BS assessed ‘Fit’, then 100% ‘Fit’ 
𝑅2: if BS assessed ‘Good’, then 90% ‘Good’ and 10% ‘Moderate’ 
𝑅3: if BS assessed ‘Moderate’, then 90% ‘Moderate’ and 10% ‘Bad’ 
𝑅4: if BS assessed ‘Weak’, then 80% ‘Bad’ and 20% ‘Unfit’ 
𝑅5: if BS assessed ‘V. Weak’, then 100% ‘Unfit’ 
 
 
The fuzzy outputs from mapping BS to F&S, conducted based on given information for 
Pilot 3 and subject to fuzzy rules on Table II.34, are as follows:  
Based on 𝑅3and 𝑅4, the result can transform into 0.72 Moderate (𝑂3 = 0.8 × 0.9), 0.24 
Bad (𝑂4 = (0.8 × 0.1) + (0.2 × 0.8)), and 0.04 Unfit (𝑂5 = 0.2 × 0.2), respectively. 
Therefore, the BS for Pilot 3 is assessed as follows: 
𝐹&𝑆 − 𝐵𝑆𝑝3 = {(𝐹𝑖𝑡, 0), (𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑, 0), (𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒, 0.72), (𝐵𝑎𝑑, 0.24), (𝑈𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑡, 0.04)} 
 
II.3.2 Transforming quantitative data into qualitative 
II.3.2.1 Pilot’s qualification and pilotage licensing (TP-QPL) 
The harbour masters at this port have assigned the following marks of value to fuzzy rules 
to evaluate pilot reliability based on the pilot's QPL: 
1- If the pilot holds an approved diploma or a BSc in nautical science and an approved 
pilot license from the port authority, he will be given 50 per cent. The pilot must 
satisfy 100 per cent of the port's minimum requirements. 
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2- If the pilot holds an approved diploma with an approved certificate of competency 
class 4 (COC IIII) as a 3rd officer, he will be given 60 per cent. Therefore, the pilot 
is evaluated as 20 per cent at minimum and 80 per cent at second minimum 
requirement. 
3- If the pilot holds an approved diploma with an approved certificate of competency 
class 3 (COC III) as a 2nd officer or BSc with an approved (COC IIII) as a 3rd 
officer, then he will be given 70 per cent. Therefore, the pilot is evaluated as 80 per 
cent at second minimum requirement and 20 per cent on average, which represent 
the third requirement. 
4- If the pilot holds an approved diploma with an approved certificate of competency 
class 2 (COC II) as a 1st officer or BSc with an approved (COC III) as a 2nd officer, 
then he will be given 80%. Therefore, the pilot is evaluated as 80 per cent average 
and 20 per cent second higher requirement. 
5- If the pilot holds an approved diploma with an approved certificate of competency 
class 1 (COC I) as a master mariner or BSc with an approved (COC II) as a 1st 
officer, then he will be given 90%. Therefore, the pilot is evaluated as 80 per cent 
second required qualification and 20 per cent uppermost. 
6- If the pilot holds an approved BSc with an approved (COC I) as a master mariner, 
then he will be given 100%. Therefore, the pilot is evaluated as 100 per cent the 
uppermost requirement. 
According to the given pilots’ information, with reference to the above rules, Pilot 3's TP-
QPL is assessed based on his QPL as follows: 
𝑄𝑃?̃?𝑝3 = {(𝑈𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑜𝑠𝑡, 0), (𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑑 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑒𝑟, 0), (𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒, 0), (𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑑 𝑀𝑖𝑛. , 0), (𝑉.𝑀𝑖𝑛. ,1)} 
The harbour masters at this port have agreed to the fuzzy rules on Table (II.35) for mapping 
pilots’ QPL to its associated criterion, TP, in order to assess pilot reliability based on QPL. 
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𝑅1: if QPL assessed ‘Uppermost’, then 100% ‘V. Good’  
𝑅2: if QPL assessed ‘2nd  Higher’, then 80% ‘Good’ and 20% ‘V. Good’  
𝑅3: if QPL assessed ‘Average’, then 80% ‘Average’ and 20% ‘Good’ 
𝑅4: if QPL assessed ‘2nd  Min.’, then 90% ‘Low’ and 10% ‘Average’ 
𝑅5: if QPL assessed ‘V. Min’, then 100% ‘Basic’ 
 
 
The fuzzy outputs from mapping QPL to TP, conducted based on given information for 
Pilot 3 and subject to fuzzy rules on Table II.35, are as follow:  
Based on 𝑅5, the result can transform into 1 Basic (𝑂5 = 1 × 1),. Therefore, the QPL for 
Pilot 3 is assessed as follows: 
𝑇𝑃 − 𝑄𝑃𝐿𝑝3 = {(𝑉. 𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑, 0), (𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑, 0), (𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒, 0), (𝐿𝑜𝑤, 0), (𝐵𝑎𝑠𝑖𝑐, 1)} 
 
II.3.2.2 Pilot’s special training (TP-ST) 
Similar to the requirements of pilot qualifications required by the port authority, there are 
sets of minimum basic training courses that are also essential for a pilot to be endorsed. 
According to the port authority requirements, the following are compulsory basic training 
courses that a pilot must have when applying for a pilotage license: 
1- Proficiency in Survival Craft (PSC); 
2- Personal Survival Technique (PST); 
3- Fire Prevention and Firefighting (FPF); 
4- Elementary First Aid (EFA);  
5- Advanced Fire Prevention and Firefighting (AFF). 
The authority also recommends some extra training courses, but they are optional. These 
extra courses are: 
1- Global Maritime Distress and Safety System (GMDSS) training;  
2- Radar simulation training; 
3- Advanced Pilot Training (APT) course; 
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4- Bridge Resource Management (BRM) training course;  
5- Port State Control (PSC) training;  
6- Ship-handling simulator. 
According to the experts’ opinions, having valid course certificates for more than nine 
courses makes one a ‘well-trained’ pilot. This information helps in developing the 
membership function used to evaluate pilots based on their ST. Accordingly, if the pilot 
holds one of these certificates, then 10 per cent will be given for each valid certificate; if 
the certificate is not valid, then 0 per cent is given. Based on the pilot’s given information 
in the test case, the following are the training courses that Pilot 3 has: 
1- Proficiency in survival craft (PSC) (Valid); 
2- Personal survival technique (PST) (Valid); 
3- Fire prevention and firefighting (FPFF) (Not Valid); 
4- Elementary first aid (EFA) (Valid); 
5- Advanced fire prevention and firefighting certificate (AFF) (Not Valid);  
6- Ship-handling simulator certificate (Valid); 
7- Global Maritime Distress and Safety System (GMDSS) certificate (Not Valid);  
8- Advanced Pilot Training (APT) certificate (Valid);  
Based on the pilot’s stated valid training certificates, 50 per cent is given to Pilot 3. The 
membership function model constructed is shown in Figures (II.5). 
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Figure II.5 The membership function for Pilot 3's special training (TP-ST) 
 
 
The horizontal axis represents the quantitative number, while the vertical axis represents 
the belief degrees. When a given quantitative number is found not ranging between two 
different grades, then 100 per cent will be given. According to the given pilot's information, 
with reference to the above information, Pilot 3's TP-ST is assessed based on his ST as 
follows: 
𝑆?̃?p3 = {(𝑊𝑒𝑙𝑙 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑑, 0), (𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑑, 0), (𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒, 0), (𝐿𝑜𝑤, 0), (𝐵𝑎𝑠𝑖𝑐, 1)} 
The harbour masters at this port have agreed to the fuzzy rules on Table (II.36) for mapping 
pilots’ ST to its associated criterion, TP, in order to assess pilot reliability based on ST. 
 






𝑅1:  if ST assessed ‘Well Trained’, then 100% ‘V. Good’  
𝑅2: if ST assessed ‘Trained’, then 80% ‘Good’ and 20% ‘V. Good’  
𝑅3: if ST assessed ‘Average’, then 80% ‘Average’ and 20% ‘Good’ 
𝑅4: if ST assessed ‘Low’, then 80% ‘Low’ and 20% ‘Average’ 
𝑅5: if ST assessed ‘Basic’, then 100% ‘Basic’ 
 
 
The fuzzy outputs from mapping ST to TP, conducted based on given information for Pilot 
3 and subject to fuzzy rules on Table II.36, are as follows:  
Based on 𝑅5 the result can transform into 1 Basic (𝑂5 =  1 × 1). Therefore, the ST for Pilot 
3 is assessed as follows: 
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𝑇𝑃 − 𝑆𝑇𝑝3 = {(𝑉. 𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑, 0), (𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑, 0), (𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒, 0), (𝐿𝑜𝑤, 0), (𝐵𝑎𝑠𝑖𝑐, 1)} 
 
II.3.2.3 Pilot’s working experience (TP-WEx) 
According to the given pilots’ information, a membership function model can be 
constructed based on the number of years served as a pilot, as shown in Figure (II.6). 
 
  
Figure II.6 The membership function for Pilot 3's working experience (TP-WEx) 
 
Therefore, the assessment of Pilot 3's TP-WExs is as follows: 
𝑊𝐸?̃?𝑝3 = {(𝑉. 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ, 1), (𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ, 0), (𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒, 0), (𝐿𝑜𝑤, 0), (𝑉. 𝐿𝑜𝑤, 0)} 
The harbour masters at this port have agreed to the fuzzy rules on Table (II.37) for mapping 
pilots’ WEx to its associated criterion, TP, in order to assess pilot reliability based on WEx. 
 







𝑅1: if WEx assessed ‘Very High’, then 100% ‘V. Good’  
𝑅2: if WEx assessed ‘High’, then 80% ‘Good’ and 20% ‘V. Good’  
𝑅3: if WEx assessed ‘Average’, then 80% ‘Average’ and 20% ‘Good’ 
𝑅4: if WEx assessed ‘Low’, then 90% ‘Low’ and 10% ‘Average’ 
𝑅5: if WEx assessed ‘V. Low’, then 100% ‘Basic’ 
 
 
The fuzzy outputs from mapping WEx to TP, conducted based on given information for 
Pilot 3 and subject to fuzzy rules on Table II.37, are as follows:  
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Based on 𝑅1result can transform into 1 V. Good (𝑂1 =  1 × 1). Therefore, the WEx for 
Pilot 3 is assessed as follows: 
𝑇𝑃 − 𝑊𝐸𝑥𝑝3 = {(𝑉. 𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑, 1), (𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑, 0), (𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒, 0), (𝐿𝑜𝑤, 0), (𝐵𝑎𝑠𝑖𝑐, 0)} 
 
II.3.2.4 Pilot’s age 
Due to the difficulty of how to assign a degree of belief to a pilot’s age, a range of 
assessments were proposed. Based on the experts’ opinions, that the membership function 
can be utilised in order to transform the grade for given quantitative data into a qualitative 
degree of beliefs, with reference to a study conducted by Riahi et al. (2012), the following 
rules were used: 
1- If the pilot is 60 years old, he is considered ‘Very old’. 
2- If the pilot is 50 years old, he is considered ‘Old’. 
3- If the pilot is 40 years old, he is considered ‘Mid-Aged’. 
4- If the pilot is 30 years old, he is considered ‘Young’. 
5- If the pilot is 20 years old, he is considered ‘Very Young’. 
Based on the information from each pilot, the membership function on Figure (II.7) 
represents the assessment F&S-OA of Pilot 3.  
 
 
Figure II.7 The membership function for Pilot 3's age (F&S-OA) 
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The horizontal axis represents the quantitative number, while the vertical axis represents 
the belief degrees. When a given quantitative number is found in the range of ℎ𝑛+1,𝑖(with 





 , if ℎ𝑛,𝑖 < ℎ𝑖 < ℎ𝑛+1,𝑖  
𝛽𝑛+1,𝑖 = 1 − 𝛽𝑛,𝑖 
Where, 𝛽𝑛,𝑖 is the degree of belief of the given quantitative number with the grade 𝐻𝑛+1. 
Based on the given information from Pilot 3, the degree of belief for Pilot 3's F&S-OA can 
be calculated as follows: 
1- 𝐻𝑛+1 is the ‘V. Old’ grade. 
2- 𝐻𝑛 is the ‘Old’ grade. 
3- ℎ𝑖= 55, ℎ𝑛,𝑖= 50, and ℎ𝑛+1,𝑖= 60. 
4- 𝛽𝑛,𝑖 = (60-55)/(60-50) = 0.5 with the ‘Old’ grade, and 𝛽𝑛+1,𝑖 = 1-0.5 = 0.5 with the 
‘V. Old’ grade. 
Therefore, the assessment of Pilot 3's F&S-OA based on their information is as follows: 
𝑂?̃?p3 = {(𝑉𝑒𝑟𝑦 𝑌𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑔, 0), (𝑌𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑔, 0), (𝑀𝑖𝑑 𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑑, 0), (𝑂𝑙𝑑, 0.5), (𝑉𝑒𝑟𝑦 𝑂𝑙𝑑, 0.5)} 
The harbour masters at this port have agreed to the fuzzy rules on Table (II.38) for mapping 
pilots’ OA to its associated criterion, F&S, in order to assess pilot reliability based on OA. 
 
Table II.38 Fuzzy rule base belief structure for F&S-OA 
Operator Age 
(OA) to Fitness 
& Strength 
(F&S) 
𝑅1: if OA assessed ‘Very Young’, then 100% ‘Fit’  
𝑅2: if OA assessed ‘Young’, then 80% ‘Good’ and 20% ‘Fit’  
𝑅3: if OA assessed ‘Mid Aged’, then 90% ‘Moderate’ and 10% ‘Bad’ 
𝑅4: if OA assessed ‘Old’, then 80% ‘Bad’ and 20% ‘Unfit’ 
𝑅5: if OA assessed ‘Very Old’, then 100% ‘Unfit’ 
 
 
The fuzzy outputs from mapping OA to F&S, , conducted based on given information for 
Pilot 3 and subject to fuzzy rules on Table II.38, are as follows:  
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Based on 𝑅4and 𝑅5 the result can transform into 0.4 Bad (𝑂4 =  0.5 × 0.8), and 0.6 Unfit 
(𝑂5 = (0.5 × 0.2) + (0.5 × 1)), respectively. Therefore, the OA for Pilot 3 is assessed as 
follows: 
𝐹&𝑆 − 𝑂𝐴𝑝3 = {(𝐹𝑖𝑡, 0), (𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑, 0), (𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒, 0), (𝐵𝑎𝑑, 0.4), (𝑈𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑡, 0.6)} 
 
II.3.2.5 Mapping main criteria to goal 
Following the aggregation process of all sub-criteria to their associated criterion, the main 
criterion can be further mapped similarly as above. Accordingly, the aggregated main 
criterion for Pilot 3 is as follows: 
𝑇?̃?p3 = {(𝑉. 𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑, 0.75), (𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑, 0), (𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒, 0), (𝐿𝑜𝑤, 0), (Basic, 0.25)} 
𝑃?̃?p3 = {(𝑁𝑒𝑢𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑙, 0), (𝑆. 𝐹𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑔𝑢𝑒𝑑, 0), (𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒, 0.21), (𝐹𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑔𝑢𝑒𝑑, 0.56), (𝑉. 𝐵𝑎𝑑, 0.22)} 
𝑁𝑇?̃?p3 = {(𝑉. 𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑, 0.08), (𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑, 0.17), (𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒, 0.34), (𝐵𝑎𝑑, 0.34), (𝑉. 𝐵𝑎𝑑, 0.08)} 
𝐹&?̃?p3 = {(𝐹𝑖𝑡, 0), (𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑, 0), (𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒, 0.85), (𝐵𝑎𝑑, 0.13), (𝑈𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑡, 0.02)} 
The harbour masters at this port have agreed to the fuzzy rules on Table (II.39) for mapping 














Table II.39 Fuzzy rule base belief structure for Main criteria to PR 
Technical 
Proficiency (TP) 
to Main Goal 
(PR) 
𝑅1: if TP assessed ‘V. Good’, then 100% ‘Very High’ 
𝑅2: if TP assessed ‘Good’, then 80% ‘High’ and 20% ‘Very High’  
𝑅3: if TP assessed ‘Average’, then 80% ‘Moderate’ and 20% ‘High’ 
𝑅4: if TP assessed ‘Low’, then 80% ‘Low’ and 20% ‘Very  Low’ 
𝑅5: if TP assessed ‘Basic’, then 100% ‘Very Low’ 
Personal Fatigue 
(PF) to Main 
Goal (PR) 
𝑅1: if TP assessed ‘Neutral, then 100% ‘Very High’ 
𝑅2: if TP assessed ‘S. Fatigued’, then 80% ‘High’ and 20% ‘Very High’  
𝑅3: if TP assessed ‘Moderate’, then 80% ‘Moderate’ and 20% ‘High’ 
𝑅4: if TP assessed ‘Fatigued’, then 80% ‘Low’ and 20% ‘Very Low’ 
𝑅5: if TP assessed ‘Very Bad’, then 100% ‘Very Low’ 
Non-Technical 
Skills (NTS) to 
Main Goal (PR) 
𝑅1: if TP assessed ‘V. Good’, then 100% ‘Very High’ 
𝑅2: if TP assessed ‘Good’, then 80% ‘High’ and 20% ‘Very High’  
𝑅3: if TP assessed ‘Moderate’, then 80% ‘Moderate’ and 20% ‘High’ 
𝑅4: if TP assessed ‘Bad’, then 80% ‘Low’ and 20% ‘Very Low’ 
𝑅5: if TP assessed ‘V. Bad’, then 100% ‘Very Low’ 
Fitness & 
Strength (F&S) 
to Main Goal 
(PR) 
𝑅1: if TP assessed ‘Fit’, then 100% ‘Very High’ 
𝑅2: if TP assessed ‘Good’, then 80% ‘High’ and 20% ‘V. High’  
𝑅3: if TP assessed ‘Moderate’, then 80% ‘Moderate’ and 20% ‘High’ 
𝑅4: if TP assessed ‘Bad’, then 80% ‘Low’ and 20% ‘Very Low’ 
𝑅5: if TP assessed ‘Unfit’, then 100% ‘Very Low’ 
 
𝑃𝑅𝑇𝑃𝑝3 = {(𝑉.𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ, 0.75), (𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ, 0), (𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒, 0), (𝐿𝑜𝑤, 0), (𝑉. 𝐿𝑜𝑤, 025)} 
𝑃𝑅𝑃𝐹𝑝3 = {(𝑉.𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ, 0), (𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ, 0.02), (𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒, 0.19), (𝐿𝑜𝑤, 0.45), (𝑉. 𝐿𝑜𝑤, 0.34)} 
𝑃𝑅𝑁𝑇𝑆𝑝3 = {(𝑉.𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ, 0.11), (𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ, 0.17), (𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒, 0.30), (𝐿𝑜𝑤, 0.27), (𝑉. 𝐿𝑜𝑤, 0.14)} 
𝑃𝑅𝐹&𝑆𝑝3 = {(𝑉.𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ, 0), (𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ, 0.08), (𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒, 0.76), (𝐿𝑜𝑤, 0.10), (𝑉. 𝐿𝑜𝑤, 0.05)} 
 
II.3.3 Fuzzy set aggregation process 
This section follows the same process as described on section (II.1.1-II.1.4). The result are 
presented as follows: 
 











 𝑇?̃?𝑄𝑃𝐿 0.089 0 0 0 0 1 
𝑇?̃?𝑆𝑇 0.289 0 0 0 0 1 
𝑇?̃?𝑊𝐸𝑥 0.622 1 0 0 0 0 

















 𝑃?̃?𝑊𝐻 0.210 0 0 0 0.24 0.76 
𝑃?̃?𝑊𝑆 0.366 0 0 0.32 0.56 0.12 
𝑃?̃?𝑊𝐸𝑛𝑣 0.424 0 0 0.24 0.62 0.14 
Aggregation result 0 0 0.21 0.56 0.22 
 
 











 𝑁𝑇?̃?𝐷𝑀 0.075 0.52 0.48 0 0 0 
𝑁𝑇?̃?𝑆𝐴 0.155 0.36 0.64 0 0 0 
𝑁𝑇?̃?𝐶𝑆 0.234 0.10 0.40 0.45 0.05 0 
𝑁𝑇?̃?𝑇&𝐿 0.536 0 0 0.36 0.52 0.12 
Aggregation result 0.08 0.17 0.34 0.34 0.08 
 
 











 𝐹&?̃?𝑂𝐴 0.049 0 0 0 0.40 0.60 
𝐹&?̃?𝐻𝐼 0.558 0 0 0.90 0.10 0 
𝐹&?̃?𝐵𝑆 0.393 0 0 0.72 0.24 0.04 
Aggregation result 0 0 0.85 0.13 0.02 
 
 











 𝑃𝑅𝑇𝑃 0.045 0.75 0 0 0 0.25 
𝑃𝑅𝑃𝐹 0.186 0 0.02 0.19 0.45 0.34 
𝑃𝑅𝑁𝑇𝑆 0.606 0.11 0.17 0.30 0.27 0.14 
𝑃𝑅𝐹&𝑆 0.163 0 0.08 0.76 0.10 0.05 
Aggregation result 0.10 0.13 0.34 0.27 0.16 
 
 
II.3.4 Obtaining a pilot’s 3 reliability using utility techniques  
The result obtained from the aggregation of the 4 main criteria for each pilot, as shown on 
previous section, shows this is not a straightforward way to obtain a crisp reliability value 
for the assessed pilot. The aggregation process for Pilot 3's reliability is identified as 
follows: 
𝑃?̃? = {(Very High, 0.10), (High, 0.13), (Moderate, 0.34), (Low, 0.27), (Very Low, 0.16)} 
The fuzzy terms used to express the goal use five linguistic variables, where the highest 
414 
 
preference term used is (Very High) while the lowest linguistic preference used is (Very 
Low). The utility value for assessing the reliability of a marine pilot can be identified as 
0.6298, using equations (6.16-6.21), as presented in Table (II.45). 
 
Table II.45 The reliability value for Pilot 3 
𝐻𝑛 Very High High Moderate Low Very Low 





















 = 0.10+ 0.13+ 0.34+ 0.27+ 0.16= 1             𝛽𝐻 = 0 
𝛽𝑛𝑢(𝐻𝑛) 0.098 0.096 0.172 0.068 0 
The reliability value for Pilot 3 = ∑ 𝛽𝑛𝑢(𝐻𝑛)
5
𝑛=1 = 0.4341 
 
 
II.3.5 Sensitivity analysis 
 




V. Good Good Average Low Basic 
𝑇?̃?𝑄𝑃𝐿 
Main 0 0 0 0 1 
0.1 0.1 0 0 0 0.9 
0.2 0.2 0 0 0 0.8 
0.3 0.3 0 0 0 0.7 
𝑇?̃?𝑆𝑇 
Main 0 0 0 0 1 
0.1 0.1 0 0 0 0.9 
0.2 0.2 0 0 0 0.8 
0.3 0.3 0 0 0 0.7 
𝑇?̃?𝑊𝐸𝑥 
Main 1 0 0 0 0 
0.1 1 0 0 0 0 
0.2 1 0 0 0 0 


















Neutral S. Fatigues Moderate Fatigued V. Bad 
𝑃?̃?𝑊𝐻 
Main 0 0 0 0.24 0.76 
0.1 0.1 0 0 0.24 0.66 
0.2 0.2 0 0 0.24 0.56 
0.3 0.3 0 0 0.24 0.46 
𝑃?̃?𝑊𝑆 
Main 0 0 0.32 0.56 0.12 
0.1 0.1 0 0.32 0.56 0.02 
0.2 0.2 0 0.32 0.48 0 
0.3 0.3 0 0.32 0.38 0 
𝑃?̃?𝑊𝐸𝑛𝑣 
Main 0 0 0.24 0.62 0.14 
0.1 0.1 0 0.24 0.62 0.04 
0.2 0.2 0 0.24 0.58 0 








V. Good Good Moderate Bad V. Bad 
𝑁𝑇?̃?𝐷𝑀 
Main 0.52 0.48 0 0 0 
0.1 0.62 0.38 0 0 0 
0.2 0.72 0.28 0 0 0 
0.3 0.82 0.18 0 0 0 
𝑁𝑇?̃?𝑆𝐴 
Main 0.36 0.64 0 0 0 
0.1 0.46 0.54 0 0 0 
0.2 0.56 0.44 0 0 0 
0.3 0.66 0.34 0 0 0 
𝑁𝑇?̃?𝐶𝑆 
Main 0.1 0.4 0.45 0.05 0 
0.1 0.2 0.4 0.40 0 0 
0.2 0.3 0.4 0.3 0 0 
0.3 0.4 0.4 0.2 0 0 
𝑁𝑇?̃?𝑇&𝐿 
Main 0 0 0.36 0.52 0.12 
0.1 0.1 0 0.36 0.52 0.02 
0.2 0.2 0 0.36 0.44 0 























Fit Good Moderate Bad Unfit 
𝐹&?̃?𝑂𝐴 
Main 0 0 0 0.4 0.6 
0.1 0.1 0 0 0.4 0.5 
0.2 0.2 0 0 0.4 0.4 
0.3 0.3 0 0 0.4 0.3 
𝐹&?̃?𝐻𝐼 
Main 0 0 0.9 0.1 0 
0.1 0.1 0 0.9 0 0 
0.2 0.2 0 0.8 0 0 
0.3 0.3 0 0.7 0 0 
𝐹&?̃?𝐵𝑆 
Main 0 0 0.72 0.24 0.04 
0.1 0.1 0 0.72 0.18 0 
0.2 0.2 0 0.72 0.08 0 
0.3 0.3 0 0.70 0 0 
 
According to the above increment and decrement process, the utility value for the goals in 
accordance to these changes are presented on Table (II.49), and a graph is drawn on Figure 
II.8. 
 
Table II.49 Alteration of the median of Pilot 3's reliability due to lowest preference decrement 
Sub-
criterion 
Alteration of the median reliability value of a pilot’s duo to the following decrease 
in the degree of belief associated to the lowest preferences linguistic term of the 
median fuzzy set of each sub-criterion 
Main - 0.1 - 0.2 - 0.3 
QPL 0.4341 0.4343 0.4345 0.4347 
ST 0.4341 0.4348 0.4355 0.4362 
WEx 0.4341 0.4341 0.4341 0.4341 
WH 0.4341 0.4360 0.4379 0.4399 
WS 0.4341 0.4384 0.4421 0.4457 
WEnv 0.4341 0.4396 0.4449 0.4496 
DM 0.4341 0.4347 0.4352 0.4358 
SA 0.4341 0.4355 0.4369 0.4382 
CS 0.4341 0.4435 0.4497 0.4559 
T&L 0.4341 0.4847 0.5274 0.5679 
OA 0.4341 0.4344 0.4346 0.4348 
HI 0.4341 0.4391 0.4416 0.4443 




























Main -0.1 -0.2 -0.3
